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19 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1909–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
DAVIS v. the STATE.green2 sentences2022Further, the Court reasoned, there was nothing for a plea in bar to defeat “until either an indictment or an accusation [was] filed.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 786 (2). 3 See generally Coalson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 761, 764 (2) ( 555 SE2d 128 ) (2001) (“[T]he purpose of the indictment is to allow defendant to prepare his defense intelligently and to protect him from double jeopardy.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 4 See generally Davis v. State, 347 Ga. App. 757, 757 ( 820 SE2d 791 ) (2018) (“A special plea in bar is ‘[a] plea that, rather than addressing the merits and denying the fa 2022Further, the Court reasoned, there was nothing for a plea in bar to defeat “until either an indictment or an accusation [was] filed.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 786 (2). 3 See generally Coalson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 761, 764 (2) ( 555 SE2d 128 ) (2001) (“[T]he purpose of the indictment is to allow defendant to prepare his defense intelligently and to protect him from double jeopardy.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 4 See generally Davis v. State, 347 Ga. App. 757, 757 ( 820 SE2d 791 ) (2018) (“A special plea in bar is ‘[a] plea that, rather than addressing the merits and denying the fa | 2 | 2 |
Bell v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Daniels v. State, 78 Ga. 98, 103 (2) (1886) (fact questions related to applicability of double jeopardy defense “would have to be submitted to the jury”); Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109,117 ( 17 SE2d 573 ) (1941); compare Bell v. State, 249 Ga. 644, 645 (1) ( 292 SE2d 402 ) (1982) (“No question of fact was at issue in this special plea in bar [asserting double jeopardy], so it was unnecessary to have a jury hear the plea.”). 2015See Daniels v. State, 78 Ga. 98, 103 (2) (1886) (fact questions related to applicability of double jeopardy defense “would have to be submitted to the jury”); Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109,117 ( 17 SE2d 573 ) (1941); compare Bell v. State, 249 Ga. 644, 645 (1) ( 292 SE2d 402 ) (1982) (“No question of fact was at issue in this special plea in bar [asserting double jeopardy], so it was unnecessary to have a jury hear the plea.”). | 2 | 2 |
McDonald v. Stategreen2 sentences1975In Bryant v. State, 224 Ga. 235 ( 161 SE2d 312 ), the court said, 'Though the defendant designated these motions as motions to "quash” the indictment, we treat them as being pleas in abatement or a special plea in bar. ’ 'It is an elementary rule of pleading that substance, not mere nomenclature, controls.’ McDonald v. State, 222 Ga. 596, 597 (1) ( 151 SE2d 121 ) and cits.” State v. Houston, 134 Ga. App. 36 ( 213 SE2d 139 ). 2. 1975In Bryant v. State, 224 Ga. 235 ( 161 SE2d 312 ), the court said, 'Though the defendant designated these motions as motions to "quash” the indictment, we treat them as being pleas in abatement or a special plea in bar. ’ 'It is an elementary rule of pleading that substance, not mere nomenclature, controls.’ McDonald v. State, 222 Ga. 596, 597 (1) ( 151 SE2d 121 ) and cits.” State v. Houston, 134 Ga. App. 36 ( 213 SE2d 139 ). 2. | 2 | 2 |
MAXWELL v. THE STATE (Two Cases)green1 sentence2022See generally Maxwell, 311 Ga. at 677 (2) (summarizing that “[u]nlike constitutionally based double jeopardy, statutory procedural double jeopardy extends the concept of res judicata to the successive prosecution of different crimes arising from the same conduct in situations where the State should have prosecuted the different crimes in a single proceeding”). | 1 | 1 |
Coalson v. Stategreen2 sentences2022Further, the Court reasoned, there was nothing for a plea in bar to defeat “until either an indictment or an accusation [was] filed.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 786 (2). 3 See generally Coalson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 761, 764 (2) ( 555 SE2d 128 ) (2001) (“[T]he purpose of the indictment is to allow defendant to prepare his defense intelligently and to protect him from double jeopardy.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 4 See generally Davis v. State, 347 Ga. App. 757, 757 ( 820 SE2d 791 ) (2018) (“A special plea in bar is ‘[a] plea that, rather than addressing the merits and denying the fa 2022Further, the Court reasoned, there was nothing for a plea in bar to defeat “until either an indictment or an accusation [was] filed.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 786 (2). 3 See generally Coalson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 761, 764 (2) ( 555 SE2d 128 ) (2001) (“[T]he purpose of the indictment is to allow defendant to prepare his defense intelligently and to protect him from double jeopardy.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 4 See generally Davis v. State, 347 Ga. App. 757, 757 ( 820 SE2d 791 ) (2018) (“A special plea in bar is ‘[a] plea that, rather than addressing the merits and denying the fa | 1 | 1 |
