witnesses at the suppression hearing in New York

2017The Supreme Court properly denied suppression of the defendant’s statement to law enforcement officials. “ ‘The credibility determinations of the Supreme Court, which saw and heard the witnesses at the suppression hearing, are entitled to great weight on appeal, and will not be disturbed unless they are unsupported by the record’ ” (People v Reaves, 112 AD3d 746 , 747 [2013], quoting People v Timmons, 54 AD3d 883, 885 [2008]).

2014“The credibility determinations of the Supreme Court, which saw and heard the witnesses at the suppression hearing, are entitled to great weight on appeal, and will not be disturbed unless they are unsupported by the record” (P eople v Timmons, 54 AD3d 883, 885 [2008]; see People v Oliver, 87 AD3d 1035, 1036 [2011]).

2019The court's determination that defendant "voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to making [the challenged] statement[] was based upon the credibility of the witnesses at the suppression hearing and thus is entitled to great deference" ( People v Vaughan , 48 AD3d 1069, 1071 [4th Dept 2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 845 [2008], cert denied 555 US 910 [2008]), and the minor inconsistencies in the police testimony at the suppression hearing "concerning the precise time when the warnings were provided do[ ] not undermine the court's [credibility] determination" ( People v Williams , 118 AD3d 1429 ,

2012Here, the court’s determination that the officer could not have smelled the unburned marihuana is supported by the evidence in the record and was based solely upon the court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses at the suppression hearing, and we perceive no basis to disturb that determination (see People v Vaughan, 48 AD3d 1069, 1071 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 845 [2008], cert denied 555 US 910 [2008]; see generally People v Gerena, 49 AD3d 1204, 1205 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 958 [2008]).

2012Here, the court’s determination that the officer could not have smelled the unburned marihuana is supported by the evidence in the record and was based solely upon the court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses at the suppression hearing, and we perceive no basis to disturb that determination (see People v Vaughan, 48 AD3d 1069, 1071 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 845 [2008], cert denied 555 US 910 [2008]; see generally People v Gerena, 49 AD3d 1204, 1205 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 958 [2008]).

2012Here, the court’s determination that the officer could not have smelled the unburned marihuana is supported by the evidence in the record and was based solely upon the court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses at the suppression hearing, and we perceive no basis to disturb that determination (see People v Vaughan, 48 AD3d 1069, 1071 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 845 [2008], cert denied 555 US 910 [2008]; see generally People v Gerena, 49 AD3d 1204, 1205 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 958 [2008]).

2015Here, the defendant’s statements, although made before being informed of his Miranda rights (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), were spontaneous and were “not triggered by any police questioning or other conduct which reasonably could have been expected to elicit a declaration from him” (People v Barley, 82 AD3d 996, 996 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Henderson, 57 AD3d 562, 564-565 [2008]; People v Whyte, 47 AD3d 852, 853 [2008]).

2011The evidence presented at the suppression hearing supports the Supreme Court’s determination that the defendant’s spontaneous statements, made after a police officer arrested him but before Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]) were administered, were not triggered by any police questioning or other conduct which reasonably could have been expected to elicit a statement from him (see People v Whyte, 47 AD3d 852, 853 [2008]; People v Baliukonis, 35 AD3d 626, 627 [2006]).

2013Here, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing supports the Supreme Court’s determination that the defendant’s spontaneous statements, made after a police officer arrested him but before Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]) were administered, were not triggered by any police questioning or other conduct which reasonably could have been expected to elicit a statement from him (see People v Davis, 32 AD3d 445, 446 [2006]; People v Thorpe, 126 AD2d 685, 686 [1987]).

2013Here, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing supports the Supreme Court’s determination that the defendant’s spontaneous statements, made after a police officer arrested him but before Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]) were administered, were not triggered by any police questioning or other conduct which reasonably could have been expected to elicit a statement from him (see People v Davis, 32 AD3d 445, 446 [2006]; People v Thorpe, 126 AD2d 685, 686 [1987]).

2013Here, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing supports the Supreme Court’s determination that the defendant’s spontaneous statements, made after a police officer arrested him but before Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]) were administered, were not triggered by any police questioning or other conduct which reasonably could have been expected to elicit a statement from him (see People v Davis, 32 AD3d 445, 446 [2006]; People v Thorpe, 126 AD2d 685, 686 [1987]).

2013Here, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing supports the Supreme Court’s determination that the defendant’s spontaneous statements, made after a police officer arrested him but before Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]) were administered, were not triggered by any police questioning or other conduct which reasonably could have been expected to elicit a statement from him (see People v Davis, 32 AD3d 445, 446 [2006]; People v Thorpe, 126 AD2d 685, 686 [1987]).

2011The evidence presented at the suppression hearing supports the Supreme Court’s determination that the defendant’s spontaneous statements, made after a police officer arrested him but before Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]) were administered, were not triggered by any police questioning or other conduct which reasonably could have been expected to elicit a statement from him (see People v Whyte, 47 AD3d 852, 853 [2008]; People v Baliukonis, 35 AD3d 626, 627 [2006]).

2008Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, we find that the defendant’s spontaneous statement, made after a police officer arrested him but before Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]) were administered, was not triggered by any police questioning or other conduct which reasonably could have been expected to elicit a declaration from him (see People v Whyte, 47 AD3d 852, 853 [2008]; People v Baliukonis, 35 AD3d 626 [2006]).

