general savings clause in Illinois

2022Section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016)) seemingly would lead to a conclusion that the amendment was retroactive in that section 4 “is a general savings clause, which [the Illinois Supreme Court] has interpreted as meaning that procedural changes to statutes will be applied retroactively, while substantive changes are prospective only.” Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 20 (citing People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499, 506-07 (2002)).

2022Lastly, courts - 44 - No. 1-21-0261 may assume that “the legislature did not intend absurdity, inconvenience or injustice to result from legislation.” Id. ¶ 143 Illinois courts utilize a retroactivity analysis that couples the procedure set forth in the United States Supreme Court’s Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), with section 4 of our legislature’s Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2020)), which is a general savings clause providing instruction on the temporal reach of statutory amendments.

2018People v. Herron , 215 Ill. 2d 167 , 178-79, 294 Ill.Dec. 55 , 830 N.E.2d 467 (2005). ¶ 15 The plain error doctrine is not a general savings clause preserving all errors affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court.

2018People v. Herron , 215 Ill. 2d 167 , 178-79, 294 Ill.Dec. 55 , 830 N.E.2d 467 (2005). ¶ 15 The plain error doctrine is not a general savings clause preserving all errors affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court.

2023This section shall extend to all repeals, either by express words or by implication, whether the repeal is in the act making any new provision upon the same subject or in any other act.” 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2020). ¶ 37 “[S]ection 4 is a general savings clause, which [the supreme court] has interpreted as meaning that procedural changes to statutes will be applied retroactively, while substantive changes are prospective only.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 22 . - 13 - Further, under section 4, procedural law changes have been held to apply retroactively to cases th

2020The general savings clause of section 4 of the Statute on Statutes prohibits the retroactive application of an amendment to defendant’s case. 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2010); see also Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶¶ 21, 22, 33 .

2024Our court has acknowledged, however, that a general savings clause in section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2000)) “represents a clear legislative directive as to the temporal reach of statutory amendments 19 No. 1-22-1428 and repeals.” Caveney v. Bower, 207 Ill. 2d 82, 92 (2003).

2017Id. at 92-93 . ¶ 31 In a concurring opinion, Justice Freeman noted the majority opinion’s “expansive holding” and questioned whether its interpretation of section 4 as a general savings clause for purposes of the Landgraf analysis was proper.

2025Section 4 is a general savings clause, which our supreme court has interpreted “as meaning that procedural changes to statutes will be applied retroactively, while substantive changes are prospective only.” Howard, 2016 IL 120729 , ¶ 20. ¶ 16 In Howard, the supreme court applied the section 4 analysis to an amendment to section 5- 130(1)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-130(1)(a) (West 2014)), impacting whether a defendant is tried in juvenile or criminal court, and found it to be a purely procedural matter.

2023This section shall extend to -4- all repeals, either by express words or by implication, whether the repeal is in the act making any new provision upon the same subject or in any other act.” (Emphases added.) 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2020). ¶ 17 Section 4 “is a general savings clause, which this court has interpreted as meaning that procedural changes to statutes will be applied retroactively, while substantive changes are prospective only.” People v. Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 20 , 72 N.E.3d 346 .

2014That is because the legislature will always have clearly indicated the temporal reach of an amended 11 1-13-2315 statute, either expressly in the new legislative enactment or by default in section 4 of the Statute on Statutes." Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas, 234 Ill. 2d 393, 406 (2009). ¶ 29 Section 4, often referred to as the general savings clause of Illinois, provides: "No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law, whether such former law is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed against the former law, or as to any act done, any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incur

2014That is because the legislature will always have clearly indicated the temporal reach of an amended 11 1-13-2315 statute, either expressly in the new legislative enactment or by default in section 4 of the Statute on Statutes." Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas, 234 Ill. 2d 393, 406 (2009). ¶ 29 Section 4, often referred to as the general savings clause of Illinois, provides: "No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law, whether such former law is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed against the former law, or as to any act done, any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incur

2002The plain error doctrine allows a court to consider an issue that was not properly preserved, but it "does not operate as a general savings clause." People v. Childress , 158 Ill. 2d 275, 300 , 633 N.E.2d 635 (1994).

2002The plain error doctrine allows a court to consider an issue that was not properly preserved, but it "does not operate as a general savings clause." People v. Childress , 158 Ill. 2d 275, 300 , 633 N.E.2d 635 (1994).

2021“If error did occur, we then consider whether either prong of the plain-error doctrine has been satisfied.” People v. Sykes, 2012 IL App (4th) 111110, ¶ 31 , 972 N.E.2d 1272 . “[T]he plain error rule is not a general savings clause for any alleged error, but instead is designed to address serious injustices.” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Williams, 299 Ill.

2021“If error did occur, we then consider whether either prong of the plain-error doctrine has been satisfied.” People v. Sykes, 2012 IL App (4th) 111110, ¶ 31 , 972 N.E.2d 1272 . “[T]he plain error rule is not a general savings clause for any alleged error, but instead is designed to address serious injustices.” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Williams, 299 Ill.

2022People v. Gray, 215 Ill.

2022People v. Gray, 215 Ill.

2025Taylor, 2024 IL App (5th) 220116-U, ¶ 42 (citing People v. Gancarz, 228 Ill. 2d 312, 319 (2008); People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499, 505-07 (2002)).

2024People v. Gancarz, 228 Ill. 2d 312, 319 (2008); People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499, 505-07 (2002).

2002App. 3d at 253 , citing Randall v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 284 Ill.

2002App. 3d at 253 , citing Randall v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 284 Ill.

2023Id. ¶ 28 Because defendant contends that the statute should be applied retroactively, we begin with a retroactivity analysis. ¶ 29 Illinois courts apply a retroactivity analysis that couples the procedure set forth in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), with section 4 of our legislature’s Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2020)), the general savings clause that instructs on the temporal reach of statutory amendments.

