dragnet clause in Georgia

2014Id. at 754-755 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted) (concluding that suit against individual-debtor was not barred for lack of confirmation of foreclosure sale, where the creditor was not seeking a deficiency as to the secured personal debt but recovery on a separate corporate debt, albeit a corporate debt that was guaranteed by the individual-debtor); see 3 West Investments, LLC, supra (concluding that the confirmation requirement did not apply, where the loan sued upon was not inextricably intertwined with loans that underlay foreclosure sales that had not been confirmed); Vaughn & Co., Lt

2014Id. at 754-755 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted) (concluding that suit against individual-debtor was not barred for lack of confirmation of foreclosure sale, where the creditor was not seeking a deficiency as to the secured personal debt but recovery on a separate corporate debt, albeit a corporate debt that was guaranteed by the individual-debtor); see 3 West Investments, LLC, supra (concluding that the confirmation requirement did not apply, where the loan sued upon was not inextricably intertwined with loans that underlay foreclosure sales that had not been confirmed); Vaughn & Co., Lt

2012Compare Iwan, 296 Ga. App. at 129 (1) (two debts were inextricably intertwined because the notes “were secured by two separate security deeds, the notes were incurred only seven months apart for the same purpose,... both deeds pertained to the exact same property, [and] both notes were always held by the same creditor and both contained a cross-default clause”); Oakvale Road, 231 Ga. App. at 417-418 (two debts merged by the dragnet clause in the first note).

2012Compare Iwan, 296 Ga. App. at 129 (1) (two debts were inextricably intertwined because the notes “were secured by two separate security deeds, the notes were incurred only seven months apart for the same purpose, . . . both deeds pertained to the exact same property, [and] both notes were always held by the same creditor and both contained a cross-default clause”); Oakvale Road, 231 Ga. App. at 417-418 (two debts merged by the dragnet clause in the first note). 9 security instrument.” Here, Graham, Allen, and BCB were the original parties to Loans 608076 and 20030; 3 West and Unity were the or

1984The trial court rejected that argument, analogizing the present case to *296 C & S DeKalb Bank v. Hicks, 232 Ga. 244 ( 206 SE2d 22 ) (1974).

1984The trial court rejected that argument, analogizing the present case to *296 C & S DeKalb Bank v. Hicks, 232 Ga. 244 ( 206 SE2d 22 ) (1974).

2014See 3 West Investments, LLC, supra; Baby Days, Inc., supra at 754-755 (2).

2014C., supra at 282 (2) (reciting principles that “[a]fter an initial foreclosure under a deed with a ‘dragnet clause,’ a subsequent foreclosure under a separate deed securing separate property is not a deficiency judgment, but is a separate contractual remedy of the creditor not subject to the confirmation requirement”; and that “recovery on a separate, subsequent and different note for a different debt and for which separate property was conveyed is not recovery of a deficiency judgment on a previous note that contained a dragnet clause”). 49 See 3 West Investments, LLC, supra; Baby Days, Inc.,

2014The note sued upon is a separate transaction from that which was the basis for foreclosure, is not within the prohibition of [OCGA § 44-14-161 (a)], and [appellee bank] was not barred from bringing action thereon.”) (emphasis in original); Clements v. Fleet Finance, 206 Ga. App. 736, 738 ( 426 SE2d 910 ) (1992) (concluding that suit upon a note was not barred for lack of confirmation of a foreclosure sale, where there were “two separate debts evidenced by two separate notes and secured by two separate security deeds”) (emphasis in original) (physical precedent only).

2014The note sued upon is a separate transaction from that which was the basis for foreclosure, is not within the prohibition of [OCGA § 44-14-161 (a)], and [appellee bank] was not barred from bringing action thereon.”) (emphasis in original); Clements v. Fleet Finance, 206 Ga. App. 736, 738 ( 426 SE2d 910 ) (1992) (concluding that suit upon a note was not barred for lack of confirmation of a foreclosure sale, where there were “two separate debts evidenced by two separate notes and secured by two separate security deeds”) (emphasis in original) (physical precedent only).

