breach of warranty claim in Texas

2012Conveying land ‘subject to’ defined interests is merely a means of providing notice of outstanding interests that may affect a grantee’s title.”) (citations omitted); Averyt, 686 S.W.2d at 634 (“This clause [‘less, however, and subject to’] limits the granting or conveyance of the mineral interest from Grande, Inc. to the Fogelmans, thereby protecting the general warranty in the deed and avoiding an estoppel situation.... ”).

2012Conveying land ‘subject to’ defined interests is merely a means of providing notice of outstanding interests that may affect a grantee’s title.”) (citations omitted); Averyt , 686 S.W.2d at 634 (“This clause [‘less, however, and subject to’] limits the granting or conveyance of the mineral interest from Grande, Inc. to the Fogelmans, thereby protecting the general warranty in the deed and avoiding an estoppel situation . . . .”).

2019Co. v. FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex. 1991) (holding that the damages-limitation clause was valid to bar a breach of warranty claim but not valid “insofar as it purported to waive liability” for a deceptive act under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA)).

2015FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572 , 576-77 & n. 3 (Tex.1991)(noting elements of a breach of warranty claim).

2013The court further noted that, although a breach of warranty claim is distinct from a breach of contract claim, it is “a creature of contract” and is “contract-based.” See Medical City, 251 S.W.3d at 60-61 .

2013The court further noted that, although a breach of warranty claim is distinct from a breach of contract claim, it is “a creature of contract” and is “contract-based.” See Medical City, 251 S.W.3d at 60–61.

2016See id. at 880-81.

2012See id. at 880-81.

2012See id.

2012See id.

2009Walker v. Foss, 930 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ).

2009Walker v. Foss , 930 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1996, no writ).

2008However, in Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Hampton State Bank, the Dallas Court of Appeals stated, in deciding a breach of warranty claim under the Business and Commerce Code, that neither “failure to exercise ordinary care [n]or even gross negligence is equivalent to lack of good faith.” 497 S.W.2d 80, 87 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1973, no pet.).

2008However, in Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Hampton State Bank , the Dallas Court of Appeals stated, in deciding a breach of warranty claim under the Business and Commerce Code, that neither “failure to exercise ordinary care [n]or even gross negligence is equivalent to lack of good faith.” 497 S.W.2d 80, 87 (Tex. Civ.

2007Co. v. American Permanent Ware Co., 201 S.W.3d 301, 310 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (“A buyer who rightfully rejects the goods or justifiably revokes his acceptance may recover breach of contract remedies for delivery of non-conforming goods under section 2.711.”); Selectouch Corp. v. Perfect Starch, Inc., 111 S.W.3d 830, 834 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) (“[T]he critical factor in whether the buyer has a breach of contract or a breach of warranty claim is whether the buyer has finally accepted the goods.”); Materials Mktg.

2007Co. v. American Permanent Ware Co. , 201 S.W.3d 301, 310 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2006, no pet.) ("A buyer who rightfully rejects the goods or justifiably revokes his acceptance may recover breach of contract remedies for delivery of non-conforming goods under section 2.711."); Selectouch Corp. v. Perfect Starch, Inc. , 111 S.W.3d 830, 834 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2003, no pet.) ("[T]he critical factor in whether the buyer has a breach of contract or a breach of warranty claim is whether the buyer has finally accepted the goods."); Materials Mktg.

2007Corp. v. Spencer, 40 S.W.3d 172, 174 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (“A buyer’s sole recovery after acceptance is for breach of warranty.”).

2007Corp. v. Spencer , 40 S.W.3d 172, 174 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2001, no pet.) ("A buyer's sole recovery after acceptance is for breach of warranty.").

2007Co. v. American Permanent Ware Co., 201 S.W.3d 301, 310 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (“A buyer who rightfully rejects the goods or justifiably revokes his acceptance may recover breach of contract remedies for delivery of non-conforming goods under section 2.711.”); Selectouch Corp. v. Perfect Starch, Inc., 111 S.W.3d 830, 834 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) (“[T]he critical factor in whether the buyer has a breach of contract or a breach of warranty claim is whether the buyer has finally accepted the goods.”); Materials Mktg.

2007Co. v. American Permanent Ware Co. , 201 S.W.3d 301, 310 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2006, no pet.) ("A buyer who rightfully rejects the goods or justifiably revokes his acceptance may recover breach of contract remedies for delivery of non-conforming goods under section 2.711."); Selectouch Corp. v. Perfect Starch, Inc. , 111 S.W.3d 830, 834 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2003, no pet.) ("[T]he critical factor in whether the buyer has a breach of contract or a breach of warranty claim is whether the buyer has finally accepted the goods."); Materials Mktg.