2021Contrary to defendant's further contention, the court did not improperly curtail his cross-examination of the witnesses at the suppression hearing ( see People v Carroll , 303 AD2d 200, 201 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 560 [2003]; People v Presha , 190 AD2d 1005, 1005 [4th Dept 1993], lv denied 81 NY2d 891 [1993]), particularly because the precluded questions involved collateral issues with no direct bearing on the suppression analysis ( see People v Arnau , 58 NY2d 27, 37 [1982], cert denied 468 US 1217 [1984]; People v Patino , 97 AD2d 552, 553 [2d Dept 1983] [Gibbons, J., concurring]

2021Contrary to defendant's further contention, the court did not improperly curtail his cross-examination of the witnesses at the suppression hearing ( see People v Carroll , 303 AD2d 200, 201 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 560 [2003]; People v Presha , 190 AD2d 1005, 1005 [4th Dept 1993], lv denied 81 NY2d 891 [1993]), particularly because the precluded questions involved collateral issues with no direct bearing on the suppression analysis ( see People v Arnau , 58 NY2d 27, 37 [1982], cert denied 468 US 1217 [1984]; People v Patino , 97 AD2d 552, 553 [2d Dept 1983] [Gibbons, J., concurring]

2021Contrary to defendant's further contention, the court did not improperly curtail his cross-examination of the witnesses at the suppression hearing ( see People v Carroll , 303 AD2d 200, 201 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 560 [2003]; People v Presha , 190 AD2d 1005, 1005 [4th Dept 1993], lv denied 81 NY2d 891 [1993]), particularly because the precluded questions involved collateral issues with no direct bearing on the suppression analysis ( see People v Arnau , 58 NY2d 27, 37 [1982], cert denied 468 US 1217 [1984]; People v Patino , 97 AD2d 552, 553 [2d Dept 1983] [Gibbons, J., concurring]

2021Defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are forfeited by his guilty plea ( see People v Petgen , 55 NY2d 529, 534-535 [1982], rearg denied 57 NY2d 674 [1982]).

2021Contrary to defendant's further contention, the court did not improperly curtail his cross-examination of the witnesses at the suppression hearing ( see People v Carroll , 303 AD2d 200, 201 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 560 [2003]; People v Presha , 190 AD2d 1005, 1005 [4th Dept 1993], lv denied 81 NY2d 891 [1993]), particularly because the precluded questions involved collateral issues with no direct bearing on the suppression analysis ( see People v Arnau , 58 NY2d 27, 37 [1982], cert denied 468 US 1217 [1984]; People v Patino , 97 AD2d 552, 553 [2d Dept 1983] [Gibbons, J., concurring]

2018Here, the court's determination that the police officer observed the pipe in plain view "was based solely upon the credibility of the witnesses at the suppression hearing" ( People v Esquerdo , 71 AD3d 1424, 1424 [4th Dept 2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 887 [2010]), and the officer's testimony in that regard "was not so inherently incredible or improbable as to warrant disturbing the . . . court's determination of credibility" ( People v Walters , 52 AD3d 1273, 1274 [4th Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 795 [2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2018Here, the court's determination that the police officer observed the pipe in plain view "was based solely upon the credibility of the witnesses at the suppression hearing" ( People v Esquerdo , 71 AD3d 1424, 1424 [4th Dept 2010], lv denied 14 NY3d 887 [2010]), and the officer's testimony in that regard "was not so inherently incredible or improbable as to warrant disturbing the . . . court's determination of credibility" ( People v Walters , 52 AD3d 1273, 1274 [4th Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 795 [2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2018Finally, contrary to defendant's remaining contention, the court's Sandoval ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion ( see People v Taylor , 140 AD3d 1738, 1739 [4th Dept 2016]).

2017Here, the hearing court properly credited the police officer’s testimony that he observed a vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger make a left turn without signaling, which justified the stop of the vehicle for a traffic infraction (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163; People v Davis, 103 AD3d at 811 ; People v Glover, 84 AD3d 977, 978 [2011]; People v Grant, 83 AD3d at 863 ).

2017The credibility determinations of a hearing court, which saw and heard the witnesses at the suppression hearing, are entitled to deference on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see People v Wallace, 128 AD3d 866, 866 [2015]; People v Davis, 103 AD3d 810, 811 [2013]). “[A]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, even if the underlying reason for the stop was to investigate another matter unrelated to the traffic violation” (People v Davis,

2017The credibility determinations of a hearing court, which saw and heard the witnesses at the suppression hearing, are entitled to deference on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see People v Wallace, 128 AD3d 866, 866 [2015]; People v Davis, 103 AD3d 810, 811 [2013]). “[A]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, even if the underlying reason for the stop was to investigate another matter unrelated to the traffic violation” (People v Davis,

2017The credibility determinations of a hearing court, which saw and heard the witnesses at the suppression hearing, are entitled to deference on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see People v Wallace, 128 AD3d 866, 866 [2015]; People v Davis, 103 AD3d 810, 811 [2013]). “[A]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, even if the underlying reason for the stop was to investigate another matter unrelated to the traffic violation” (People v Davis,

2017Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the defendant’s statement, made after his arrest but before administration of Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]), was not triggered by any police questioning or other conduct which reasonably could have been expected to elicit a declaration from him (see People v Rivers, 56 NY2d 476, 480 [1982]; People v Tavares-Nunez, 87 AD3d 1171 [2011]; People v Dunn, 195 AD2d 240 [1994], affd 85 NY2d 956 [1995]).

2017The credibility determinations of a hearing court, which saw and heard the witnesses at the suppression hearing, are entitled to deference on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see People v Wallace, 128 AD3d 866, 866 [2015]; People v Davis, 103 AD3d 810, 811 [2013]). “[A]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, even if the underlying reason for the stop was to investigate another matter unrelated to the traffic violation” (People v Davis,