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19 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co.green2 sentences2014An insurer may cede control of the defense under two scenarios: (1) when a conflict of interest exists, which entitles the insured to control the defense through counsel of its own choosing; or (2) when the insurer breaches its duty to defend, thereby requiring the insured to assume its own defense. - 13 - No. 1-12-3339 ¶ 44 Under Illinois law, a conflict of interest arises when “the interests of the insurer would be furthered by providing a less than vigorous defense to the allegations against the insured.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 288 Ill. 2014An insurer may cede control of the defense under two scenarios: (1) when a conflict of interest exists, which entitles the insured to control the defense through counsel of its own choosing; or (2) when the insurer breaches its duty to defend, thereby requiring the insured to assume its own defense. - 13 - No. 1-12-3339 ¶ 44 Under Illinois law, a conflict of interest arises when “the interests of the insurer would be furthered by providing a less than vigorous defense to the allegations against the insured.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 288 Ill. | 4 | 5 |
MASONIC MEDICAL CTR. v. Turegum Ins. Co.green2 sentences2005Illinois Masonic, 168 Ill. 2003Illinois Masonic Medical Center v. Turegum Insurance Co., 168 Ill. | 2 | 3 |
Nandorf, Inc. v. CNA Insurance Companiesgreen2 sentences2026To determine whether a conflict of interest exists, we consider whether, in “comparing the allegations of the complaint to the policy terms, the interest of the insurer would be furthered by providing a less than vigorous defense to those allegations.” Nandorf, 134 Ill. 1988The test of whether a conflict exists is if, in comparing the allegations of the complaint to the terms of the policy, the insurer’s interests would be furthered by providing a less than vigorous defense to the allegations (Nandorf, Inc., 134 Ill. | 1 | 6 |
Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochugreen2 sentences1991See Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 486, 499-500 , 475 N.E.2d 872 ; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 187, 195 , 355 N.E.2d 24 .) A conflict of interest which may prejudice the insured exists, if, when comparing the allegations of the complaint to the policy terms, the interest of the insurer would be furthered by providing a less than vigorous defense to those allegations. 1991See Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 486, 499-500 , 475 N.E.2d 872 ; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 187, 195 , 355 N.E.2d 24 .) A conflict of interest which may prejudice the insured exists, if, when comparing the allegations of the complaint to the policy terms, the interest of the insurer would be furthered by providing a less than vigorous defense to those allegations. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Royal Insurance v. Process Design Associates, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011App. 3d at 973 , 582 N.E.2d at 1239 . ¶ 23 A conflict of interest that may prejudice the insured exists if, when comparing the allegations of the complaint to the policy terms, the interest of the insurer would be furthered by providing a less than vigorous defense to those allegations. 2008The appellate court has also articulated the test as whether, when comparing the complaint’s allegations to the policy’s terms, the insurer’s interest “would be furthered by providing a less than vigorous defense to those allegations.” Royal Insurance Co., 221 Ill. | 3 | 2008–2011 |
Thornton v. Paul
green
2 sentences1992(Thornton v. Paul (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 132, 152 , 384 N.E.2d 335, 343 .) Seibert argues it is likely the Association would provide a less than vigorous defense of the punitive damages claims lodged against him. 1992(Thornton v. Paul (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 132, 152 , 384 N.E.2d 335, 343 .) Seibert argues it is likely the Association would provide a less than vigorous defense of the punitive damages claims lodged against him. | 2 | 1986–1992 |
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers
green
2 sentences1991See Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 486, 499-500 , 475 N.E.2d 872 ; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 187, 195 , 355 N.E.2d 24 .) A conflict of interest which may prejudice the insured exists, if, when comparing the allegations of the complaint to the policy terms, the interest of the insurer would be furthered by providing a less than vigorous defense to those allegations. 1991See Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 486, 499-500 , 475 N.E.2d 872 ; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 187, 195 , 355 N.E.2d 24 .) A conflict of interest which may prejudice the insured exists, if, when comparing the allegations of the complaint to the policy terms, the interest of the insurer would be furthered by providing a less than vigorous defense to those allegations. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Pepper Construction Co. v. Casualty Insurance
green
1 sentence1988App. 3d 134 , 479 N.E.2d 988 ; Pepper Construction Co. v. Casualty Insurance Co. (1986), 145 Ill. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Murphy v. Urso
green
2 sentences1986(Murphy v. Urso (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 444 , 430 N.E.2d 1079 ; Thornton v. Paul (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 132 , 384 N.E.2d 335 .) In determining whether a conflict of interest exists, Illinois courts consider whether, in comparing the allegations of the complaint to the policy terms, the interest of the insurer would be furthered by providing a less than vigorous defense to those allegations. 1986(Murphy v. Urso (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 444 , 430 N.E.2d 1079 ; Thornton v. Paul (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 132 , 384 N.E.2d 335 .) In determining whether a conflict of interest exists, Illinois courts consider whether, in comparing the allegations of the complaint to the policy terms, the interest of the insurer would be furthered by providing a less than vigorous defense to those allegations. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
The People v. Stoval
green