2004See generally Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 568 (Tex.2001) (accrual is a legal question, but there may be underlying fact question).

2004See generally Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 568 (Tex. 2001) (accrual is a legal question, but there may be underlying fact question).

1993Relying on Bell v. Meeks , 725 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Tex. 1987), Gracy Meadow argues that "it is not an abuse of discretion for a court to find that there is no practical difference in the factual development between a breach of implied warranty claim and a DTPA representation claim." We do not address, however, whether there could ever be a practical distinction between a breach-of-warranty claim and a misrepresentation claim such that a court might abuse its discretion in denying a continuance after a trial amendment had been allowed.

1993Relying on Bell v. Meeks, 725 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Tex.1987), Gracy Meadow argues that “it is not an abuse of discretion for a court to find that there is no practical difference in the factual development between a breach of implied warranty claim and a DTPA representation claim.” We do not address, however, whether there could ever be a practical distinction between a breach-of-warranty claim and a misrepresentation claim such that a court might abuse its discretion in denying a continuance after a trial amendment had been allowed.

2023See CExchange, LLC v. Top Wireless Wholesaler, No. 05-17-01318-CV, 2019 WL 3986299 , at *7–8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 23, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (first citing Ellis v. Precision Engine Rebuilders, Inc., 68 S.W.3d 894 , 896–97 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.); and then citing Med.

2019In this case, Top’s warranty claim is based on CExchange’s delivery of –14– nonconforming goods, the majority of which were not in “working condition” or in their “original retail packaging.” Such delivery gave rise to a breach of warranty claim, Ellis v. Precision Engine Rebuilders, Inc., 68 S.W.3d 894 , 896–97 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.), as distinct from a breach of contract claim, Med.

2015Mills, 225 S.W.3d at 290 .

2015Mills v. Pate, 225 S.W.3d 277, 290 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, no pet.) (emphasis added).

2006Id. at 162 .

2004See Prudential, 896 S.W.2d at 163-64 . 8 .

2024Generally, “[t]o establish a breach of warranty claim, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a warranty and that the breach thereof caused the plaintiff’s injuries.” Munoz v. Gulf Oil Co., 732 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2024P’ship, 146 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. 2004) (holding that the UCC requires suit on a breach of warranty claim within four years of delivery unless the warranty explicitly guarantees performance beyond four years). 19 Citing Haring v. Bay Rock Corp., 773 S.W.2d 676, 680 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, no writ); Exxon Corp. v. Roberts, 724 S.W.2d 863, 871 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 28 Zurich alleges that Scallon’s breaches of contract in failing to indemnify Sunoco and Zurich are the cause of the expenses and damages for which it seeks recovery.

2024P’ship, 146 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. 2004) (holding that the UCC requires suit on a breach of warranty claim within four years of delivery unless the warranty explicitly guarantees performance beyond four years). 19 Citing Haring v. Bay Rock Corp., 773 S.W.2d 676, 680 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, no writ); Exxon Corp. v. Roberts, 724 S.W.2d 863, 871 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 28 Zurich alleges that Scallon’s breaches of contract in failing to indemnify Sunoco and Zurich are the cause of the expenses and damages for which it seeks recovery.

2021Summary judgment that the Woods Deed is void cannot rest on this argument. 9 See Jackson, 505 S.W.3d at 88-90 (explaining differences between deeds and quitclaim deeds; both convey the grantor’s interest in the property described to grantee, but a quitclaim deed grants only whatever “right, title, and interest” the grantor has, whereas a deed purports to grant and convey the described property; nature of given instrument is determined from intent of grantor as expressed in the deed).

2016A breach of warranty claim accrues when the goods are delivered, “‘regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach.’” Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Certainteed Corp., 710 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tex. 1986) (quoting Tex. Bus. & Com.

2016A breach of warranty claim accrues when the goods are delivered, “ ‘regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach.’ ” Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Certainteed Corp., 710 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tex.1986) (quoting Tex. Bus. & Com.

2015Id. at 324-329, 331 . respect to other tort law topics." ).

2013“The cardinal rule for preserving error is that an objection must be clear enough to give the trial court an opportunity to correct it.” Arkoma Basin Exploration Co. v. FMF Assocs. 1990-A, Ltd., 249 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tex.2008).

2013See id.

2004Whether or not reliance is an essential element of a breach-of-warranty claim is a question we recently noted in Compaq v. Lapray is undecided in Texas. 135 S.W.3d 657, 675 (Tex.2004).