binding rule in Ohio

2024Though the rule is considered one of practice and not a binding rule of substantive law, it “is necessary to ensure 8 January Term, 2024 consistency of results in a case, to avoid endless litigation by settling the issues, and to preserve the structure of superior and inferior courts as designed by the Ohio Constitution.” Id.

2024Though the rule is considered one of practice and not a binding rule of substantive law, it “is necessary to ensure consistency of results in a case, to avoid endless litigation by settling the issues, and to preserve the structure of superior and inferior courts as designed by the Ohio Constitution.” Id.

2023See Hopkins v. Dyer, 104 Ohio St.3d 461 , 2004-Ohio-6769 , 820 N.E.2d 329, ¶ 15 (The law-of-the-case doctrine is “a rule of practice, not a binding rule of substantive law”).

2023See Hopkins v. Dyer, 104 Ohio St.3d 461 , 2004-Ohio-6769 , 820 N.E.2d 329, ¶ 15 (The law-of-the-case doctrine is “a rule of practice, not a binding rule of substantive law”).

2023Creed v. Sauline, 74 Ohio St.3d 402, 404 (1996). {¶ 49} The law of the case doctrine is “a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law and will not be applied so as to achieve unjust results.” Nolan at 3 .

2012Creed v. Sauline, 74 Ohio St.3d 402, 404-405 , 1996-Ohio-174 , 659 N.E.2d 781 . {¶17} Although we recognize that the doctrine of the law of the case is considered a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law, we view its application here achieves just results.

2012Potain v. Mathews, 59 Ohio St.2d 29, 32 , 391 N.E.2d 343 (1979) (“ ‘The [law-of-the-case] doctrine is considered to be a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law and will not be applied so as to achieve unjust results’ ”); see also State ex rel.

2012Potain v. Mathews, 59 Ohio St.2d 29, 32 , 391 N.E.2d 343 (1979) (“ ‘The [law-of-the-case] doctrine is considered to be a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law and will not be applied so as to achieve unjust results’ ”); see also State ex rel.

2001It is considered to be “a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law.” Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3 , 11 OBR 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 410, 413 ; see, also, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. (1988), 486 U.S. 800, 817 , 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2178 , 100 L.Ed.2d 811, 831 (“the law-of-the-case doctrine ‘merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, not a limit to their power,’ ” quoting Messinger v. Anderson [1912], 225 U.S. 436, 444 , 32 S.Ct. 739, 740 , 56 L.Ed. 1152, 1156 ).

2001It is considered to be “a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law.” Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3 , 11 OBR 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 410, 413 ; see, also, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. (1988), 486 U.S. 800, 817 , 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2178 , 100 L.Ed.2d 811, 831 (“the law-of-the-case doctrine ‘merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, not a limit to their power,’ ” quoting Messinger v. Anderson [1912], 225 U.S. 436, 444 , 32 S.Ct. 739, 740 , 56 L.Ed. 1152, 1156 ).

2001It is considered to be “a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law.” Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3 , 11 OBR 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 410, 413 ; see, also, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. (1988), 486 U.S. 800, 817 , 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2178 , 100 L.Ed.2d 811, 831 (“the law-of-the-case doctrine ‘merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, not a limit to their power,’ ” quoting Messinger v. Anderson [1912], 225 U.S. 436, 444 , 32 S.Ct. 739, 740 , 56 L.Ed. 1152, 1156 ).

2001It is considered to be “a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law.” Nolan v. Nolan (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3 , 11 OBR 1, 3, 462 N.E.2d 410, 413 ; see, also, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. (1988), 486 U.S. 800, 817 , 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2178 , 100 L.Ed.2d 811, 831 (“the law-of-the-case doctrine ‘merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, not a limit to their power,’ ” quoting Messinger v. Anderson [1912], 225 U.S. 436, 444 , 32 S.Ct. 739, 740 , 56 L.Ed. 1152, 1156 ).

2026The law-of-the-case doctrine is “a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law [] and we will not apply it to achieve unjust results.” Farmers State Bank v. Sponaugle, 2019-Ohio-2518, ¶ 22 . {¶11} In In re J.D.

2022Turner and Sheriff Christopher Paul Viland (collectively, “the county”), contend that Lundeen cannot establish a meritorious claim or defense, arguing that because this court already rejected Lundeen’s arguments in Lundeen I, her motion fails under the law-of-the-case doctrine. {¶ 13} Described as a “rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law,” the “law-of-the-case doctrine provides that legal questions resolved by a reviewing court in a prior appeal remain the law of that case for any subsequent proceedings at both the trial and appellate levels.” Farmers State Bank v. Spo

2008Co. v. Hosbrook (1935), 130 Ohio St. 101 ; Gottfried v. Yocum (App. 1953), 72 Ohio Law Abs. 343, 345 . {¶ 19} The law of the case doctrine "is considered to be a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law and will not be applied so as to achieve unjust results." Nolan , at 3 , citing Gohman , at 730-731 .

