granted rule in Pennsylvania

2024The court granted the defense objection prohibiting this explicit and consequential identification, based upon the inherent unreliability of such testimony as set forth in Pifer, supra. The jury was specifically instructed that the record would not reflect [Doyle]’s in-court identification of [Appellant].

2024The court granted the defense objection prohibiting this explicit and consequential identification, based upon the inherent unreliability of such testimony as set forth in Pifer, supra. The jury was specifically instructed that the record would not reflect [Doyle]’s in-court identification of [Appellant].

2019Commonwealth v. Hill , 558 Pa. 238 , 254-55, 736 A.2d 578 , 587 (1999) (citations and footnote omitted). 2 In a similar case, Commonwealth v. Wallace , 804 A.2d 675 , 680 (Pa.Super. 2002), the appellant challenged the trial court's decision to find excludable a period of delay that occurred after the trial court granted a defense request for additional discovery. 3 This Court agreed that the eighty-four-day period was excludable delay as Appellant's motion placed an obligation on the prosecution that required the delay of the trial's commencement.

2019Commonwealth v. Hill , 558 Pa. 238 , 254-55, 736 A.2d 578 , 587 (1999) (citations and footnote omitted). 2 In a similar case, Commonwealth v. Wallace , 804 A.2d 675 , 680 (Pa.Super. 2002), the appellant challenged the trial court's decision to find excludable a period of delay that occurred after the trial court granted a defense request for additional discovery. 3 This Court agreed that the eighty-four-day period was excludable delay as Appellant's motion placed an obligation on the prosecution that required the delay of the trial's commencement.

2019Commonwealth v. Hill , 558 Pa. 238 , 254-55, 736 A.2d 578 , 587 (1999) (citations and footnote omitted). 2 In a similar case, Commonwealth v. Wallace , 804 A.2d 675 , 680 (Pa.Super. 2002), the appellant challenged the trial court's decision to find excludable a period of delay that occurred after the trial court granted a defense request for additional discovery. 3 This Court agreed that the eighty-four-day period was excludable delay as Appellant's motion placed an obligation on the prosecution that required the delay of the trial's commencement.

2019The trial court granted defense counsel’s request, and issued an order stating that the defendant “is given no time credit for any of the time spent on these charges and that time is to go towards other matters, the state parole violations.” Id. at 748 .

2018She contends that notwithstanding its conclusion that the factors enunciated in Hammermill Paper Company v. The Rust Engineering Company, 243 A.2d 389 (Pa. 1968), were absent, the Trial Court granted immunity to Appellees based simply on its determination that they were performing a government function and there was a written contract between Township and Appellees.

2011Consistent with the statute, the regulation also requires that a Findings Report be issued either within 180 days after the commencement of the investigation or within the time period of a granted exception, but no later than 360 days. 51 Pa.Code § 21.5. 3 . "[Tjhis Court may affirm on grounds different than those relied upon by the court or agency below if such grounds for affirmance exist.” Motor Coils MFG/WABTEC v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Bish), 853 A.2d 1082 , 1087 n. 9 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004). 4 .

2010Jayne v. Jayne, 443 Pa.Super. 664 , 663 A.2d 169 (1995). ¶9 In his first two claims, Husband asserts that, because the trial court granted his exception “to Wife’s claimed reasonable needs and found that the needs as stated were over-inflated,” the trial court “should have reduced her claim for reasonable needs and alimony award accordingly.” Husband’s Brief at 6.

2010Jayne v. Jayne, 443 Pa.Super. 664 , 663 A.2d 169 (1995). ¶9 In his first two claims, Husband asserts that, because the trial court granted his exception “to Wife’s claimed reasonable needs and found that the needs as stated were over-inflated,” the trial court “should have reduced her claim for reasonable needs and alimony award accordingly.” Husband’s Brief at 6.

1997Id. at 175 , 578 A.2d at 1286-87 .

