Helms rule in Texas

2018In 1972, this Court held in Helms v. State, that where a plea of guilty is voluntarily and understandingly made, all non-jurisdictional defects, including claimed deprivations of federal due process, are waived.1 The Helms rule discouraged guilty pleas because it forced a defendant to go to a full trial on the merits if he wanted to preserve issues for appeal.2 In response to Helms, the legislature amended Article 44.02 in 1977 to add this proviso, which created a somewhat different rule for plea bargains: . . . provided, however, before the defendant who has been convicted upon either his ple

2018In 1972, this Court held in Helms v. State, that where a plea of guilty is voluntarily and understandingly made, all non-jurisdictional defects, including claimed deprivations of federal due process, are waived.1 The Helms rule discouraged guilty pleas because it forced a defendant to go to a full trial on the merits if he wanted to preserve issues for appeal.2 In response to Helms, the legislature amended Article 44.02 in 1977 to add this proviso, which created a somewhat different rule for plea bargains: . . . provided, however, before the defendant who has been convicted upon either his ple

2017In Young, the Court of Criminal Appeals modified the Helms rule so that if a defendant enters a valid plea of guilty or nolo contendere, whether or not he received an agreed recommendation of punishment, he waives or forfeits the right to appeal an error “when the judgment of guilt was rendered independent of, and is not supported by, the error.” Rankin, 46 S.W.3d at 901 (citing Young, 8 S.W.3d at 666–67).

2017In Young, the Court of Criminal Appeals modified the Helms rule so that if a defendant enters a valid plea of guilty or nolo contendere, whether or not he received an agreed recommendation of punishment, he waives or forfeits the right to appeal an error “when the judgment of guilt was rendered independent of, and is not supported by, the error.” Rankin, 46 S.W.3d at 901 (citing Young, 8 S.W.3d at 666–67).

2002The Helms rule did not apply to asserted error "occurring at or after entry of a nonnegotiated guilty plea.” Jack v. State, 871 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (per curiam); see Lemons v. State, 953 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.) ("A voluntary and understanding guilty plea entered without the benefit of a plea bargain waives all nonjurisdictional defects that occurred before the entry of the plea.”) (emphasis added); see also Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 87 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (Price, J., dissenting) ("It is true that in Young v. State, 8 S.W.3d 656 (Tex.Crim.App

2002See Jack v. State, 871 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex. Crim.App.1994) (per curiam) (noting that Helms rule did not limit appeal of asserted error “occurring at or after entry of a nonnegotiated guilty plea”); see also Lemons v. State, 953 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.) (recognizing that “[a] voluntary and understanding guilty plea entered without the benefit of a plea bargain waives all nonjurisdic-tional defects that occurred before the entry of the plea.”) (emphasis added).

2002Application of the Helms rule was predicated on a guilty plea that was "voluntarily and understandingly made.” Flowers v. State, 935 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Tex.Crim.

2002Application of the Helms rule was predicated on a guilty plea that was "voluntarily and understandingly made.” Flowers v. State, 935 S.W.2d 131, 132 (Tex.Crim.

2007Griffin v. State, 145 S.W.3d 645, 646-47 (Tex. Crim.App.2004); see also Lyon, 872 S.W.2d at 735 ("This proviso was a limited abrogation of the Helms rule; it allowed some appellate issues to be addressed on their merits in negotiated plea situations where the Helms rule otherwise applied in order `to conserve judicial resources by encouraging guilty pleas,' and to prevent `windy' appeals.") (citations and footnote omitted). "`[A] defendant who has lost one or more pre-trial motions will often go through an entire trial simply to preserve the pre-trial issues for later appellate review.

2007Griffin v. State, 145 S.W.3d 645, 646-47 (Tex. Crim.App.2004); see also Lyon, 872 S.W.2d at 735 ("This proviso was a limited abrogation of the Helms rule; it allowed some appellate issues to be addressed on their merits in negotiated plea situations where the Helms rule otherwise applied in order `to conserve judicial resources by encouraging guilty pleas,' and to prevent `windy' appeals.") (citations and footnote omitted). "`[A] defendant who has lost one or more pre-trial motions will often go through an entire trial simply to preserve the pre-trial issues for later appellate review.

