19 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1930–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
XTO Energy Inc. v. Nikolaigreen2 sentences2015Appellees cite to XTO Energy Inc. v. Nikolai, 357 S.W.3d 47, 55 (Tex. App.BFort Worth 2011, pet. denied) for an explication of the estoppel by deed doctrine. 2015In Texas, the doctrine of estoppel by deed “precludes parties from alleging title ‘in derogation of the deed or denying the truth of any material fact asserted in it.’” XTO Energy Inc. v. Nikolai, 357 S.W.3d 47, 56 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied). | 3 | 4 |
Woldert v. Skelly Oil Co.green2 sentences2015Estoppel by Deed The doctrine of estoppel by deed is of “universal recognition.” XTO v. Nikolai, 357 S.W.3d 47, 56 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, pet. denied) citing Woldert v. Skelly Oil Co., 202 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex. Civ. 2011The doctrine of estoppel by deed is of ―universal recognition.‖ Woldert v. Skelly Oil Co., 202 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex. Civ. | 3 | 3 |
Greene v. Whitegreen2 sentences2023See Greene v. White, 153 S.W.2d 575, 583 (Tex. 1941). 2020“In the broadest sense, estoppel by deed stands for the proposition that all parties to a deed are bound by the recitals in it, which operate as an estoppel.” 41 We have further observed that 40 See LaLonde, ___ S.W.3d at ___ (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 41 Trial v. Dragon, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (Tex. 2019) (citing Greene v. White, 153 S.W.2d 575 , 583–84 (Tex. 1941)). 16 estoppel-by-deed “does not bind mere strangers.” 42 The court of appeals held that Teal could not invoke an estoppel-by-deed defense because Teal was not a party to the replat. 534 S.W.3d at 586 (citing Tex | 2 | 5 |
Sauceda v. Kerlingreen2 sentences2019Over the years, the doctrine of estoppel by deed developed in the courts of appeals to have a wide application that “all parties to a deed are bound by the recitals therein, which operate as an estoppel, working on the interest in the land if it be a deed of conveyance, and binding both parties and privies; privies in blood, privies in estate, and privies in law.” E.g., Sauceda v. Kerlin, 164 S.W.3d 892, 915 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005) (quoting Wallace v. Pruitt, 20 S.W. 728 , 728–79 (Tex. App.—Houston 1892, no writ)), rev’d, 263 S.W.3d 920 (Tex. 2008). 2007Sauceda, 164 S.W.3d at 915 . | 1 | 3 |
Sams v. Creagergreen2 sentences2011“The doctrine of an estoppel by deed is ... founded upon the theory that the parties have contracted upon the basis of the recited facts.” Williams, 85 Tex. at 506 , 22 S.W. at 401 . 2002Williams v. Hardie, 85 Tex. 499 , 22 S.W. 399, 401 (1893); see also Adams v. Duncan, 147 Tex. 332 , 215 S.W.2d 599, 603 (1948); Greene v. White, 137 Tex. 361, 153 *800 S.W.2d 575, 583-86 (1941). | 1 | 2 |
McMahan v. Greenwoodgreen1 sentence2023A recital is a “formal statement or setting forth of some matter of fact, in any 11 deed or writing, in order to explain the reasons upon which the transaction is founded.” McMahan v. Greenwood, 108 S.W.3d 467, 484 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). | 1 | 1 |
Clark, Admr. v. Gaunttgreen1 sentence2022See Clark, 161 S.W.2d at 271–72; Texas Standard Oil & Gas. | 1 | 1 |
Texas Co. v. Leegreen1 sentence2020“In the broadest sense, estoppel by deed stands for the proposition that all parties to a deed are bound by the recitals in it, which operate as an estoppel.” 41 We have further observed that 40 See LaLonde, ___ S.W.3d at ___ (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 41 Trial v. Dragon, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (Tex. 2019) (citing Greene v. White, 153 S.W.2d 575 , 583–84 (Tex. 1941)). 16 estoppel-by-deed “does not bind mere strangers.” 42 The court of appeals held that Teal could not invoke an estoppel-by-deed defense because Teal was not a party to the replat. 534 S.W.3d at 586 (citing Tex | 1 | 1 |
Dragon v. Trialgreen2 sentences2019See 568 S.W.3d at 167–69. 2019See 568 S.W.3d at 168–69. | 1 | 1 |
Angell v. Baileygreen1 sentence2017XTO Energy Inc. v. Nikolai , 357 S.W.3d 47 , 56 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied) ; see also Greene v. White , 137 Tex. 361 , 153 S.W.2d 575 , 583 (1941) (estoppel by deed applies to grantors and grantees); Angell , 225 S.W.3d at 842 (same). | 1 | 1 |
