Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
20 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 2003–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fullergreen2 sentences2012We subsequently applied Dixon in, among other cases, State v. Cozart, 54 S.W.3d 242, 247 (Tenn.2001) 4 and State v. Fuller, 172 S.W.3d 533, 537-38 (Tenn.2005). 5 In Richardson , we explicitly recognized the Dixon two-part test as a replacement for the Anthony “essentially incidental” analysis. 251 S.W.3d at 443 . 2008As we previously have observed, the Dixon test “provides the structure necessary for applying the principles announced in Anthony.” State v. Fuller, 172 S.W.3d 533, 537 (Tenn.2005). 5 Although we adhere to the due process principles adopted in Anthony, 6 we now make clear that the Anthony analysis should not be used in conjunction with the Dixon two-part test. | 7 | 7 |
State v. Richardsongreen2 sentences2016In State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tenn. 1997), also in the context of kidnapping, the supreme court replaced the essentially incidental test with a two-part due process analysis which examined whether the confinement went beyond that necessary to perpetrate the underlying felony and whether the kidnapping “(1) prevented the victim from summoning help; (2) lessened the defendant‟s risk of detection; or (3) created a significant danger or increased the victim‟s risk of harm.” (citing Anthony, 817 S.W.2d at 306 ); see State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438, 443 (Tenn. 2008) (“The Dixon two-par 2015In State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438, 443 (Tenn.2008), the Court explicitly recognized the Dixon two-part test as a replacement for the Anthony “essentially incidental” analysis. | 6 | 14 |
State v. Dixonred2 sentences2016In State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tenn. 1997), also in the context of kidnapping, the supreme court replaced the essentially incidental test with a two-part due process analysis which examined whether the confinement went beyond that necessary to perpetrate the underlying felony and whether the kidnapping “(1) prevented the victim from summoning help; (2) lessened the defendant‟s risk of detection; or (3) created a significant danger or increased the victim‟s risk of harm.” (citing Anthony, 817 S.W.2d at 306 ); see State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438, 443 (Tenn. 2008) (“The Dixon two-par 2011Finally, the Dixon court emphasized that the focus of any Anthony inquiry should be on “the purpose of the removal or confinement and not the distance or duration.” Id. -3- In State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438 (Tenn. 2008), our supreme court completely abandoned the “essentially incidental” analysis of Anthony and replaced it with the two-part test established in Dixon: The Dixon two-part test fully replaces the Anthony “essentially incidental” analysis. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Dentonred1 sentence2016In State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373, 381 (Tenn. 1996), also in a kidnapping context, the supreme court developed a four-part analysis pursuant to double jeopardy principles. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Whitegreen1 sentence2015See State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997), overruled, State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cozartgreen1 sentence2012We subsequently applied Dixon in, among other cases, State v. Cozart, 54 S.W.3d 242, 247 (Tenn.2001) 4 and State v. Fuller, 172 S.W.3d 533, 537-38 (Tenn.2005). 5 In Richardson , we explicitly recognized the Dixon two-part test as a replacement for the Anthony “essentially incidental” analysis. 251 S.W.3d at 443 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Anthony
red
1 sentence2016In State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tenn. 1997), also in the context of kidnapping, the supreme court replaced the essentially incidental test with a two-part due process analysis which examined whether the confinement went beyond that necessary to perpetrate the underlying felony and whether the kidnapping “(1) prevented the victim from summoning help; (2) lessened the defendant‟s risk of detection; or (3) created a significant danger or increased the victim‟s risk of harm.” (citing Anthony, 817 S.W.2d at 306 ); see State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438, 443 (Tenn. 2008) (“The Dixon two-par | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Blockburger v. United States
green
1 sentence2003W e held in Anthony that the Blockburger double jeopardy test was not adequate to resolve the issue of whether a separate kidnapping conviction may be imposed because “[t]he essential elements of kidnapping and robbery are obviously separate and distinct, and simultaneous convictions on these two charges would not necessarily violate the rule in Blockburger.” Id. (continued...) 5 should not be used in conjunction with the Dixon two-part test. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.