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19 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Watkinsgreen2 sentences2015In Watkins, we first confirmed that the rule in Denton had not been adopted in any other jurisdiction, 362 S.W.3d at 547 & n. 28, and further observed as follows: Unfortunately, the Denton test has not successfully resolved the “vexatious and recurring” questions regarding this Court’s double jeopardy analysis. 2015In Watkins, we first confirmed that the rule in Denton had not been adopted in any other jurisdiction, 362 S.W.3d at 547 & n. 28, and further observed as follows: Unfortunately, the Denton test has not successfully resolved the “vexatious and recurring” questions regarding this Court’s double jeopardy analysis. | 6 | 9 |
State v. Dentonred2 sentences2015No single factor of the Denton test was determinative; rather, the factors were to “be weighed and considered in relation to each other.” Id. 2015No single factor of the Denton test was determinative; rather, the factors were to “be weighed and considered in relation to each other.” Id. | 2 | 6 |
State v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences2008Nonetheless, I am unable to agree with the majority’s utilization of subsection (a)(3) within the double jeopardy analysis as discussed infra. Second, the majority concludes under the Denton test “that the same evidence was required to prove both the attempted aggravated rape and the attempted aggravated sexual battery.” Furthermore, the majority concludes that “it requires speculation to conclude that the Defendant attempted two discrete acts which could reasonably be viewed as constituting different offenses.” As observed by the majority, our supreme court in State v. Phillips, 924 S.W.2d 66 2008Nonetheless, I am unable to agree with the majority’s utilization of subsection (a)(3) within the double jeopardy analysis as discussed infra. Second, the majority concludes under the Denton test “that the same evidence was required to prove both the attempted aggravated rape and the attempted aggravated sexual battery.” Furthermore, the majority concludes that “it requires speculation to conclude that the Defendant attempted two discrete acts which could reasonably be viewed as constituting different offenses.” As observed by the majority, our supreme court in State v. Phillips, 924 S.W.2d 66 | 2 | 2 |
Cable v. Clemmonsgreen2 sentences2012See, e.g., Cable, 36 S.W.3d at 43 (applying the Denton test even though the “convictions [did] not involve multiple or distinct statutes”). 33 . 2012See, e.g., Cable, 36 S.W.3d at 43 (applying the Denton test even though the “convictions [did] not involve multiple or distinct statutes”). 33 . | 2 | 2 |
Duchac v. Stategreen2 sentences2012In order to determine if double jeopardy attaches, our supreme court devised the following four-part test, also known as the “Denton test”: (1) a Blockburger analysis of the statutory offenses; (2) an analysis, guided by the principles of [Duchac v. State, 505 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tenn. 1973)], of the evidence used to prove the offenses; (3) a consideration of whether there were multiple victims or discrete acts; and (4) a comparison of the purposes of the respective statutes. 2010However, the court also emphasized that no one step in the Denton analysis is determinative and that “the results of each must be 16 weighed and considered in relation to each other.” Id. at 381 . | 1 | 3 |
Rogers v. Tennesseegreen2 sentences2017Three years after the Watkins decision, our supreme court held that the retroactive application of Watkins to crimes that were committed before it was decided did not run afoul of due process because the abandonment of the Denton test was not “‘unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law as it then existed.’” State v. Feaster, 466 S.W.3d 80, 87 (Tenn. 2015) (quoting Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 464 (2001)). 2015Our rejection of the Denton test and adoption of the federal standard in Wai- kins cannot be classified as “unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law as it then existed.” Rogers, 532 U.S. at 464 , 121 S.Ct. 1693 ; see also Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 . | 1 | 2 |
State of Tennessee v. Terrence Justin Feastergreen1 sentence2017Three years after the Watkins decision, our supreme court held that the retroactive application of Watkins to crimes that were committed before it was decided did not run afoul of due process because the abandonment of the Denton test was not “‘unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law as it then existed.’” State v. Feaster, 466 S.W.3d 80, 87 (Tenn. 2015) (quoting Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 464 (2001)). | 1 | 1 |
Bouie v. City of Columbiagreen2 sentences2015Our rejection of the Denton test and adoption of the federal standard in Wai- kins cannot be classified as “unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law as it then existed.” Rogers, 532 U.S. at 464 , 121 S.Ct. 1693 ; see also Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 . 2015Our rejection of the Denton test and adoption of the federal standard in Wai- kins cannot be classified as “unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law as it then existed.” Rogers, 532 U.S. at 464 , 121 S.Ct. 1693 ; see also Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354 , 84 S.Ct. 1697 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Thorntongreen1 sentence2012See also State v. Thornton, 10 S.W.3d 229, 239 (Tenn.Crim.App.1999) (conflating the analysis of the first and second Denton factors). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Beardgreen2 sentences2001“Upon a finding that two convictions cannot both stand, the conviction for the greater offense must stand and that for the lower offense must be vacated.” State v. Beard, 818 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tenn. Crim. 2001“Upon a finding that two convictions cannot both stand, the conviction for the greater offense must stand and that for the lower offense must be vacated.” State v. Beard, 818 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2000See State v. Adams, 973 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Tenn. Crim. 2000See State v. Adams, 973 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dentonred2 sentences2015No single factor of the Denton test was determinative; rather, the factors were to “be weighed and considered in relation to each other.” Id. 2015No single factor of the Denton test was determinative; rather, the factors were to “be weighed and considered in relation to each other.” Id. | 1 | 6 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hoting v. Hamff
neutral
2 sentences2001In State v. Beauregard, 32 S.W.2d 681 (Tenn. 2000), our supreme court recently undertook the Denton analysis to affirm a defendant’s conviction for rape and incest arising out of the same evidence. 2001In State v. Beauregard, 32 S.W.2d 681 (Tenn. 2000), our supreme court recently undertook the Denton analysis to affirm a defendant’s conviction for rape and incest arising out of the same evidence. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Hall
green
2 sentences1998State v. Hall, 947 S.W.2d 181 (Tenn. 7 Crim. 1998State v. Hall, 947 S.W.2d 181 (Tenn. 7 Crim. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.