Freeman v. Stephens Production Co.green1 sentence2015The Fort Worth Court of Appeals stated that: …all parties to a deed are bound by the recitals therein, which operate as an estoppel, working on the interest in the land if it be a deed of conveyance, and binding both parties and privies; privies in blood, privies in estate, and privies in law.@ Freeman, 171 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2005, pet. denied) (quoting Wallace v. Pruitt, 1 Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1 |
Whiteside v. Bellgreen2 sentences2015Whiteside v. Bell, 162 Tex. 411 , 347 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex., 1961) (noting that deed conveying 22 land subject to a lien for unpaid purchase money is treated as an executory contract); Johnson v. Lockhart, 40 S.W. 640 (Tex. 1897) (applying executory contract rule to purchase money dispute); see also, Davis v. Huey, 620 S.W.2d 561, 565-66 (Tex. 1981) (a grantee is "bound by those restrictive covenants running with the property of which he has actual or constructive notice," and is estopped from denying the recitals that appear in his chain of title). 2015Whiteside v. Bell, 162 Tex. 411 , 347 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex., 1961) (noting that deed conveying 22 land subject to a lien for unpaid purchase money is treated as an executory contract); Johnson v. Lockhart, 40 S.W. 640 (Tex. 1897) (applying executory contract rule to purchase money dispute); see also, Davis v. Huey, 620 S.W.2d 561, 565-66 (Tex. 1981) (a grantee is "bound by those restrictive covenants running with the property of which he has actual or constructive notice," and is estopped from denying the recitals that appear in his chain of title). | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Hueygreen1 sentence2015Whiteside v. Bell, 162 Tex. 411 , 347 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex., 1961) (noting that deed conveying 22 land subject to a lien for unpaid purchase money is treated as an executory contract); Johnson v. Lockhart, 40 S.W. 640 (Tex. 1897) (applying executory contract rule to purchase money dispute); see also, Davis v. Huey, 620 S.W.2d 561, 565-66 (Tex. 1981) (a grantee is "bound by those restrictive covenants running with the property of which he has actual or constructive notice," and is estopped from denying the recitals that appear in his chain of title). | 1 | 1 |
Surtees v. Hobsongreen1 sentence2011Estoppel by deed precludes parties from alleging title “in derogation of the deed [or] denypng] the truth of any material fact asserted in it.” Surtees v. Hobson, 4 S.W.2d 245, 246 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1928), aff'd, 13 S.W.2d 345 (Tex.Comm’n App.1929). | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. Duncangreen2 sentences2002Williams v. Hardie, 85 Tex. 499 , 22 S.W. 399, 401 (1893); see also Adams v. Duncan, 147 Tex. 332 , 215 S.W.2d 599, 603 (1948); Greene v. White, 137 Tex. 361, 153 *800 S.W.2d 575, 583-86 (1941). 2002Williams v. Hardie, 85 Tex. 499 , 22 S.W. 399, 401 (1893); see also Adams v. Duncan, 147 Tex. 332 , 215 S.W.2d 599, 603 (1948); Greene v. White, 137 Tex. 361, 153 *800 S.W.2d 575, 583-86 (1941). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wallace v. Pruitt
green
2 sentences2019Over the years, the doctrine of estoppel by deed developed in the courts of appeals to have a wide application that “all parties to a deed are bound by the recitals therein, which operate as an estoppel, working on the interest in the land if it be a deed of conveyance, and binding both parties and privies; privies in blood, privies in estate, and privies in law.” E.g., Sauceda v. Kerlin, 164 S.W.3d 892, 915 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005) (quoting Wallace v. Pruitt, 20 S.W. 728 , 728–79 (Tex. App.—Houston 1892, no writ)), rev’d, 263 S.W.3d 920 (Tex. 2008). 2015The Fort Worth Court of Appeals stated that: …all parties to a deed are bound by the recitals therein, which operate as an estoppel, working on the interest in the land if it be a deed of conveyance, and binding both parties and privies; privies in blood, privies in estate, and privies in law.@ Freeman, 171 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2005, pet. denied) (quoting Wallace v. Pruitt, 1 Tex. Civ. | 3 | 2005–2019 |
Heirs of Shelby Corzine v. Williams
green
2 sentences2011“The doctrine of an estoppel by deed is ... founded upon the theory that the parties have contracted upon the basis of the recited facts.” Williams, 85 Tex. at 506 , 22 S.W. at 401 . 2002Williams v. Hardie, 85 Tex. 499 , 22 S.W. 399, 401 (1893); see also Adams v. Duncan, 147 Tex. 332 , 215 S.W.2d 599, 603 (1948); Greene v. White, 137 Tex. 361, 153 *800 S.W.2d 575, 583-86 (1941). | 2 | 2002–2011 |
