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19 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 2000–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Golden v. Mullengreen2 sentences2018Atkinson , 369 Ill.App.3d at 832 , 308 Ill.Dec. 186 , 861 N.E.2d 251 (citing Golden , 295 Ill.App.3d at 870 , 230 Ill.Dec. 256 , 693 N.E.2d 385 ); accord Popp , 313 Ill.App.3d at 642 , 246 Ill.Dec. 481 , 730 N.E.2d 506 (citing Skopp v. First Federal Savings , 189 Ill.App.3d 440 , 448, 136 Ill.Dec. 832 , 545 N.E.2d 356 (1989) ). ¶ 20 Through the years, as our jurisprudence has developed and as the methods of legal representation have modernized, the attorney litigation privilege has also progressed. 2018Atkinson , 369 Ill.App.3d at 832 , 308 Ill.Dec. 186 , 861 N.E.2d 251 (citing Golden , 295 Ill.App.3d at 870 , 230 Ill.Dec. 256 , 693 N.E.2d 385 ); accord Popp , 313 Ill.App.3d at 642 , 246 Ill.Dec. 481 , 730 N.E.2d 506 (citing Skopp v. First Federal Savings , 189 Ill.App.3d 440 , 448, 136 Ill.Dec. 832 , 545 N.E.2d 356 (1989) ). ¶ 20 Through the years, as our jurisprudence has developed and as the methods of legal representation have modernized, the attorney litigation privilege has also progressed. | 4 | 4 |
O'Callaghan v. Satherliegreen2 sentences2022O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶ 25 . ¶ 35 Before considering the propriety of the trial court’s ruling on the attorney litigation privilege, we will address the plaintiff’s contention that the Lawyer Defendants’ motion to dismiss was based on an affirmative defense and more properly filed under section 2-619. 2022See, for e.g., O’Callaghan, 2015 IL App (1st) 142152, ¶¶ 25, 29-30 (where the plaintiffs alleged that opposing counsel ordered workers to remove mold-containing barriers, required their experts to alter their opinions, and concealed evidence, the litigation privilege applied because all of the alleged improper conduct clearly pertained to the role of the attorney in the underlying action and were done in furtherance of representing their client). ¶ 39 Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the attorney litigation privilege does not apply to its statutory claims under the Illinois Trade Secrets A | 3 | 4 |
Atkinson v. Affrontigreen2 sentences2018Atkinson , 369 Ill.App.3d at 833 , 308 Ill.Dec. 186 , 861 N.E.2d 251 . ¶ 19 The only requirement for the application of the attorney litigation privilege is that the communication must pertain to proposed or pending litigation. 2018Atkinson , 369 Ill.App.3d at 833 , 308 Ill.Dec. 186 , 861 N.E.2d 251 . ¶ 19 The only requirement for the application of the attorney litigation privilege is that the communication must pertain to proposed or pending litigation. | 3 | 3 |
Thompson v. Frankgreen2 sentences2018Here, unlike in Kurczaba where the purpose of disseminating the material was to advertise, defendants' purpose in recording the sheriff's deed was related to the foreclosure case. ¶ 32 In Thompson v. Frank , 313 Ill. 2012App. 3d at 705 (“Illinois clearly limits the attorney litigation privilege and has refused to extend it to third-party communications unrelated to a lawsuit.”); Thompson, 313 Ill. | 2 | 3 |
Popp v. O'NEILgreen2 sentences2018Popp v. O'Neil , 313 Ill.App.3d 638 , 642, 246 Ill.Dec. 481 , 730 N.E.2d 506 (2000) (this is a question of law). ¶ 15 We find that the trial court properly dismissed Frank's and Margaret's intrusion upon seclusion claims pursuant to McDermott's section 2-615 motion. ¶ 16 Undeniably, the instant cause centers on the attorney litigation privilege, its applicability to the facts herein, and O'Callaghan . 2018Popp v. O'Neil , 313 Ill.App.3d 638 , 642, 246 Ill.Dec. 481 , 730 N.E.2d 506 (2000) (this is a question of law). ¶ 15 We find that the trial court properly dismissed Frank's and Margaret's intrusion upon seclusion claims pursuant to McDermott's section 2-615 motion. ¶ 16 Undeniably, the instant cause centers on the attorney litigation privilege, its applicability to the facts herein, and O'Callaghan . | 2 | 2 |
