18 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lavarato v. Branneygreen2 sentences2015We conclude, however, that the counterclaims were timely because Mr. Hailey’s amended answer and counterclaims related back to his initial answer, which was filed within the revival statute’s one-year limitations period. ¶14 C.R.C.P. 15(c) provides, in relevant part: “Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.” Thus, an amended pleading that meets the requirements of Rule 15(c) is treated as if 2015We conclude, however, that the counterclaims were timely because Mr. Hailey’s amended answer and counterclaims related back to his initial answer, which was filed within the revival statute’s one-year limitations period. ¶ 14 C.R.C.P. 15(e) provides, in relevant part: ‘Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of .the original pleading.” Thus, an amended pleading that meets the requirements of Rule 15(c) is treated as | 4 | 4 |
Full Draw Productions v. Easton Sports, Inc.green2 sentences2015To rule otherwise would be inconsistent because the relation back doctrine would allow a plaintiff to assert an otherwise time-barred claim through an amended complaint “yet deny defendant an analogous opportunity.” 6 Wright & Miller at § 1496.1. ¶18 Relying on Full Draw Productions v. Easton Sports, Inc. , 85 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1009 (D. 2015To rule otherwise would be inconsistent because the relation back doctrine would allow a plaintiff to assert an otherwise time-barred claim through an amended complaint “yet deny defendant an analogous opportunity.” 6 Wright & Miller at § 1496.1. ¶ 18 Relying on Full Draw Productions v. Easton Sports, Inc., 85 F.Supp.2d 1001, 1009 (D.Colo.2000), Mr. Makeen argues that the counterclaims are untimely under the revival statute because they were not actually filed within one year of the original complaint. | 3 | 3 |
Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. King Consolidated Ditch Co.green1 sentence2015Ditch Co., 250 P.3d 1226, 1237 (Colo.2011); Lavarato v. Branney, 210 P.3d 485, 489 (Colo.App.2009). | 1 | 1 |
Richter v. City of Greenwood Villagegreen2 sentences2015Dannielson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 807 P.2d 541, 543 (Colo.1990); see Westlund v. Carter, 193 Colo. 129, 131 , 565 P.2d 920, 921 (1977) ("Since the requirements of C.R.C.P. 106(b) must be construed as a statute of limitations, the failure of the plaintiffs to perfect their petition for certiorari review within [the period set forth in the rule] constituted a fatal defect which required that the complaint be dismissed."). 118 As a result, "when the original complaint in a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) proceeding fails to state 'a claim for relief, [the relation-back doctrine of] C.R.C.P. 15(c) has no 2015Dannielson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 807 P.2d 541, 543 (Colo.1990); see Westlund v. Carter, 193 Colo. 129, 131 , 565 P.2d 920, 921 (1977) ("Since the requirements of C.R.C.P. 106(b) must be construed as a statute of limitations, the failure of the plaintiffs to perfect their petition for certiorari review within [the period set forth in the rule] constituted a fatal defect which required that the complaint be dismissed."). 118 As a result, "when the original complaint in a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) proceeding fails to state 'a claim for relief, [the relation-back doctrine of] C.R.C.P. 15(c) has no | 1 | 1 |
Lorenz v. City of Littletongreen2 sentences2015Dannielson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 807 P.2d 541, 543 (Colo.1990); see Westlund v. Carter, 193 Colo. 129, 131 , 565 P.2d 920, 921 (1977) ("Since the requirements of C.R.C.P. 106(b) must be construed as a statute of limitations, the failure of the plaintiffs to perfect their petition for certiorari review within [the period set forth in the rule] constituted a fatal defect which required that the complaint be dismissed."). 118 As a result, "when the original complaint in a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) proceeding fails to state 'a claim for relief, [the relation-back doctrine of] C.R.C.P. 15(c) has no 2015Dannielson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 807 P.2d 541, 543 (Colo.1990); see Westlund v. Carter, 193 Colo. 129, 131 , 565 P.2d 920, 921 (1977) ("Since the requirements of C.R.C.P. 106(b) must be construed as a statute of limitations, the failure of the plaintiffs to perfect their petition for certiorari review within [the period set forth in the rule] constituted a fatal defect which required that the complaint be dismissed."). 118 As a result, "when the original complaint in a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) proceeding fails to state 'a claim for relief, [the relation-back doctrine of] C.R.C.P. 15(c) has no | 1 | 1 |