1997Id. at 175 , 578 A.2d at 1286-87 .

1992Relying upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), the trial court held that defense counsel had been ineffective for failing to move pre-trial or at trial to redact or exclude statements of a co-defendant which implicated Cull in the offenses with which he had been charged.

1992Relying upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), the trial court held that defense counsel had been ineffective for failing to move pre-trial or at trial to redact or exclude statements of a co-defendant which implicated Cull in the offenses with which he had been charged.

1992Stating in a per curiam order: The trial court found that it had the power to vacate the decree beyond the thirty days provided by 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5505 because within the thirty-day period the court granted a rule to show cause why the decree should not be vacated, thus tolling the thirty-day period under Commonwealth v. Kern, 294 Pa.Super. 151 , 439 A.2d 795 (1982).

1992Stating in a per curiam order: The trial court found that it had the power to vacate the decree beyond the thirty days provided by 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5505 because within the thirty-day period the court granted a rule to show cause why the decree should not be vacated, thus tolling the thirty-day period under Commonwealth v. Kern, 294 Pa.Super. 151 , 439 A.2d 795 (1982).

1979Ditter to represent appellant. *584 The Commonwealth filed an answer to the Petition for a Post Conviction Hearing on May 24, 1977, stating: "It is denied that the sentence imposed on Bill of Indictment No. 3640 October Term, 1974 was subsequently overruled by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on or about July 6, 1976." The Commonwealth, on May 10, 1976, had petitioned the Supreme Court for leave to appeal the Superior Court's reversal of the conviction at No. 3640, and, on March 23, 1978, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court at Commonwealth v. Coleman, 477 Pa. 400 , 383 A.2d 1268 (1

1979Ditter to represent appellant. *584 The Commonwealth filed an answer to the Petition for a Post Conviction Hearing on May 24, 1977, stating: "It is denied that the sentence imposed on Bill of Indictment No. 3640 October Term, 1974 was subsequently overruled by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on or about July 6, 1976." The Commonwealth, on May 10, 1976, had petitioned the Supreme Court for leave to appeal the Superior Court's reversal of the conviction at No. 3640, and, on March 23, 1978, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court at Commonwealth v. Coleman, 477 Pa. 400 , 383 A.2d 1268 (1

1978Appellant now contends that he has been denied his day in court because the non-suit was inappropriate simply because appellant’s proposed testimony was insufficient to sustain his cause of action: Ruhe v. Kroger Company, 425 Pa. 213, 215 , 228 A.2d 750 (1967).

1978Appellant now contends that he has been denied his day in court because the non-suit was inappropriate simply because appellant’s proposed testimony was insufficient to sustain his cause of action: Ruhe v. Kroger Company, 425 Pa. 213, 215 , 228 A.2d 750 (1967).

1942In Rieder v. Rieder, 21 Pa. Superior Ct. 488 (1902), the court granted a rule for an order for additional counsel fee on the same day the judgment was entered and subsequently ordered payment thereof.

1938Unless such an order is made, (Frazier’s Est., 7 Pa. Superior Ct. 473 , affirmed 18S Pa. 415, 41 A. 528 ), the rule for rehearing does not stay the running of the time within which the appeal must be taken: Barlott v. Forney, 187 Pa. 301, 303 , 41 A. 47 ; Henry’s Est., 290 Pa. 537, 539 , 139 A. 198 ; Real Estate & Mtge.

1938Unless such an order is made, (Frazier’s Est., 7 Pa. Superior Ct. 473 , affirmed 18S Pa. 415, 41 A. 528 ), the rule for rehearing does not stay the running of the time within which the appeal must be taken: Barlott v. Forney, 187 Pa. 301, 303 , 41 A. 47 ; Henry’s Est., 290 Pa. 537, 539 , 139 A. 198 ; Real Estate & Mtge.