1995See Ex parte Green, 548 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (addressing a claim of violation of the doctrine of carving, a Texas common-law variety of double jeopardy pro *910 tection which no longer exists). 2 Judge Clinton included Menna in his warning that not all antecedent constitutional violations were waived by the Helms rule in King v. State, 687 S.W.2d 762 , 767 n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (Clinton, J., concurring). 3 The Fifth Court of Appeals relied upon Menna in holding that a claim of double jeopardy was not waived by the entry of a voluntary plea of guilty.

1995See Ex parte Green, 548 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (addressing a claim of violation of the doctrine of carving, a Texas common-law variety of double jeopardy pro *910 tection which no longer exists). 2 Judge Clinton included Menna in his warning that not all antecedent constitutional violations were waived by the Helms rule in King v. State, 687 S.W.2d 762 , 767 n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (Clinton, J., concurring). 3 The Fifth Court of Appeals relied upon Menna in holding that a claim of double jeopardy was not waived by the entry of a voluntary plea of guilty.

1994As I pointed out in Morris : "The effect of the 1977 amendment, as noted by a panel of the Court in Ferguson v. State, 571 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978), was to abrogate the Helms rule....

1994As I pointed out in Morris : "The effect of the 1977 amendment, as noted by a panel of the Court in Ferguson v. State, 571 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978), was to abrogate the Helms rule....

1996This proviso was “a limited abrogation of the Helms rule; it allowed some appellate issues to be addressed on their merits in negotiated plea situations where the Helms rule otherwise applied in order ‘to conserve judicial resources by encouraging guilty pleas,’’ and to prevent ‘windy ’ appeals.” Lyon, 872 S.W.2d at 735 (emphasis supplied); see Morris, 749 S.W.2d at 779 n. 12; Morgan v. State, 688 S.W.2d 504, 507, 513-14 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (Onion, J., dissenting). 4 The court of criminal appeals later decided a defendant’s failure to comply with the proviso to article 44.02 was jurisdictional

1996This proviso was “a limited abrogation of the Helms rule; it allowed some appellate issues to be addressed on their merits in negotiated plea situations where the Helms rule otherwise applied in order ‘to conserve judicial resources by encouraging guilty pleas,’’ and to prevent ‘windy ’ appeals.” Lyon, 872 S.W.2d at 735 (emphasis supplied); see Morris, 749 S.W.2d at 779 n. 12; Morgan v. State, 688 S.W.2d 504, 507, 513-14 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (Onion, J., dissenting). 4 The court of criminal appeals later decided a defendant’s failure to comply with the proviso to article 44.02 was jurisdictional

1993There is a departure from the Helms rule when two restrictive conditions are met: “one, that there be a negotiated recommendation as to punishment *155 and, two, that the punishment actually assessed by the trial court not exceed the recommendation.” Prochaska v. State, 587 S.W.2d 726, 729 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979).

1985In Prochaska v. State, 587 S.W.2d 726, 729 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), this Court, speaking through Judge Clinton, wrote: “Yet, whatever the reasoning, the Legislature conditioned a departure from the Helms rule in two restrictive respects: one, that there be a negotiated recommendation as to punishment and, two, that the punishment actually assessed by the trial court not exceed the recommendation.

2010App. 1994) (explaining the Helms rule); see Young v. State , 8 S.W.3d 656, 666 (Tex. Crim App. 2000) ("[A] valid plea of guilty or nolo contendere 'waives' or forfeits the right to appeal a claim of error only when the judgment of guilt was rendered independent of, and is not supported by, the error."); see also Monreal v. State , 99 S.W.3d 615, 619 (Tex. Crim.

2010App. 1994) (explaining the Helms rule); see Young v. State , 8 S.W.3d 656, 666 (Tex. Crim App. 2000) ("[A] valid plea of guilty or nolo contendere 'waives' or forfeits the right to appeal a claim of error only when the judgment of guilt was rendered independent of, and is not supported by, the error."); see also Monreal v. State , 99 S.W.3d 615, 619 (Tex. Crim.

2005App. 1972) (reasoning that non-jurisdictional issues occurring before the entry of the plea are waived when guilty plea is entered without the benefit of a plea bargain) ; see also Lewis v. State , 911 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Tex. Crim.

2005App. 1972) (reasoning that non-jurisdictional issues occurring before the entry of the plea are waived when guilty plea is entered without the benefit of a plea bargain) ; see also Lewis v. State , 911 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Tex. Crim.

