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127 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2026 39 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jawad a Shah Md Pc v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Cogreen2 sentences2023The trial court, summarizing the holding of this Court’s decision in Jawad A Shah, MD, PC v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 324 Mich App 182, 204 ; 920 NW2d 148 (2018), stated that “the controlling date for purposes of the one-year-back rule is the date of assignment[.]” The trial court reasoned that the tolling provision became inapplicable after Falls Lake formally denied intervening plaintiffs’ claims on June 13, 2019. 2023This subsection does not apply if the person claiming the benefits fails to pursue the claim with reasonable diligence. [MCL 500.3145(1) through (3), as amended by 2019 PA 21 .] “The one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) is designed to limit the amount of benefits recoverable under the no-fault act to those losses occurring no more than one year before an action is brought.” Shah, 324 Mich App at 202 (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 10 | 24 |
Devillers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'ngreen2 sentences2025Our Supreme Court eradicated this judicial tolling of the one-year-back rule in Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562 ; 702 NW2d 539 (2005), holding that because the statute did not include a tolling mechanism, none could be engrafted. 2025Our Supreme Court eradicated this judicial tolling of the one-year-back rule in Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562 ; 702 NW2d 539 (2005), holding that because the statute did not include a tolling mechanism, none could be engrafted. | 5 | 23 |
Joseph v. Auto Club Insurance Associationgreen2 sentences2025As we explained in Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 491 Mich 200, 220-221 ; 815 NW2d 412 (2012): The one-year-back rule codifies an integral part of the legislative compromise that is the no-fault act . . . . 2025As we explained in Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 491 Mich 200, 220-221 ; 815 NW2d 412 (2012): The one-year-back rule codifies an integral part of the legislative compromise that is the no-fault act . . . . | 4 | 35 |
Lewis v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchangered2 sentences2023See also Lewis v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 426 Mich 93, 101 ; 393 NW2d 167 (1986), overruled by Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562 ; 702 NW2d 539 (2005) (concluding that the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145 is tolled from the date of a specific claim for benefits to the date of a formal denial of liability). 2023See also Lewis v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 426 Mich 93, 101 ; 393 NW2d 167 (1986), overruled by Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562 ; 702 NW2d 539 (2005) (concluding that the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145 is tolled from the date of a specific claim for benefits to the date of a formal denial of liability). | 3 | 11 |
Kane v. Cloughgreen2 sentences2025Kane v Clough, 36 Mich 436, 440 (1877). 35 But a rescission is not the same as the revocation, repudiation, or cancellation of a contract. 29 See Wall v Zynda, 283 Mich 260, 264 ; 278 NW 66 (1938) (“ ‘To rescind a contract is not merely to terminate it, but to abrogate and undo it from the beginning[.] . . . 2025Kane v Clough, 36 Mich 436, 440 (1877). 35 But a rescission is not the same as the revocation, repudiation, or cancellation of a contract. 29 See Wall v Zynda, 283 Mich 260, 264 ; 278 NW 66 (1938) (“ ‘To rescind a contract is not merely to terminate it, but to abrogate and undo it from the beginning[.] . . . | 3 | 3 |
Welton v. Carriers Insurancegreen2 sentences2015Defendant cites an unpublished decision that relied on the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Welton v Carriers Ins Co, 421 Mich 571, 579-580 ; 365 NW2d 170 (1984), overruled in part by Devillers, 473 Mich at 577, 581 . 3 In Welton , the Michigan Supreme Court required the plaintiff to make a specific claim for personal protection insurance benefits to trigger tolling of the one-year-back rule set forth in MCL 500.3145 because “something more than a general notice of injury [was required to toll the one-year-back rule].” Devillers, 473 Mich at 576 . 2015Defendant cites an unpublished decision that relied on the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Welton v Carriers Ins Co, 421 Mich 571, 579-580 ; 365 NW2d 170 (1984), overruled in part by Devillers, 473 Mich at 577, 581 . 3 In Welton , the Michigan Supreme Court required the plaintiff to make a specific claim for personal protection insurance benefits to trigger tolling of the one-year-back rule set forth in MCL 500.3145 because “something more than a general notice of injury [was required to toll the one-year-back rule].” Devillers, 473 Mich at 576 . | 2 | 9 |
