APR hearing in Colorado

2026See L.B., 254 P.3d at 1208 . ¶ 44 Finally, mother asserts that her counsel “allowed” mother to be “portrayed at the APR hearing as a domestic violence offender.” Mother’s only basis for this assertion is one statement made by the 22 GAL in her closing argument, specifically “[a]s was alluded to by [mother], there [were] times when the parties . . . had informal supervision between each other.

2026See L.B., 254 P.3d at 1208 . ¶ 44 Finally, mother asserts that her counsel “allowed” mother to be “portrayed at the APR hearing as a domestic violence offender.” Mother’s only basis for this assertion is one statement made by the 22 GAL in her closing argument, specifically “[a]s was alluded to by [mother], there [were] times when the parties . . . had informal supervision between each other.

2026See People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 29 (a court’s determination of a child’s best interests must be based on the circumstances existing at the time of the proceeding).

2026See People in Interest of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 29 (a court’s determination of a child’s best interests must be based on the circumstances existing at the time of the proceeding).

2026See Boulder Plaza Residential, LLC v. Summit Flooring, LLC, 198 P.3d 1217, 1222 (Colo. App. 2008) (declining to consider evidence on appeal that a party failed to introduce at trial).

2026See Boulder Plaza Residential, LLC v. Summit Flooring, LLC, 198 P.3d 1217, 1222 (Colo. App. 2008) (declining to consider evidence on appeal that a party failed to introduce at trial).

2026Mother cites Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982), a case involving the termination 5 of parental rights, to argue that she needed to be present at the APR hearing to prevent “the irretrievable destruction of [her] family life.” We disagree with mother that this case “posed a similar destruction of [m]other’s family life” as discussed in Santosky.

2026Mother cites Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982), a case involving the termination 5 of parental rights, to argue that she needed to be present at the APR hearing to prevent “the irretrievable destruction of [her] family life.” We disagree with mother that this case “posed a similar destruction of [m]other’s family life” as discussed in Santosky.

2026While the child’s out-of-state placement undoubtedly made exercising her parenting time more challenging, mother’s “fundamental liberty interest[]” “in the care, custody, and control of [her] child[]” — the liberty interest articulated in Troxel v. Granville that is protected by substantive due process — wasn’t at risk. 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).

2026While the child’s out-of-state placement undoubtedly made exercising her parenting time more challenging, mother’s “fundamental liberty interest[]” “in the care, custody, and control of [her] child[]” — the liberty interest articulated in Troxel v. Granville that is protected by substantive due process — wasn’t at risk. 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).

2026See Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 21 (“Although we do not require that parties use talismanic language to preserve an argument for appeal, a party must present the trial court with ‘an adequate opportunity to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on any issue before we will review it.’” (quoting People v. Melendez, 102 P.3d 315, 322 (Colo. 2004)).

2026See Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 21 (“Although we do not require that parties use talismanic language to preserve an argument for appeal, a party must present the trial court with ‘an adequate opportunity to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on any issue before we will review it.’” (quoting People v. Melendez, 102 P.3d 315, 322 (Colo. 2004)).

2026See In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (When reviewing for an abuse of discretion, even where “there is evidence in the record that could have supported a different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the district court.”). 14 ¶ 28 Next, father argues that the court failed to consider that, before the APR hearing, mother refused to allow him to see the child for over a month — a fact that he says shows mother will not foster his relationship with the child.

2026See In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (When reviewing for an abuse of discretion, even where “there is evidence in the record that could have supported a different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the district court.”). 14 ¶ 28 Next, father argues that the court failed to consider that, before the APR hearing, mother refused to allow him to see the child for over a month — a fact that he says shows mother will not foster his relationship with the child.

2026J.A.S., 160 P.3d at 262. ¶ 19 Further, mother doesn’t explain why she wasn’t able to secure the PCI evaluator’s appearance in the nine months between the setting of the initial APR hearing and the final day of the hearing.

2026J.A.S., 160 P.3d at 262. ¶ 19 Further, mother doesn’t explain why she wasn’t able to secure the PCI evaluator’s appearance in the nine months between the setting of the initial APR hearing and the final day of the hearing.

2026People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1115 (Colo. 1986).

2026But we do not consider evidence that “was not presented to the trial court.” In re Edilson, 637 P.2d 362, 364 (Colo. 1981). 6

2026But we do not consider evidence that “was not presented to the trial court.” In re Edilson, 637 P.2d 362, 364 (Colo. 1981). 6

2026See Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 21 (“Although we do not require that parties use talismanic language to preserve an argument for appeal, a party must present the trial court with ‘an adequate opportunity to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on any issue before we will review it.’” (quoting People v. Melendez, 102 P.3d 315, 322 (Colo. 2004)).

2026See Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 21 (“Although we do not require that parties use talismanic language to preserve an argument for appeal, a party must present the trial court with ‘an adequate opportunity to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on any issue before we will review it.’” (quoting People v. Melendez, 102 P.3d 315, 322 (Colo. 2004)).

2026See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶¶ 34, 36 (three-hour time limit for parenting time hearing was not an abuse of discretion when mother’s counsel did not object and mother failed to identify any evidence excluded based on the time limit); see also In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27 (an appellate court may decline to consider an argument not supported by legal authority or any meaningful legal analysis), aff’d, 2021 CO 12 . 5 IV.

