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19 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 2006–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Purkgreen1 sentence2026“In doing so, this Court ‘would be usurping the role of the trial court and exceeding its authority on appeal.’” State v. Purk, 2017-Ohio-7381, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.), quoting Nationstar Mtg., L.L.C. v. Young, 2015-Ohio-3868, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Nationstar Mtge, L.L.C. v. Younggreen1 sentence2026“In doing so, this Court ‘would be usurping the role of the trial court and exceeding its authority on appeal.’” State v. Purk, 2017-Ohio-7381, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.), quoting Nationstar Mtg., L.L.C. v. Young, 2015-Ohio-3868, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Weimer, Unpublished Decision (5-13-2005)green1 sentence2026See, e.g., State v. Ice, 2024-Ohio-5341, ¶ 14 (7th Dist.) (“a probation condition prohibiting a probationer’s entry into premises where alcohol is served would be reasonably related to rehabilitating an OVI defendant”); State v. Weimer, 2005-Ohio-2361, ¶ 48 (11th Dist.) (for a defendant who had “multiple DUI convictions,” a trial court’s “probation condition regarding alcohol was related to protecting the public by lessening the likelihood” that he would reoffend). {¶ 52} Yet where alcohol has played no role in the crime or crimes in question, where no recent troubling events or substance-use | 1 | 1 |
State v. Icegreen1 sentence2026See, e.g., State v. Ice, 2024-Ohio-5341, ¶ 14 (7th Dist.) (“a probation condition prohibiting a probationer’s entry into premises where alcohol is served would be reasonably related to rehabilitating an OVI defendant”); State v. Weimer, 2005-Ohio-2361, ¶ 48 (11th Dist.) (for a defendant who had “multiple DUI convictions,” a trial court’s “probation condition regarding alcohol was related to protecting the public by lessening the likelihood” that he would reoffend). {¶ 52} Yet where alcohol has played no role in the crime or crimes in question, where no recent troubling events or substance-use | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hoovergreen2 sentences2017See State v. Hoover , 123 Ohio St.3d 418 , 2009-Ohio-4993 , 916 N.E.2d 1056 , ¶ 21. 2017See State v. Hoover , 123 Ohio St.3d 418 , 2009-Ohio-4993 , 916 N.E.2d 1056 , ¶ 21. | 1 | 1 |
City of Tallmadge v. McCoygreen2 sentences2016See State v. Winand, 116 Ohio App.3d 286 , 688 N.E.2d 9 (7th Dist.1996), citing City of Tallmadge v. McCoy, 96 Ohio App.3d 604 , 645 N.E.2d 802 (9th Dist.1994). * * * This is the appropriate standard because ‘in a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’ State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521 , 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist.1996).” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Loyd, 126 Ohio App.3d 95 , 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998). {¶11} After accepting such fact 2016See State v. Winand, 116 Ohio App.3d 286 , 688 N.E.2d 9 (7th Dist.1996), citing City of Tallmadge v. McCoy, 96 Ohio App.3d 604 , 645 N.E.2d 802 (9th Dist.1994). * * * This is the appropriate standard because ‘in a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’ State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521 , 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist.1996).” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Loyd, 126 Ohio App.3d 95 , 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998). {¶11} After accepting such fact | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hopfergreen2 sentences2016See State v. Winand, 116 Ohio App.3d 286 , 688 N.E.2d 9 (7th Dist.1996), citing City of Tallmadge v. McCoy, 96 Ohio App.3d 604 , 645 N.E.2d 802 (9th Dist.1994). * * * This is the appropriate standard because ‘in a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’ State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521 , 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist.1996).” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Loyd, 126 Ohio App.3d 95 , 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998). {¶11} After accepting such fact 2016See State v. Winand, 116 Ohio App.3d 286 , 688 N.E.2d 9 (7th Dist.1996), citing City of Tallmadge v. McCoy, 96 Ohio App.3d 604 , 645 N.E.2d 802 (9th Dist.1994). * * * This is the appropriate standard because ‘in a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’ State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521 , 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist.1996).” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Loyd, 126 Ohio App.3d 95 , 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998). {¶11} After accepting such fact | 1 | 1 |
