order dismissing claim in Florida

2005The State appeals a final order dismissing a violation of probation (VOP) affidavit pursuant to Jackson v. State, 881 So.2d 666 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

2005This case involves a State appeal of a final order dismissing a violation of probation (VOP) affidavit pursuant to Jackson v. State, 881 So.2d 666 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

2005This court, en banc, recently issued Crain v. State, 914 So.2d 1015 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), in which we held that although unsworn VOP affidavits are defective under Jackson , "the remedy of dismissal applied in Jackson is inappropriate in instances where the good faith exception applies." In light of Crain , we reverse and remand this case to the trial court to determine whether the good faith exception applies.

2005This Court recently issued an en banc decision in Crain v. State, 914 So.2d 1015 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), holding that although unsworn VOP affidavits are defective under Jackson , "the remedy of dismissal applied in Jackson is inappropriate in instances where the good faith exception applies." In light of Crain , we remand this case to the trial court to determine whether the good faith exception applies.

2015Id. at 664-65 .

2013In Televisual Communications, Inc., the appellant sought review of a final order dismissing its rule challenge petition for lack of standing. 667 So.2d at 372 .

2012In deciding that the State could not seek certio-rari review of such an order, the court noted its prior holdings that “no right of review by certiorari exists if no right of appeal exists.” Id. (citing State v. C.C., 476 So.2d 144 (Fla.1985), and State v. G.P., 476 So.2d 1272 (Fla.1985)).

2012In deciding that the State could not seek certio-rari review of such an order, the court noted its prior holdings that “no right of review by certiorari exists if no right of appeal exists.” Id. (citing State v. C.C., 476 So.2d 144 (Fla.1985), and State v. G.P., 476 So.2d 1272 (Fla.1985)).

1994This case is more like Deanna Const. Co. Inc. v. Sarasota Entertainment Corp., 563 So.2d 150 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), where the second district reversed an order dismissing a claim for unjust *578 enrichment on pleading grounds.

1994The court concluded that the pleading had fully alleged all of the elements of unjust enrichment. 563 So.2d at 152 .

1993MRS rested its argument in the trial court on the second district’s opinion in Swartzman v. Harlan, 535 So.2d 605 (Fla. 2d DCA1988), where that court reasoned as a matter of Florida law that statutes of limitations will be tolled only under those circumstances specified in section 95.051(1), Florida Statutes (1987). 6 Not finding bankruptcy specified in the statute then, the court concluded that under Florida law bankruptcy did not toll an otherwise applicable statute of limitations.

1990See also Rudolph v. Miami Dolphins, Ltd., 447 So.2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (JCC had no jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of an employment contract relating to compensation-like benefits, because the employer was exempt from complying with the workers’ compensation act), review denied, 453 So.2d 45 (Fla.1984); TRW, Inc. v. Betts, 407 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (JCC was without jurisdiction to determine a group insurance carrier’s entitlement to an offset for benefits paid by it under the group insurance contract, because the issue involved the interpretation of the insurance policy), r

1984Therefore, this case turns on whether the court lost jurisdiction to further entertain the claim of Mrs. Johnson against the city when the time for obtaining a rehearing or taking an appeal from the order dismissing that claim with prejudice expired. 422 So.2d at 19 .

1983In order to permit Tanaya to preserve the question (if she desires to do so), we again certify to the Florida Supreme Court as a matter of great public importance the same question certified in Champion v. Gray, 420 So.2d 348 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).

1983Because the Supreme Court reversed Hicks in State v. Hicks, 421 So.2d 510 (Fla.1982), we must reverse the order dismissing the violation of probation and information in this case.

1983Cf. Crawford v. Sheriff of Orange County, Florida, 441 So.2d 646 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). *1025 The order dismissing the rule to show cause is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.

1982Cf. 31 Fla. Stat.Anno. 14; Author's Comment, Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.500, "The court is required to enter such a default after notice and thus the new rule overrules Capers v. Lee, 91 So.2d 337 ." *54 An order dismissing a claim for failure to state a cause of action with leave to amend is not an order of court to amend.

1981We reverse and remand for further proceeding pursuant to Simpson v. Simpson, 108 So.2d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959) and Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 131 So.2d 509 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961).

1981We reverse and remand for further proceeding pursuant to Simpson v. Simpson, 108 So.2d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959) and Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, 131 So.2d 509 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961).

1981Kingsland v. National Advertising Company, 384 So.2d 701 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).