Pledger v. Burnup & Sims, Inc.green2 sentences2000The privilege is based on English doctrine and the basis for the privilege is that "it is [in] the interest of the public that great freedom should be allowed in complaints and allegations with a view to have them inquired into; and that parties and counsel should be indulged with great latitude in the freedom of speech in the conduct of their causes and courts and in asserting their rights, because in this way the purposes of justice will be subserved, and the court can and will protect the party aggrieved by expunging irrelevant, defamatory matter from the pleadings, and by punishing for con 2000The privilege is based on English doctrine and the basis for the privilege is: “[I]t is [in] the interest of the public that great freedom should be allowed in complaints and allegations with a view to have them inquired into; and that parties and counsel should be indulged with great latitude in the freedom of speech in the conduct of their causes and courts and in asserting their rights, because in this way the purposes of justice will be subserved, and the court can and will protect the party aggrieved by expunging irrelevant, defamatory matter from the pleadings, and by punishing for conte | 2 | 2 |
Kurczaba v. Pollockgreen2 sentences2018The court noted that "Illinois clearly limits the attorney litigation privilege and has refused to extend it to third-party communications unrelated to a lawsuit." Id . at 705, 252 Ill.Dec. 175 , 742 N.E.2d 425 . 2018The court noted that "Illinois clearly limits the attorney litigation privilege and has refused to extend it to third-party communications unrelated to a lawsuit." Id . at 705, 252 Ill.Dec. 175 , 742 N.E.2d 425 . | 1 | 7 |
Scarpelli v. McDermott Will & Emery LLPgreen2 sentences2025“The only requirement for the application 5 No. 1-24-0419 of the attorney litigation privilege is that the communication must pertain to proposed or pending litigation.” Scarpelli, 2018 IL App (1st) 170874, ¶ 19 . 2025See Scarpelli, 2018 IL App (1st) 170874, ¶ 19 (“The only requirement for the application of the attorney litigation privilege is that the communication must pertain to proposed or pending litigation.”). | 1 | 3 |
Dillon v. Evanston Hospitalgreen1 sentence2023See Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 199 Ill. 2d 483, 493 (2002) (reaching the merits of appellants’ issue despite appellants’ failure to cite any authority supporting their appellate argument). ¶ 21 A. Application of the Attorney Litigation Privilege ¶ 22 We find plaintiff’s claim that defendant’s comment during the November 15, 2021, hearing falls beyond the protection of the attorney litigation privilege is without merit. ¶ 23 Defendant brought her motion to dismiss under section 2-619.1 of the Code, which permits a party to file a combined section 2-615 motion to dismiss and a section 2-619 motio | 1 | 1 |
In Re Detention of Swopegreen1 sentence2022In re Detention of Swope, 213 Ill. 2d 210, 217 (2004). 15 court did not err in finding that the attorney litigation privilege applied to the Lawyer Defendants’ respective communications with SpearTip and Miller. ¶ 38 We next consider the plaintiffs’ contention that the litigation privilege did not apply to the Lawyer Defendants’ “illegal out-of-court conduct.” Initially, we note that the plaintiffs have not made specific allegations that the Lawyer Defendants committed a crime. | 1 | 1 |
Skopp v. First Federal Savingsgreen2 sentences2018Atkinson , 369 Ill.App.3d at 832 , 308 Ill.Dec. 186 , 861 N.E.2d 251 (citing Golden , 295 Ill.App.3d at 870 , 230 Ill.Dec. 256 , 693 N.E.2d 385 ); accord Popp , 313 Ill.App.3d at 642 , 246 Ill.Dec. 481 , 730 N.E.2d 506 (citing Skopp v. First Federal Savings , 189 Ill.App.3d 440 , 448, 136 Ill.Dec. 832 , 545 N.E.2d 356 (1989) ). ¶ 20 Through the years, as our jurisprudence has developed and as the methods of legal representation have modernized, the attorney litigation privilege has also progressed. 2018Atkinson , 369 Ill.App.3d at 832 , 308 Ill.Dec. 186 , 861 N.E.2d 251 (citing Golden , 295 Ill.App.3d at 870 , 230 Ill.Dec. 256 , 693 N.E.2d 385 ); accord Popp , 313 Ill.App.3d at 642 , 246 Ill.Dec. 481 , 730 N.E.2d 506 (citing Skopp v. First Federal Savings , 189 Ill.App.3d 440 , 448, 136 Ill.Dec. 832 , 545 N.E.2d 356 (1989) ). ¶ 20 Through the years, as our jurisprudence has developed and as the methods of legal representation have modernized, the attorney litigation privilege has also progressed. | 1 | 1 |