State v. Winandgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Winand, 116 Ohio App.3d 286 , 688 N.E.2d 9 (7th Dist.1996), citing City of Tallmadge v. McCoy, 96 Ohio App.3d 604 , 645 N.E.2d 802 (9th Dist.1994). * * * This is the appropriate standard because ‘in a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’ State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521 , 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist.1996).” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Loyd, 126 Ohio App.3d 95 , 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998). {¶11} After accepting such fact 2016See State v. Winand, 116 Ohio App.3d 286 , 688 N.E.2d 9 (7th Dist.1996), citing City of Tallmadge v. McCoy, 96 Ohio App.3d 604 , 645 N.E.2d 802 (9th Dist.1994). * * * This is the appropriate standard because ‘in a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’ State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521 , 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist.1996).” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Loyd, 126 Ohio App.3d 95 , 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998). {¶11} After accepting such fact | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lloydgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Winand, 116 Ohio App.3d 286 , 688 N.E.2d 9 (7th Dist.1996), citing City of Tallmadge v. McCoy, 96 Ohio App.3d 604 , 645 N.E.2d 802 (9th Dist.1994). * * * This is the appropriate standard because ‘in a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’ State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521 , 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist.1996).” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Loyd, 126 Ohio App.3d 95 , 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998). {¶11} After accepting such fact 2016See State v. Winand, 116 Ohio App.3d 286 , 688 N.E.2d 9 (7th Dist.1996), citing City of Tallmadge v. McCoy, 96 Ohio App.3d 604 , 645 N.E.2d 802 (9th Dist.1994). * * * This is the appropriate standard because ‘in a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of facts and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.’ State v. Hopfer, 112 Ohio App.3d 521 , 679 N.E.2d 321 (2nd Dist.1996).” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Loyd, 126 Ohio App.3d 95 , 709 N.E.2d 913 (7th Dist.1998). {¶11} After accepting such fact | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Mayl
green
2 sentences2014While R.C. 2317.02(B)(2)(a) and R.C. 2317.022 waive the physician-patient privilege, they do not strip an OVI defendant of his or her expectation of privacy in his medical records. {¶39} The Ohio Supreme Court noted that “R.C. 2317.02(B)(2) simply waives patient-physician privilege when law enforcement seeks to obtain certain test results.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Mayl, 106 Ohio St.3d 207 , 2005-Ohio- 4629, 833 N.E.2d 1216, ¶ 55 . 2014While R.C. 2317.02(B)(2)(a) and R.C. 2317.022 waive the physician-patient privilege, they do not strip an OVI defendant of his or her expectation of privacy in his medical records. {¶39} The Ohio Supreme Court noted that “R.C. 2317.02(B)(2) simply waives patient-physician privilege when law enforcement seeks to obtain certain test results.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Mayl, 106 Ohio St.3d 207 , 2005-Ohio- 4629, 833 N.E.2d 1216, ¶ 55 . | 3 | 2007–2014 |
State v. Meyers
green