2012Compare Iwan, 296 Ga. App. at 129 (1) (two debts were inextricably intertwined because the notes “were secured by two separate security deeds, the notes were incurred only seven months apart for the same purpose,... both deeds pertained to the exact same property, [and] both notes were always held by the same creditor and both contained a cross-default clause”); Oakvale Road, 231 Ga. App. at 417-418 (two debts merged by the dragnet clause in the first note).

2012Recovery Fund-Atlanta Pools, 231 Ga. App. 414, 416 ( 499 SE2d 404 ) (1998) (physical precedent only). 10 The fact that Loan 20030 was incurred to complete a sewer line to the 3 West property is not enough, in an of itself, to render the 3 West Loan and Loan 20030 inextricably intertwined, given the fact that the lenders were different and the distinctions regarding collateral. 8 confirmation of the foreclosure sale was not required in order for HSB to pursue collection under the 3 West Loan.11 We also reject the defendants’ argument that the dragnet clause contained in the initial loans effect

1987"The operation of `open-end' clauses contained in real estate mortgage or deeds conveying realty as security for a debt, which clauses provide that, in addition to securing the debt named or described in the instrument, such instruments or the property thereby conveyed shall also secure any other debt or obligation that may be or become owing by the mortgagor or grantor, is limited to other debts or obligations arising ex contractu, as distinguished from those arising ex delicto, between the original parties to the security instrument." OCGA § 44-14-1 (b). "[T]he phrase `original parties' as i

1987"The operation of `open-end' clauses contained in real estate mortgage or deeds conveying realty as security for a debt, which clauses provide that, in addition to securing the debt named or described in the instrument, such instruments or the property thereby conveyed shall also secure any other debt or obligation that may be or become owing by the mortgagor or grantor, is limited to other debts or obligations arising ex contractu, as distinguished from those arising ex delicto, between the original parties to the security instrument." OCGA § 44-14-1 (b). "[T]he phrase `original parties' as i

2025See id.

2023See Griggs v. Miller, 363 Ga. App. 82 , 84, 85-87 (1) ( 870 SE2d 578 ) (2022) (finding no intent to establish a perpetual or indefinite security interest where a security deed secured any indebtedness or liability “now owing or hereafter created by the grantor(s) to the grantee(s) at any time between the date of [the] deed” and its “cancellation of record or foreclosure” but also “set a fixed maturity date for the loan”); Bell, 355 Ga. App. at 99-100 (2) (b) (finding no intent to create a perpetual or indefinite security interest in a security deed containing a dragnet clause and a “fixed matu

2023See Griggs v. Miller, 363 Ga. App. 82 , 84, 85-87 (1) ( 870 SE2d 578 ) (2022) (finding no intent to establish a perpetual or indefinite security interest where a security deed secured any indebtedness or liability “now owing or hereafter created by the grantor(s) to the grantee(s) at any time between the date of [the] deed” and its “cancellation of record or foreclosure” but also “set a fixed maturity date for the loan”); Bell, 355 Ga. App. at 99-100 (2) (b) (finding no intent to create a perpetual or indefinite security interest in a security deed containing a dragnet clause and a “fixed matu

2015Bank of Chatsworth, 280 Ga. 535, 537-538 (1) ( 630 SE2d 407 ) (2006) (Where the evidence showed that the grantors of a deed to secure debt had satisfied the original indebtedness secured by the deed, and there was no evidence of any valid renewal or extension of the original note, the grantee could no longer claim any legal title to the property by virtue of a “dragnet” clause in the security deed, because a dragnet clause does not, in itself, change the fact that full payment of a secured indebtedness passes legal title back to the grantor.) (acknowledging a different result in Tedesco v. CDC

2015Bank of Chatsworth, 280 Ga. 535, 537-538 (1) ( 630 SE2d 407 ) (2006) (Where the evidence showed that the grantors of a deed to secure debt had satisfied the original indebtedness secured by the deed, and there was no evidence of any valid renewal or extension of the original note, the grantee could no longer claim any legal title to the property by virtue of a “dragnet” clause in the security deed, because a dragnet clause does not, in itself, change the fact that full payment of a secured indebtedness passes legal title back to the grantor.) (acknowledging a different result in Tedesco v. CDC