Daniels v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See Daniels v. State, 78 Ga. 98, 103 (2) (1886) (fact questions related to applicability of double jeopardy defense “would have to be submitted to the jury”); Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109,117 ( 17 SE2d 573 ) (1941); compare Bell v. State, 249 Ga. 644, 645 (1) ( 292 SE2d 402 ) (1982) (“No question of fact was at issue in this special plea in bar [asserting double jeopardy], so it was unnecessary to have a jury hear the plea.”). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Daniels v. State, 78 Ga. 98, 103 (2) (1886) (fact questions related to applicability of double jeopardy defense “would have to be submitted to the jury”); Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109,117 ( 17 SE2d 573 ) (1941); compare Bell v. State, 249 Ga. 644, 645 (1) ( 292 SE2d 402 ) (1982) (“No question of fact was at issue in this special plea in bar [asserting double jeopardy], so it was unnecessary to have a jury hear the plea.”). 2015See Daniels v. State, 78 Ga. 98, 103 (2) (1886) (fact questions related to applicability of double jeopardy defense “would have to be submitted to the jury”); Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109,117 ( 17 SE2d 573 ) (1941); compare Bell v. State, 249 Ga. 644, 645 (1) ( 292 SE2d 402 ) (1982) (“No question of fact was at issue in this special plea in bar [asserting double jeopardy], so it was unnecessary to have a jury hear the plea.”). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Millsgreen2 sentences1974I concur fully in the pronouncements by the majority, and add thereto as follows: This was much too late to make the motion, and defendant had waived same by pleading to the merits (not guilty) without raising this question. *697 This is nothing more than an effort to file a special plea in bar to the indictment, and "if such pleas are not made preliminary to the trial they are held to be waived in contemplation of law," as is held in Jones v. Mills, 216 Ga. 616, at 618 ( 118 SE2d 484 ). 1974I concur fully in the pronouncements by the majority, and add thereto as follows: This was much too late to make the motion, and defendant had waived same by pleading to the merits (not guilty) without raising this question. *697 This is nothing more than an effort to file a special plea in bar to the indictment, and "if such pleas are not made preliminary to the trial they are held to be waived in contemplation of law," as is held in Jones v. Mills, 216 Ga. 616, at 618 ( 118 SE2d 484 ). | 1 | 1 |
Bowen v. Stategreen2 sentences1964See Bowen v. State, 215 Ga. 471 ( 111 SE2d 44 ); Morgan v. Todd, 214 Ga. 497 ( 106 SE2d 37 ). 1964See Bowen v. State, 215 Ga. 471 ( 111 SE2d 44 ); Morgan v. Todd, 214 Ga. 497 ( 106 SE2d 37 ). | 1 | 1 |
Savannah Electric Co. v. Jacksongreen1 sentence1953In Savannah Electric Co. v. Jackson, 132 Ga. 559, 563 (4) ( 64 S. E. 680 ), it was held: “Where the judge instructs the jury that if the defendant has used all ordinary care and diligence there can be no recovery, it cannot be said to add a distinct and substantive defense to also prove that the plaintiff is free from fault. | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Hillgreen2 sentences1950See Roberts v. Hill, 78 Ga. App. 264 ( 50 S. E. 2d, 706 ). 2. 1950See Roberts v. Hill, 78 Ga. App. 264 ( 50 S. E. 2d, 706 ). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Hayes v. Mayor of Lithoniagreen1 sentence1926See Hayes v. Mayor &c. of Lithonia, 94 Ga. 552 ( 20 S. E. 46 ); Central of Georgia Ry. | 1 | 1 |
Mayor & Council v. Boonegreen1 sentence1926See Hayes v. Mayor &c. of Lithonia, 94 Ga. 552 ( 20 S. E. 46 ); Central of Georgia Ry. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bryant v. State
green
2 sentences1975In Bryant v. State, 224 Ga. 235 ( 161 SE2d 312 ), the court said, 'Though the defendant designated these motions as motions to "quash” the indictment, we treat them as being pleas in abatement or a special plea in bar. ’ 'It is an elementary rule of pleading that substance, not mere nomenclature, controls.’ McDonald v. State, 222 Ga. 596, 597 (1) ( 151 SE2d 121 ) and cits.” State v. Houston, 134 Ga. App. 36 ( 213 SE2d 139 ). 2. 1975In Bryant v. State, 224 Ga. 235 ( 161 SE2d 312 ), the court said, 'Though the defendant designated these motions as motions to "quash” the indictment, we treat them as being pleas in abatement or a special plea in bar. ’ 'It is an elementary rule of pleading that substance, not mere nomenclature, controls.’ McDonald v. State, 222 Ga. 596, 597 (1) ( 151 SE2d 121 ) and cits.” State v. Houston, 134 Ga. App. 36 ( 213 SE2d 139 ). 2. | 3 | 1974–1975 |