Kleinschrodt v. General Motors Corp.green2 sentences2010Moreover, contrary to the majority’s suggestions, Cameron is not at all inconsistent with Lambert v Calhoun, 394 Mich 179, 181 ; 229 NW2d 332 (1975), which held that the minority/insanity tolling provision of the RJA “extends the time for bringing suit under an act which contains its own statute of limitations”; with Rawlins v Aetna Cas & Surety Co, 92 Mich App 268 ; 284 NW2d 782 (1979), which held that the minority/insanity tolling provision of the RJA applies to the period of limitations contained in the no-fault automobile insurance act; with Kleinschrodt v Gen Motors Corp, 402 Mich 381 ; 2 2010Moreover, contrary to the majority’s suggestions, Cameron is not at all inconsistent with Lambert v Calhoun, 394 Mich 179, 181 ; 229 NW2d 332 (1975), which held that the minority/insanity tolling provision of the RJA “extends the time for bringing suit under an act which contains its own statute of limitations”; with Rawlins v Aetna Cas & Surety Co, 92 Mich App 268 ; 284 NW2d 782 (1979), which held that the minority/insanity tolling provision of the RJA applies to the period of limitations contained in the no-fault automobile insurance act; with Kleinschrodt v Gen Motors Corp, 402 Mich 381 ; 2 | 2 | 6 |
Cameron v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'ngreen2 sentences2016The one-year-back rule of “MCL 500.3145(1) . . . is clear” that “[d]amages are only allowed for one year back from the date the lawsuit is filed.” Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 476 Mich 55, 63 ; 718 NW2d 784 (2006).2 Therefore, a plain reading of MCL 500.3145(1) compels me to conclude that, because plaintiff did not file its complaint until August 4, 2014, its recovery was limited to losses incurred on or after August 4, 2013, i.e., one year back from the date the lawsuit was filed. 2016The one-year-back rule of “MCL 500.3145(1) . . . is clear” that “[d]amages are only allowed for one year back from the date the lawsuit is filed.” Cameron v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 476 Mich 55, 63 ; 718 NW2d 784 (2006).2 Therefore, a plain reading of MCL 500.3145(1) compels me to conclude that, because plaintiff did not file its complaint until August 4, 2014, its recovery was limited to losses incurred on or after August 4, 2013, i.e., one year back from the date the lawsuit was filed. | 2 | 5 |
Howard v. General Motors Corp.green2 sentences2012In Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, we discussed the significance of the legislative distinction between statutes of limitations and provisions that limit damages, noting that although a no-fault action to recover PIP benefits may be filed more than one year after the accident and more than one year after a particular loss has been incurred (provided that notice of injury has been given to the insurer or the insurer has previously paid PIP benefits for the injury), § 3145(1) nevertheless limits recovery in that action to those losses incurred within the one year preceding the filing of the act 2010Therefore, on the basis of the language of the rules, we perceive no logical reason for characterizing the one- and two-year-back rules as statutes of limitations. [Howard, 427 Mich at 384-387 (lead opinion by BRICKLEY, J.).] Justice Weaver would also overrule Cameron because it is inconsistent with “the reasons in [her] dissent to the Cameron decision.” In her dissent, she concluded that the one-year-back rule applies when the plaintiff is able to bring an action beyond one year from the date of the accident because he provided notice or was previously paid benefits, but does not apply when n | 2 | 3 |
| Henry Ford Health System v. Titan Insurancegreen | 2 | 2 |
Darryl McGore v. Baraga Correctional Facility Wardengreen2 sentences2023The trial court, summarizing the holding of this Court’s decision in Jawad A Shah, MD, PC v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 324 Mich App 182, 204 ; 920 NW2d 148 (2018), stated that “the controlling date for purposes of the one-year-back rule is the date of assignment[.]” The trial court reasoned that the tolling provision became inapplicable after Falls Lake formally denied intervening plaintiffs’ claims on June 13, 2019. 2022Defendant also does not dispute that plaintiff’s action in this case complied with the one-year back rule in MCL 500.3145 with respect to the services rendered by Renew and Farmbrook.4 According to defendant, however, the revocations are nonetheless void because when they were executed Farmbrook and Renew were precluded by the one-year back rule from recovering benefits relating to plaintiff, and therefore the revocations did not transfer anything to plaintiff.5 See Jawad A Shah, MD, PC, v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 324 Mich App 182, 204-205 ; 920 NW2d 148 (2018) (observing that an assignment | 1 | 12 |
