Joseph motion in California

2016(In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 772 .) 7 The Department contends Joseph’s challenge to the jurisdiction findings against him is moot because the juvenile court based jurisdiction on the sustained allegations against Lucia.

2016(In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 772 .) 7 The Department contends Joseph’s challenge to the jurisdiction findings against him is moot because the juvenile court based jurisdiction on the sustained allegations against Lucia.

2021Joseph’s defense counsel then asked the following hypothetical of the expert: “So perhaps Joseph Castro could have been fishing one day, used the pole, it’s a hot day, you’re fishing, you get sweaty, excrete your DNA onto the fishing pole, and Salvador 8 Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 ] (Griffin). 32 Castro then uses it at a later date?” The expert agreed this was possible.

2021Joseph’s defense counsel then asked the following hypothetical of the expert: “So perhaps Joseph Castro could have been fishing one day, used the pole, it’s a hot day, you’re fishing, you get sweaty, excrete your DNA onto the fishing pole, and Salvador 8 Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 106 ] (Griffin). 32 Castro then uses it at a later date?” The expert agreed this was possible.

2020As in Lee, these circumstances “show[ed] that no arrest was going to [happen prior to the search], the search was [thus] incident only to an intended citation, . . . and the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the search.” (Ibid.) The juvenile court here primarily relied on a trio of cases—Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, supra, 532 U.S. 318 , Coleman, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 321 , and Brocks, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d 959—to deny Joseph’s motion.

2020Therefore, liberally construing the notice of appeal in favor of validity (see In re Marriage of Macfarlane & Lang (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 247, 252 ; Collins v. San Francisco (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 719, 722 [stating rule of liberal construction]), we treat 8.

2020As in Lee, these circumstances “show[ed] that no arrest was going to [happen prior to the search], the search was [thus] incident only to an intended citation, . . . and the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the search.” (Ibid.) The juvenile court here primarily relied on a trio of cases—Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, supra, 532 U.S. 318 , Coleman, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 321 , and Brocks, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d 959—to deny Joseph’s motion.

2020As in Lee, these circumstances “show[ed] that no arrest was going to [happen prior to the search], the search was [thus] incident only to an intended citation, . . . and the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the search.” (Ibid.) The juvenile court here primarily relied on a trio of cases—Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, supra, 532 U.S. 318 , Coleman, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 321 , and Brocks, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d 959—to deny Joseph’s motion.

2020As in Lee, these circumstances “show[ed] that no arrest was going to [happen prior to the search], the search was [thus] incident only to an intended citation, . . . and the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the search.” (Ibid.) The juvenile court here primarily relied on a trio of cases—Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, supra, 532 U.S. 318 , Coleman, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d 321 , and Brocks, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d 959—to deny Joseph’s motion.

2015(See Gately v. Cloverdale Unified School Dist. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 487, 496 ; Fladeboe v. American 8 Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d), provides, “An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake . . . is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” 9 9 Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58 .) Here, substantial evidence supports the implied finding the limitations period began running no later than August 1, 2010 and thus Joseph’s motion filed on March 26, 2012 was untimely.

2015(See Gately v. Cloverdale Unified School Dist. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 487, 496 ; Fladeboe v. American 8 Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d), provides, “An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake . . . is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” 9 9 Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58 .) Here, substantial evidence supports the implied finding the limitations period began running no later than August 1, 2010 and thus Joseph’s motion filed on March 26, 2012 was untimely.

2013(In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924 ; In re Rico W. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1169, 1173 .) We have no power to reweigh the evidence, but determine only if there is sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding.

2013Thus, Joseph’s challenge is one to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s implied finding that subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) of section 366.26 did not apply.7 (See In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 ; see also In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 810-812 ; In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 50-53 .) When reviewing such a challenge, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s finding to determine whether substantial evidence supported termination of parental rights.

2013(In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924 ; In re Rico W. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1169, 1173 .) We have no power to reweigh the evidence, but determine only if there is sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding.

2013(Corona, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1226 .) The $120,000 sanction is less than the $280,000 in attorney's fees Debbara incurred, and Joseph has never contested his ability to pay this award. 6 Joseph's challenge to sanctions under section 271 is based on the same arguments as his challenge to the section 2017 award.

2013Thus, Joseph’s challenge is one to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s implied finding that subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) of section 366.26 did not apply.7 (See In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 ; see also In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 810-812 ; In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 50-53 .) When reviewing such a challenge, we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s finding to determine whether substantial evidence supported termination of parental rights.

2005Happy Father’s Day!” On March 14, 2003, the court issued a “Decision and Orders Re: Petitioner’s Ability to Asert [ric] Standing in this Matter” in which the court found: “1. [T]his case can be distinguished from In re Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 146 , 46 P.3d 932 ],. . . based on the fact that the minor in this case has a loving Mother who has been her primary care provider for her entire life. [Maria] is a fit parent.

2005Happy Father’s Day!” On March 14, 2003, the court issued a “Decision and Orders Re: Petitioner’s Ability to Asert [ric] Standing in this Matter” in which the court found: “1. [T]his case can be distinguished from In re Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 146 , 46 P.3d 932 ],. . . based on the fact that the minor in this case has a loving Mother who has been her primary care provider for her entire life. [Maria] is a fit parent.

2001First, it ruled that the alleged agreement between Joseph and Celeste was “an unenforceable contract” because it was dependent upon “meretricious consideration, as it is based upon sexual conduct.” Alternatively, the court said, if the consideration was “a promise to bear children, it is an unenforceable promise” because “sexual conduct does indeed form an inseparable part of the consideration for the agreement.” In addition to Marvin, the court cited in support of this conclusion Hill v. Estate of Westbrook (1950) 95 Cal.App.2d 599 [ 213 P.2d 727 ] (Hill) and excerpts from the deposition of C

2001First, it ruled that the alleged agreement between Joseph and Celeste was “an unenforceable contract” because it was dependent upon “meretricious consideration, as it is based upon sexual conduct.” Alternatively, the court said, if the consideration was “a promise to bear children, it is an unenforceable promise” because “sexual conduct does indeed form an inseparable part of the consideration for the agreement.” In addition to Marvin, the court cited in support of this conclusion Hill v. Estate of Westbrook (1950) 95 Cal.App.2d 599 [ 213 P.2d 727 ] (Hill) and excerpts from the deposition of C

1996This case is more analogous to People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d 367 (hereafter Wright).

1973Co. (1967) supra, 66 Cal.2d 738, 746 ; Corfee v. Southern Cal. Edison Co. (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 473, 477 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 870 ].) We conclude that the affidavit supporting Carolyn’s motion did not adequately support the dismissal of Joseph’s motion on grounds of forum non conveniens.