2022Lastly, courts - 44 - No. 1-21-0261 may assume that “the legislature did not intend absurdity, inconvenience or injustice to result from legislation.” Id. ¶ 143 Illinois courts utilize a retroactivity analysis that couples the procedure set forth in the United States Supreme Court’s Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), with section 4 of our legislature’s Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2020)), which is a general savings clause providing instruction on the temporal reach of statutory amendments.

2018See Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d at 508-09 (holding that the general savings clause of section 4 of the Statute on Statutes prohibited retroactive application of a substantive statutory amendment that went into effect while the defendant’s case was pending on appeal); accord People v. Atkins, 217 Ill. 2d 66, 71-73 (2005) (holding that, under section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, a substantive amendment that became effective after the defendant was convicted and sentenced would not apply retroactively). ¶ 28 Our agreement with Hunter on this point, however, does not lead us to conclude that, pursuant t

2017See Glisson , 202 Ill. 2d at 508 -09 , 270 Ill.Dec. 57 , 782 N.E.2d 251 (holding that the general savings clause of section 4 of the Statute on Statutes prohibited retroactive application of a substantive statutory amendment that went into effect while the defendant's case was pending on appeal); accord People v. Atkins , 217 Ill. 2d 66 , 71-73, 298 Ill.Dec. 50 , 838 N.E.2d 943 (2005) (holding that under section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, a substantive amendment that became effective after the defendant was convicted and sentenced would not apply retroactively). ¶ 28 Our agreement with Hunt

2017As our supreme court in Caveney v. Bower, 207 Ill. 2d 82, 92 (2003), found, “section 4 represents a clear legislative directive as to the temporal reach of statutory amendments and repeals: those that are procedural in nature may be applied retroactively, while those that are substantive may not.” The Patterson court determined, following previous cases (In re M.C., 319 Ill.

2016As our supreme court in Caveney v. Bower, 207 Ill. 2d 82, 92 (2003), found, “section 4 represents a clear legislative directive as to the temporal reach of statutory amendments and repeals: those that are procedural in nature may be applied retroactively, while those that are substantive may not.” The Patterson court determined, following previous cases (In re M.C., 319 Ill.

2010App. 3d 844, 850 , 617 N.E.2d 1294, 1299 (1993), for the proposition that the plain-error doctrine applies to this case because his challenges to his sentence “affect[ ] [his] fundamental right to liberty.” However, the plain-error doctrine is not a general savings clause, to be used as a means by which to preserve all errors affecting substantial rights that have not been brought to the trial court’s attention.

2010App. 3d 844, 850 , 617 N.E.2d 1294, 1299 (1993), for the proposition that the plain-error doctrine applies to this case because his challenges to his sentence "affect[] [his] fundamental right to liberty." However, the plain-error doctrine is not a general savings clause, to be used as a means by which to preserve all errors affecting substantial rights that have not been brought to the trial court's attention.

1997Corrigan Construction Co. , 149 Ill. 2d 190 , 195, 595 N.E.2d 561, 563 (1992), quoting Bowes v. City of Chicago , 3 Ill. 2d 175, 205 , 120 N.E.2d 15, 31 (1954); see also In re Lifschultz Fast Freight Corp. , 63 F.3d 621, 629 (7th Cir. 1995)(when forced to choose between specific statutory provisions and a general savings clause, a court should err on the side of the specific provision) .

1997Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190 , 195, 595 N.E.2d 561, 563 (1992), quoting Bowes v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 175, 205 , 120 N.E.2d 15, 31 (1954); see also In re Lifschultz Fast Freight Corp., 63 F.3d 621, 629 (7th Cir. 1995) (when forced to choose between specific statutory provisions and a general savings clause, a court should err on the side of the specific provision).

2024People v. Johnson, 238 Ill. 2d 478, 484 (2010).

2013Under the plain-error doctrine, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error when: “(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 484 (quoting People v. Piatkowski, 225

2025Perry v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2018 IL 122349, ¶ 43 .

2019Section 4 is a general savings clause that our supreme court has interpreted to apply to repeals and amendments (People ex rel Alvarez v. Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 25 ) and to mean that “ ‘procedural changes to statutes will be applied retroactively, while substantive changes are prospective only.’ ” Perry, 2018 IL 122349, ¶ 43 (quoting People v. Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 20 ).

2023Yet, the plain error rule does not operate in the nature of a general savings clause (People v. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89, 143 (1990), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Tisdel, 201 Ill. 2d 210 (2002)), and the first step in such an analysis is to determine whether any error occurred at all (People v. Hutt, 2023 IL 128170, ¶ 29 ). 8 No. 1-22-0520 ¶ 21 Suppression Motion and Warrant ¶ 22 Turning to the merits, defendant first contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.

1992(People v. Hayes (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 89, 143 ; 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).) Neither alternative is present in this matter.

2017This court rejected this argument, explaining, as follows: “[T]he plain-error doctrine is not a general savings clause, to be used as a means by which to preserve all errors affecting substantial rights that have not been brought to the trial court’s attention. [Citation.] And we note that defendant’s contention here is essentially the same contention this court rejected in Rathbone. - 23 ­ Rathbone, 345 Ill.

2017App. 3d at 311 , 802 N.E.2d at 338 (holding that it is not sufficient to ‘simply state that because sentencing affects the defendant’s fundamental right to liberty, any error committed at that stage is reviewable as plain error’).

1999People v. Helm, 282 Ill.

1998App. 3d 32, 34 , 669 N.E.2d 111, 113 (1996), the plain error rule is not a general savings clause for any alleged error, but instead is designed to address serious injustices.