1998Compare Lynch v. State, 903 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.)(applying Helms- rule), and Studer v. State, 757 S.W.2d 107 , 109 n. 1 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988)(same), aff'd, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), with Salazar v. State, 773 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.)(holding merits of complaint regarding motion to suppress addressable based on inapplicability of rule 40(b)(1)), and Yates v. State, 759 S.W.2d 949, 949-50 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, no pet.)(same).

1998See Lynch v. State, 903 S.W.2d at 118 ; see also Jack v. State, 871 S.W.2d 741 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)(discussing application of Helms rule to non-negotiated plea in felony cases); Salazar v. State, 773 S.W.2d at 36-39 (Brown, C.J., concurring)(disagreeing with majority’s failure to apply Helms rule in misdemeanor cases).

1997See Broddus v. State, 693 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex.Crim.App.1985)(court of appeals erred in addressing merits of motion to suppress in interest of judicial economy where defendant’s conditional plea was involuntary; court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to rule on merits of the appeal under the Helms rule and also lacked authority to enforce the condition on which the plea was based); see also Jackson v. State, 841 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.)(follows Broddus , but criticizes “appellate orbit” it creates). .

1996The court further noted that when a defendant enters an “open” plea of guilt (that is, one made without a plea bargain agreement) he does not waive the right to challenge the voluntariness of the plea under the Helms rule, Broddus v. State, 693 S.W.2d 459, 460 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); see Helms, 484 S.W.2d at 927 (waiver of nonjurisdictional defects occurs only “[wjhere a plea of guilty is voluntarily and understandingly made”), and then opined that the same protection should be afforded defendants pleading guilty with a plea bargain.

2001It then observed that Rule 40(b)(1) “was not intended to and did not have the effect of reviving the Helms rule,” because in enacting Rule 40(b)(1), the court “acted on the assumption that the body of case law construing the proviso would prevail and still control.” Lemmons, 818 S.W.2d at 62 .

2001It then observed that Rule 40(b)(1) “was not intended to and did not have the effect of reviving the Helms rule,” because in enacting Rule 40(b)(1), the court “acted on the assumption that the body of case law construing the proviso would prevail and still control.” Lemmons, 818 S.W.2d at 62 .

1996Prior to 1977, Article 44.02, V.A.C.C.P., as enacted in 1965, and its predecessor, Article 813, C.C.P.1925, granted a defendant a broad right to appeal regardless of his plea. 2 In the late sixties and early seventies this right was judicially limited in guilty plea cases by establishment of the “Helms rule.” Helms v. State, 484 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); see also Hoskins v. State, 425 S.W.2d 825 (Tex.Cr.App.1968)(opinion on rehearing).

1991The Court initially imported a seedling of the so-called “Helms rule” into this state in Hoskins v. State, 425 S.W.2d 825 (Tex.Cr.App.1968) (opinion on rehearing), viz: “With reference to appellant’s claim of deprivation of federal constitutional due process, attention is directed to Bee v. Beto, 384 F.2d 925 [CA5 1967], wherein the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a guilty plea entered by a Texas state defendant was conclusive as to the defendant’s guilt, admitted all facts charged in the indictment and waived all nonjurisdiction defects, citing White v. Beto, 367 F.2d 557 [CA5 1966];

1996For a more detailed history of the development of the Helms rule, see Lemmons v. State, 818 S.W.2d 58 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), and Dees v. State, 676 S.W.2d 403, 405-408 (Tex.Cr.App.1984)(Clinton, J., dissenting). 4 .

1994As I have pointed out on other occasions, the importation of the Helms rule into our jurisprudence was both improper, see Dees v. State, 676 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (Clinton, J., dissenting), and flawed, see King v. State, 687 S.W.2d 762, 766 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) (Clinton, J., concurring).

2000The Helms rule does not apply to errors “occurring at or after entry of [the] plea.” Daw v. State, 17 S.W.3d 330, 331 (Tex.App.—Waco 2000); Jack v. State, 871 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).

2000The Helms rule does not apply to errors “occurring at or after entry of [the] plea.” Daw v. State, 17 S.W.3d 330, 331 (Tex.App.—Waco 2000); Jack v. State, 871 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).

2001The Helms rule “discouraged guilty pleas, and caused a defendant, who wanted to preserve his appellate issues, to force the State to a full blown trial on the merits.” Id. at 734 (citing Morris, 749 S.W.2d at 779 ).

2001The Helms rule “discouraged guilty pleas, and caused a defendant, who wanted to preserve his appellate issues, to force the State to a full blown trial on the merits.” Id. at 734 (citing Morris, 749 S.W.2d at 779 ).