2001Co. v. Hosbrook (1935), 130 Ohio St. 101 [ 3 O.O. 138 , 196 N.E. 888 ]; Gottfried v. Yocum (App.1953), 72 Ohio Law Abs. 343, 345 [ 58 O.O. 446 , 133 N.E.2d 389 ], “The doctrine is considered to be a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law and will not be applied so as to achieve unjust results.

2022“The doctrine is considered to be a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law and will not be applied so as to achieve unjust results. * * * However, the rule is necessary to ensure consistency of results in a case, to avoid endless litigation by settling the issues, and to preserve the structure of superior and inferior courts as designed by the Ohio Constitution.” (Citations omitted.) Id.; see Giancola v. Azem, 153 Ohio St.3d 594 , 2018-Ohio-1694 , 109 N.E.3d 1194, ¶ 14 ; Hopkins v. Dyer, 104 Ohio St.3d 461 , 2004-Ohio-6769 , 820 N.E.2d 329, ¶ 15 . {¶ 18} The law of the

2022“The doctrine is considered to be a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law and will not be applied so as to achieve unjust results. * * * However, the rule is necessary to ensure consistency of results in a case, to avoid endless litigation by settling the issues, and to preserve the structure of superior and inferior courts as designed by the Ohio Constitution.” (Citations omitted.) Id.; see Giancola v. Azem, 153 Ohio St.3d 594 , 2018-Ohio-1694 , 109 N.E.3d 1194, ¶ 14 ; Hopkins v. Dyer, 104 Ohio St.3d 461 , 2004-Ohio-6769 , 820 N.E.2d 329, ¶ 15 . {¶ 18} The law of the

2026“The doctrine is considered to be a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law and will not be applied so as to achieve unjust results.” Id. at *4; R.G. v. N.G., 2022-Ohio-1886, ¶ 13 (5th Dist.).

2022The doctrine “should not be taken to imply that a trial court can never, under any circumstances, reconsider its prior ruling.” Poluse at 725, 735 N.E.2d 505 , quoting Clymer v. Clymer, 10th Dist.

2020In addition, the law of the case doctrine “is considered to be a rule of practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law and will not be applied so as to achieve unjust results.” Nolan at 3 . {¶ 14} In contrast, the doctrine of judicial estoppel “forbids a party ‘from taking a position inconsistent with one successfully and unequivocally asserted by the same party in a prior proceeding.’ ” Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 116 Ohio St.3d 324 , 2007-Ohio-6442 , 879 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 25 , quoting Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376, 380 (6th Cir.1998).

2017See Nestle R&D Ctr., Inc. v. Levin, 122 Ohio St.3d 22 , 2009-Ohio-1929 , 907 N.E.2d 714, ¶ 40 (no deference owed to agency’s regulation when the legislature did not delegate administrative authority in that particular area).

2017See Nestle R&D Ctr., Inc. v. Levin, 122 Ohio St.3d 22 , 2009-Ohio-1929 , 907 N.E.2d 714, ¶ 40 (no deference owed to agency’s regulation when the legislature did not delegate administrative authority in that particular area).

2012Estate of Miles v. Piketon, 121 Ohio St.3d 231 , 2009-Ohio-786 , 903 N.E.2d 311, ¶ 30 , citing Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 93 Ohio St.3d 488, 491 , 756 N.E.2d 657 (2001) (“The binding effect of res judicata has been held not to apply when fairness and justice would not support it”).

2012Estate of Miles v. Piketon, 121 Ohio St.3d 231 , 2009-Ohio-786 , 903 N.E.2d 311, ¶ 30 , citing Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 93 Ohio St.3d 488, 491 , 756 N.E.2d 657 (2001) (“The binding effect of res judicata has been held not to apply when fairness and justice would not support it”).

2012Estate of Miles v. Piketon, 121 Ohio St.3d 231 , 2009-Ohio-786 , 903 N.E.2d 311, ¶ 30 , citing Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 93 Ohio St.3d 488, 491 , 756 N.E.2d 657 (2001) (“The binding effect of res judicata has been held not to apply when fairness and justice would not support it”).

2012Estate of Miles v. Piketon, 121 Ohio St.3d 231 , 2009-Ohio-786 , 903 N.E.2d 311, ¶ 30 , citing Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 93 Ohio St.3d 488, 491 , 756 N.E.2d 657 (2001) (“The binding effect of res judicata has been held not to apply when fairness and justice would not support it”).