2015Credit Union, where the grantor expressly agreed in the deed’s “dragnet clause” that total repayment of the original debt would not operate to extinguish the deed to secure debt). 7 In a later transaction, Mullins and a business partner granted the bank a security interest in a different parcel of real property, and that security deed included as an “additional term,” “Grantor and Grantee agree, by this affirmative statement pursuant to OCGA § 44-14-80, to establish a perpetual or indefinite security interest in the property to secure the secured debt.” 8 Cf. Vineville Capital Group v. McCook,

2015Credit Union, where the grantor expressly agreed in the deed’s “dragnet clause” that total repayment of the original debt would not operate to extinguish the deed to secure debt). 7 In a later transaction, Mullins and a business partner granted the bank a security interest in a different parcel of real property, and that security deed included as an “additional term,” “Grantor and Grantee agree, by this affirmative statement pursuant to OCGA § 44-14-80, to establish a perpetual or indefinite security interest in the property to secure the secured debt.” 8 Cf. Vineville Capital Group v. McCook,

2012OCGA § 44-14-1 (b) limits the operation of dragnet clauses to debts “arising ex contractu . . . between the original parties to the 11 See Baby Days, Inc. v. Bank of Adairsville, 218 Ga. App. 752, 754 (2) ( 463 SE2d 171 ) (1995) (failure to confirm foreclosure did not bar the plaintiff from suing on the remaining debt because: “(a) [t]he loans were not to the same debtor; (b) the debtors executed the loan instruments at different times; (c) each loan was for a separate and distinct purpose . . . ; and (d) the corporate debt was backed by certain securities not serving as collateral as to [the

2012OCGA § 44-14-1 (b) limits the operation of dragnet clauses to debts “arising ex contractu . . . between the original parties to the 11 See Baby Days, Inc. v. Bank of Adairsville, 218 Ga. App. 752, 754 (2) ( 463 SE2d 171 ) (1995) (failure to confirm foreclosure did not bar the plaintiff from suing on the remaining debt because: “(a) [t]he loans were not to the same debtor; (b) the debtors executed the loan instruments at different times; (c) each loan was for a separate and distinct purpose . . . ; and (d) the corporate debt was backed by certain securities not serving as collateral as to [the

2012See Vaughn, 143 Ga. App. at 77 (1); Baker v. NEI Corp., 144 Ga. App. 165, 166 (1) ( 241 SE2d 4 ) (1977).

2012See Vaughn, 143 Ga. App. at 77 (1); Baker v. NEI Corp., 144 Ga. App. 165, 166 (1) ( 241 SE2d 4 ) (1977).

2010Co. v. Welchel, 257 Ga. 259, 261 (1) ( 356 SE2d 877 ) (1987). 10 Internal Medicine Alliance v. Budell, 290 Ga. App. 231, 239 (5) ( 659 SE2d 668 ) (2008). 11 William Goldberg & Co. v. Cohen, 219 Ga. App. 628, 640 (7) (a) ( 466 SE2d 872 ) (1995). 12 Given the dragnet clause contained in the deed of trust, the surplus was owed to the Bank. 13 Taylor v. Powertel, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 356, 358-359 (2) ( 551 SE2d 765 ) (2001). 14 Decatur Auto Center v. Wachovia Bank, 276 Ga. 817, 821 ( 583 SE2d 6 ) (2003). 15 Farmers Alliance Warehouse &c. v. McElhannon, 98 Ga. 394, 396 ( 25 SE 558 ) (1896).

2010Co. v. Welchel, 257 Ga. 259, 261 (1) ( 356 SE2d 877 ) (1987). 10 Internal Medicine Alliance v. Budell, 290 Ga. App. 231, 239 (5) ( 659 SE2d 668 ) (2008). 11 William Goldberg & Co. v. Cohen, 219 Ga. App. 628, 640 (7) (a) ( 466 SE2d 872 ) (1995). 12 Given the dragnet clause contained in the deed of trust, the surplus was owed to the Bank. 13 Taylor v. Powertel, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 356, 358-359 (2) ( 551 SE2d 765 ) (2001). 14 Decatur Auto Center v. Wachovia Bank, 276 Ga. 817, 821 ( 583 SE2d 6 ) (2003). 15 Farmers Alliance Warehouse &c. v. McElhannon, 98 Ga. 394, 396 ( 25 SE 558 ) (1896).

