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20 New York opinions name it 5 courts 1995–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nemeth v. K-Toolinggreen2 sentences2019A private nuisance claim "may be 'established by proof of intentional action or inaction that substantially and unreasonably interferes with other people's use and enjoyment of [plaintiff's] property'" (133 AD3d at 1145, quoting Nemeth v K—Tooling , 100 AD3d 1271, 1272 [2012]; accord O'Connor v Shultz , 166 AD3d 1104 , 1104 [2018]; see Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. , 41 NY2d 564 , 570 [1977]). 2015With that proof in mind, a private nuisance claim does not require an actual intrusion upon property by the tortfeasor and may be “established by proof of intentional action or inaction that substantially and unreasonably interferes with other people’s use and enjoyment of their property” (Nemeth v K-Tooling, 100 AD3d 1271, 1272 [2012]; see Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 41 NY2d 564 , 570 [1977]; Schillaci v Sarris, 122 AD3d 1085, 1087 [2014]). | 5 | 5 |
Futerfas v. Shultisgreen2 sentences2015“The issue of whether a use constitutes a private nuisance ordinarily turns on questions of fact” and, in light of the above evidence, which reveals material questions of fact, we find that defendants have not made out a prima facie case for summary judgment (Murray v Young, 97 AD2d 958, 958 [1983]; see Futerfas v Shultis, 209 AD2d 761, 763 [1994]). 2015“The issue of whether a use constitutes a private nuisance ordinarily turns on questions of fact” and, in light of the above evidence, which reveals material questions of fact, we find that defendants have not made out a prima facie case for summary judgment (Murray v Young, 97 AD2d 958, 958 [1983]; see Futerfas v Shultis, 209 AD2d 761, 763 [1994]). | 4 | 4 |
Ivory v. International Business Machines Corp.green2 sentences2024Machines Corp. , 116 AD3d 121 , 131-132 [3d Dept 2014], [*2] lv denied 23 NY3d 903 [2014]). 2014Machines Corp., 116 AD3d at 131). | 3 | 4 |
Volunteer Fire Ass'n of Tappan, Inc. v. County of Rocklandgreen2 sentences2014As a private nuisance claim involves the right to use and enjoy the land in question, no actual intrusion onto the plaintiffs property is required (see Volunteer Fire Assn. of Tappan, Inc. v County of Rockland, 101 AD3d 853, 856 [2012]) and no actual damage to the property itself need be shown (see Ivory v International Bus. 2014As a private nuisance claim involves the right to use and enjoy the land in question, no actual intrusion onto the plaintiffs property is required (see Volunteer Fire Assn. of Tappan, Inc. v County of Rockland, 101 AD3d 853, 856 [2012]) and no actual damage to the property itself need be shown (see Ivory v International Bus. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Gouldgreen2 sentences2025Further, Supreme Court properly dismissed the private nuisance claim against defendant because it was not responsible for the creation of the purported nuisance ( see Bernard v 345 E. 73rd Owners Corp. , 181 AD2d 543, 544 [1st Dept 1992]). 2025Further, Supreme Court properly dismissed the private nuisance claim against defendant because it was not responsible for the creation of the purported nuisance ( see Bernard v 345 E. 73rd Owners Corp. , 181 AD2d 543, 544 [1st Dept 1992]). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Brooklyn & Queens Transit Corp.green2 sentences2024Relying upon People v. Brooklyn & Queens Transit Corp. , defendant argues that to prevail on a private nuisance claim, the harm must not affect "any considerable number of persons," but rather must be limited to a small number of people, and here the Complaint fails to do so ( 283 NY 484, 490 (1940)). 2024Relying upon People v. Brooklyn & Queens Transit Corp. , defendant argues that to prevail on a private nuisance claim, the harm must not affect "any considerable number of persons," but rather must be limited to a small number of people, and here the Complaint fails to do so ( 283 NY 484, 490 (1940)). | 2 | 2 |
Sarratori v. Parkgreen2 sentences2015“The issue of whether a use constitutes a private nuisance ordinarily turns on questions of fact” and, in light of the above evidence, which reveals material questions of fact, we find that defendants have not made out a prima facie case for summary judgment (Murray v Young, 97 AD2d 958, 958 [1983]; see Futerfas v Shultis, 209 AD2d 761, 763 [1994]). 2015“The issue of whether a use constitutes a private nuisance ordinarily turns on questions of fact” and, in light of the above evidence, which reveals material questions of fact, we find that defendants have not made out a prima facie case for summary judgment (Murray v Young, 97 AD2d 958, 958 [1983]; see Futerfas v Shultis, 209 AD2d 761, 763 [1994]). | 2 | 2 |
Schillaci v. Sarrisgreen2 sentences2015With that proof in mind, a private nuisance claim does not require an actual intrusion upon property by the tortfeasor and may be “established by proof of intentional action or inaction that substantially and unreasonably interferes with other people’s use and enjoyment of their property” (Nemeth v K-Tooling, 100 AD3d 1271, 1272 [2012]; see Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 41 NY2d 564 , 570 [1977]; Schillaci v Sarris, 122 AD3d 1085, 1087 [2014]). 2015With that proof in mind, a private nuisance claim does not require an actual intrusion upon property by the tortfeasor and may be “established by proof of intentional action or inaction that substantially and unreasonably interferes with other people’s use and enjoyment of their property” (Nemeth v K-Tooling, 100 AD3d 1271, 1272 [2012]; see Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 41 NY2d 564 , 570 [1977]; Schillaci v Sarris, 122 AD3d 1085, 1087 [2014]). | 2 | 2 |
