presence of extraordinary factors in Colorado

2016See, e.g., Lavenhar, 934 P.2d at 1359 (imposing disbarment for multiple instances of misconduct, the most serious of which was knowing conversion bf third-party funds, and stating that "[w]e have repeatedly held that a lawyer's knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors of mitigation”); Motsenbocker, 926 P.2d at 577 (disbarring an attorney who knowingly misappropriated bar association funds); cf. People v. Lujan, 890 P.2d 109, 110-12 (Colo. 1995) (stating that disbarment was the presumptiv

2011People v. Lavenhar, 934 P.2d 1355, 1359 (Colo.1997) ("We have repeatedly held that a lawyer's knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors of mitigation.") (citing People v. Mundis, 929 P.2d 1327, 1331 (Colo.1996); People v. Motsenbocker, 926 P.2d 576, 577 (Colo.1996); ABA Standard 4.11). 32 . 966 P.2d 1040, 1046 (Colo.1998). 33 .

2011People v. Lavenhar, 934 P.2d 1355, 1359 (Colo.1997) ("We have repeatedly held that a lawyer's knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors of mitigation.") (citing People v. Mundis, 929 P.2d 1327, 1331 (Colo.1996); People v. Motsenbocker, 926 P.2d 576, 577 (Colo.1996); ABA Standard 4.11). 32 . 966 P.2d 1040, 1046 (Colo.1998). 33 .

1998See, e.g., People v. Mundis, 929 P.2d 1327, 1331 (Colo.1996) (lawyer disbarred for knowing misappropriation of client funds, neglect of client matters, and practicing law under suspension); People v. Motsenbocker, 926 P.2d 576, 577 (Colo.1996) (lawyer disbarred for knowingly misappropriating bar association funds); see also ABA Standards [for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ] 4.11 [1991 & Supp.1992] (in the absence of mitigating factors, “[disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.”).

2017See, e.g., People v. Townshend, 933 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Colo. 1997) (disbarring a lawyer who accepted retainers from two clients, abandoned Aem, and then failed to participate in the' disciplinary proceeding); People v. Lavenhar, 934 P.2d 1355, 1358-59 (Colo. 1997) (imposing disbar- , ment for multiple instances of misconduct, Ae most serious of which was, knowing conversion - of third-party funds, and stating that ”[w]e have repeatedly held that a lawyer’s knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary

2016See, e.g., Lavenhar, 934 P.2d at 1359 (imposing disbarment for multiple instances of misconduct, the most serious of which was knowing conversion bf third-party funds, and stating that "[w]e have repeatedly held that a lawyer's knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors of mitigation”); Motsenbocker, 926 P.2d at 577 (disbarring an attorney who knowingly misappropriated bar association funds); cf. People v. Lujan, 890 P.2d 109, 110-12 (Colo. 1995) (stating that disbarment was the presumptiv

2004See also, People v. Wiedman, 36 P.3d 785, 788 (Colo.1999) (holding that a lawyer’s knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or a third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors in mitigation).

2003See also People v. Wiedman, 36 P.3d 785, 788 (Colo.PDJ 1999) (holding that a lawyer's knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or a third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors in mitigation).

2011People v. Lavenhar, 934 P.2d 1355, 1359 (Colo.1997) ("We have repeatedly held that a lawyer's knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors of mitigation.") (citing People v. Mundis, 929 P.2d 1327, 1331 (Colo.1996); People v. Motsenbocker, 926 P.2d 576, 577 (Colo.1996); ABA Standard 4.11). 32 . 966 P.2d 1040, 1046 (Colo.1998). 33 .

2003See People v. Torpy, 966 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Colo.1998)(lawyer’s knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors of mitigation).

2017See, e.g., People v. Townshend, 933 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Colo. 1997) (disbarring a lawyer who accepted retainers from two clients, abandoned Aem, and then failed to participate in the' disciplinary proceeding); People v. Lavenhar, 934 P.2d 1355, 1358-59 (Colo. 1997) (imposing disbar- , ment for multiple instances of misconduct, Ae most serious of which was, knowing conversion - of third-party funds, and stating that ”[w]e have repeatedly held that a lawyer’s knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary

2003Varallo, supra. See also, People v. Wiedman, 36 P.3d 785, 788 (Colo.O.P.D.J.1999) (holding that a lawyer's knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or a third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors in mitigation).

2002See People v. Lavenhar, 934 P.2d 1355, 1359 (Colo.1997) (holding that a lawyer’s knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors of mitigation); In the Matter of Thompson, 991 P.2d 820 (Colo.1999)(lawyer misappropriated funds from firm in which he was a salaried employee); People v. Nulan, 820 P.2d 1117 (Colo.1991)(finding conversion even though escrowed funds held by the lawyer were the property of parties who were not clients of the lawyer).

