Carpenter v. State, 477 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). · Go Syfert
Carpenter v. State, 477 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“this court has consistently refused to go behind the indictment where it is valid on its face.”
34 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: the State of Texas v. Michael Robert Anthony (texapp, 2022-04-29)
Treatment trajectory · 1973 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1973 1999 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) the State of Texas v. Michael Robert Anthony
Tex. App. · 2022 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
this court has consistently refused to go behind the indictment where it is valid on its face.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ramon Hernandez v. Rick Thaler, Director
5th Cir. · 2012 · confidence medium
E.g., State v. Rosenbaum, 910 S.W.2d 934, 948 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (dissenting op. adopted on reh’g); Woods v. State, 153 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex.Crim.App.2005); Carpenter v. State, 477 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). 4 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gerardo Leyva v. State
Tex. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Like the court of criminal appeals, "We decline to open the door to the interminable delays which would undoubtedly result without any reasonable expectation of adding to the assurance of a fair trial by allowing defendants to inquire into an indictment valid on its face returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury." Carpenter v. State , 477 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex. Crim.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Splawn v. State
Tex. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Pruitt v. State, 476 S.W.2d 693, 693 (Tex.Crim.App.1972); Carpenter v. State, 477 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex.Crim.App.1972).
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. Rosenbaum (4×)
Tex. Crim. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Ex Parte Millard, 587 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (indictment void because it failed to allege elements of a crime where name of property owner alleged where defendant’s name should have been alleged); Crocker v. State, 573 S.W.2d 190, 204 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (motion to quash assault indictment denied even though grand jury did not have witnesses or testimony before it upon which to predicate its finding); Carpenter v. State, 477 S.W.2d 22, 28 (Tex.Crim.App.1972) (court may not look beyond face of murder indictment to see if sufficient evidence to support it); Bourland et al. v. Stat…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Springer v. State
Tex. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
The Court of Criminal Appeals “has consistently refused to go behind the indictment where it is valid on its face when various errors were alleged.” Carpenter v. State, 477 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex.Crim.App.1972).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Burkhalter v. State
Tex. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
Tarpley v. State, 565 S.W.2d 525, 532 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), Carpenter v. State, 477 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Acosta v. State
Tex. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
He may not now challenge the indictment, by going behind its valid face. 1 Carpenter v. State, 477 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
cited Cited "see" Hernandez v. Thaler
W.D. Tex. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Carpenter v. State, 477 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex.Crim.App.1972) (explaining that a court may not look beyond the face of the murder indictment to see if there is sufficient evidence to support it.).
cited Cited "see" Daniel Anders v. State
Tex. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Carpenter v. State , 477 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex. Crim.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Marcus Dewayne Beatty
Tex. App. · 2018 · signal: see also · confidence medium
App. 1994); see also Carpenter v. State, 477 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex. Crim.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Draheim v. State
Tex. App. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Carpenter v. State, 477 S.W.2d 22 (Tex.Crim.App.1972) (admonishment before jury); White v. State, 475 S.W.2d 927 (Tex.Crim.App.1972) (continuance); Morin v. State, 682 S.W.2d 265 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (instructed verdict, evidence of extraneous offense, definition in jury charge, sufficiency of evidence); Brown v. State, 487 S.W.2d 86 (Tex.Crim.App.1972) (evidence of extraneous offense); Glenn v. State, 442 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.Crim.App.1969) (evidence of prior criminal record and reputation evidence). 3 .Q. [by the State] Now, after [the offense] was there anything in [E.S.] that was a chan…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Ray Royce CARPENTER, Appellant,
v.
the STATE of Texas, Appellee
45032.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Mar 8, 1972.
477 S.W.2d 22
1972 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 2548
Thomas E. Lucas, Houston (appointed on appeal), for appellant., Carol S. Vance, Dist. Atty., James Lar-kin, Asst. Dist. Atty., Houston, and Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.
Douglas, Odom.
Cited by 31 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

DOUGLAS, Judge.

This is an appeal from a conviction for murder with malice. The jury assessed the punishment at life.

Appellant was indicted with another for the murder of James Warner Bricker. He initially pled not guilty after the State filed notice of intent to seek the death penalty. On January 15, 1970, during jury selection, the appellant and his co-defendant, by their counsel, personally and joined by the State, moved for a mistrial. The motion was granted, the State withdrew its notice to seek the death penalty, appellant changed his plea to guilty and filed his election to have the jury assess punishment. Appellant was admonished in the absence of a jury. A jury was selected, sworn, and had the indictment read to them. Appellant pled guilty before the jury and was again admonished. Witness[*23] es were called and testified without objection except for certain photographs which were withdrawn. The jury found the appellant guilty as instructed and assessed punishment at life.

In his first ground of error appellant contends the trial court erred in admonishing him and taking his plea of guilty before the jury empaneled to assess punishment after already having pled and been admonished outside their presence. He contends that the admonishment and plea before the jury were highly prejudicial and denied his right to a fair and impartial trial.

The issue is not before us since appellant pled guilty voluntarily and understandingly before a jury which waives all non jurisdictional defects including claimed deprivation of federal due process. See Pruitt v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 476 S.W.2d 693 (1972), and cases there cited. [1]

In his second and third grounds of error appellant attempts to urge jurisdictional defects by attacking the validity of the indictment. In each ground he does not allege error but he shows that he attempted to get the trial court, and now this Court, to go behind the face of the indictment to see if there was evidence to support it and to see if it was prepared according to Article 20.19, Vernon’s Ann.C. C.P.

This Court has consistently refused to go behind the indictment where it is valid on its face when various errors were alleged. See Barnes v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 461, 116 S.W.2d 408 (insufficient evidence); Bell v. State, 92 Tex.Cr.R. 342, 243 S.W. 109S (illegal evidence); Buchanan v. State, 41 Tex.Cr.R. 127, 52 S.W. 769 (incompetent evidence).

Where the defendant sought to quash an indictment because the evidence before the grand jury was in the nature of “hearsay” the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, stated:

“. . . If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay would be great indeed. The result of such a rule would be that before trial on the merits a defendant could always insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine the competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury. This is not required by the Fifth Amendment. An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, * * * if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits(Emphasis supplied) Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363, 76 S.Ct. 406, 408, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956). See Ford v. United States, 233 F.2d 56 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 352 U.S. 833, 77 S.Ct. 49, 1 L.Ed.2d 53 (1956).

The Supreme Court further stated :

“. . . In a trial on the merits, defendants are entitled to a strict observance of all the rules designed to bring about a fair verdict. Defendants are not entitled, however, to a rule which would result in interminable delay but add nothing to the assurance of a fair trial.” Id., 350 U.S. at 364, 76 S.Ct. at 409.

We decline to open the door to the interminable delays which would undoubtedly result without any reasonable expectation of adding to the assurance of a fair trial by allowing defendants to inquire into an indictment valid on its face returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury.

No error is shown. The judgment is affirmed.

ODOM, J., not participating.
1

. Such an admonishment before the jury could be prejudicial where it becomes necessary to withdraw the plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty. Wilson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 436 S.W.2d 642. In the present case the appellant (lid not withdraw his plea of guilty.