Martin v. Somberg-Berlin Metals Co.green2 sentences1988In Martin v Somberg-Berlin Metals Co, 407 Mich 737, 741 ; 288 NW2d 574 (1980), the Supreme Court held: If compensation is paid for a particular disability (general on account of back injury) and subsequently another disability is determined (total and permanent on account of loss of industrial use of legs) compensation for the second disability is not "further compensation” subject to the one-year-back rule but is a separate "category” not so limited. 1988In Martin v Somberg-Berlin Metals Co, 407 Mich 737, 741 ; 288 NW2d 574 (1980), the Supreme Court held: If compensation is paid for a particular disability (general on account of back injury) and subsequently another disability is determined (total and permanent on account of loss of industrial use of legs) compensation for the second disability is not "further compensation” subject to the one-year-back rule but is a separate "category” not so limited. | 1 | 7 |
Ali Bazzi v. Sentinel Insurance Companygreen2 sentences2025And we remand the matter to the trial court to consider whether equitable rescission should apply to the case, see Bazzi, 502 Mich at 410 , and whether the real party in interest defect that existed at filing can be cured. 31 We note that Wallace’s claims were all “formally denied” and that therefore, there is no question that the tolling period under MCL 500.3145(3) ended. 2025And we remand the matter to the trial court to consider whether equitable rescission should apply to the case, see Bazzi, 502 Mich at 410 , and whether the real party in interest defect that existed at filing can be cured. 31 We note that Wallace’s claims were all “formally denied” and that therefore, there is no question that the tolling period under MCL 500.3145(3) ended. | 1 | 3 |
Baldwin v. Chrysler Corp.green2 sentences1986In Baldwin v Chrysler Corp, 67 Mich App 61 ; 240 NW2d 266 (1976), it applied the one-year-back rule as a limitation of authority. 1986In Baldwin v Chrysler Corp, 67 Mich App 61 ; 240 NW2d 266 (1976), it applied the one-year-back rule as a limitation of authority. | 1 | 3 |
Botsford General Hospital v. Citizens Insurancegreen2 sentences2023In Botsford, the injured party filed suit within the time permitted by the one-year-back rule, seeking reimbursement “for all reasonable charges, unlimited amount for medical and/or rehabilitative expenses and hospital charges.” Id. at 140 (quotation marks omitted). 2023Later, the intervening plaintiff, Botsford General Hospital, filed suit outside the time frame permitted by the one-year-back rule, seeking, as subrogee of the plaintiff’s rights, “reasonable charges for medical treatment rendered to [the] Plaintiff . . . .” Id. | 1 | 2 |
Titan Insurance v. North Pointe Insurancegreen2 sentences2023See Titan Ins Co v North Pointe Ins Co, 270 Mich App 339, 347 ; 715 NW2d 324 (2006). 2023See Titan Ins Co v North Pointe Ins Co, 270 Mich App 339, 347 ; 715 NW2d 324 (2006). | 1 | 2 |
| Tom Thomas Organization, Inc. v. Reliance Insurancegreen | 1 | 2 |
| Palchak v. Murray Corp. of Americagreen | 1 | 2 |
| Cashaw v. Great Lakes Greyhound Lines, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Sniecinski v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Campbell-Durocher Grp. Painting & Gen. Contracting, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| J. R. Watkins Co. v. Richgreen | 1 | 1 |
| University of Michigan Regents v. Titan Ins Agencygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lewis v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchangered2 sentences2023See also Lewis v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 426 Mich 93, 101 ; 393 NW2d 167 (1986), overruled by Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562 ; 702 NW2d 539 (2005) (concluding that the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145 is tolled from the date of a specific claim for benefits to the date of a formal denial of liability). 2023See also Lewis v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 426 Mich 93, 101 ; 393 NW2d 167 (1986), overruled by Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562 ; 702 NW2d 539 (2005) (concluding that the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145 is tolled from the date of a specific claim for benefits to the date of a formal denial of liability). | 1 | 11 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Burkhardt v. Bailey
green
