binding requirement in New York

1990Even assuming that Election Law § 6-134 (2) were applicable, the Village Clerk’s "use of staples of an adequate size, strength and number to securely fasten together [the petitioner’s eight-page nominating petition] constitutes strict compliance with the binding requirement of Election Law § 6-134 (2)” (Matter of Jones v Scaringe, 143 AD2d 294, 295 ; see, Matter of Braxton v Mahoney, 63 NY2d 691, 692 ; cf., Matter of Bouldin v Scaringe, 133 AD2d 287 ).

1989However, the law is settled that the binding requirement of a petition and the numbering of sheets in a petition are matters of content rather than form (Matter of Braxton v Mahoney, 63 NY2d 691 ; Matter of Bouldin v Scaringe, 133 AD2d 287 , lv denied 70 NY2d 604 ).

1988In Matter of Bouldin v Scaringe ( 133 AD2d 287, 288 , lv denied 70 NY2d 604 ), we described this binding requirement as one “of content rather than form * * * such that strict compliance is required”, and we held that the use of a spring clip to hold the pages of a designating petition together was not sufficient, citing Matter of Braxton v Mahoney ( 63 NY2d 691 , revg 104 AD2d 729 ).

1987This binding requirement has been held to be a requirement of content rather than form (Matter of Braxton v Mahoney, 63 NY2d 691, 692 , revg 104 AD2d 729 ) such that strict compliance is required (see, Matter of Hutson v Bass, 54 NY2d 772, 774 ).

1983When “the error in the charge was * * * committed at the request of defendant, he [defendant] certainly should not be permitted to complain” (People v Hille, 42 AD2d 881, 882 ).

1983When ‘the error in the charge was * * * committed at the request of defendant, he [defendant] certainly should not be permitted to complain’ (People v Hille, 42 AD2d 881, 882 ).

1993The uncontroverted testimony at the hearing held before Supreme Court, and the affidavits filed by both Goodspeed and Robert Allen, the secretary and Republican Commissioner of respondent Warren County Board of Elections, plainly established that the first volume of Goodspeed’s petition was not bound at the time it was filed with the Board at 5:00 p.m. on July 13, 1993 (see, Election Law § 1-106 [1]; Matter of Rutherford v Jones, 128 AD2d 978, 979 , lv denied 69 NY2d 606 ); it was not until the following morning that Allen bound the petition for Goodspeed in the printing shop located in the Co

1993Commn., 164 AD2d 618, 623 ).

1992Under these circumstances, we find that the defendant’s express objection to a limiting instruction with regard to the uncharged crimes constituted a binding waiver of any right to that charge (see generally, People v White, 53 NY2d 721 ).

1990Even assuming that Election Law § 6-134 (2) were applicable, the Village Clerk’s "use of staples of an adequate size, strength and number to securely fasten together [the petitioner’s eight-page nominating petition] constitutes strict compliance with the binding requirement of Election Law § 6-134 (2)” (Matter of Jones v Scaringe, 143 AD2d 294, 295 ; see, Matter of Braxton v Mahoney, 63 NY2d 691, 692 ; cf., Matter of Bouldin v Scaringe, 133 AD2d 287 ).

1989If space on the question sheet proves inadequate for any given answer, additional sheets can be appended by the answerer with a cross-reference to them following the question.” (Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3134:l, at 685.) Although Professor Siegel himself states that this is but a suggestion and not a binding requirement of the statute (1976 Supp Practice Commentaries, op. cit, CPLR C3134:l, 1989 Supp Pamph, at 405), nonetheless at least one court has seen fit to strike interrogatories with leave to resubmit where lengthy interrogatories were prop

1987This binding requirement has been held to be a requirement of content rather than form (Matter of Braxton v Mahoney, 63 NY2d 691, 692 , revg 104 AD2d 729 ) such that strict compliance is required (see, Matter of Hutson v Bass, 54 NY2d 772, 774 ).

1986In support of its decision, Special Term relied upon Matter of Nicholas v Kahn ( 47 NY2d 24 ).

1983Therefore, upon the instant facts, we find a binding waiver.” (People v Williams, supra, p 726 .) The concurring opinion of Justice Sandler also indicated that “it is difficult to accept the notion that a verdict must be set aside which was rendered on a count submitted at the specific request of the defendant, with an obvious view of securing a trial advantage that was in fact secured.” (People v Williams, supra, p 727 .) Justice Silver-man, also in a concurring opinion, held that: “The obvious reason for defendant’s request was that he did not wish to confront the jury with a choice, between

1983Therefore, upon the instant facts, we find a binding waiver.” (People v Williams, supra, p 726 .) The concurring opinion of Justice Sandler also indicated that “it is difficult to accept the notion that a verdict must be set aside which was rendered on a count submitted at the specific request of the defendant, with an obvious view of securing a trial advantage that was in fact secured.” (People v Williams, supra, p 727 .) Justice Silver-man, also in a concurring opinion, held that: “The obvious reason for defendant’s request was that he did not wish to confront the jury with a choice, between

1979Under the agency approach, which was seemingly rejected in Schneckloth v Bustamonte ( 412 US 218, 245-246 , supra), the "agent’s” implied authority to give binding consent to a search on behalf of a co-occupant is deemed to be "rescinded” when the co-occupant expresses a contrary intention not to permit the search (Lucero v Donovan, 354 F2d 16, supra). 1 In Carter , we declined to follow this approach because we found it theoretically unacceptable to hold that one co-occupant may commit another to a binding waiver of an important constitutional right solely because the two share a common inter

1979Under the agency approach, which was seemingly rejected in Schneckloth v Bustamonte ( 412 US 218, 245-246 , supra), the "agent’s” implied authority to give binding consent to a search on behalf of a co-occupant is deemed to be "rescinded” when the co-occupant expresses a contrary intention not to permit the search (Lucero v Donovan, 354 F2d 16, supra). 1 In Carter , we declined to follow this approach because we found it theoretically unacceptable to hold that one co-occupant may commit another to a binding waiver of an important constitutional right solely because the two share a common inter

1979Nevertheless, we upheld the search in Carter because we found that the co-occupant possessed authority in her own right to permit a police entry " 'into premises where she lives and of which she had control’ ” ( 30 NY2d, at p 282 , quoting Roberts v United States, 332 F2d 892, 896-897).