2002Pursuant to ABA Standard 7.1, “disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public or the legal profession.” Colorado has followed the ABA Standards by imposing disbarment for knowing conversion of the funds belonging to third parties. “[A] lawyer’s knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraor

2017See, e.g., People v. Townshend, 933 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Colo. 1997) (disbarring a lawyer who accepted retainers from two clients, abandoned Aem, and then failed to participate in the' disciplinary proceeding); People v. Lavenhar, 934 P.2d 1355, 1358-59 (Colo. 1997) (imposing disbar- , ment for multiple instances of misconduct, Ae most serious of which was, knowing conversion - of third-party funds, and stating that ”[w]e have repeatedly held that a lawyer’s knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary

2017See, e.g., People v. Townshend, 933 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Colo. 1997) (disbarring a lawyer who accepted retainers from two clients, abandoned Aem, and then failed to participate in the' disciplinary proceeding); People v. Lavenhar, 934 P.2d 1355, 1358-59 (Colo. 1997) (imposing disbar- , ment for multiple instances of misconduct, Ae most serious of which was, knowing conversion - of third-party funds, and stating that ”[w]e have repeatedly held that a lawyer’s knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary

2017See, e.g., People v. Townshend, 933 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Colo. 1997) (disbarring a lawyer who accepted retainers from two clients, abandoned Aem, and then failed to participate in the' disciplinary proceeding); People v. Lavenhar, 934 P.2d 1355, 1358-59 (Colo. 1997) (imposing disbar- , ment for multiple instances of misconduct, Ae most serious of which was, knowing conversion - of third-party funds, and stating that ”[w]e have repeatedly held that a lawyer’s knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary

2017See, e.g., People v. Townshend, 933 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Colo. 1997) (disbarring a lawyer who accepted retainers from two clients, abandoned Aem, and then failed to participate in the' disciplinary proceeding); People v. Lavenhar, 934 P.2d 1355, 1358-59 (Colo. 1997) (imposing disbar- , ment for multiple instances of misconduct, Ae most serious of which was, knowing conversion - of third-party funds, and stating that ”[w]e have repeatedly held that a lawyer’s knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary

2016See, e.g., Lavenhar, 934 P.2d at 1359 (imposing disbarment for multiple instances of misconduct, the most serious of which was knowing conversion bf third-party funds, and stating that "[w]e have repeatedly held that a lawyer's knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors of mitigation”); Motsenbocker, 926 P.2d at 577 (disbarring an attorney who knowingly misappropriated bar association funds); cf. People v. Lujan, 890 P.2d 109, 110-12 (Colo. 1995) (stating that disbarment was the presumptiv

2005Id. at 11; People v. McGrath, 780 P.2d 492, 493 (Colo.1989); People v. Lavenhar, 934 P.2d 1355, 1359 (Colo.1997); In re Thompson 991 P.2d 820, 823 (Colo.1999); In the Matter of Fischer, 89 P.3d 817 (Colo. 2004).

2003In Varallo, supra, 913 P.2d 1, 11 , the Colorado Supreme Court stated as follows: A "technical conversion," usually warranting suspension rather than disbarment, is a conversion or misappropriation where the complainant either concedes that the misappropriation was negligent, People v. Dickinson, 903 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Colo.1995), or it cannot be proven by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent knowingly converted the funds, People v. Galindo, 884 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Colo.1994) (board's conclusion that conversion was negligent rather than knowing was supported by the record and would not

2003In Varallo, supra, 913 P.2d 1, 11 , the Colorado Supreme Court stated as follows: A "technical conversion," usually warranting suspension rather than disbarment, is a conversion or misappropriation where the complainant either concedes that the misappropriation was negligent, People v. Dickinson, 903 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Colo.1995), or it cannot be proven by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent knowingly converted the funds, People v. Galindo, 884 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Colo.1994) (board's conclusion that conversion was negligent rather than knowing was supported by the record and would not

2003In Varallo, supra, 913 P.2d 1, 11 , the Colorado Supreme Court stated as follows: A "technical conversion," usually warranting suspension rather than disbarment, is a conversion or misappropriation where the complainant either concedes that the misappropriation was negligent, People v. Dickinson, 903 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Colo.1995), or it cannot be proven by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent knowingly converted the funds, People v. Galindo, 884 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Colo.1994) (board's conclusion that conversion was negligent rather than knowing was supported by the record and would not

2002See also Siegel, 133 N.J. at 170 , 627 A.2d 156 (holding that knowingly misappropriating funds — whether from a client or from one’s partners — will generally result in disbarment, acknowledging that although the relationship between lawyers and clients differs from that between partners, misappropriation from the latter is as wrong as from the former).

2002See also Siegel, 133 N.J. at 170 , 627 A.2d 156 (holding that knowingly misappropriating funds — whether from a client or from one’s partners — will generally result in disbarment, acknowledging that although the relationship between lawyers and clients differs from that between partners, misappropriation from the latter is as wrong as from the former).

2002Varallo, 913 P.2d at 11 ; People v. Rishel, 50 P.3d 938, 944 (Colo. PDJ 2002); People v. Wiedman, 36 P.3d 785, 788 (Colo.1999)(holding that a lawyer’s knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or a third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors in mitigation).

2002See also Finesilver, supra, Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Ezrin, 312 Md. 603 , 541 A.2d 966 (1988).

2002People v. Dice, 947 P.2d 339, 340 (Colo.1997)(holding that a lawyer's knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraordinary factors of mitigation); Motsenbocker; 926 P.2d at 577 (attorney disbarred for knowing misappropriation of bar association funds).

2002Pursuant to ABA Standard 7.1, “disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public or the legal profession.” Colorado has followed the ABA Standards by imposing disbarment for knowing conversion of the funds belonging to third parties. “[A] lawyer’s knowing misappropriation of funds, whether belonging to a client or third party, warrants disbarment except in the presence of extraor

2002See also Finesilver, supra, Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Ezrin, 312 Md. 603 , 541 A.2d 966 (1988).

2002See also Finesilver, supra, Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Ezrin, 312 Md. 603 , 541 A.2d 966 (1988).

1999See People v. Skaalerud, 963 P.2d 341, 344 (Colo.1998); People v. Hindman, 958 P.2d 463, 464 (Colo.1998).

1999See People v. Skaalerud, 963 P.2d 341, 344 (Colo.1998); People v. Hindman, 958 P.2d 463, 464 (Colo.1998).