breach of warranty claim in Alabama

2018Corp. v. Milam & Co. Constr., Inc. , 901 So.2d 84 , 103 (Ala. 2004) (holding breach-of-warranty claim not subsumed by AEMLD claim).

2018Corp. v. Milam & Co. Constr., Inc. , 901 So.2d 84 , 103 (Ala. 2004) (holding breach-of-warranty claim not subsumed by AEMLD claim).

2017Generally, "[o]nce the administration and settlement of an estate are removed from the probate court, the probate court loses jurisdiction over the estate, and the circuit court obtains and maintains jurisdiction until the final settlement of the case." Oliver v. Johnson , 583 So.2d 1331 , 1332 (Ala. 1991).

2013The circuit court certified the first controlling question of law presented by the permissive appeal, as follows: “[W]hether a breach of warranty claim cannot be maintained under Alabama’s wrongful death statute pursuant to Geohagan v. General Motors Corp., [ 291 Ala. 167 ,] 279 So.2d 436 (Ala.1973); or whether this Court is correct that Geohagan was overruled by Sledge v. IC Corporation, 47 So.3d 243 (Ala.2010).” We answer the second part of this question in the negative: Sledge does not overrule Geohagan and a breach-of-warranty claim cannot be maintained under Alabama’s wrongful-death statu

2013The circuit court certified the first controlling question of law presented by the permissive appeal, as follows: “[W]hether a breach of warranty claim cannot be maintained under Alabama’s wrongful death statute pursuant to Geohagan v. General Motors Corp., [ 291 Ala. 167 ,] 279 So.2d 436 (Ala.1973); or whether this Court is correct that Geohagan was overruled by Sledge v. IC Corporation, 47 So.3d 243 (Ala.2010).” We answer the second part of this question in the negative: Sledge does not overrule Geohagan and a breach-of-warranty claim cannot be maintained under Alabama’s wrongful-death statu

2013The circuit court certified the first controlling question of law presented by the permissive appeal, as follows: “[W]hether a breach of warranty claim cannot be maintained under Alabama’s wrongful death statute pursuant to Geohagan v. General Motors Corp., [ 291 Ala. 167 ,] 279 So.2d 436 (Ala.1973); or whether this Court is correct that Geohagan was overruled by Sledge v. IC Corporation, 47 So.3d 243 (Ala.2010).” We answer the second part of this question in the negative: Sledge does not overrule Geohagan and a breach-of-warranty claim cannot be maintained under Alabama’s wrongful-death statu

2013The court further holds that [Wiese] has a maintainable breach of implied warranty of merchantability claim under pursuant to Benefield v. Aquaslide N’ Dive Corp., 406 So.2d 873 (Ala.1981). [Wiese’s] amended complaint does not assert a claim for breach [of] the implied warranty for a particular purpose, and this part of [APA’s] motion is therefore moot.

2010Because the plaintiff in Dawson had not asserted a breach-of-warranty claim, because "in the abstract” the plaintiff's claims were not "necessarily dependant on the existence of a contract,” and because the defendant had not properly supported its arguments, this Court in Dawson concluded that the plaintiff was not estopped from avoiding arbitration. 57 So.3d at 99 .

2009Thus, aside from the breach-of-warranty claim itself, there was no evidence indicating that Hennis had ever “assented to the terms in the Homeowner’s Manual, includ *111 ing the warranty and the arbitration provisions.” 776 So.2d at 109 .

2009Hyundai appealed, arguing, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s award of damages on the breach-of-warranty claim. 222 Ill.2d at 84 , 305 Ill.Dec. 15 , 854 N.E.2d at 614 .

2009Hyundai appealed, arguing, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s award of damages on the breach-of-warranty claim. 222 Ill.2d at 84 , 305 Ill.Dec. 15 , 854 N.E.2d at 614 .

2009The main opinion reverses the trial court's judgment and remands the case based on Troy Brown's contention that this Court should overrule Tittle v. Steel City Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc., 544 So.2d 883 (Ala.1989), in which this Court held that the plaintiff's breach-of-warranty claim arose at the time of delivery of the vehicle.