Durham v. Holeman
green
2 sentences1942The apparent ruling in Durham v. IJoleman, 30 Ga. 619 (7), that when the plaintiff's title or cause of action is plainly made out, and 'the defendant relies on a special plea in bar to defeat the recovery, such as the statute of limitations, the defendant must establish the facts to sustain the plea affirmatively beyond a reasonable doubt, else the verdict must be against the plea, was explained in Schnell v. Toomer, 56 Ga. 168, where the trial judge was upheld for refusing a request to charge that the plea of the statute must be supported by proof so conclusive as to exclude reasonable doubt. 1932Durham v. Holeman, 30 Ga. 619 (7). | 2 | 1932–1942 |
Jones v. Grimes
green
1 sentence2018More particularly, a special plea in bar is "[a] plea that, rather than addressing the merits and denying the facts alleged, sets up some extrinsic fact showing why a criminal defendant cannot be tried for the offense charged ." Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Tuzman
green
2 sentences1981In State v. Tuzman, 145 Ga. App. 481 ( 243 SE2d 675 ) (1978) we held that a pre-trial hearing on a plea in bar was an appropriate procedure for handling the plea. 1981In State v. Tuzman, 145 Ga. App. 481 ( 243 SE2d 675 ) (1978) we held that a pre-trial hearing on a plea in bar was an appropriate procedure for handling the plea. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Houston
green
2 sentences1975In Bryant v. State, 224 Ga. 235 ( 161 SE2d 312 ), the court said, 'Though the defendant designated these motions as motions to "quash” the indictment, we treat them as being pleas in abatement or a special plea in bar. ’ 'It is an elementary rule of pleading that substance, not mere nomenclature, controls.’ McDonald v. State, 222 Ga. 596, 597 (1) ( 151 SE2d 121 ) and cits.” State v. Houston, 134 Ga. App. 36 ( 213 SE2d 139 ). 2. 1975In Bryant v. State, 224 Ga. 235 ( 161 SE2d 312 ), the court said, 'Though the defendant designated these motions as motions to "quash” the indictment, we treat them as being pleas in abatement or a special plea in bar. ’ 'It is an elementary rule of pleading that substance, not mere nomenclature, controls.’ McDonald v. State, 222 Ga. 596, 597 (1) ( 151 SE2d 121 ) and cits.” State v. Houston, 134 Ga. App. 36 ( 213 SE2d 139 ). 2. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Hightower v. State
green
1 sentence1975This case differs from Dismuke v. State, 127 Ga. App. 835 ( 195 SE2d 259 ), State v. Houston, 1 supra, and Hightower v. State, 135 Ga. App. 92 , in that in each of those cases a preliminary hearing was held, but the case was reversed because the defendant was not given the benefit of counsel at the preliminary hearing. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Dismuke v. State
green
2 sentences1975This case differs from Dismuke v. State, 127 Ga. App. 835 ( 195 SE2d 259 ), State v. Houston, 1 supra, and Hightower v. State, 135 Ga. App. 92 , in that in each of those cases a preliminary hearing was held, but the case was reversed because the defendant was not given the benefit of counsel at the preliminary hearing. 1975This case differs from Dismuke v. State, 127 Ga. App. 835 ( 195 SE2d 259 ), State v. Houston, 1 supra, and Hightower v. State, 135 Ga. App. 92 , in that in each of those cases a preliminary hearing was held, but the case was reversed because the defendant was not given the benefit of counsel at the preliminary hearing. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Morgan v. Todd
green
2 sentences1964See Bowen v. State, 215 Ga. 471 ( 111 SE2d 44 ); Morgan v. Todd, 214 Ga. 497 ( 106 SE2d 37 ). 1964See Bowen v. State, 215 Ga. 471 ( 111 SE2d 44 ); Morgan v. Todd, 214 Ga. 497 ( 106 SE2d 37 ). | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Allen v. Terrell
green
1 sentence1953In Savannah Electric Co. v. Jackson, 132 Ga. 559, 563 (4) ( 64 S. E. 680 ), it was held: “Where the judge instructs the jury that if the defendant has used all ordinary care and diligence there can be no recovery, it cannot be said to add a distinct and substantive defense to also prove that the plaintiff is free from fault. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Morton v. Savannah Hospital
green
2 sentences1950Morton v. Savannah Hospital 148 Ga. 438 ( 96 S. E. 887 ); Robertson v. Executive Committee of the Baptist Convention, 55 Ga. App. 469 ( 190 S. E. 432 ). 1950Morton v. Savannah Hospital 148 Ga. 438 ( 96 S. E. 887 ); Robertson v. Executive Committee of the Baptist Convention, 55 Ga. App. 469 ( 190 S. E. 432 ). | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Robertson v. Executive Committee of the Baptist Convention
green
2 sentences1950Morton v. Savannah Hospital 148 Ga. 438 ( 96 S. E. 887 ); Robertson v. Executive Committee of the Baptist Convention, 55 Ga. App. 469 ( 190 S. E. 432 ). 1950Morton v. Savannah Hospital 148 Ga. 438 ( 96 S. E. 887 ); Robertson v. Executive Committee of the Baptist Convention, 55 Ga. App. 469 ( 190 S. E. 432 ). | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Howell v. State