2 sentences2024Farrar concluded, “Accordingly, under the express language of the one-year-back rule, [the medical provider] is barred under MCL 500.3145(2) from recovering any benefits that it incurred before February 11, 2020.” Id. 2019The Shah opinion, 324 Mich App at 204-205 , rejected the argument that the amendment (and thus the assignments) would relate back to the filing of the complaint, which would provide the relevant date from which to calculate the one-year-back rule: In this case, after the Covenant decision was issued, plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint to account for the assignments obtained from Hensley to allow plaintiffs to pursue an action against defendant insurer. ‘‘An assignee stands in the position of the assignor, possessing the same rights and being subject to the same defenses.’’ Burkhardt [v | 4 | 2018–2024 |
Grist v. the Upjohn Company
green
2 sentences2018Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the date of the assignments—July 11, 2017—provides the pertinent reference date for purposes of the one-year-back rule because plaintiffs’ motion actually sought leave to file a supplemental pleading rather than an amended pleading. -10- The rule regarding the relation back of amended pleadings is contained in MCR 2.118(D), which provides in pertinent part that an “amendment that adds a claim or defense relates back to the date of the original pleading if the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or oc 2018Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the date of the assignments—July 11, 2017—provides the pertinent reference date for purposes of the one-year-back rule because plaintiffs’ motion actually sought leave to file a supplemental pleading rather than an amended pleading. -10- The rule regarding the relation back of amended pleadings is contained in MCR 2.118(D), which provides in pertinent part that an “amendment that adds a claim or defense relates back to the date of the original pleading if the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or oc | 4 | 2018–2018 |
Geiger v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange
green
2 sentences2012Therefore, it does not apply to toll the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) because that provision does not concern when an action may be brought but, instead, limits the amount of PIP benefits a person injured in an automobile accident may recover.[ 24] In reaching this conclusion, we overruled the Court of Appeals’ decision in Geiger v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 25 which held that MCL 600.5851(1) applies to toll the one- year-back rule. 26 The Geiger panel reasoned that reading the statute in a contrary fashion 23 Id. at 62 . 24 Id. at 72 . 25 Geiger v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 114 M 2012Therefore, it does not apply to toll the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) because that provision does not concern when an action may be brought but, instead, limits the amount of PIP benefits a person injured in an automobile accident may recover.[ 24] In reaching this conclusion, we overruled the Court of Appeals’ decision in Geiger v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 25 which held that MCL 600.5851(1) applies to toll the one- year-back rule. 26 The Geiger panel reasoned that reading the statute in a contrary fashion 23 Id. at 62 . 24 Id. at 72 . 25 Geiger v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 114 M | 4 | 2006–2012 |
Lynch v. Briggs Manufacturing Co.
green
2 sentences1986The Court reasoned: We do not read the [one-year-back provision] as a statute of limitations, but rather as a limit on the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board’s authority to order the payment of benefits. [Id., p 62.] The Bordas Court cited no authority for its assertion that the two-year-back rule "is similar to the statute of limitations.” Yet, it went out of its way to distinguish Lynch, supra, p 173 , which had held that the one-year-back rule "expressly limited” "the power of the commission to award compensation.” Lynch was distinguished on the grounds that (1) it involved the one-year-ba 1986The Court reasoned: We do not read the [one-year-back provision] as a statute of limitations, but rather as a limit on the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board's authority to order the payment of benefits. [ Id., p 62.] [7] The Bordas Court cited no authority for its assertion that the two-year-back rule "is similar to the statute of limitations." Yet, it went out of its way to distinguish Lynch, supra, p 173 , which had held that the one-year-back rule "expressly limited" "the power of the commission to award compensation." Lynch was distinguished on the grounds that (1) it involved the one-ye | 4 | 1980–1987 |
Morgan v. Lloyds Builders Inc.