Guzzardi v. Perry's Boats, Inc.green2 sentences2014A private nuisance claim requires a showing of “intentional action or inaction that substantially and unreasonably interferes with other people’s use and enjoyment of their property” (Nemeth v K-Tooling, 100 AD3d 1271, 1272 [2012]; see Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 41 NY2d 564 , 570 [1977]; Langan v Bellinger, 203 AD2d 857, 857-858 [1994]; see also Guzzardi v Perry’s Boats, 92 AD2d 250, 254 [1983]). 2014A private nuisance claim requires a showing of “intentional action or inaction that substantially and unreasonably interferes with other people’s use and enjoyment of their property” (Nemeth v K-Tooling, 100 AD3d 1271, 1272 [2012]; see Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 41 NY2d 564 , 570 [1977]; Langan v Bellinger, 203 AD2d 857, 857-858 [1994]; see also Guzzardi v Perry’s Boats, 92 AD2d 250, 254 [1983]). | 2 | 2 |
Langan v. Bellingergreen2 sentences2014A private nuisance claim requires a showing of “intentional action or inaction that substantially and unreasonably interferes with other people’s use and enjoyment of their property” (Nemeth v K-Tooling, 100 AD3d 1271, 1272 [2012]; see Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 41 NY2d 564 , 570 [1977]; Langan v Bellinger, 203 AD2d 857, 857-858 [1994]; see also Guzzardi v Perry’s Boats, 92 AD2d 250, 254 [1983]). 2014A private nuisance claim requires a showing of “intentional action or inaction that substantially and unreasonably interferes with other people’s use and enjoyment of their property” (Nemeth v K-Tooling, 100 AD3d 1271, 1272 [2012]; see Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 41 NY2d 564 , 570 [1977]; Langan v Bellinger, 203 AD2d 857, 857-858 [1994]; see also Guzzardi v Perry’s Boats, 92 AD2d 250, 254 [1983]). | 2 | 2 |
Pilatich v. Town of New Baltimoregreen1 sentence2019A private nuisance claim "may be 'established by proof of intentional action or inaction that substantially and unreasonably interferes with other people's use and enjoyment of [plaintiff's] property'" (133 AD3d at 1145, quoting Nemeth v K—Tooling , 100 AD3d 1271, 1272 [2012]; accord O'Connor v Shultz , 166 AD3d 1104 , 1104 [2018]; see Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. , 41 NY2d 564 , 570 [1977]). | 1 | 1 |
Saperstein v. Bermangreen1 sentence2005In addition, as the defendants’ fence did not interfere with plaintiffs’ right to light or air, such allegations did not form a sufficient basis for a private nuisance claim” (Christenson v Gutman, 249 AD2d 805, 808 [1998]; see RPAPL 843, 841; Kolodziej v Martin, 249 AD2d 941, 942 [1998]; cf. Saperstein v Berman, 119 Misc 205, 207 [1922]). | 1 | 1 |
Valley Courts, Inc. v. Newtongreen1 sentence2005There is no merit to the plaintiffs’ argument to the extent that it rests on the premise that the mere presence, on the adjoining property, of unsightly dumpsters, an abandoned icebox, “automobile hulks,” or a “hideous rampart of dirt,” without more, would give rise to a valid cause of action on a theory of private nuisance (see Dugway, Ltd. v Fizzinoglia, 166 AD2d 836, 837 [1990]; 81 NY Jur 2d, Nuisances § 33). “[T]hings merely disagreeable, however, which simply displease the eye ... no matter how irritating or unpleasant, are not nuisances” (Dugway, Ltd. v Fizzinoglia, supra at 837, quoting | 1 | 1 |
Dugway, Ltd. v. Fizzinogliagreen2 sentences2005There is no merit to the plaintiffs’ argument to the extent that it rests on the premise that the mere presence, on the adjoining property, of unsightly dumpsters, an abandoned icebox, “automobile hulks,” or a “hideous rampart of dirt,” without more, would give rise to a valid cause of action on a theory of private nuisance (see Dugway, Ltd. v Fizzinoglia, 166 AD2d 836, 837 [1990]; 81 NY Jur 2d, Nuisances § 33). “[T]hings merely disagreeable, however, which simply displease the eye ... no matter how irritating or unpleasant, are not nuisances” (Dugway, Ltd. v Fizzinoglia, supra at 837, quoting 2005There is no merit to the plaintiffs’ argument to the extent that it rests on the premise that the mere presence, on the adjoining property, of unsightly dumpsters, an abandoned icebox, “automobile hulks,” or a “hideous rampart of dirt,” without more, would give rise to a valid cause of action on a theory of private nuisance (see Dugway, Ltd. v Fizzinoglia, 166 AD2d 836, 837 [1990]; 81 NY Jur 2d, Nuisances § 33). “[T]hings merely disagreeable, however, which simply displease the eye ... no matter how irritating or unpleasant, are not nuisances” (Dugway, Ltd. v Fizzinoglia, supra at 837, quoting | 1 | 1 |
Christenson v. Gutmangreen1 sentence2005In addition, as the defendants’ fence did not interfere with plaintiffs’ right to light or air, such allegations did not form a sufficient basis for a private nuisance claim” (Christenson v Gutman, 249 AD2d 805, 808 [1998]; see RPAPL 843, 841; Kolodziej v Martin, 249 AD2d 941, 942 [1998]; cf. Saperstein v Berman, 119 Misc 205, 207 [1922]). | 1 | 1 |
Thousand v. Hedberggreen1 sentence2005In addition, as the defendants’ fence did not interfere with plaintiffs’ right to light or air, such allegations did not form a sufficient basis for a private nuisance claim” (Christenson v Gutman, 249 AD2d 805, 808 [1998]; see RPAPL 843, 841; Kolodziej v Martin, 249 AD2d 941, 942 [1998]; cf. Saperstein v Berman, 119 Misc 205, 207 [1922]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Baker v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.