Westlund v. Cartergreen2 sentences2015Dannielson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 807 P.2d 541, 543 (Colo.1990); see Westlund v. Carter, 193 Colo. 129, 131 , 565 P.2d 920, 921 (1977) ("Since the requirements of C.R.C.P. 106(b) must be construed as a statute of limitations, the failure of the plaintiffs to perfect their petition for certiorari review within [the period set forth in the rule] constituted a fatal defect which required that the complaint be dismissed."). 118 As a result, "when the original complaint in a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) proceeding fails to state 'a claim for relief, [the relation-back doctrine of] C.R.C.P. 15(c) has no 2015Dannielson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 807 P.2d 541, 543 (Colo.1990); see Westlund v. Carter, 193 Colo. 129, 131 , 565 P.2d 920, 921 (1977) ("Since the requirements of C.R.C.P. 106(b) must be construed as a statute of limitations, the failure of the plaintiffs to perfect their petition for certiorari review within [the period set forth in the rule] constituted a fatal defect which required that the complaint be dismissed."). 118 As a result, "when the original complaint in a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) proceeding fails to state 'a claim for relief, [the relation-back doctrine of] C.R.C.P. 15(c) has no | 1 | 1 |
Danielson v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Commerce Citygreen1 sentence2015Dannielson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 807 P.2d 541, 543 (Colo.1990); see Westlund v. Carter, 193 Colo. 129, 131 , 565 P.2d 920, 921 (1977) ("Since the requirements of C.R.C.P. 106(b) must be construed as a statute of limitations, the failure of the plaintiffs to perfect their petition for certiorari review within [the period set forth in the rule] constituted a fatal defect which required that the complaint be dismissed."). 118 As a result, "when the original complaint in a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) proceeding fails to state 'a claim for relief, [the relation-back doctrine of] C.R.C.P. 15(c) has no | 1 | 1 |
Schiavone v. Fortunered1 sentence2015See Schiavone v. Fortune , 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986) (âThe linchpin is notice, and notice within the limitations period.â); 6 Wright & Miller at § 1498.3 (âRelation back will be refused only if the court finds that there is no reason why the party to be added should have understood that it was not named due to mistake.â). ¶17       Here, the ALJ properly found that the three requirements for application of the relation back doctrine were satisfied. | 1 | 1 |
City and County of Honolulu v. Hsiunggreen2 sentences2011Seq, e.g., Farber v. Wards Co., 825 F.2d 684, 689 (2d Cir.1987) (rejecting a landlord's argument that his amended complaint seeking retroactive use and occupancy payments related back to his original filing, so as to avoid a bankruptey bar, because the relation back doctrine applies only for purposes of the statute of limitations, which was not implicated); Besig v. Dolphin Boating & Swimming Club, 683 F.2d 1271 , 1278 n. 4 (9th Cir.1982) ("The few cases in which relation back may apply outside the context of statutes of limitations fail even remotely to suggest application of the doctrine to 2011Seq, e.g., Farber v. Wards Co., 825 F.2d 684, 689 (2d Cir.1987) (rejecting a landlord's argument that his amended complaint seeking retroactive use and occupancy payments related back to his original filing, so as to avoid a bankruptey bar, because the relation back doctrine applies only for purposes of the statute of limitations, which was not implicated); Besig v. Dolphin Boating & Swimming Club, 683 F.2d 1271 , 1278 n. 4 (9th Cir.1982) ("The few cases in which relation back may apply outside the context of statutes of limitations fail even remotely to suggest application of the doctrine to | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. O'Bannongreen2 sentences2011Seq, e.g., Farber v. Wards Co., 825 F.2d 684, 689 (2d Cir.1987) (rejecting a landlord's argument that his amended complaint seeking retroactive use and occupancy payments related back to his original filing, so as to avoid a bankruptey bar, because the relation back doctrine applies only for purposes of the statute of limitations, which was not implicated); Besig v. Dolphin Boating & Swimming Club, 683 F.2d 1271 , 1278 n. 4 (9th Cir.1982) ("The few cases in which relation back may apply outside the context of statutes of limitations fail even remotely to suggest application of the doctrine to 2011Seq, e.g., Farber v. Wards Co., 825 F.2d 684, 689 (2d Cir.1987) (rejecting a landlord's argument that his amended complaint seeking retroactive use and occupancy payments related back to his original filing, so as to avoid a bankruptey bar, because the relation back doctrine applies only for purposes of the statute of limitations, which was not implicated); Besig v. Dolphin Boating & Swimming Club, 683 F.2d 1271 , 1278 n. 4 (9th Cir.1982) ("The few cases in which relation back may apply outside the context of statutes of limitations fail even remotely to suggest application of the doctrine to | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Goldmangreen1 sentence2011Wilson v. Goldman, 699 P.2d 420, 426 (Colo.App.1985), which Beaver Creek inappropriately brought to our attention by way of a C.A.R. 28(J) submission of supplemental authority, see C.A.R. 28(J) (allowing for the submission of "pertinent and significant new authority") (emphasis added), is inapposite. | 1 | 1 |
Farber v. Wards Co.green2 sentences2011Seq, e.g., Farber v. Wards Co., 825 F.2d 684, 689 (2d Cir.1987) (rejecting a landlord's argument that his amended complaint seeking retroactive use and occupancy payments related back to his original filing, so as to avoid a bankruptey bar, because the relation back doctrine applies only for purposes of the statute of limitations, which was not implicated); Besig v. Dolphin Boating & Swimming Club, 683 F.2d 1271 , 1278 n. 4 (9th Cir.1982) ("The few cases in which relation back may apply outside the context of statutes of limitations fail even remotely to suggest application of the doctrine to 2011Seq, e.g., Farber v. Wards Co., 825 F.2d 684, 689 (2d Cir.1987) (rejecting a landlord's argument that his amended complaint seeking retroactive use and occupancy payments related back to his original filing, so as to avoid a bankruptey bar, because the relation back doctrine applies only for purposes of the statute of limitations, which was not implicated); Besig v. Dolphin Boating & Swimming Club, 683 F.2d 1271 , 1278 n. 4 (9th Cir.1982) ("The few cases in which relation back may apply outside the context of statutes of limitations fail even remotely to suggest application of the doctrine to | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Teitelbaumgreen1 sentence1999See Brown v. Teitelbaum, supra. IV. | 1 | 1 |
Metropolitan Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Conservation Districtgreen2 sentences1995See Metropolitan Suburban Water Ass’n v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 148 Colo. 173, 194 , 365 P.2d 273, 285 (1961) (stating that the relation-back principle should be construed and applied in a manner which would “aid and encourage, rather than to block development and early use of the water resources of the state.”). 1995See Metropolitan Suburban Water Ass’n v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 148 Colo. 173, 194 , 365 P.2d 273, 285 (1961) (stating that the relation-back principle should be construed and applied in a manner which would “aid and encourage, rather than to block development and early use of the water resources of the state.”). | 1 | 1 |
City of Aspen v. Colorado River Water Conservation Districtgreen1 sentence1985See City of Aspen v. Colorado River Water Conservation District, 696 P.2d 758, 761 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Garcia v. Schneider Energy Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016We agree that the Estate failed to demonstrate a genuine factual dispute' regarding whether the Pratts had notice of the original lawsuit within the prescribed time period. ¶ 21 An amendment will not relate back to the original complaint under Rule 15(c) unless the new party receives notice of the institution of the action within the period provided by Rule 4(m). 6 Cf. Garcia v. Schneider Energy Servs,, Inc., 2012 CO 62, ¶ 13 , 287 P.3d 112 (under Fed. 2016We agree that the Estate failed to demonstrate a genuine factual dispute' regarding whether the Pratts had notice of the original lawsuit within the prescribed time period. ¶ 21 An amendment will not relate back to the original complaint under Rule 15(c) unless the new party receives notice of the institution of the action within the period provided by Rule 4(m). 6 Cf. Garcia v. Schneider Energy Servs,, Inc., 2012 CO 62, ¶ 13 , 287 P.3d 112 (under Fed. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Dillingham v. Greeley Publishing Co.