2 sentences1977Ed. 680 , 62 S. Ct. 457 .) This right is deemed to have been denied where the interests of codefendants represented by a single attorney are potentially inconsistent (Glasser), where a fee earned through the representation of another client will be enhanced in the event of a less than vigorous defense of the accused (People v. Meyers (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 149 , 263 N.E.2d 81 ), where the future business of another client may not be forthcoming should a successful defense of the accused result (People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109 , 239 N.E.2d 441 ), and where the defense attorney is the recipi 1977Ed. 680 , 62 S. Ct. 457 .) This right is deemed to have been denied where the interests of codefendants represented by a single attorney are potentially inconsistent (Glasser), where a fee earned through the representation of another client will be enhanced in the event of a less than vigorous defense of the accused (People v. Meyers (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 149 , 263 N.E.2d 81 ), where the future business of another client may not be forthcoming should a successful defense of the accused result (People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109 , 239 N.E.2d 441 ), and where the defense attorney is the recipi | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Glasser v. United States
green
1 sentence1977Ed. 680 , 62 S. Ct. 457 .) This right is deemed to have been denied where the interests of codefendants represented by a single attorney are potentially inconsistent (Glasser), where a fee earned through the representation of another client will be enhanced in the event of a less than vigorous defense of the accused (People v. Meyers (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 149 , 263 N.E.2d 81 ), where the future business of another client may not be forthcoming should a successful defense of the accused result (People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109 , 239 N.E.2d 441 ), and where the defense attorney is the recipi | 1 | 1977–1977 |
People v. Newberry
green
2 sentences1977App. 3d 199 , 331 N.E.2d 643 ), but not where the defense attorney has terminated his employment as a prosecutor subsequent to defendant’s indictment (People v. Newberry (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 74 , 302 N.E.2d 34 ), unless there was an earlier representation of the State in that particular case (People v. Kester, (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 162 , 361 N.E.2d 569 ). 1977App. 3d 199 , 331 N.E.2d 643 ), but not where the defense attorney has terminated his employment as a prosecutor subsequent to defendant’s indictment (People v. Newberry (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 74 , 302 N.E.2d 34 ), unless there was an earlier representation of the State in that particular case (People v. Kester, (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 162 , 361 N.E.2d 569 ). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
People v. Kester
green
2 sentences1977App. 3d 199 , 331 N.E.2d 643 ), but not where the defense attorney has terminated his employment as a prosecutor subsequent to defendant’s indictment (People v. Newberry (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 74 , 302 N.E.2d 34 ), unless there was an earlier representation of the State in that particular case (People v. Kester, (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 162 , 361 N.E.2d 569 ). 1977App. 3d 199 , 331 N.E.2d 643 ), but not where the defense attorney has terminated his employment as a prosecutor subsequent to defendant’s indictment (People v. Newberry (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 74 , 302 N.E.2d 34 ), unless there was an earlier representation of the State in that particular case (People v. Kester, (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 162 , 361 N.E.2d 569 ). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
People v. Cross
neutral
2 sentences1977Ed. 680 , 62 S. Ct. 457 .) This right is deemed to have been denied where the interests of codefendants represented by a single attorney are potentially inconsistent (Glasser), where a fee earned through the representation of another client will be enhanced in the event of a less than vigorous defense of the accused (People v. Meyers (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 149 , 263 N.E.2d 81 ), where the future business of another client may not be forthcoming should a successful defense of the accused result (People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109 , 239 N.E.2d 441 ), and where the defense attorney is the recipi 1977App. 3d 199 , 331 N.E.2d 643 ), but not where the defense attorney has terminated his employment as a prosecutor subsequent to defendant’s indictment (People v. Newberry (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 74 , 302 N.E.2d 34 ), unless there was an earlier representation of the State in that particular case (People v. Kester, (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 162 , 361 N.E.2d 569 ). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
The PEOPLE v. Meyers
green
2 sentences1977Ed. 680 , 62 S. Ct. 457 .) This right is deemed to have been denied where the interests of codefendants represented by a single attorney are potentially inconsistent (Glasser), where a fee earned through the representation of another client will be enhanced in the event of a less than vigorous defense of the accused (People v. Meyers (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 149 , 263 N.E.2d 81 ), where the future business of another client may not be forthcoming should a successful defense of the accused result (People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109 , 239 N.E.2d 441 ), and where the defense attorney is the recipi 1977Ed. 680 , 62 S. Ct. 457 .) This right is deemed to have been denied where the interests of codefendants represented by a single attorney are potentially inconsistent (Glasser), where a fee earned through the representation of another client will be enhanced in the event of a less than vigorous defense of the accused (People v. Meyers (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 149 , 263 N.E.2d 81 ), where the future business of another client may not be forthcoming should a successful defense of the accused result (People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109 , 239 N.E.2d 441 ), and where the defense attorney is the recipi | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.