green
2 sentences1982Without any deduction for the compensation heretofore paid for loss of time or employment, plaintiff is entitled to receive compensation for specific loss of eye, according to [MCL 412.10; MSA 17.160] of $26 per week, for a total of 150 weeks from May 9, 1951.’ Id., 528-529 , "and refused to apply the one-year-back rule. 1982Morgan, supra. "In this case no compensation has been paid for the 'total and permanent’ disability resulting from the loss of industrial use of claimant’s legs and hence the award of differential benefits is not 'further compensation’ subject to the one-year-back rule.” (Emphasis in original.) The petition in which plaintiffs decedent requested total and permanent disability benefits did not constitute an application for "further compensation” within the meaning of the one-year-back provision. | 4 | 1978–1982 |
Miller v. Chapman Contracting
green
2 sentences2023The trial court agreed with Falls Lake that the one-year-back rule applied and the intervening complaint did not relate back to Johnson’s filing date, relying on Miller v Chapman Contracting, 477 Mich 102, 105 ; 730 NW2d 462 (2007). 2023The trial court agreed with Falls Lake that the one-year-back rule applied and the intervening complaint did not relate back to Johnson’s filing date, relying on Miller v Chapman Contracting, 477 Mich 102, 105 ; 730 NW2d 462 (2007). | 3 | 2018–2023 |
Yudashkin v. Holden
green
2 sentences2018Rory , 473 Mich. at 464 , 703 N.W.2d 23 ; Yudashkin , 247 Mich.App. at 651 , 637 N.W.2d 257 . *210 Defendant's remaining argument related to the jurisdictional minimum for the amount in controversy constitutes an argument that an alternate ground for affirming the trial court's ruling exists. 2018Rory , 473 Mich. at 464 , 703 N.W.2d 23 ; Yudashkin , 247 Mich.App. at 651 , 637 N.W.2d 257 . *210 Defendant's remaining argument related to the jurisdictional minimum for the amount in controversy constitutes an argument that an alternate ground for affirming the trial court's ruling exists. | 3 | 2018–2018 |
Rory v. Continental Insurance
green
2 sentences2018Rory , 473 Mich. at 464 , 703 N.W.2d 23 ; Yudashkin , 247 Mich.App. at 651 , 637 N.W.2d 257 . *210 Defendant's remaining argument related to the jurisdictional minimum for the amount in controversy constitutes an argument that an alternate ground for affirming the trial court's ruling exists. 2018Rory , 473 Mich. at 464 , 703 N.W.2d 23 ; Yudashkin , 247 Mich.App. at 651 , 637 N.W.2d 257 . *210 Defendant's remaining argument related to the jurisdictional minimum for the amount in controversy constitutes an argument that an alternate ground for affirming the trial court's ruling exists. | 3 | 2018–2018 |
Piwowarski v. Detroit Sulphite Pulp & Paper Co.
green
2 sentences1986Without discussing Kleinschrodt, the panel distinguished Lynch . 7 A minority of this Court disapproved of expanding Kleinschrodt in Piwowarski v Detroit Sulphite Pulp & Paper Co, 412 Mich 716 ; 316 NW2d 719 (1982), which construed the one-year-back rule. 1986Without discussing Kleinschrodt, the panel distinguished Lynch . 7 A minority of this Court disapproved of expanding Kleinschrodt in Piwowarski v Detroit Sulphite Pulp & Paper Co, 412 Mich 716 ; 316 NW2d 719 (1982), which construed the one-year-back rule. | 3 | 1982–1994 |
White v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co.
