conclusion of the suppression hearing in Illinois

1984App.3d 59 , 405 N.E.2d 1121 . • 3 However, because a ruling on a motion to suppress is not final and may be reversed at any time, a reviewing court may consider evidence during trial after the conclusion of the suppression hearing.

1982App. 3d 59, 65 , 405 N.E.2d 1121, 1127 , which states that “in considering a ruling upon a motion to suppress, a reviewing court may consider evidence during trial after the conclusion of the suppression hearing.” We do not find Sakalas applicable here.

1997Officer Wilson testified that he frisked defendant "for my safety as well as his.” However, when asked whether he had any particular reason to believe that defendant had a weapon, Officer Wilson responded: "No. I do that as a common thing in my job, to pat people down for my safety as well as theirs.” At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court ruled that the stop of defendant was valid under section 107 — 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/107 — 14 (West 1994)) and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 20 L.

1997Officer Wilson testified that he frisked defendant "for my safety as well as his.” However, when asked whether he had any particular reason to believe that defendant had a weapon, Officer Wilson responded: "No. I do that as a common thing in my job, to pat people down for my safety as well as theirs.” At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court ruled that the stop of defendant was valid under section 107 — 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/107 — 14 (West 1994)) and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 20 L.

1981(People v. Braden (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 516 , 216 N.E.2d 808 ; People v. Sakalas (1980), 85 Ill.

1981(People v. Braden (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 516 , 216 N.E.2d 808 ; People v. Sakalas (1980), 85 Ill.

2007Specifically, the trial court distinguished the present case from People v. Lawson, 298 Ill.App.3d 997 , 233 Ill.Dec. 24 , 700 N.E.2d 125 (1998), a case which affirmed a quashing of an arrest and suppression of evidence where the officer issuing the police bulletin did not possess facts sufficient to establish probable cause.

2007Specifically, the trial court distinguished the present case from People v. Lawson, 298 Ill.App.3d 997 , 233 Ill.Dec. 24 , 700 N.E.2d 125 (1998), a case which affirmed a quashing of an arrest and suppression of evidence where the officer issuing the police bulletin did not possess facts sufficient to establish probable cause.

1980(People v. Braden (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 516 , 216 N.E.2d 808 ; People v. Turner (1976), 35 Ill.

1980(People v. Braden (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 516 , 216 N.E.2d 808 ; People v. Turner (1976), 35 Ill.

1996At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial judge ruled that defendant’s statement and the gun were admissible pursuant to the public safety exception enunciated in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 , 81 L.

1996At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial judge ruled that defendant’s statement and the gun were admissible pursuant to the public safety exception enunciated in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 , 81 L.

1993(See People v. Hoffman (1942), 381 Ill. 460, 465 .) At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial judge found the confession to be voluntary; as such, it was properly admissible.

1993(See People v. Hoffman (1942), 381 Ill. 460, 465 , 45 N.E.2d 874 .) At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial judge found the confession to be voluntary; as such, it was properly admissible.

1991At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, after making findings and rulings that: (a) defendant was arrested on March 11, 1986, and was advised of the Miranda warnings (Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L.

1991At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, after making findings and rulings that: (a) defendant was arrested on March 11, 1986, and was advised of the Miranda warnings (Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L.

1989In granting the motion, the circuit judge relied on the Federal district court’s decision in Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner (1981), 518 F. Supp. 582 , which had been issued on July 6, 1981, one day after the search at issue here.

1985In affirming the circuit court, the appellate court held that the police officer’s “detection of the smell of marijuana and alcohol gave him a reasonable basis to believe that a crime was being committed in his presence thus justifying under the circumstances a warrantless search of the automobile.” 67 Ill.

1985In affirming the circuit court, the appellate court held that the police officer's "detection of the smell of marijuana and alcohol gave him a reasonable basis to believe that a crime was being committed in his presence thus justifying under the circumstances a warrantless search of the automobile." 67 Ill.

1984Ed. 2d 564 , 91 S. Ct. 2022 .) In addition, as the trial court recognized at the conclusion of the suppression hearing, if the initial entry was proper, then probable cause existed for the issuance of the search warrants once Officer Behner learned from the Addison police department that the blue jeep was a stolen vehicle.

1984(See People v. Taylor (1981), 99 Ill.

1984(See People v. Taylor (1981), 99 Ill.

1982However, at the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court stated: “It’s obvious *** there [were] no grounds to get a search warrant before the officers believed an offense was taking place and once they believed that an offense was taking place they had a right to make an arrest.” The first issue to be considered is whether defendant retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room when the door was “cracked open.” Although the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573 , 63 L.

1982However, at the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court stated: “It’s obvious *** there [were] no grounds to get a search warrant before the officers believed an offense was taking place and once they believed that an offense was taking place they had a right to make an arrest.” The first issue to be considered is whether defendant retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room when the door was “cracked open.” Although the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573 , 63 L.

1982However, at the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court stated: "It's obvious * * * there [were] no grounds to get a search warrant before the officers believed an offense was taking place and once they believed that an offense was taking place they had a right to make an arrest." The first issue to be considered is whether defendant retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room when the door was "cracked open." Although the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , concerned preser

1982However, at the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court stated: "It's obvious * * * there [were] no grounds to get a search warrant before the officers believed an offense was taking place and once they believed that an offense was taking place they had a right to make an arrest." The first issue to be considered is whether defendant retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room when the door was "cracked open." Although the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , concerned preser