2006Therefore, the breach-of-warranty claim against Emerald arose in Houston County, even if it did not accrue , for purposes of the statute of limitations, until the date of the Florida accident; thus, venue for this action properly lies in Houston County." Kia , 881 So.2d at 402 -03 (See, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).

2006In Ex parte Kia Motors America, Inc., 881 So.2d 396 (Ala. 2003), the parties disputed whether the plaintiff's breach-of-warranty claim arose in Florida or Alabama.

2005We concluded, in light of the standard of review of a summary judgment set out in Hobson v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. , 690 So.2d 341 , 344 (Ala. 1997), as follows: "The record indicates that on the day Deborah purchased the 1980 Mazda, a wheel came off while the car was being driven.

2005To like effect is Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Davis, 126 N.J.Super. 379 , 314 A.2d 615 (1974), in which the New Jersey Superior Court held that a depositary bank, First National State Bank ("National"), was entitled to a set-off based upon § 4-207(4) because of the delay of an insurer in bringing a breach-of-warranty claim; in that case, as here, the insurer had issued a draft to joint payees and that draft had lacked a necessary endorsement at the time it was tendered to National for deposit.

2005To like effect is Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Davis, 126 N.J.Super. 379 , 314 A.2d 615 (1974), in which the New Jersey Superior Court held that a depositary bank, First National State Bank ("National"), was entitled to a set-off based upon § 4-207(4) because of the delay of an insurer in bringing a breach-of-warranty claim; in that case, as here, the insurer had issued a draft to joint payees and that draft had lacked a necessary endorsement at the time it was tendered to National for deposit.

1992I would hold that Hillis's injuries did not result from a continuous tort, but that, like the alleged negligent acts in Moon v. Harco Drugs, Inc., 435 So.2d 218 (Ala.1983), and Ramey v. Guyton, 394 So.2d 2 (Ala. 1981), the alleged negligent acts of Rentokil and Larry Landman resulting in Hillis's injuries did not occur concurrently and that because the record reveals that on September 25, 1987, Hillis knew of his injury but did not file suit until November 15, 1989, his claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

1992I would hold that Hillis's injuries did not result from a continuous tort, but that, like the alleged negligent acts in Moon v. Harco Drugs, Inc. , 435 So.2d 218 (Ala. 1983), and Ramey v. Guyton , 394 So.2d 2 (Ala. 1981), the alleged negligent acts of Rentokil and Larry Landman resulting in Hillis's injuries did not occur concurrently and that because the record reveals that on September 25, 1987, Hillis knew of his injury but did not file suit until November 15, 1989, his claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

1992Rule 56, A.R.Civ.P.; RNH, Inc. v. Beatty, 571 So.2d 1039 (Ala.1990).

1992Rule 56, A.R.Civ.P.; RNH, Inc. v. Beatty , 571 So.2d 1039 (Ala. 1990).

1992I would hold that Hillis's injuries did not result from a continuous tort, but that, like the alleged negligent acts in Moon v. Harco Drugs, Inc., 435 So.2d 218 (Ala.1983), and Ramey v. Guyton, 394 So.2d 2 (Ala. 1981), the alleged negligent acts of Rentokil and Larry Landman resulting in Hillis's injuries did not occur concurrently and that because the record reveals that on September 25, 1987, Hillis knew of his injury but did not file suit until November 15, 1989, his claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

1992I would hold that Hillis's injuries did not result from a continuous tort, but that, like the alleged negligent acts in Moon v. Harco Drugs, Inc. , 435 So.2d 218 (Ala. 1983), and Ramey v. Guyton , 394 So.2d 2 (Ala. 1981), the alleged negligent acts of Rentokil and Larry Landman resulting in Hillis's injuries did not occur concurrently and that because the record reveals that on September 25, 1987, Hillis knew of his injury but did not file suit until November 15, 1989, his claims are barred by the statute of limitations.

1981Simmons v. Clemco Industries, Ala., 368 So.2d 509 (1979).

1976In Sealy v. McElroy , 288 Ala. 93 , 257 So.2d 340 (1972), an agent and his principal were both sued on a breach of warranty claim for false representations made by the agent.

1976In Sealy v. McElroy , 288 Ala. 93 , 257 So.2d 340 (1972), an agent and his principal were both sued on a breach of warranty claim for false representations made by the agent.