readiness rule in New York

2007As defendant correctly argues, readiness under CPL 30.30 requires both a statement of readiness and actual readiness to proceed to trial. ( Kendzia, supra.) Actual readiness means that there is no longer any legal impediment to proceed to trial.

1998(People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331 [1985].) Thus defendant has demonstrated a prima facie violation of the trial readiness rule.

1984(People v Brothers, 50 NY2d 413 .) Construing this section the Court of Appeals said it is “a command that the People must be ready for trial rather than the defendant must be granted a trial within the prescribed period.” (People v Brothers, at p 418.) Consequently, the People’s timely pretrial disclosure that exculpatory material existed and their efforts to ac quire it, amply satisfied their Brady obligation.

1984It is generally held that, to be “ready for trial” within the meaning of CPL 30.30, the People must file an accusatory instrument sufficient to confer trial jurisdiction upon the court (see People v Colon, 59 NY2d 921 ) and must communicate their readiness to the court on the record (see, e.g., People v Hamilton, 46 NY2d 932, 933 ; People v Brothers, 50 NY2d 413 ).

1995As this Court stated in People v Bissereth (supra, at 319 ), "The statutory requirement for a speedy trial relates to prosecutorial readiness and is not dependent on the readiness of the defense to proceed to trial” (citing People v Liotta, supra).

1993The statutory requirement for a speedy trial relates to prosecutorial readiness and is not dependent on the readiness of the defense to proceed to trial (People v Liotta, 79 NY2d 841 ).

1984It is generally held that, to be “ready for trial” within the meaning of CPL 30.30, the People must file an accusatory instrument sufficient to confer trial jurisdiction upon the court (see People v Colon, 59 NY2d 921 ) and must communicate their readiness to the court on the record (see, e.g., People v Hamilton, 46 NY2d 932, 933 ; People v Brothers, 50 NY2d 413 ).

1981Although service upon defendant of a written notice of readiness affixed to the indictment is inadequate to satisfy the rule, as set forth in People v Hamilton ( 46 NY2d 932 ), that the record reflect a communication of readiness (see, also, People v Brothers, 50 NY2d 413, 416 ), it is the established practice in Monroe County that once a case is placed upon the Trial Calendar the People must be ready to proceed as directed by the court.

1998(People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 77-78 [1995]; People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 [1986]; People v Fields, 214 AD2d 332 [1st Dept 1995].) The Sufficiency of the Record Defendant requests a hearing on his motion to dismiss.

1997Failure to commence the fact-finding hearing within the requisite period of time can only result in the dismissal of this petition. 8 (Matter of Frank C., 70 NY2d 408 [1987].) Accordingly, the Law Guardian’s motion to dismiss this petition because of a violation of the respondent’s right to a speedy fact-finding hearing is granted. .

1995As in People v Smith (supra, at 678 ), "The adjournments at issue here were, in the first instance, precipitated by the People’s failure to be ready for trial.” The "additional adjournment time required to accommodate defense counsel’s schedule” is not excludable (supra, at 678).

1995As this Court stated in People v Bissereth (supra, at 319 ), "The statutory requirement for a speedy trial relates to prosecutorial readiness and is not dependent on the readiness of the defense to proceed to trial” (citing People v Liotta, supra).

1993In any event, the requirement that a defendant’s consent to an adjournment be clearly expressed on the record (People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 215-216 ) has not been met in view of defense counsel’s conceded absence on the date it was granted.

1987The evidence adduced at trial, both direct and circumstantial, was sufficient to establish the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v Malizia, 62 NY2d 755 , cert denied 469 US 932 ).

1987The evidence adduced at trial, both direct and circumstantial, was sufficient to establish the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (see, People v Malizia, 62 NY2d 755 , cert denied 469 US 932 ).

1985CPL 30.30 is a trial readiness rule; delay occasioned by the People’s failure to comply with discovery requests does not affect their continued readiness to proceed to trial (see, People v Alicea, 109 AD2d 1083 ; People v Runion, 107 AD2d 1080 ).

1985CPL 30.30 is a trial readiness rule; delay occasioned by the People’s failure to comply with discovery requests does not affect their continued readiness to proceed to trial (see, People v Alicea, 109 AD2d 1083 ; People v Runion, 107 AD2d 1080 ).

1985In the context of these proceedings, however, the error was harmless (see, People v Gushlaw [appeal No. 2], 112 AD2d 792 ).

1984It is generally held that, to be “ready for trial” within the meaning of CPL 30.30, the People must file an accusatory instrument sufficient to confer trial jurisdiction upon the court (see People v Colon, 59 NY2d 921 ) and must communicate their readiness to the court on the record (see, e.g., People v Hamilton, 46 NY2d 932, 933 ; People v Brothers, 50 NY2d 413 ).

1982Since the trial court heard no evidence bearing on delays chargeable to defendant and denied the motion without making finding of fact, we remit the case for a hearing and appropriate findings in accordance with CPL 30.30 (subd 4) (see People v Williams, 67 AD2d 1094 ).

1960However, in affirming Special Term’s unconditional granting of the relief sought we in no way detract from our stated position that generally the readiness rule must be strictly enforced (Price v. Brody, 7 A D 2d 204; McGuire v. Pick, supra).

1958(See companion opinion Ehlin v. Piccola, 14 Misc 2d 251 .) The readiness rule permits the exercise of discretion (Moskowitz v. 440 Realty Cory., 13 Misc 2d 748 ) but an unreasonable delay to complete preliminary proceedings, especially after being prompted to be expeditious, seems to me to constitute a clear waiver thereof.

1958(See companion opinion Ehlin v. Piccola, 14 Misc 2d 251 .) The readiness rule permits the exercise of discretion (Moskowitz v. 440 Realty Cory., 13 Misc 2d 748 ) but an unreasonable delay to complete preliminary proceedings, especially after being prompted to be expeditious, seems to me to constitute a clear waiver thereof.