green
2 sentences1987The purpose of the one-year-back rule is "to guarantee a defendant prompt notice of claim for subsequent compensation, and to prohibit imposing on a defendant the burden of defending a stale claim.” White v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 352 Mich 201, 212 ; 89 NW2d 439 (1958). 1987The purpose of the one-year-back rule is "to guarantee a defendant prompt notice of claim for subsequent compensation, and to prohibit imposing on a defendant the burden of defending a stale claim.” White v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 352 Mich 201, 212 ; 89 NW2d 439 (1958). | 3 | 1978–1987 |
Wall v. Zynda
green
2 sentences2025Kane v Clough, 36 Mich 436, 440 (1877). 35 But a rescission is not the same as the revocation, repudiation, or cancellation of a contract. 29 See Wall v Zynda, 283 Mich 260, 264 ; 278 NW 66 (1938) (“ ‘To rescind a contract is not merely to terminate it, but to abrogate and undo it from the beginning[.] . . . 2025Kane v Clough, 36 Mich 436, 440 (1877). 35 But a rescission is not the same as the revocation, repudiation, or cancellation of a contract. 29 See Wall v Zynda, 283 Mich 260, 264 ; 278 NW 66 (1938) (“ ‘To rescind a contract is not merely to terminate it, but to abrogate and undo it from the beginning[.] . . . | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Lafontaine Saline, Inc v. Chrysler Group LLC
green
2 sentences2025However, because retroactively applying the tolling provision would “create new obligations or duties with respect to transactions or considerations already past,” LaFontaine, 496 Mich at 39 , we do not find it 16 necessary here to determine whether the one-year-back rule and tolling provision as applied here constitutes a vested right. 2025However, because retroactively applying the tolling provision would “create new obligations or duties with respect to transactions or considerations already past,” LaFontaine, 496 Mich at 39 , we do not find it 16 necessary here to determine whether the one-year-back rule and tolling provision as applied here constitutes a vested right. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Richards v. American Fellowship Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences1986The Court of Appeals, in Richards v American Fellowship Mutual Ins Co, 84 Mich App 629 ; 270 NW2d 670 (1978), lv den 406 Mich 862 (1979), applied the Tom Thomas rationale to the one-year-back rule contained in § 3145 of the no-fault act. 1986The Court of Appeals, in Richards v American Fellowship Mutual Ins Co, 84 Mich App 629 ; 270 NW2d 670 (1978), lv den 406 Mich 862 (1979), applied the Tom Thomas rationale to the one-year-back rule contained in § 3145 of the no-fault act. | 2 | 1986–2022 |
Bronson Methodist Hospital v. Allstate Insurance
green
2 sentences2014The Court, citing Henry Ford Health Sys, 275 Mich App at 646-647 , noted that “[c]laims filed through the MACF remain subject to the one-year-back rule found in MCL 500.3145(1).” Bronson Methodist *99 Hosp, 286 Mich App at 225 . 2014The Court reasoned that the Legislature’s “omission of language in MCL 500.3174 extending the recovery limitation was intentional” and, therefore, “recovery of benefits remains subject to the one-year-back rule.” Id. at 228 . | 2 | 2014–2021 |
Cooper v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n
green
2 sentences2009Shortly after this Court granted plaintiffs application for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court, in Cooper v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 481 Mich 399 ; 751 NW2d 443 (2008), specifically addressed whether an action for fraud is subject to the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145(1). 2009Shortly after this Court granted plaintiffs application for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court, in Cooper v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 481 Mich 399 ; 751 NW2d 443 (2008), specifically addressed whether an action for fraud is subject to the one-year-back rule of MCL 500.3145(1). | 2 | 2009–2019 |
| Regents of the University of Michigan v. State Farm Mutual Insurance green | 2 | 2007–2010 |
| Johnson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance green | 2 | 2001–2005 |
| In Re Certified Question green | 2 | 1986–2005 |
| Wozniak v. General Motors Corp. neutral | 2 | 1998–2000 |
| Fuchs v. General Motors Corp. green | 2 | 1986–1995 |
| Filion v. Art Himbault Trucking Co. green | 2 | 1993–1995 |
| Kushay v. Sexton Dairy Co. green | 2 | 1978–1994 |
| Bordas v. Detroit General Hospital green | 2 | 1986–1987 |
| Loucks v. Bauman green | 2 | 1978–1986 |
| State Bar Grievance Administrator v. Gillis neutral | 2 | 1984–1986 |
| Campbell v. St John Hospital green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Auto-Owners Insurance Company v. Compass Healthcare Plc green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Maiden v. Rozwood green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Kearns v. Michigan Iron & Coke Co. green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Lansing Schools Education Ass'n v. Lansing Board of Education green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Cannon Township v. Rockford Public Schools green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Barclae v. Zarb green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Bowles v. Oakman green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Lothian v. City of Detroit green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Martineau v. State Conservation Commission green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Local Emergency Financial Assistance Loan Board v. Blackwell green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Tamara Woodring v. Phoenix Insurance Company green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Douglas v. Allstate Insurance Company green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Cheesman v. Williams green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.