2010Co. v. Welchel, 257 Ga. 259, 261 (1) ( 356 SE2d 877 ) (1987). 10 Internal Medicine Alliance v. Budell, 290 Ga. App. 231, 239 (5) ( 659 SE2d 668 ) (2008). 11 William Goldberg & Co. v. Cohen, 219 Ga. App. 628, 640 (7) (a) ( 466 SE2d 872 ) (1995). 12 Given the dragnet clause contained in the deed of trust, the surplus was owed to the Bank. 13 Taylor v. Powertel, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 356, 358-359 (2) ( 551 SE2d 765 ) (2001). 14 Decatur Auto Center v. Wachovia Bank, 276 Ga. 817, 821 ( 583 SE2d 6 ) (2003). 15 Farmers Alliance Warehouse &c. v. McElhannon, 98 Ga. 394, 396 ( 25 SE 558 ) (1896).

2010Co. v. Welchel, 257 Ga. 259, 261 (1) ( 356 SE2d 877 ) (1987). 10 Internal Medicine Alliance v. Budell, 290 Ga. App. 231, 239 (5) ( 659 SE2d 668 ) (2008). 11 William Goldberg & Co. v. Cohen, 219 Ga. App. 628, 640 (7) (a) ( 466 SE2d 872 ) (1995). 12 Given the dragnet clause contained in the deed of trust, the surplus was owed to the Bank. 13 Taylor v. Powertel, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 356, 358-359 (2) ( 551 SE2d 765 ) (2001). 14 Decatur Auto Center v. Wachovia Bank, 276 Ga. 817, 821 ( 583 SE2d 6 ) (2003). 15 Farmers Alliance Warehouse &c. v. McElhannon, 98 Ga. 394, 396 ( 25 SE 558 ) (1896).

2010Co. v. Welchel, 257 Ga. 259, 261 (1) ( 356 SE2d 877 ) (1987). 10 Internal Medicine Alliance v. Budell, 290 Ga. App. 231, 239 (5) ( 659 SE2d 668 ) (2008). 11 William Goldberg & Co. v. Cohen, 219 Ga. App. 628, 640 (7) (a) ( 466 SE2d 872 ) (1995). 12 Given the dragnet clause contained in the deed of trust, the surplus was owed to the Bank. 13 Taylor v. Powertel, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 356, 358-359 (2) ( 551 SE2d 765 ) (2001). 14 Decatur Auto Center v. Wachovia Bank, 276 Ga. 817, 821 ( 583 SE2d 6 ) (2003). 15 Farmers Alliance Warehouse &c. v. McElhannon, 98 Ga. 394, 396 ( 25 SE 558 ) (1896).

2010Co. v. Welchel, 257 Ga. 259, 261 (1) ( 356 SE2d 877 ) (1987). 10 Internal Medicine Alliance v. Budell, 290 Ga. App. 231, 239 (5) ( 659 SE2d 668 ) (2008). 11 William Goldberg & Co. v. Cohen, 219 Ga. App. 628, 640 (7) (a) ( 466 SE2d 872 ) (1995). 12 Given the dragnet clause contained in the deed of trust, the surplus was owed to the Bank. 13 Taylor v. Powertel, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 356, 358-359 (2) ( 551 SE2d 765 ) (2001). 14 Decatur Auto Center v. Wachovia Bank, 276 Ga. 817, 821 ( 583 SE2d 6 ) (2003). 15 Farmers Alliance Warehouse &c. v. McElhannon, 98 Ga. 394, 396 ( 25 SE 558 ) (1896).

2010Co. v. Welchel, 257 Ga. 259, 261 (1) ( 356 SE2d 877 ) (1987). 10 Internal Medicine Alliance v. Budell, 290 Ga. App. 231, 239 (5) ( 659 SE2d 668 ) (2008). 11 William Goldberg & Co. v. Cohen, 219 Ga. App. 628, 640 (7) (a) ( 466 SE2d 872 ) (1995). 12 Given the dragnet clause contained in the deed of trust, the surplus was owed to the Bank. 13 Taylor v. Powertel, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 356, 358-359 (2) ( 551 SE2d 765 ) (2001). 14 Decatur Auto Center v. Wachovia Bank, 276 Ga. 817, 821 ( 583 SE2d 6 ) (2003). 15 Farmers Alliance Warehouse &c. v. McElhannon, 98 Ga. 394, 396 ( 25 SE 558 ) (1896).