2 sentences2014We have recognized in Meyers, 146 Ohio App.3d at 575 , 767 N.E.2d 739 , that “R.C. 2317.02(B)(2)(a) excluded related records from the privilege.” “The clear intent of the legislature was to abrogate the physician- patient privilege and provide the state access to blood-alcohol tests in criminal cases,” “ ‘except to the extent specifically prohibited by any law of this state or of the United States.’ ” Id. at 577 , quoting R.C. 2317.02(B)(2)(a). 2014We have recognized in Meyers, 146 Ohio App.3d at 575 , 767 N.E.2d 739 , that “R.C. 2317.02(B)(2)(a) excluded related records from the privilege.” “The clear intent of the legislature was to abrogate the physician- patient privilege and provide the state access to blood-alcohol tests in criminal cases,” “ ‘except to the extent specifically prohibited by any law of this state or of the United States.’ ” Id. at 577 , quoting R.C. 2317.02(B)(2)(a). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Brown
green
1 sentence2022Marion No. 9-16-37, 2017-Ohio-678, ¶ 7 , quoting State v. Erskine, 4th Dist. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Cochran, 22240 (7-18-2008)
neutral
2 sentences2022Montgomery No. 22240, 2008-Ohio-3612, ¶ 25 . {¶ 24} The difference between an OVI violation, which requires "operating," and a physical control violation, is that an OVI violation requires actual movement of the car; if there is no evidence that the person moved or caused the vehicle to move, the person cannot be convicted of OVI. 2022Montgomery No. 22240, 2008-Ohio-3612, ¶ 25 . {¶ 24} The difference between an OVI violation, which requires "operating," and a physical control violation, is that an OVI violation requires actual movement of the car; if there is no evidence that the person moved or caused the vehicle to move, the person cannot be convicted of OVI. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Codeluppi
green
2 sentences2020We conclude that it could not. {¶ 28} As observed by the Ohio Supreme Court, “a video recording of the field sobriety test” constitutes “[t]he primary source of evidence normally available to an OVI defendant.” State v. Codeluppi, 139 Ohio St.3d 165 , 2014-Ohio-1574 , 10 N.E.3d 691, ¶ 14 . 2020We conclude that it could not. {¶ 28} As observed by the Ohio Supreme Court, “a video recording of the field sobriety test” constitutes “[t]he primary source of evidence normally available to an OVI defendant.” State v. Codeluppi, 139 Ohio St.3d 165 , 2014-Ohio-1574 , 10 N.E.3d 691, ¶ 14 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Powell
green
2 sentences2019Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233 , 2012-Ohio-2577 , 971 N.E.2d 865 , at ¶ 77. 2019Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233 , 2012-Ohio-2577 , 971 N.E.2d 865 , at ¶ 77. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Evans
green
2 sentences2019State v. Evans, 122 Ohio St.3d 381 , 2009-Ohio-2974, ¶ 13 ; State v. Parker, 12th Dist. 2019State v. Evans, 122 Ohio St.3d 381 , 2009-Ohio-2974, ¶ 13 ; State v. Parker, 12th Dist. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Preztak
green
2 sentences2016He further stated that had Oles attempted to leave during the questioning, he would have arrested Oles for an OVI violation based on his observations to that point. {¶8} Based on the above testimony, the trial court granted Oles’ motion to suppress, finding that “based on” Miranda, his rights had been violated thereby excluding Oles’ statement to Lieutenant Sheppard and the results of the field sobriety tests. {¶9} The City appeals and argues that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence based on Miranda because Lieutenant Sheppard’s questioning of Oles did not rise to the level of cu 2016He further stated that had Oles attempted to leave during the questioning, he would have arrested Oles for an OVI violation based on his observations to that point. {¶8} Based on the above testimony, the trial court granted Oles’ motion to suppress, finding that “based on” Miranda, his rights had been violated thereby excluding Oles’ statement to Lieutenant Sheppard and the results of the field sobriety tests. {¶9} The City appeals and argues that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence based on Miranda because Lieutenant Sheppard’s questioning of Oles did not rise to the level of cu | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Klembus
green
1 sentence2015Klembus, 2014-Ohio-3227, at ¶ 10-13 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Hohenberger
green
2 sentences2013Hohenberger, 189 Ohio App.3d 346 , 2010-Ohio-4053 , at ¶ 44. 2013Hohenberger, 189 Ohio App.3d 346 , 2010-Ohio-4053 , at ¶ 44. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Schultz, 90412 (9-4-2008)
green