1998Compare Lynch v. State, 903 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.)(applying Helms- rule), and Studer v. State, 757 S.W.2d 107 , 109 n. 1 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988)(same), aff'd, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), with Salazar v. State, 773 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.)(holding merits of complaint regarding motion to suppress addressable based on inapplicability of rule 40(b)(1)), and Yates v. State, 759 S.W.2d 949, 949-50 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, no pet.)(same).

1998See Lynch v. State, 903 S.W.2d at 118 ; see also Jack v. State, 871 S.W.2d 741 (Tex.Crim.App.1994)(discussing application of Helms rule to non-negotiated plea in felony cases); Salazar v. State, 773 S.W.2d at 36-39 (Brown, C.J., concurring)(disagreeing with majority’s failure to apply Helms rule in misdemeanor cases).

1998Compare Lynch v. State, 903 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.)(applying Helms- rule), and Studer v. State, 757 S.W.2d 107 , 109 n. 1 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988)(same), aff'd, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), with Salazar v. State, 773 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.)(holding merits of complaint regarding motion to suppress addressable based on inapplicability of rule 40(b)(1)), and Yates v. State, 759 S.W.2d 949, 949-50 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, no pet.)(same).

1998Compare Lynch v. State, 903 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 1995, no pet.)(applying Helms rule), and Studer v. State, 757 S.W.2d 107 , 109 n. 1 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988)(same), aff'd, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), ivith Salazar v. State, 773 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.)(holding merits of complaint regarding motion to suppress addressable based on inapplicability of rule 40(b)(1)), and Yates v. State, 759 S.W.2d 949, 949-50 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1988, no pet.)(same).

1991The Court initially imported a seedling of the so-called “Helms rule” into this state in Hoskins v. State, 425 S.W.2d 825 (Tex.Cr.App.1968) (opinion on rehearing), viz: “With reference to appellant’s claim of deprivation of federal constitutional due process, attention is directed to Bee v. Beto, 384 F.2d 925 [CA5 1967], wherein the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a guilty plea entered by a Texas state defendant was conclusive as to the defendant’s guilt, admitted all facts charged in the indictment and waived all nonjurisdiction defects, citing White v. Beto, 367 F.2d 557 [CA5 1966];

1987Joining the opinion, I write to point out again that a complete statement of the Helms rule may be gleaned from White v. Beto, 367 F.2d 557 (CA5 1966), viz: “The guilty plea under the circumstances is conclusive as to defendant’s guilt, admits all the facts charged and waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the prior proceedings.” Id., at 558 (my emphasis).

2007Griffin v. State, 145 S.W.3d 645, 646-47 (Tex. Crim.App.2004); see also Lyon, 872 S.W.2d at 735 ("This proviso was a limited abrogation of the Helms rule; it allowed some appellate issues to be addressed on their merits in negotiated plea situations where the Helms rule otherwise applied in order `to conserve judicial resources by encouraging guilty pleas,' and to prevent `windy' appeals.") (citations and footnote omitted). "`[A] defendant who has lost one or more pre-trial motions will often go through an entire trial simply to preserve the pre-trial issues for later appellate review.

2007Griffin v. State, 145 S.W.3d 645, 646-47 (Tex. Crim.App.2004); see also Lyon, 872 S.W.2d at 735 ("This proviso was a limited abrogation of the Helms rule; it allowed some appellate issues to be addressed on their merits in negotiated plea situations where the Helms rule otherwise applied in order `to conserve judicial resources by encouraging guilty pleas,' and to prevent `windy' appeals.") (citations and footnote omitted). "`[A] defendant who has lost one or more pre-trial motions will often go through an entire trial simply to preserve the pre-trial issues for later appellate review.

1998Compare Lynch v. State, 903 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.)(applying Helms- rule), and Studer v. State, 757 S.W.2d 107 , 109 n. 1 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988)(same), aff'd, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), with Salazar v. State, 773 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.)(holding merits of complaint regarding motion to suppress addressable based on inapplicability of rule 40(b)(1)), and Yates v. State, 759 S.W.2d 949, 949-50 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, no pet.)(same).

1998Compare Lynch v. State, 903 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 1995, no pet.)(applying Helms rule), and Studer v. State, 757 S.W.2d 107 , 109 n. 1 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988)(same), aff'd, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), ivith Salazar v. State, 773 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.)(holding merits of complaint regarding motion to suppress addressable based on inapplicability of rule 40(b)(1)), and Yates v. State, 759 S.W.2d 949, 949-50 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1988, no pet.)(same).

