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19 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 2023–2026 19 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2026The court distinguished its decisions in Harris and People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 115151 , by stating that they “addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphasis in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 . ¶ 20 Further, our supreme court has concluded that “[a]s Miller does not directly apply to young adults, it also does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 40 . 2026However, the Clark court made clear that the emerging adult cases it discussed “addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphasis in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 . | 6 | 14 |
People v. Hilliardgreen2 sentences2025Moore reasoned that, “As Miller does not directly apply to young adults, it also does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” Id. ¶ 40. ¶ 57 Lastly, People v. Hilliard repeated the supreme court’s narrow view of Thompson and Harris by stating, “those cases addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphases in original.) People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶ 27 (quoting Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 ). ¶ 58 We recently had 2025The Clark court specified that case law related to emerging adult offenders “addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphasis in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 ; see Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 31 (Miller “does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause in a successive postconviction petition”); see also, People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶27 . | 6 | 6 |
People v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2025The supreme court clarified that Thompson and Harris “addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphases in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 (citing Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 1, 44 , and Harris, 2018 IL 121932 , ¶¶ 1, 48). - 15 - No. 1-23-1568 ¶ 56 People v. Moore followed, in which the supreme court reiterated that “Miller does not present new proportionate penalties clause principles with respect to discretionary sentencing of young adult offenders.” People v. Moore, 2023 2025And “those cases addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphasis in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 (citing Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 1 , 44 and Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 1, 48 ). | 3 | 5 |
People v. Mooregreen2 sentences2026The court distinguished its decisions in Harris and People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 115151 , by stating that they “addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphasis in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 . ¶ 20 Further, our supreme court has concluded that “[a]s Miller does not directly apply to young adults, it also does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 40 . 2025The supreme court clarified that Thompson and Harris “addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphases in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 (citing Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 1, 44 , and Harris, 2018 IL 121932 , ¶¶ 1, 48). - 15 - No. 1-23-1568 ¶ 56 People v. Moore followed, in which the supreme court reiterated that “Miller does not present new proportionate penalties clause principles with respect to discretionary sentencing of young adult offenders.” People v. Moore, 2023 | 2 | 4 |
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2025The supreme court clarified that Thompson and Harris “addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphases in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 (citing Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 1, 44 , and Harris, 2018 IL 121932 , ¶¶ 1, 48). - 15 - No. 1-23-1568 ¶ 56 People v. Moore followed, in which the supreme court reiterated that “Miller does not present new proportionate penalties clause principles with respect to discretionary sentencing of young adult offenders.” People v. Moore, 2023 2025And “those cases addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphasis in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 (citing Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 1 , 44 and Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 1, 48 ). | 1 | 4 |
People v. Spencergreen1 sentence2025The Clark court specified that case law related to emerging adult offenders “addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction petitions.” (Emphasis in original.) Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 88 ; see Spencer, 2025 IL 130015, ¶ 31 (Miller “does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause in a successive postconviction petition”); see also, People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL 128186, ¶27 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Conickgreen1 sentence2024(Also see People v. Conick, 232 Ill. 2d 132, 142 (2008) (the cause-and-prejudice test is a more exacting standard than the test to survive summary dismissal at the first stage of an initial postconviction petition).) Here, the defendant received a discretionary sentence which he seeks to challenge in a successive postconviction petition. ¶ 14 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a procedural mechanism for defendants to raise claims of violations of their constitutional rights. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Leachgreen1 sentence2024See Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 42 (“As Miller did not change the law applicable to young adults, it does not provide cause for the proportionate penalties challenges advanced in [the defendants’] proposed successive - 11 - No. 1-22-0587 postconviction petitions.”); People v. Leach, 2024 IL App (4th) 230298, ¶ 86 (“[N]othing in Moore suggested a distinction between discretionary and mandatory sentences.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Dorsey
green
1 sentence2026“Mandatory-life-sentencing statutes are constitutionally flawed, according to Miller, because they remove consideration of youth from the determination of whether to impose the harshest sentence and pose too great a risk of disproportionate punishment. [Citation.] But Miller did not foreclose the possibility of discretionary life sentences for juvenile homicide offenders.” Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 38 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Green-Hosey
green
1 sentence2026While Brady was sentenced to a de facto life sentence, the proportionate penalties claim was not in his initial postconviction petition. ¶ 26 Brady cites two cases in support of his contention that he established cause, People v. Green-Hosey, 2025 IL App (2d) 240284 and People v. Dobbey, 2025 IL App (1st) 231929-U , both of which are distinguishable. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. House
green
1 sentence2023House, 2021 IL 125124, ¶¶ 5-7 . ¶ 28 Here, defendant is facing neither a mandatory sentence that resembles what has been recognized as a de facto life sentence, nor is he advancing the as-applied proportionate penalties clause argument in his initial postconviction petition. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.