2 sentences2011Id. {¶ 28} Essentially, appellant contends that the definition of “operate” found in R.C. 4511.01 is equally applicable to R.C. 2921.331 and, therefore, a conviction for eluding or fleeing cannot be constitutionally applied to a situation where an officer orders a defendant to stop a parked vehicle. 2011Id. {¶ 28} Essentially, appellant contends that the definition of “operate” found in R.C. 4511.01 is equally applicable to R.C. 2921.331 and, therefore, a conviction for eluding or fleeing cannot be constitutionally applied to a situation where an officer orders a defendant to stop a parked vehicle. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Mitchell, 21957 (2-8-2008)
green
2 sentences2011To reverse a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, it must be demonstrated that trial counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that his errors were serious enough to create a reasonable probability that, but for the errors, the result of the trial would have been different.” State v. Mitchell, Montgomery App. No. 21957, 2008-Ohio-493, ¶ 31 . {¶ 8} Upon review, we conclude that Jenkins had reasonable, articulable suspicion of an OVI violation sufficient to justify performing field-sobriety tests. 2011To reverse a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, it must be demonstrated that trial counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that his errors were serious enough to create a reasonable probability that, but for the errors, the result of the trial would have been different.” State v. Mitchell, Montgomery App. No. 21957, 2008-Ohio-493, ¶ 31 . {¶ 8} Upon review, we conclude that Jenkins had reasonable, articulable suspicion of an OVI violation sufficient to justify performing field-sobriety tests. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2010An investigative detention is limited to the time it reasonably takes to determine facts that will either confirm or dispel the suspicion, with the reasonableness of the detention to be decided on a case-by-case basis, Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1 [, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 ]. 2010An investigative detention is limited to the time it reasonably takes to determine facts that will either confirm or dispel the suspicion, with the reasonableness of the detention to be decided on a case-by-case basis, Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1 [, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 ]. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Cook, 2006 Ca 00280 (9-10-2007)
neutral
1 sentence2008You might win the red light violation but you're going to have to fight for the OVI and that's what the officer did he made an OVI stop." T. at 27-28. {¶ 35} In referring to a "subjective" standard, the trial court relied on this court's opinion in State v. Cook , Stark App. No. 2006CA00280, 2007-Ohio-4648 , ¶ 27, wherein this court held the officer had "reasonable, articulable reason to stop appellant" based *Page 7 on de minimus traffic violations. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2008The Cook court relied on this court's opinion in State v. McCormick (February 5, 2001), Stark App. No. 2000CA00204, wherein this court noted the following at page 3: {¶ 36} "Appellant references several cases, which have held, `Where a driver commits only a de minimus marked lanes violation, some other evidence to suggest impairment is needed before an officer is justified in stopping the vehicle.' State v. Johnson (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 37 (Citation omitted). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Illinois v. Gates
green
2 sentences2007No. C.A. 20647, 2005-Ohio 1573. 12 Ohio Adm. Code 3701-53-05 (B). 13 (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 292 , 294-295 , 490 N.E.2d 902 . 14 Mayl , supra, at fn. 2 . 15 Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 420 U.S. 103 , 111-112 , 95 S.Ct. 854 ; Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89 , 91 , 85 S.Ct. 223 . 16 See Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ; State v. Homan , 89 Ohio St. 3d 421 , 2000-Ohio-212 , 732 N.E.2d 952 , superseded by statute as stated in State v. Schmitt , 101 Ohio St. 3d 79 , 2004-Ohio-37 , 801 N.E.2d 446 17 Cf. Oregon v. Szakovits (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 271 , 291 N.E.2d 742 . *Page 1 2007No. C.A. 20647, 2005-Ohio 1573. 