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6 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1951–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shedden, L., Aplts. v. Anadarko E&P Co.green2 sentences2017Shedden v. Anadarko E. & P. Co., L.P., 136 A.3d 485, 490-91 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted). 2017Shedden v. Anadarko E. & P. Co., L.P., 136 A.3d 485, 490-91 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Daley v. Hornbakergreen2 sentences2016Boyd Enterprises, Inc., 326 Pa. 385 , 191 A. 137, 140 (1937) (under the doctrine of estoppel by deed, “when a vendor or mortgagor either sells or mortgages land which he does not own, and afterwards acquires title thereto, he is not permitted to set up this after-acquired title to defeat his previous grant or mortgage, for this would permit him to perpetrate a fraud upon his grantee or creditor.”); Daley v. Hornbaker, 325 Pa.Super. 172 , 472 A.2d 703, 705 (1984) (“A *394 grantor is estopped to assert anything in derogation of his deed, as against grantee.”). 2016Boyd Enterprises, Inc., 326 Pa. 385 , 191 A. 137, 140 (1937) (under the doctrine of estoppel by deed, “when a vendor or mortgagor either sells or mortgages land which he does not own, and afterwards acquires title thereto, he is not permitted to set up this after-acquired title to defeat his previous grant or mortgage, for this would permit him to perpetrate a fraud upon his grantee or creditor.”); Daley v. Hornbaker, 325 Pa.Super. 172 , 472 A.2d 703, 705 (1984) (“A *394 grantor is estopped to assert anything in derogation of his deed, as against grantee.”). | 1 | 1 |
Bowen v. A. R. Boyd Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences2016Boyd Enterprises, Inc., 326 Pa. 385 , 191 A. 137, 140 (1937) (under the doctrine of estoppel by deed, “when a vendor or mortgagor either sells or mortgages land which he does not own, and afterwards acquires title thereto, he is not permitted to set up this after-acquired title to defeat his previous grant or mortgage, for this would permit him to perpetrate a fraud upon his grantee or creditor.”); Daley v. Hornbaker, 325 Pa.Super. 172 , 472 A.2d 703, 705 (1984) (“A *394 grantor is estopped to assert anything in derogation of his deed, as against grantee.”). 2016Boyd Enterprises, Inc., 326 Pa. 385 , 191 A. 137, 140 (1937) (under the doctrine of estoppel by deed, “when a vendor or mortgagor either sells or mortgages land which he does not own, and afterwards acquires title thereto, he is not permitted to set up this after-acquired title to defeat his previous grant or mortgage, for this would permit him to perpetrate a fraud upon his grantee or creditor.”); Daley v. Hornbaker, 325 Pa.Super. 172 , 472 A.2d 703, 705 (1984) (“A *394 grantor is estopped to assert anything in derogation of his deed, as against grantee.”). | 1 | 1 |
McLaughlin v. Lambourngreen1 sentence2016But see Shell Oil Co., 828 F.2d at 209 (recognizing that some courts, including the court in In re Solomon, supra, have held that detrimental reliance is not an element of estoppel by deed, but stating that "[w]e know of no reason” for such a conclusion and opining that, "detrimental reliance is so obvious that courts may not bother to mention it.”); McLaughlin v. Lambourn, 359 N.W.2d 370, 372 (N.D.1985) (in case involving reservation of mineral rights, application of estoppel by deed requires, inter alia, that the party asserting estoppel relied directly upon such conduct or admissions, and w | 1 | 1 |
Summers v. CERTAINTEED CORP.green2 sentences2016Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 606 Pa. 294 , 997 A.2d 1152, 1159 (2010). 2016Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 606 Pa. 294 , 997 A.2d 1152, 1159 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Solomongreen1 sentence2016But see Shell Oil Co., 828 F.2d at 209 (recognizing that some courts, including the court in In re Solomon, supra, have held that detrimental reliance is not an element of estoppel by deed, but stating that "[w]e know of no reason” for such a conclusion and opining that, "detrimental reliance is so obvious that courts may not bother to mention it.”); McLaughlin v. Lambourn, 359 N.W.2d 370, 372 (N.D.1985) (in case involving reservation of mineral rights, application of estoppel by deed requires, inter alia, that the party asserting estoppel relied directly upon such conduct or admissions, and w | 1 | 1 |
cluster 493906yellow1 sentence2016But see Shell Oil Co., 828 F.2d at 209 (recognizing that some courts, including the court in In re Solomon, supra, have held that detrimental reliance is not an element of estoppel by deed, but stating that "[w]e know of no reason” for such a conclusion and opining that, "detrimental reliance is so obvious that courts may not bother to mention it.”); McLaughlin v. Lambourn, 359 N.W.2d 370, 372 (N.D.1985) (in case involving reservation of mineral rights, application of estoppel by deed requires, inter alia, that the party asserting estoppel relied directly upon such conduct or admissions, and w | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dixon v. Fuller
green
2 sentences2014Dixon, supra. Moreover, contrary to the Shed-dens’ argument, it is of no moment to the application of the doctrine of estoppel by deed that Anadarko initially paid them for only the oil and gas underlying one-half of the premises (ie., via the $2,400.00 Bonus Payment). 2014See Hennebont Co., supra; Dixon, supra. 3 The Sheddens’ after-aequired title to the reserved 31 acres inured, by the way of estoppel, to the use and benefit of Anadar-ko. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Phillips Et Ux. v. Tetzner
green
2 sentences1972Phillips v. Tetzner, 357 Pa. 43 , 53 A. 2d 129 (1947); Mott v. Kaldes, 288 Pa. 264 , 135 A. 764 (1927). 1972Phillips v. Tetzner, 357 Pa. 43 , 53 A. 2d 129 (1947); Mott v. Kaldes, 288 Pa. 264 , 135 A. 764 (1927). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Mott v. Kaldes
green
2 sentences1972Phillips v. Tetzner, 357 Pa. 43 , 53 A. 2d 129 (1947); Mott v. Kaldes, 288 Pa. 264 , 135 A. 764 (1927). 1972Phillips v. Tetzner, 357 Pa. 43 , 53 A. 2d 129 (1947); Mott v. Kaldes, 288 Pa. 264 , 135 A. 764 (1927). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Norris's Estate
green
1 sentence1951In section 316, comment C, supra, it is stated: “In many aspects, the rights of the transferee are determined in the same manner they would be under applications of the doctrine of estoppel by deed.” See Kuhns’ Estate, 163 Pa. 438 ; Lennig’s Estate, 182 Pa. 485 ; Norris’ Estate, 329 Pa. 483 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Kuhns's Estate
neutral
1 sentence1951In section 316, comment C, supra, it is stated: “In many aspects, the rights of the transferee are determined in the same manner they would be under applications of the doctrine of estoppel by deed.” See Kuhns’ Estate, 163 Pa. 438 ; Lennig’s Estate, 182 Pa. 485 ; Norris’ Estate, 329 Pa. 483 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Estate of Lennig
green
1 sentence1951In section 316, comment C, supra, it is stated: “In many aspects, the rights of the transferee are determined in the same manner they would be under applications of the doctrine of estoppel by deed.” See Kuhns’ Estate, 163 Pa. 438 ; Lennig’s Estate, 182 Pa. 485 ; Norris’ Estate, 329 Pa. 483 . | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.