2026See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶¶ 34, 36 (three-hour time limit for parenting time hearing was not an abuse of discretion when mother’s counsel did not object and mother failed to identify any evidence excluded based on the time limit); see also In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27 (an appellate court may decline to consider an argument not supported by legal authority or any meaningful legal analysis), aff’d, 2021 CO 12 . 5 IV.

2026See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶¶ 34, 36 (three-hour time limit for parenting time hearing was not an abuse of discretion when mother’s counsel did not object and mother failed to identify any evidence excluded based on the time limit); see also In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27 (an appellate court may decline to consider an argument not supported by legal authority or any meaningful legal analysis), aff’d, 2021 CO 12 . 5 IV.

2026See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶¶ 34, 36 (three-hour time limit for parenting time hearing was not an abuse of discretion when mother’s counsel did not object and mother failed to identify any evidence excluded based on the time limit); see also In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27 (an appellate court may decline to consider an argument not supported by legal authority or any meaningful legal analysis), aff’d, 2021 CO 12 . 5 IV.

2026See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶¶ 34, 36 (three-hour time limit for parenting time hearing was not an abuse of discretion when mother’s counsel did not object and mother failed to identify any evidence excluded based on the time limit); see also In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27 (an appellate court may decline to consider an argument not supported by legal authority or any meaningful legal analysis), aff’d, 2021 CO 12 . 5 IV.

2026See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶¶ 34, 36 (three-hour time limit for parenting time hearing was not an abuse of discretion when mother’s counsel did not object and mother failed to identify any evidence excluded based on the time limit); see also In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27 (an appellate court may decline to consider an argument not supported by legal authority or any meaningful legal analysis), aff’d, 2021 CO 12 . 5 IV.

2026That’s as much information as I could take judicial notice of.” But the court’s judicial notice of the letter was insufficient to establish mother’s disability status under the ADA. 7 See RHJ Medical Center, Inc. v. City of DuBois, 754 F.Supp.2d 723, 752 (W.D.Pa. 2010) (“A record identifying a person as disabled for some other purpose — like a receipt of social security benefits — may not necessarily establish the fact that the person has a record of being disabled under the ADA”).

2026That’s as much information as I could take judicial notice of.” But the court’s judicial notice of the letter was insufficient to establish mother’s disability status under the ADA. 7 See RHJ Medical Center, Inc. v. City of DuBois, 754 F.Supp.2d 723, 752 (W.D.Pa. 2010) (“A record identifying a person as disabled for some other purpose — like a receipt of social security benefits — may not necessarily establish the fact that the person has a record of being disabled under the ADA”).

2025See People in Interest of M.D., 2014 COA 121, ¶ 43 (“[T]he department must establish a compelling reason why it is not in the child’s best interests to return home before the court may award permanent custody to a nonparent.”).

2025See People in Interest of M.D., 2014 COA 121, ¶ 43 (“[T]he department must establish a compelling reason why it is not in the child’s best interests to return home before the court may award permanent custody to a nonparent.”).

2024See People in Interest of S.N- V. , 300 P.3d 911 , 916 (Colo. App. 2011) (the invited error doctrine applies when a party invites or injects an error in t he proceedings and later claims that the error should be a basis f or reversal on appeal). ¶ 23 Finally , m other contends that she did not waive her right to appeal the APR judgment as a whole because she “ only left and acquiesced to the ruling after the court ruled the [D]epartment ha d made reasonable efforts, which she had already tied t o the best interests of her child.” ¶ 24 But mother did not mention the child’s best interests du ri

2024See People in Interest of S.N- V. , 300 P.3d 911 , 916 (Colo. App. 2011) (the invited error doctrine applies when a party invites or injects an error in t he proceedings and later claims that the error should be a basis f or reversal on appeal). ¶ 23 Finally , m other contends that she did not waive her right to appeal the APR judgment as a whole because she “ only left and acquiesced to the ruling after the court ruled the [D]epartment ha d made reasonable efforts, which she had already tied t o the best interests of her child.” ¶ 24 But mother did not mention the child’s best interests du ri

2024See C.S., 83 P.3d at 638 .

2024See C.S., 83 P.3d at 638 .

2022See People in Interest of C.B., 2019 COA 168, ¶ 31 (where parent does not claim Indian heritage on appeal, lack of inquiry by the juvenile court constitutes harmless error). ¶ 19 Third, although father was not present at the APR hearing, he was represented by counsel, who did not provide any information indicating that the child is an Indian child. ¶ 20 And finally, although the placement of the child with the maternal aunt and uncle with an APR was a “child custody proceeding,” as defined under ICWA, see 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (1)(i), the child was placed with maternal relatives who had adopted a h

2022See People in Interest of C.B., 2019 COA 168, ¶ 31 (where parent does not claim Indian heritage on appeal, lack of inquiry by the juvenile court constitutes harmless error). ¶ 19 Third, although father was not present at the APR hearing, he was represented by counsel, who did not provide any information indicating that the child is an Indian child. ¶ 20 And finally, although the placement of the child with the maternal aunt and uncle with an APR was a “child custody proceeding,” as defined under ICWA, see 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (1)(i), the child was placed with maternal relatives who had adopted a h