12 Ohio Adm. Code 3701-53-05 (B). 13 (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 292 , 294-295 , 490 N.E.2d 902 . 14 Mayl , supra, at fn. 2 . 15 Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 420 U.S. 103 , 111-112 , 95 S.Ct. 854 ; Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89 , 91 , 85 S.Ct. 223 . 16 See Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ; State v. Homan , 89 Ohio St. 3d 421 , 2000-Ohio-212 , 732 N.E.2d 952 , superseded by statute as stated in State v. Schmitt , 101 Ohio St. 3d 79 , 2004-Ohio-37 , 801 N.E.2d 446 17 Cf. Oregon v. Szakovits (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 271 , 291 N.E.2d 742 . *Page 1 | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Beck v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2007No. C.A. 20647, 2005-Ohio 1573. 12 Ohio Adm. Code 3701-53-05 (B). 13 (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 292 , 294-295 , 490 N.E.2d 902 . 14 Mayl , supra, at fn. 2 . 15 Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 420 U.S. 103 , 111-112 , 95 S.Ct. 854 ; Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89 , 91 , 85 S.Ct. 223 . 16 See Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ; State v. Homan , 89 Ohio St. 3d 421 , 2000-Ohio-212 , 732 N.E.2d 952 , superseded by statute as stated in State v. Schmitt , 101 Ohio St. 3d 79 , 2004-Ohio-37 , 801 N.E.2d 446 17 Cf. Oregon v. Szakovits (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 271 , 291 N.E.2d 742 . *Page 1 2007No. C.A. 20647, 2005-Ohio 1573. 12 Ohio Adm. Code 3701-53-05 (B). 13 (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 292 , 294-295 , 490 N.E.2d 902 . 14 Mayl , supra, at fn. 2 . 15 Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 420 U.S. 103 , 111-112 , 95 S.Ct. 854 ; Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89 , 91 , 85 S.Ct. 223 . 16 See Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ; State v. Homan , 89 Ohio St. 3d 421 , 2000-Ohio-212 , 732 N.E.2d 952 , superseded by statute as stated in State v. Schmitt , 101 Ohio St. 3d 79 , 2004-Ohio-37 , 801 N.E.2d 446 17 Cf. Oregon v. Szakovits (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 271 , 291 N.E.2d 742 . *Page 1 | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Homan green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Gerstein v. Pugh green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| City of Oregon v. Szakovits green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Fanning green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Plummer
green
2 sentences2007No. C.A. 20647, 2005-Ohio 1573. 12 Ohio Adm. Code 3701-53-05 (B). 13 (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 292 , 294-295 , 490 N.E.2d 902 . 14 Mayl , supra, at fn. 2 . 15 Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 420 U.S. 103 , 111-112 , 95 S.Ct. 854 ; Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89 , 91 , 85 S.Ct. 223 . 16 See Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ; State v. Homan , 89 Ohio St. 3d 421 , 2000-Ohio-212 , 732 N.E.2d 952 , superseded by statute as stated in State v. Schmitt , 101 Ohio St. 3d 79 , 2004-Ohio-37 , 801 N.E.2d 446 17 Cf. Oregon v. Szakovits (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 271 , 291 N.E.2d 742 . *Page 1 2007No. C.A. 20647, 2005-Ohio 1573. 12 Ohio Adm. Code 3701-53-05 (B). 13 (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 292 , 294-295 , 490 N.E.2d 902 . 14 Mayl , supra, at fn. 2 . 15 Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 420 U.S. 103 , 111-112 , 95 S.Ct. 854 ; Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89 , 91 , 85 S.Ct. 223 . 16 See Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ; State v. Homan , 89 Ohio St. 3d 421 , 2000-Ohio-212 , 732 N.E.2d 952 , superseded by statute as stated in State v. Schmitt , 101 Ohio St. 3d 79 , 2004-Ohio-37 , 801 N.E.2d 446 17 Cf. Oregon v. Szakovits (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 271 , 291 N.E.2d 742 . *Page 1 | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| City of Newark v. Lucas green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Mills green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Homan
green