August v. Hanlongreen2 sentences2013August v. Hanlon, 2012 IL App (2d) 111252, ¶ 35 . 2013August, 2012 IL App (2d) 111252, ¶ 36 (citing Golden v. Mullen, 295 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Lykowski v. Bergmangreen1 sentence2012App. 3d at 664 (holding that attorney-litigation privilege does not apply to out-of- court communication between an attorney and an opposing party’s spouse); Lykowski v. Bergman, 299 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing & Administration, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003Defendants alternatively rely on the qualified privilege, citing Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing & Administration, Inc., 156 Ill. 2d 16 , 619 N.E.2d 129 (1993). 2003Defendants alternatively rely on the qualified privilege, citing Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing & Administration, Inc., 156 Ill. 2d 16 , 619 N.E.2d 129 (1993). | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Cahokia Unit School District No. 187 v. Pritzker
green
1 sentence2025Id. ¶ 11 As discussed, although the circuit court orally remarked that it would be dismissing Cole’s complaint based on the attorney litigation privilege and the doctrine of res judicata, the court’s written order only utilized the attorney litigation privilege as a basis for dismissal. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Masters v. Murphy
green
2 sentences2025Because we can affirm the circuit court’s dismissal based on any basis supported by the record (see Masters v. Murphy, 2020 IL App (1st) 190908, ¶ 9 ), we need not determine whether the attorney litigation privilege bars the claims in Cole’s complaint. 2025Because we can affirm the circuit court’s dismissal based on any basis supported by the record (see Masters v. Murphy, 2020 IL App (1st) 190908, ¶ 9 ), we need not determine whether the attorney litigation privilege bars the claims in Cole’s complaint. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy
green
1 sentence2025Id. ¶ 13 First, there was a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction based on the first municipal district case, as the judge there dismissed the case with prejudice based on Cole’s failure to state causes of action and the attorney litigation privilege. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
American Backflow and Fire Prevention, Inc. v. Hincks
green
1 sentence2025We disagree with plaintiffs’ arguments and hold that the trial court correctly found the statements privileged. -9- 2025 IL App (2d) 250023 ¶ 23 The absolute litigation privilege, also called the attorney litigation privilege, is generally based on section 586 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states that an attorney is “absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Cooney v. Rossiter
green
1 sentence2025Rather, this case presents a clear-cut application of the res judicata doctrine based on the first municipal district judge’s dismissal of Cole’s complaint against Yanoff, and we resolve the case accordingly. ¶ 12 “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction bars any subsequent cause of action between the parties or their privies on the same cause of action.” Cooney v. Rossiter, 2012 IL 113227, ¶ 18 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Johnson v. Johnson and Bell, LTD.
green
1 sentence2023Johnson v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd., 2014 IL App (1st) 122677, ¶ 15 ; 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2022). ¶ 25 In Illinois, the attorney litigation privilege is well-established, affording complete immunity to an attorney in a defamation action based on his or her statements, irrespective of the attorney’s knowledge to the statement’s falsity or the attorney’s motives. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Samson Investment Co. v. Chevaillier
green
1 sentence2013Id. ¶ 36 We conclude that the attorney litigation privilege does not apply to this case. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.