Teal Trading & Development, LP v. Champee Springs Ranches Property Owners Ass'n
green
1 sentence2020“In the broadest sense, estoppel by deed stands for the proposition that all parties to a deed are bound by the recitals in it, which operate as an estoppel.” 41 We have further observed that 40 See LaLonde, ___ S.W.3d at ___ (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 41 Trial v. Dragon, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (Tex. 2019) (citing Greene v. White, 153 S.W.2d 575 , 583–84 (Tex. 1941)). 16 estoppel-by-deed “does not bind mere strangers.” 42 The court of appeals held that Teal could not invoke an estoppel-by-deed defense because Teal was not a party to the replat. 534 S.W.3d at 586 (citing Tex | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Kerlin v. Sauceda
green
1 sentence2019Over the years, the doctrine of estoppel by deed developed in the courts of appeals to have a wide application that “all parties to a deed are bound by the recitals therein, which operate as an estoppel, working on the interest in the land if it be a deed of conveyance, and binding both parties and privies; privies in blood, privies in estate, and privies in law.” E.g., Sauceda v. Kerlin, 164 S.W.3d 892, 915 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005) (quoting Wallace v. Pruitt, 20 S.W. 728 , 728–79 (Tex. App.—Houston 1892, no writ)), rev’d, 263 S.W.3d 920 (Tex. 2008). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences2019We hold that neither the estoppel by deed doctrine nor our opinion in Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940), applies in this case. 2019Beneficiaries of Both Estates This case requires us to review the applicability of the estoppel by deed doctrine and this Court’s opinion in Duhig, 144 S.W.2d 878 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Cooke v. Avery
green
2 sentences2015Urban Renewal Agency ofSan Antonio v. Bridges Signs, Inc., Ill S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, writ refd n.r.e.); Cooke et al, v. Avery, 147 US 375 , 13 S.Ct. 340 , 37 L. 2015Urban Renewal Agency ofSan Antonio v. Bridges Signs, Inc., Ill S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, writ refd n.r.e.); Cooke et al, v. Avery, 147 US 375 , 13 S.Ct. 340 , 37 L. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Estate of Griffin v. Sumner
green
1 sentence2015Thus, there is no conflict between the proposed application of the doctrine of estoppel by deed here and the governing law in Teal, Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Dr. Hector Farias and Voices in Democratic Action (VIDA) v. Eduardo A. Garza and Uni-Trade Forwarding, L.C.
green
1 sentence2015Teal, Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Johnson v. Lockhart, Adm'r.
neutral
1 sentence2015Whiteside v. Bell, 162 Tex. 411 , 347 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex., 1961) (noting that deed conveying 22 land subject to a lien for unpaid purchase money is treated as an executory contract); Johnson v. Lockhart, 40 S.W. 640 (Tex. 1897) (applying executory contract rule to purchase money dispute); see also, Davis v. Huey, 620 S.W.2d 561, 565-66 (Tex. 1981) (a grantee is "bound by those restrictive covenants running with the property of which he has actual or constructive notice," and is estopped from denying the recitals that appear in his chain of title). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Surtees v. Hobson
green
1 sentence2011Estoppel by deed precludes parties from alleging title “in derogation of the deed [or] denypng] the truth of any material fact asserted in it.” Surtees v. Hobson, 4 S.W.2d 245, 246 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1928), aff'd, 13 S.W.2d 345 (Tex.Comm’n App.1929). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Box v. Lawrence
green
1 sentence1947As. stated in Box v. Lawrence, 14 Tex. 545 , “In this country a party is estopped not only from denying his deed, but every fact which it recites, and all persons claiming through the party estopped are bound by the estoppel.” Such recitals constitute primary proof which cannot be averred against. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Galloway v. Finley
neutral
2 sentences1930App.) 179 S. W. 88 ; Galloway v. Finley, 12 Pet. 264 , 9 L. 1930App.) 179 S. W. 88 ; Galloway v. Finley, 12 Pet. 264 , 9 L. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.