2 sentences2007No. C.A. 20647, 2005-Ohio 1573. 12 Ohio Adm. Code 3701-53-05 (B). 13 (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 292 , 294-295 , 490 N.E.2d 902 . 14 Mayl , supra, at fn. 2 . 15 Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 420 U.S. 103 , 111-112 , 95 S.Ct. 854 ; Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89 , 91 , 85 S.Ct. 223 . 16 See Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ; State v. Homan , 89 Ohio St. 3d 421 , 2000-Ohio-212 , 732 N.E.2d 952 , superseded by statute as stated in State v. Schmitt , 101 Ohio St. 3d 79 , 2004-Ohio-37 , 801 N.E.2d 446 17 Cf. Oregon v. Szakovits (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 271 , 291 N.E.2d 742 . *Page 1 2007No. C.A. 20647, 2005-Ohio 1573. 12 Ohio Adm. Code 3701-53-05 (B). 13 (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 292 , 294-295 , 490 N.E.2d 902 . 14 Mayl , supra, at fn. 2 . 15 Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 420 U.S. 103 , 111-112 , 95 S.Ct. 854 ; Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89 , 91 , 85 S.Ct. 223 . 16 See Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ; State v. Homan , 89 Ohio St. 3d 421 , 2000-Ohio-212 , 732 N.E.2d 952 , superseded by statute as stated in State v. Schmitt , 101 Ohio St. 3d 79 , 2004-Ohio-37 , 801 N.E.2d 446 17 Cf. Oregon v. Szakovits (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 271 , 291 N.E.2d 742 . *Page 1 | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Burnside
green
2 sentences2007RALPH WINKLER, retired, from the First Appellate District, sitting by assignment. 1 State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357 , 366 , 582 N.E.2d 972 . 2 State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19 , 20 , 437 N.E.2d 583 . 3 State v. Mayl , 106 Ohio St.3d 207 , 2005-Ohio-4629 , 833 N.E.2d 1216 , at ¶ 41. 4 Since Hutson's arrest, R.C. 4511.19 (D) has been amended to allow bodily substances to be collected up to three hours after an alleged OVI violation. 5 See Newark v. Lucas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 140 , 532 N.E.2d 130 , paragraph one of the syllabus. 6 See id. 7 State v. Burnside , 100 Ohio St.3d 152 2007RALPH WINKLER, retired, from the First Appellate District, sitting by assignment. 1 State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357 , 366 , 582 N.E.2d 972 . 2 State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19 , 20 , 437 N.E.2d 583 . 3 State v. Mayl , 106 Ohio St.3d 207 , 2005-Ohio-4629 , 833 N.E.2d 1216 , at ¶ 41. 4 Since Hutson's arrest, R.C. 4511.19 (D) has been amended to allow bodily substances to be collected up to three hours after an alleged OVI violation. 5 See Newark v. Lucas (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 140 , 532 N.E.2d 130 , paragraph one of the syllabus. 6 See id. 7 State v. Burnside , 100 Ohio St.3d 152 | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Schmitt
green
2 sentences2007No. C.A. 20647, 2005-Ohio 1573. 12 Ohio Adm. Code 3701-53-05 (B). 13 (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 292 , 294-295 , 490 N.E.2d 902 . 14 Mayl , supra, at fn. 2 . 15 Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 420 U.S. 103 , 111-112 , 95 S.Ct. 854 ; Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89 , 91 , 85 S.Ct. 223 . 16 See Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ; State v. Homan , 89 Ohio St. 3d 421 , 2000-Ohio-212 , 732 N.E.2d 952 , superseded by statute as stated in State v. Schmitt , 101 Ohio St. 3d 79 , 2004-Ohio-37 , 801 N.E.2d 446 17 Cf. Oregon v. Szakovits (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 271 , 291 N.E.2d 742 . *Page 1 2007No. C.A. 20647, 2005-Ohio 1573. 12 Ohio Adm. Code 3701-53-05 (B). 13 (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 292 , 294-295 , 490 N.E.2d 902 . 14 Mayl , supra, at fn. 2 . 15 Gerstein v. Pugh (1975), 420 U.S. 103 , 111-112 , 95 S.Ct. 854 ; Beck v. Ohio (1964), 379 U.S. 89 , 91 , 85 S.Ct. 223 . 16 See Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 ; State v. Homan , 89 Ohio St. 3d 421 , 2000-Ohio-212 , 732 N.E.2d 952 , superseded by statute as stated in State v. Schmitt , 101 Ohio St. 3d 79 , 2004-Ohio-37 , 801 N.E.2d 446 17 Cf. Oregon v. Szakovits (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 271 , 291 N.E.2d 742 . *Page 1 | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Aaron Lindh v. James P. Murphy, Warden green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Village of Hudson v. South green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.