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112 Texas opinions name it 5 courts 1939–2026 22 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Their existence therefore did not entitle Armstrong to a hearing on her motion. 3 See Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339 (“[A]s a prerequisite to a hearing when the grounds in the motion [for new trial] are based on matters not already in the record, . . . the motion [must] be supported by an affidavit, either of the defendant or someone else, specifically setting out the factual basis for the claim.”); Klapesky v. State, 256 S.W.3d 442, 454 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref’d) (“A motion for new trial alleging facts outside the record without supporting affidavits is not a proper pleading and is defecti 2024He argues that his appellate counsel could not obtain an affidavit from 19 him because he was incarcerated at the time,5 but he cites to no authority holding that this is an exception to the Court of Criminal Appeals’ longstanding precedent requiring motions for new trial raising grounds not determinable from the record to be supported by an affidavit, which need not be executed by the defendant.6 See Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339 (“Thus we require, as a prerequisite to a hearing when the grounds in the motion are based on matters not already in the record, that the motion be supported by an affida | 9 | 35 |
Reyes v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Id. 2009To hold otherwise would deny the accused meaningful appellate review.” 14 “[R]ecogniz[ing] that an unrestricted requirement of a hearing on matters not determinable from the record could lead to ‘fishing expeditions,’” we have also held that even a defendant who has raised such matters is not entitled to a hearing on his motion for new trial unless he “establishes the existence of ‘reasonable grounds’ showing that the defendant ‘could be entitled to relief.’” 15 Thus we require, as a prerequisite to a hearing when the grounds in the motion are based on matters not already in the record, that t | 9 | 19 |
Jordan v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339 (requiring, as a prerequisite to a hearing when the grounds in the motion for new trial are based on matters not already in the record, that the motion be supported by an affidavit, either of the defendant or someone else, specifically setting out the factual basis for 11 the claim); Jordan, 883 S.W.2d at 665 (finding a hearing was not required when the appellant’s affidavit was conclusory and failed to show why his counsel was deficient or prejudiced him). 2008Jordan v. State, 883 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994). Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â To deter "fishing expeditions," a prerequisite to a hearing on a motion for new trial is that the motion must be supported by an affidavit showing the truth of the grounds of attack. | 6 | 8 |
Brown v. City of Houstongreen2 sentences2003Kreider, *80 44 S.W.3d at 263; Brown v. City of Houston, 8 S.W.3d 331, 334 (Tex.App.-Waco 1999, pet. denied). 2003Kreider , 44 S.W.3d at 263 ; Brown v. City of Houston , 8 S.W.3d 331, 334 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, pet. denied). | 5 | 5 |
Prairie View A&M University v. Diljit K. Chathagreen2 sentences2024As the court of appeals put it, Chatha directs courts to conduct this inquiry “by using a three-prong test,” which the court recounted as follows: First, “to fall within the ambit of section 311.034, a prerequisite must be found in the relevant statutory language.” “Second, the prerequisite must be a requirement.” Third, “the term ‘pre’ indicates the requirement must be met before the lawsuit is filed.” 644 S.W.3d at 751 (citations omitted) (quoting Chatha, 381 S.W.3d at 512 ). 2023“Second, the prerequisite must be a requirement.” Id. | 4 | 13 |
State v. Kreidergreen2 sentences2023State v. Kreider, 44 S.W.3d 258, 263 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied). 2003State v. Kreider , 44 S.W.3d 258, 263 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied). | 4 | 5 |
Daniels v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Daniels v. State , 63 S.W.3d 67, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). 2004Daniels v. State , 63 S.W.3d 67, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [14 th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). | 4 | 4 |
Klapesky v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Their existence therefore did not entitle Armstrong to a hearing on her motion. 3 See Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339 (“[A]s a prerequisite to a hearing when the grounds in the motion [for new trial] are based on matters not already in the record, . . . the motion [must] be supported by an affidavit, either of the defendant or someone else, specifically setting out the factual basis for the claim.”); Klapesky v. State, 256 S.W.3d 442, 454 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref’d) (“A motion for new trial alleging facts outside the record without supporting affidavits is not a proper pleading and is defecti 2019“A motion for new trial alleging facts outside the record without supporting affidavits is not a proper pleading and is defective; a trial court does not err in refusing to grant a hearing on such a motion.” Klapesky v. State, 256 S.W.3d 442, 454 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref’d) (citing Flores v. State, 18 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.)); see Cox v. State, No. 03-12-00751-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 9401 , at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 26, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (explaining that hearing is not required when matter raised in motion for new t | 2 | 2 |