1998Compare Lynch v. State, 903 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.)(applying Helms- rule), and Studer v. State, 757 S.W.2d 107 , 109 n. 1 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988)(same), aff'd, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), with Salazar v. State, 773 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.)(holding merits of complaint regarding motion to suppress addressable based on inapplicability of rule 40(b)(1)), and Yates v. State, 759 S.W.2d 949, 949-50 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, no pet.)(same).

1998Compare Lynch v. State, 903 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 1995, no pet.)(applying Helms rule), and Studer v. State, 757 S.W.2d 107 , 109 n. 1 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988)(same), aff'd, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), ivith Salazar v. State, 773 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.)(holding merits of complaint regarding motion to suppress addressable based on inapplicability of rule 40(b)(1)), and Yates v. State, 759 S.W.2d 949, 949-50 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1988, no pet.)(same).

1985In Christal the Court reiterated the now well established rule that, while Article 44.-02, supra, will not operate to limit the right of appeal pursuant to a non-negotiated plea, nevertheless, the Helms rule will, in the sense that it denies the accused a meaningful review of any claim not directed to the jurisdiction of the trial court. 2 See Prochaska v. State, 587 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. *661 Cr.App.1979); Cleveland v. State, 588 S.W.2d 942 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Galitz v. State, 617 S.W.2d 949 , nn. 8 and 9 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); King v. State, 687 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). 3 It is clear that in the

1985In Christal the Court reiterated the now well established rule that, while Article 44.-02, supra, will not operate to limit the right of appeal pursuant to a non-negotiated plea, nevertheless, the Helms rule will, in the sense that it denies the accused a meaningful review of any claim not directed to the jurisdiction of the trial court. 2 See Prochaska v. State, 587 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. *661 Cr.App.1979); Cleveland v. State, 588 S.W.2d 942 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Galitz v. State, 617 S.W.2d 949 , nn. 8 and 9 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); King v. State, 687 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). 3 It is clear that in the

1984Accord: Soto v. State, 456 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Tex.Cr.App.1970), relying on Fierro and “cases cited therein.” The “Helms rule” is thus true to the decisions on which it relies: Soto and Fier-ro.

1984Accord: Soto v. State, 456 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Tex.Cr.App.1970), relying on Fierro and "cases cited therein." The " Helms rule" is thus true to the decisions on which it relies: Soto and Fierro .

1985In Christal the Court reiterated the now well established rule that, while Article 44.-02, supra, will not operate to limit the right of appeal pursuant to a non-negotiated plea, nevertheless, the Helms rule will, in the sense that it denies the accused a meaningful review of any claim not directed to the jurisdiction of the trial court. 2 See Prochaska v. State, 587 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. *661 Cr.App.1979); Cleveland v. State, 588 S.W.2d 942 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Galitz v. State, 617 S.W.2d 949 , nn. 8 and 9 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); King v. State, 687 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). 3 It is clear that in the

1985In Christal the Court reiterated the now well established rule that, while Article 44.-02, supra, will not operate to limit the right of appeal pursuant to a non-negotiated plea, nevertheless, the Helms rule will, in the sense that it denies the accused a meaningful review of any claim not directed to the jurisdiction of the trial court. 2 See Prochaska v. State, 587 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. *661 Cr.App.1979); Cleveland v. State, 588 S.W.2d 942 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Galitz v. State, 617 S.W.2d 949 , nn. 8 and 9 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); King v. State, 687 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). 3 It is clear that in the

2017In Young, the Court of Criminal Appeals modified the Helms rule so that if a defendant enters a valid plea of guilty or nolo contendere, whether or not he received an agreed recommendation of punishment, he waives or forfeits the right to appeal an error “when the judgment of guilt was rendered independent of, and is not supported by, the error.” Rankin, 46 S.W.3d at 901 (citing Young, 8 S.W.3d at 666–67).

2017In Young, the Court of Criminal Appeals modified the Helms rule so that if a defendant enters a valid plea of guilty or nolo contendere, whether or not he received an agreed recommendation of punishment, he waives or forfeits the right to appeal an error “when the judgment of guilt was rendered independent of, and is not supported by, the error.” Rankin, 46 S.W.3d at 901 (citing Young, 8 S.W.3d at 666–67).