2010Co. v. Welchel, 257 Ga. 259, 261 (1) ( 356 SE2d 877 ) (1987). 10 Internal Medicine Alliance v. Budell, 290 Ga. App. 231, 239 (5) ( 659 SE2d 668 ) (2008). 11 William Goldberg & Co. v. Cohen, 219 Ga. App. 628, 640 (7) (a) ( 466 SE2d 872 ) (1995). 12 Given the dragnet clause contained in the deed of trust, the surplus was owed to the Bank. 13 Taylor v. Powertel, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 356, 358-359 (2) ( 551 SE2d 765 ) (2001). 14 Decatur Auto Center v. Wachovia Bank, 276 Ga. 817, 821 ( 583 SE2d 6 ) (2003). 15 Farmers Alliance Warehouse &c. v. McElhannon, 98 Ga. 394, 396 ( 25 SE 558 ) (1896).

2010Co. v. Welchel, 257 Ga. 259, 261 (1) ( 356 SE2d 877 ) (1987). 10 Internal Medicine Alliance v. Budell, 290 Ga. App. 231, 239 (5) ( 659 SE2d 668 ) (2008). 11 William Goldberg & Co. v. Cohen, 219 Ga. App. 628, 640 (7) (a) ( 466 SE2d 872 ) (1995). 12 Given the dragnet clause contained in the deed of trust, the surplus was owed to the Bank. 13 Taylor v. Powertel, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 356, 358-359 (2) ( 551 SE2d 765 ) (2001). 14 Decatur Auto Center v. Wachovia Bank, 276 Ga. 817, 821 ( 583 SE2d 6 ) (2003). 15 Farmers Alliance Warehouse &c. v. McElhannon, 98 Ga. 394, 396 ( 25 SE 558 ) (1896).

2010Co. v. Welchel, 257 Ga. 259, 261 (1) ( 356 SE2d 877 ) (1987). 10 Internal Medicine Alliance v. Budell, 290 Ga. App. 231, 239 (5) ( 659 SE2d 668 ) (2008). 11 William Goldberg & Co. v. Cohen, 219 Ga. App. 628, 640 (7) (a) ( 466 SE2d 872 ) (1995). 12 Given the dragnet clause contained in the deed of trust, the surplus was owed to the Bank. 13 Taylor v. Powertel, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 356, 358-359 (2) ( 551 SE2d 765 ) (2001). 14 Decatur Auto Center v. Wachovia Bank, 276 Ga. 817, 821 ( 583 SE2d 6 ) (2003). 15 Farmers Alliance Warehouse &c. v. McElhannon, 98 Ga. 394, 396 ( 25 SE 558 ) (1896).

2010Co. v. Welchel, 257 Ga. 259, 261 (1) ( 356 SE2d 877 ) (1987). 10 Internal Medicine Alliance v. Budell, 290 Ga. App. 231, 239 (5) ( 659 SE2d 668 ) (2008). 11 William Goldberg & Co. v. Cohen, 219 Ga. App. 628, 640 (7) (a) ( 466 SE2d 872 ) (1995). 12 Given the dragnet clause contained in the deed of trust, the surplus was owed to the Bank. 13 Taylor v. Powertel, Inc., 250 Ga. App. 356, 358-359 (2) ( 551 SE2d 765 ) (2001). 14 Decatur Auto Center v. Wachovia Bank, 276 Ga. 817, 821 ( 583 SE2d 6 ) (2003). 15 Farmers Alliance Warehouse &c. v. McElhannon, 98 Ga. 394, 396 ( 25 SE 558 ) (1896).

1987Compare Woodside v. Lippold, 113 Ga. 877 ( 39 SE 400 ) (1901). 4.

1987Compare Woodside v. Lippold, 113 Ga. 877 ( 39 SE 400 ) (1901). 4.