Roccaforte v. Jefferson Countygreen2 sentences2022Third, “the term ‘pre’ indicates the requirement must be met before the lawsuit is filed.” Id. (citing Roccaforte v. Jefferson County, 341 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex. 2011), which held that post-suit notice requirement was not jurisdictional, even in light of section 311.034, because post-suit notice is not “prerequisite” to suit). 2012See Roccaforte v. Jefferson Cnty., 341 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex.2011) (holding that post-suit notice requirement was not jurisdictional, even in light of section 311.034, because post-suit notice is not a “prerequisite” to suit). | 2 | 2 |
Conrod Scott Chapa v. Stategreen2 sentences2020Further, “as a prerequisite to a hearing when the grounds in the motion are based on matters not already in the record,” and to prevent fishing expeditions, a motion for new trial must be “supported by an affidavit, either of the defendant or someone else, specifically setting out the factual basis for the claim.” Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339 ; Chapa v. State, 407 S.W.3d 428, 431 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). 2015Chapa, 407 S.W.3d at 431 . | 1 | 6 |
Bahm v. Stategreen2 sentences2011App. 2009) (―Thus we require, as a prerequisite to a hearing when the grounds in the motion are based on matters not already in the record, that the motion be supported by an affidavit, either of the defendant or someone else, specifically setting out the factual basis for the claim.‖); Bahm v. State, 219 S.W.3d 391 , 393–94 (Tex. Crim. 2011App. 2009) (“Thus we require, as a prerequisite to a hearing when the grounds in the motion are based on matters not already in the record, that the motion be supported by an affidavit, either of the defendant or someone else, specifically setting out the factual basis for the claim.”); Bahm v. State , 219 S.W.3d 391 , 393–94 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 5 |
Wallace v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Id. at 339 ; see Wallace v. State, 106 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Tex. Crim. 2011Id. | 1 | 2 |
City of San Antonio v. Pollockgreen2 sentences2015Pollock, 284 S.W.3d at 821 (“A governmental entity is substantially certain that its actions will damage property only when the damage is ‘necessarily an incident to, or necessarily a consequential result of the [entity’s] action.’”) (quoting Jennings, 142 S.W.3d at 314 ). 2015Id. 10 “It is certainly necessary for an owner to establish cause in fact as a prerequisite to a claim for inverse condemnation.” Sloan Creek II, L.L.C. v. N. Tex. Tollway Auth., No. 05-14-01456-CV, 2015 WL 5093318, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 28, 2015, no. pet. h.) (citing Pollock, 284 S.W.3d at 821 ). | 1 | 2 |
McIntire v. Stategreen2 sentences2009To hold otherwise would deny the accused meaningful appellate review.” 14 “[R]ecogniz[ing] that an unrestricted requirement of a hearing on matters not determinable from the record could lead to ‘fishing expeditions,’” we have also held that even a defendant who has raised such matters is not entitled to a hearing on his motion for new trial unless he “establishes the existence of ‘reasonable grounds’ showing that the defendant ‘could be entitled to relief.’” 15 Thus we require, as a prerequisite to a hearing when the grounds in the motion are based on matters not already in the record, that t 1994Reyes, 849 S.W.2d at 816 ; McIntire, 698 S.W.2d at 658 . | 1 | 2 |
Dotson v. Stategreen1 sentence2024App. 2009) (“Thus we require, as a prerequisite to a hearing when the grounds in the motion are based on matters not already in the record, that the motion be supported by an affidavit, either of the defendant or someone else, specifically setting out the factual basis for the claim.”); Dotson v. State, 146 S.W.3d 285, 301 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d) (“As a prerequisite to obtaining a hearing, the motion must be supported by an affidavit that specifically demonstrates the truth of the grounds for attack.”). | 1 | 1 |
City of Dallas v. Carbajalgreen1 sentence2021Tenorio, 543 S.W.3d at 775 (citing City of Dallas v. Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d 537, 537-38 (Tex. 2010)). | 1 | 1 |
Jordan v. Ector Countygreen1 sentence2020Jordan v. Ector Cty., 290 S.W.3d 404, 406 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Flores v. Stategreen1 sentence2019“A motion for new trial alleging facts outside the record without supporting affidavits is not a proper pleading and is defective; a trial court does not err in refusing to grant a hearing on such a motion.” Klapesky v. State, 256 S.W.3d 442, 454 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref’d) (citing Flores v. State, 18 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.)); see Cox v. State, No. 03-12-00751-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 9401 , at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 26, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (explaining that hearing is not required when matter raised in motion for new t | 1 | 1 |
