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20 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1995–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Portland General Electric Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Industriesgreen2 sentences2019Compare PGE, 317 Or at 611-12 (“If, but only if, the intent of the legislature is not clear from the text and context inquiry, the court will then move to the second level, which is to consider legislative history to inform the court’s inquiry into legislative intent.”) (Emphasis added.), with Gaines, 346 Or at 171-72 (“contrary to this court’s pronouncement in PGE, we no longer will require an ambiguity in the text of a statute as a necessary predicate to the second step—consideration of pertinent legislative history that a party may proffer.”) 6 See e.g. 2009See PGE, 317 Or at 611 (“If, but only if, the intent of the legislature is not clear from the text and context inquiry, the court will then move to the second level, which is to consider legislative history * * *.”). | 12 | 16 |
State v. Gainesgreen2 sentences2019Compare PGE, 317 Or at 611-12 (“If, but only if, the intent of the legislature is not clear from the text and context inquiry, the court will then move to the second level, which is to consider legislative history to inform the court’s inquiry into legislative intent.”) (Emphasis added.), with Gaines, 346 Or at 171-72 (“contrary to this court’s pronouncement in PGE, we no longer will require an ambiguity in the text of a statute as a necessary predicate to the second step—consideration of pertinent legislative history that a party may proffer.”) 6 See e.g. 2009In Gaines , the Supreme Court concluded that the legislature, in enacting the amendments to ORS 174.020, did indeed intend to “remove the barrier that the PGE methodology placed on the consideration of legislative history and instead place legislative history on a par with text and context.” Gaines, 346 Or at 169 . | 1 | 2 |
Owens v. Maassgreen2 sentences2009See PGE, 317 Or at 611 (“If, but only if, the intent of the legislature is not clear from the text and context inquiry, the court will then move to the second level, which is to consider legislative history[.]”); see also Owens v. Maass, 323 Or 430, 449 , 918 P2d 808 (1996) (Unis, J., dissenting) (majority errs in finding an ambiguity in the statutory text; because there is no ambiguity, the analysis must stop at the first level of PGE , and legislative history should not be considered). 2009See PGE, 317 Or at 611 (“If, but only if, the intent of the legislature is not clear from the text and context inquiry, the court will then move to the second level, which is to consider legislative history[.]”); see also Owens v. Maass, 323 Or 430, 449 , 918 P2d 808 (1996) (Unis, J., dissenting) (majority errs in finding an ambiguity in the statutory text; because there is no ambiguity, the analysis must stop at the first level of PGE , and legislative history should not be considered). | 1 | 1 |
Schmidt v. Archdiocese of Portlandgreen2 sentences2009See Schmidt, 218 Or.App. at 672 , 180 P.3d 160 (describing dictionary definitions). [7] The majority concluded that it must choose between those two general interpretations and selected the latter after a text and context analysis. 2009See Schmidt, 218 Or App at 672 (describing dictionary definitions). 7 The majority concluded that it must choose between those two general interpretations and selected the latter after a text and context analysis. | 1 | 1 |
State Accident Insurance Fund Corp. v. Calkinsgreen1 sentence2007Compare Calkins, 80 Or App at 372 (because statute’s terms were “clear and unambiguous,” court would not examine statute’s legislative history) with PGE, 317 Or App at 611 (declaring that court is to consider legislative history “if, but only if, the intent of the legislature is not clear from the text and context inquiry”). 6 ORS 656.218(3) provides: “If the worker has filed a request for a hearing pursuant to ORS 656.283 and death occurs prior to the final disposition of the request, the persons described in subsection (5) of this section shall be entitled to pursue the matter to final deter | 1 | 1 |
State v. Chakeriangreen2 sentences1999See also State v. Chakerian, 325 Or 370, 376-77 , 938 P2d 756 (1997) (“If text and context yield an unambiguous meaning, we proceed no further.”). 1999See also State v. Chakerian, 325 Or 370, 376-77 , 938 P2d 756 (1997) (“If text and context yield an unambiguous meaning, we proceed no further.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Department of Consumer & Business Services v. Muliro
green
2 sentences2024DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 746 , 380 P3d 270 (2016) (exploring a dictionary definition as part of the text and context analysis). 2024DCBS v. Muliro, 359 Or 736, 746 , 380 P3d 270 (2016) (exploring a dictionary definition as part of the text and context analysis). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.