doing business standard (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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doing business standard in Illinois

19 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2007 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
Cook Associates, Inc. v. Lexington United Corp.green
ill · 1981 · cited in 11 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1983–2007
2 sentences

1990(Cook, 87 Ill. 2d at 201-02 , 429 N.E.2d at 852-53 (and cases cited therein).) As characterized by this court, the doing business standard is “quite high.” Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Mobil Rocky Mountain, Inc. (1987), 155 Ill.

1990(Cook, 87 Ill. 2d at 201-02 , 429 N.E.2d at 852-53 (and cases cited therein).) As characterized by this court, the doing business standard is “quite high.” Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Mobil Rocky Mountain, Inc. (1987), 155 Ill.

511
Tauza v. . Susquehanna Coal Co.green
ny · 1917 · cited in 5 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1988–2007
2 sentences

2007The doing-business standard requires a showing that a nonresident defendant was carrying on business activity in Illinois "`not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity.'" Maunder v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd., 102 Ill.2d 342, 351 , 80 Ill.Dec. 765 , 466 N.E.2d 217 (1984) (quoting Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267 , 115 N.E. 915, 917 (1917)).

2007The doing-business standard requires a showing that a nonresident defendant was carrying on business activity in Illinois "`not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity.'" Maunder v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd., 102 Ill.2d 342, 351 , 80 Ill.Dec. 765 , 466 N.E.2d 217 (1984) (quoting Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267 , 115 N.E. 915, 917 (1917)).

55
Maunder v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd.green
ill · 1984 · cited in 4 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2006–2007
2 sentences

2007The doing-business standard requires a showing that a nonresident defendant was carrying on business activity in Illinois "`not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity.'" Maunder v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd., 102 Ill.2d 342, 351 , 80 Ill.Dec. 765 , 466 N.E.2d 217 (1984) (quoting Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267 , 115 N.E. 915, 917 (1917)).

2007The doing-business standard requires a showing that a nonresident defendant was carrying on business activity in Illinois "`not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity.'" Maunder v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd., 102 Ill.2d 342, 351 , 80 Ill.Dec. 765 , 466 N.E.2d 217 (1984) (quoting Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267 , 115 N.E. 915, 917 (1917)).

34
Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp.green
ill · 1981 · cited in 3 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1983–1988
2 sentences

1987Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 304, 311 , 489 N.E.2d 1360, 1364 ; see Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 431 , 427 N.E.2d 1203 .) A court must first determine whether the doing business standard or the long-arm statute is satisfied.

1987Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 304, 311 , 489 N.E.2d 1360, 1364 ; see Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 431 , 427 N.E.2d 1203 .) A court must first determine whether the doing business standard or the long-arm statute is satisfied.

33
Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp.green
ill · 1978 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1983–1988
2 sentences

1988Radosta nevertheless relies on Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 548 , 382 N.E.2d 252 , to support her “totality of contacts” argument.

1988Radosta nevertheless relies on Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 548 , 382 N.E.2d 252 , to support her “totality of contacts” argument.

12
Reichel v. Supreme Courtgreen
scotus · 1979 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
1 sentence

1983See, e.g., Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 548 , 382 N.E.2d 252 , cert. denied (1979), 442 U.S. 928 , 61 L.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

CaseCitedYears
Riemer v. KSL Recreation Corp. green
illappct · 2004
2 sentences

2007The doing-business standard is high, and generally, "`doing business' means conducting business in Illinois of such a character and to such an extent that it may be inferred that the defendant has subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of this state and is bound to appear when properly served." Riemer, 348 Ill.

2007The doing-business standard is high, and generally, “ ‘doing business’ means conducting business in Illinois of such a character and to such an extent that it may be inferred that the defendant has subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of this state and is bound to appear when properly served.” Riemer, 348 Ill.

42006–2007
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Mobil Rocky Mountain, Inc. green
illappct · 1987
2 sentences

2001Mobil Rocky Mountain, 155 Ill.

1990(Cook, 87 Ill. 2d at 201-02 , 429 N.E.2d at 852-53 (and cases cited therein).) As characterized by this court, the doing business standard is “quite high.” Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Mobil Rocky Mountain, Inc. (1987), 155 Ill.

31990–2001
Alderson v. Southern Co. green
illappct · 2001
2 sentences

2005With respect to section 2 — 209(b)(4) of the Code, we note that “[t]he ‘doing business’ standard is quite high and requires a showing that the defendant is conducting business of such character and extent as to warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the forum. [Citations.] The defendant must transact business in Illinois ‘ “not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity.” ’ [Citations.] Thus, the statute requires a ‘course of business’ or ‘regularity of activities’ as opposed to isolated or sporadic ac

2005With respect to section 2-209(b)(4) of the Code, we note that "[t]he 'doing business standard is quite high and requires a showing that the defendant is conducting business of such character and extent as to warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the forum. [Citations.] The defendant must transact business in Illinois ' "not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity." ' [Citation.] Thus, the statute requires a 'course of business' or 'regularity of activities' as opposed to isolated or sporadic acts.

22005–2005
Gaidar v. Tippecanoe Distribution Service, Inc. green
illappct · 1998
2 sentences

2001Gaidar, 299 Ill.

2001Gaidar , 299 Ill.

22001–2001
Dal Ponte v. Northern Manitoba Native Lodges, Inc. green
illappct · 1991
1 sentence

1992(Cook, 87 Ill. 2d 190 , 429 N.E.2d 427 ; Dal Ponte v. Northern Manitoba Native Lodges, Inc. (1991), 220 Ill.

11992–1992
Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd. green
ilnd · 1986
1 sentence

1988Ill. 1986), 626 F. Supp. 305 , the Federal district court applied Illinois law and determined that service of summons on the defendant corporation’s agent while he was present in Illinois for a three-day exhibition was invalid because there was insufficient evidence that the defendant met the doing business standard.

11988–1988
R. W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs Corp. green
ill · 1986
2 sentences

1987Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 304, 311 , 489 N.E.2d 1360, 1364 ; see Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 431 , 427 N.E.2d 1203 .) A court must first determine whether the doing business standard or the long-arm statute is satisfied.

1987Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 304, 311 , 489 N.E.2d 1360, 1364 ; see Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 431 , 427 N.E.2d 1203 .) A court must first determine whether the doing business standard or the long-arm statute is satisfied.

11987–1987
St. Louis—San Francisco Railway Co. v. Gitchoff green
ill · 1977
1 sentence

1981Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Gitchoff (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 38 ), as it was early recognized that the doctrine was not preempted by the long-arm'statute.

11981–1981
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. green
scotus · 1952
2 sentences

1980Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. (1952), 342 U.S. 437 , 96 L.

1980Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. (1952), 342 U.S. 437 , 96 L.

11980–1980

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IL § 735 ILCS 5/2-209 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 19 (1980–2007) TX 9 (1990–2015) NY 3 (1964–1991) WA 2 (2013–2013)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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