Marquez v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Marquez v. State, 356 S.W.2d 797,799 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Sloan Creek II, L.L.C. v. Texas Department of Transportationgreen1 sentence2015Id. 10 “It is certainly necessary for an owner to establish cause in fact as a prerequisite to a claim for inverse condemnation.” Sloan Creek II, L.L.C. v. N. Tex. Tollway Auth., No. 05-14-01456-CV, 2015 WL 5093318, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 28, 2015, no. pet. h.) (citing Pollock, 284 S.W.3d at 821 ). | 1 | 1 |
Spakes v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Spakes v. State, 913 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). | 1 | 1 |
Stokes v. Stategreen1 sentence2011Reyes, 849 S.W.2d at 816 ; Stokes v. State, 298 S.W.3d 428, 431 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (citing Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339 ). | 1 | 1 |
Mapco, Inc. v. Forrestgreen1 sentence2006See Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest , 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (stating judgment is void when it is apparent that court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction). | 1 | 1 |
| Freeman v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Texana Community MHMR Center v. Silvasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burgess v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Thompson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Aguilargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilcox v. Hempsteadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malonegreen | 1 | 1 |
| National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh v. Hoffmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of San Antonio v. Tenorio ex rel. Tenorio
green
2 sentences2021Tenorio, 543 S.W.3d at 775 (citing City of Dallas v. Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d 537, 537-38 (Tex. 2010)). 2018Tenorio, 543 S.W.3d at 775 .2 Under the TTCA, a governmental unit must be given written notice of a claim against it “not later than six months after the day that the incident giving rise to the claim occurred.” 2 See also TEX. | 2 | 2018–2021 |
Hull v. State
green
1 sentence2022Hull, 67 S.W.3d at 218 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Jefferson County, Texas v. Ellarene Farris, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Heirs and Estate of James Farris
green
1 sentence2020See Chatha, 381 S.W.3d at 512 (citations omitted); Farris, 569 S.W.3d at 826–27. “‘[S]tatutory prerequisite’ refers to statutory provisions that are mandatory and must be accomplished prior to filing suit.” Chatha, 381 S.W.3d at 512 . 7 To satisfy the first of Chatha’s “statutory prerequisite” components, the “prerequisite must be found in the relevant statutory language.” Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2019“By custodial interrogation, [courts] mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. at 444 , 86 S. Ct. at 1612 .5 A custodial interrogation is also a prerequisite to the warnings required by Section 3(a)(2) of Article 38.22. 2019“By custodial interrogation, [courts] mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. at 444 , 86 S. Ct. at 1612 .5 A custodial interrogation is also a prerequisite to the warnings required by Section 3(a)(2) of Article 38.22. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
City of Dallas v. Jennings
green
2 sentences2015Pollock, 284 S.W.3d at 821 (“A governmental entity is substantially certain that its actions will damage property only when the damage is ‘necessarily an incident to, or necessarily a consequential result of the [entity’s] action.’”) (quoting Jennings, 142 S.W.3d at 314 ). 2015Pollock, 284 S.W.3d at 821 (“A governmental entity is substantially certain that its actions will damage property only when the damage is ‘necessarily an incident to, or necessarily a consequential result of the [entity’s] action.’”) (quoting Jennings, 142 S.W.3d at 314 ). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Kassim Lawal v. State
green
1 sentence2014Moreover, “[t]o deter ‘fishing expeditions,’ a motion for a new trial on matters not determinable from the record must be supported by an affidavit showing the grounds of attack as a prerequisite to a hearing on that motion.” Lawal, 368 S.W.3d at 884 (quoting Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339 ). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Hobbs v. State
green
1 sentence2014Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d at 199 ; Chapa, 407 S.W.3d at 431 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Strickland v. Washington green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Thompson v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Davila v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Moffett v. State neutral | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Gephart v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Wingo v. State neutral | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Cottrell v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Laredo v. State neutral | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Jones v. Gibbs green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Jones v. Gibbs green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Radford v. McNeny green | 1 | 1945–1945 |
| City of Arlington v. Lillard green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.