green
2 sentences2015Largely to avoid the anamo-lous situation that would result from permitting less time to serve an amended party than would have been permitted to serve the party originally named, we have eschewed a literal reading of the words "within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him," see Dillingham, 701 P.2d at 31 ; see also Garcia, 19, and instead construed this language of the rule to include a' reasonable time to serve opposing parties after filing the complaint, even if that time extends beyond the applicable statute of limitations. -In doing so, however, we made clear th 2015Dillingham, 701 P.2d at 31-32 . 15 While we therefore clarified in Garcia that the appropriate inquiry concerning the time allowed for service of process in an action commenced by filing is whether the defendant was served within a reasonable time following the filing date, rather than within a reasonable time following the running of the applicable statute of limitations, Garcia, ¶12, we did not intend to suggest that the statute of limitations for any particular action is unrelated to the time allowed for service of process in the case. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Ernest Besig, Preston Cook, and Lidia La Garda v. The Dolphin Boating and Swimming Club
green
2 sentences2011Seq, e.g., Farber v. Wards Co., 825 F.2d 684, 689 (2d Cir.1987) (rejecting a landlord's argument that his amended complaint seeking retroactive use and occupancy payments related back to his original filing, so as to avoid a bankruptey bar, because the relation back doctrine applies only for purposes of the statute of limitations, which was not implicated); Besig v. Dolphin Boating & Swimming Club, 683 F.2d 1271 , 1278 n. 4 (9th Cir.1982) ("The few cases in which relation back may apply outside the context of statutes of limitations fail even remotely to suggest application of the doctrine to 2011Seq, e.g., Farber v. Wards Co., 825 F.2d 684, 689 (2d Cir.1987) (rejecting a landlord's argument that his amended complaint seeking retroactive use and occupancy payments related back to his original filing, so as to avoid a bankruptey bar, because the relation back doctrine applies only for purposes of the statute of limitations, which was not implicated); Besig v. Dolphin Boating & Swimming Club, 683 F.2d 1271 , 1278 n. 4 (9th Cir.1982) ("The few cases in which relation back may apply outside the context of statutes of limitations fail even remotely to suggest application of the doctrine to | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Margot Rendall-Speranza v. Edward A. Nassim
green
1 sentence2009Rendall-Speranza, 107 F.3d at 919 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Scott v. Buchanan
neutral
1 sentence2001In a case involving rights in land during the time between a homestead entry and issuance of a patent, the supreme court said: "It is settled law that one who has obtained a patent for land entered by him has a title which relates back to his entry...." Scott v. Buchanan, 64 Colo. 571, 573 , 174 P. 1123 , 1124 (1918). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Sieber v. Frink
green
1 sentence1988If the beneficial use is completed with reasonable diligence, the right relates back to the date of the "first step." Sieber v. Frink, 7 Colo. 148 , 2 P. 901 (1884); 1 G. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Fruitland Irrigation Co. v. Kruemling
green
2 sentences1985See Aspen v. Colorado River Water Conservation District, at 762; Fruitland Irrigation Co. v. Kruemling, 62 Colo. at 165-67 , 162 P. at 163 . 1985See Aspen v. Colorado River Water Conservation District, at 762; Fruitland Irrigation Co. v. Kruemling, 62 Colo. at 165-67 , 162 P. at 163 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Walker v. Associated Press
green
2 sentences1981Walker v. Associated Press, 160 Colo. 361 , 417 P.2d 486 (1966). 1981Walker v. Associated Press, 160 Colo. 361 , 417 P.2d 486 (1966). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Snyder v. City of Lakewood
green
1 sentence1978Invoking the relation-back doctrine of C.R.C.P. 15(c) to rescue any such certiorari complaint which fails to state a claim for relief would undermine the important public policies of expediting resolution of challenges to zoning and annexation proceedings and of removing municipal planning and individual properties from "a cloud of uncertainty." See Snyder v. City of Lakewood, Colo., 542 P.2d 371 (1975). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
City & County of Denver v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
green
2 sentences1966Apparently relying on some of the language in City and County of Denver v. Northern Colorado Conservancy District, 130 Colo. 375 , 276 P.2d 992 , the court also concluded that the abandonment of headgates on ditch No. 1 and an increase in the take from headgates on ditch No. 3 constituted such a major change in plans that the initiation of the appropriation could not relate back to the first step taken, i.e., the survey. 1966Apparently relying on some of the language in City and County of Denver v. Northern Colorado Conservancy District, 130 Colo. 375 , 276 P.2d 992 , the court also concluded that the abandonment of headgates on ditch No. 1 and an increase in the take from headgates on ditch No. 3 constituted such a major change in plans that the initiation of the appropriation could not relate back to the first step taken, i.e., the survey. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.