green
2 sentences1947In Howell v. State, 28 Ga. App. 501 ( 111 S. E. 676 ), this court held: “Upon the trial of one charged with using obscene, profane, and vulgar language in the presence of a female, a special plea in bar by the defendant that he was acquitted at a prior term of the court of the charge of being in an intoxicated condition upon a public street or highway, ‘said drunkenness and intoxication being caused by the excessive use of wines, brews, liquors, and opiates, and was made manifest by boisterous and indecent condition and acting and by vulgar, profane, and unbecoming language and loud and .viole 1947In Howell v. State, 28 Ga. App. 501 ( 111 S. E. 676 ), this court held: “Upon the trial of one charged with using obscene, profane, and vulgar language in the presence of a female, a special plea in bar by the defendant that he was acquitted at a prior term of the court of the charge of being in an intoxicated condition upon a public street or highway, ‘said drunkenness and intoxication being caused by the excessive use of wines, brews, liquors, and opiates, and was made manifest by boisterous and indecent condition and acting and by vulgar, profane, and unbecoming language and loud and .viole | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Cain v. State
green
1 sentence1947In Howell v. State, 28 Ga. App. 501 ( 111 S. E. 676 ), this court held: “Upon the trial of one charged with using obscene, profane, and vulgar language in the presence of a female, a special plea in bar by the defendant that he was acquitted at a prior term of the court of the charge of being in an intoxicated condition upon a public street or highway, ‘said drunkenness and intoxication being caused by the excessive use of wines, brews, liquors, and opiates, and was made manifest by boisterous and indecent condition and acting and by vulgar, profane, and unbecoming language and loud and .viole | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Johnson v. State
neutral
1 sentence1947In Howell v. State, 28 Ga. App. 501 ( 111 S. E. 676 ), this court held: “Upon the trial of one charged with using obscene, profane, and vulgar language in the presence of a female, a special plea in bar by the defendant that he was acquitted at a prior term of the court of the charge of being in an intoxicated condition upon a public street or highway, ‘said drunkenness and intoxication being caused by the excessive use of wines, brews, liquors, and opiates, and was made manifest by boisterous and indecent condition and acting and by vulgar, profane, and unbecoming language and loud and .viole | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Schnell v. Toomer
neutral
1 sentence1942The apparent ruling in Durham v. IJoleman, 30 Ga. 619 (7), that when the plaintiff's title or cause of action is plainly made out, and 'the defendant relies on a special plea in bar to defeat the recovery, such as the statute of limitations, the defendant must establish the facts to sustain the plea affirmatively beyond a reasonable doubt, else the verdict must be against the plea, was explained in Schnell v. Toomer, 56 Ga. 168, where the trial judge was upheld for refusing a request to charge that the plea of the statute must be supported by proof so conclusive as to exclude reasonable doubt. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Sibley v. Lee
green
1 sentence1915Where a defendant on trial for murder enters a special plea in bar, of former jeopardy and autrefois convict, in which' he alleges that at a previous term of the court he was tried under the same indictment and regularly convicted by the jury of the offense of involuntary manslaughter, and that the court refused to accept this verdict, and afterwards, over his objection, illegally declared a mistrial in the case, which was a nullity, that the verdict of involuntary manslaughter still stands and is a legal verdict, and should stand against him because he was convicted of that offense and the ve | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Darsey v. State
green
1 sentence1915Where a defendant on trial for murder enters a special plea in bar, of former jeopardy and autrefois convict, in which' he alleges that at a previous term of the court he was tried under the same indictment and regularly convicted by the jury of the offense of involuntary manslaughter, and that the court refused to accept this verdict, and afterwards, over his objection, illegally declared a mistrial in the case, which was a nullity, that the verdict of involuntary manslaughter still stands and is a legal verdict, and should stand against him because he was convicted of that offense and the ve | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Doyal v. State green | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.