green
2 sentences2024In this way, a private wrong may be distinguished from a common injury to the public, and a private right of action is restored" ( Baker v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. , 232 F. Supp. 3d 233 (N.D.NY 2017), aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part , 959 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2020)). 2024In this way, a private wrong may be distinguished from a common injury to the public, and a private right of action is restored" ( Baker v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. , 232 F. Supp. 3d 233 (N.D.NY 2017), aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part , 959 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2020)). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Baker v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.
green
2 sentences2024In this way, a private wrong may be distinguished from a common injury to the public, and a private right of action is restored" ( Baker v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. , 232 F. Supp. 3d 233 (N.D.NY 2017), aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part , 959 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2020)). 2024In this way, a private wrong may be distinguished from a common injury to the public, and a private right of action is restored" ( Baker v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. , 232 F. Supp. 3d 233 (N.D.NY 2017), aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part , 959 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2020)). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Domen Holding Co. v. Aranovich
green
2 sentences2016Likewise, a private nuisance claim for this time cannot be established without Quaker Ridge having notice of an ongoing trespass, because a pattern or recurrence of objectionable conduct is required (Domen Holding Co. v Aranovich, 1 NY3d 117 [2003]). 8 During these two months following the storm, no pattern of objectionable conduct was established. 2011A nuisance is a continuous or persistent condition that threatens the comfort and safety of neighboring tenants and which is likely to recur (see Domen Holding Co. v Aranovich, 1 NY3d 117 [2003]). | 2 | 2011–2016 |
Berg v. Chelsea Hotel Owner, LLC
green
1 sentence2024Berg v Chelsea Hotel Owner, LLC, 203 AD3d 484 (1st Dept. 2022). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Mandel v. Geloso
green
1 sentence2007The evidence adduced at trial, including Whitmore’s testimony that the unreasonable level of noise created by the fans prevented her from using her deck and sleeping in her bedroom, and expert testimony that the noise level in her unit violated noise control provisions of the Administrative Code, was sufficient to satisfy the elements of a private nuisance claim (see Vacca v Valerino, supra; Mandel v Geloso, 206 AD2d 699 [1994]). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Vacca v. Valerino
green
1 sentence2007The evidence adduced at trial, including Whitmore’s testimony that the unreasonable level of noise created by the fans prevented her from using her deck and sleeping in her bedroom, and expert testimony that the noise level in her unit violated noise control provisions of the Administrative Code, was sufficient to satisfy the elements of a private nuisance claim (see Vacca v Valerino, supra; Mandel v Geloso, 206 AD2d 699 [1994]). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Goldberg Weprin & Ustin, L. L. P. v. Tishman Construction Corp.
green
1 sentence2001The court further rejected recovery for strict liability, and dismissed both the public nuisance claim (because plaintiff was unable to show special damages) and the private nuisance claim (because plaintiff could not show that the harm threatened only one person or relatively few). *288 The Appellate Division affirmed dismissal of the Goldberg Weprin complaint, concluding that, absent property damage, the connection between defendants’ activities and the economic losses of the purported class of plaintiffs was “too tenuous and remote to permit recovery on any tort theory” ( 275 AD2d 614 ). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Schmoeger v. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co.
green
1 sentence1995While it is also true that in Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison Co. ( 41 NY2d 564 [1977]), the Court of Appeals recognized that a private nuisance claim could be made out when an otherwise authorized public use was unreasonably, negligently or dangerously carried out (Schmoeger v Algonquin Gas Transmission Co., 802 F Supp 1084 [SD NY 1992]), such is not shown by plaintiffs to be the case here. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.