1938Unless such an order is made, (Frazier’s Est., 7 Pa. Superior Ct. 473 , affirmed 18S Pa. 415, 41 A. 528 ), the rule for rehearing does not stay the running of the time within which the appeal must be taken: Barlott v. Forney, 187 Pa. 301, 303 , 41 A. 47 ; Henry’s Est., 290 Pa. 537, 539 , 139 A. 198 ; Real Estate & Mtge.

1938Unless such an order is made, (Frazier’s Est., 7 Pa. Superior Ct. 473 , affirmed 18S Pa. 415, 41 A. 528 ), the rule for rehearing does not stay the running of the time within which the appeal must be taken: Barlott v. Forney, 187 Pa. 301, 303 , 41 A. 47 ; Henry’s Est., 290 Pa. 537, 539 , 139 A. 198 ; Real Estate & Mtge.

1938Unless such an order is made, (Frazier’s Est., 7 Pa. Superior Ct. 473 , affirmed 18S Pa. 415, 41 A. 528 ), the rule for rehearing does not stay the running of the time within which the appeal must be taken: Barlott v. Forney, 187 Pa. 301, 303 , 41 A. 47 ; Henry’s Est., 290 Pa. 537, 539 , 139 A. 198 ; Real Estate & Mtge.

1938Unless such an order is made, (Frazier’s Est., 7 Pa. Superior Ct. 473 , affirmed 18S Pa. 415, 41 A. 528 ), the rule for rehearing does not stay the running of the time within which the appeal must be taken: Barlott v. Forney, 187 Pa. 301, 303 , 41 A. 47 ; Henry’s Est., 290 Pa. 537, 539 , 139 A. 198 ; Real Estate & Mtge.

1922The appeal filed by plaintiff in the court below recited that the sewer had been constructed under the sidewalk of the street upon which his lot abutted, “and the said sewer was located and constructed in such close proximity to the building line of the said property that the said property was greatly injured thereby”; that the viewers assessed benefits against his property and made no allowance to him for the damages due to the location of the sewer; and that the assessment of benefits against said property “is excessive, unjust and unreasonable and far in excess of the amount that the proper

1922The appeal filed by plaintiff in the court below recited that the sewer had been constructed under the sidewalk of the street upon which his lot abutted, “and the said sewer was located and constructed in such close proximity to the building line of the said property that the said property was greatly injured thereby”; that the viewers assessed benefits against his property and made no allowance to him for the damages due to the location of the sewer; and that the assessment of benefits against said property “is excessive, unjust and unreasonable and far in excess of the amount that the proper

1921See Carey v. Sheldon et al., 2 Pennypacker, 330; Woods v. Sherman et al., 71 Pa. 100 ; Ashton v. Bayard, 71 Pa. 139 , and National Bank v. Thomas, 220 Pa. 360 .

1921See Carey v. Sheldon et al., 2 Pennypacker, 330; Woods v. Sherman et al., 71 Pa. 100 ; Ashton v. Bayard, 71 Pa. 139 , and National Bank v. Thomas, 220 Pa. 360 .

1921See Carey v. Sheldon et al., 2 Pennypacker, 330; Woods v. Sherman et al., 71 Pa. 100 ; Ashton v. Bayard, 71 Pa. 139 , and National Bank v. Thomas, 220 Pa. 360 .

1912We have also decided repeatedly that where there is no exception to a judgment non obstante veredicto and the only assignment of error is to the action of the court in that respect, the appeal will be quashed: Dietrich v. Insurance Co., 32 Pa. Superior Ct. 234 ; McGinnis v. Fire Insurance Co., 38 Pa. Superior Ct. 390 ; B.

1912We have also decided repeatedly that where there is no exception to a judgment non obstante veredicto and the only assignment of error is to the action of the court in that respect, the appeal will be quashed: Dietrich v. Insurance Co., 32 Pa. Superior Ct. 234 ; McGinnis v. Fire Insurance Co., 38 Pa. Superior Ct. 390 ; B.