relation-back doctrine in Alabama

2026In a narrow class of cases involving fictitious parties and the relation-back doctrine, this Court has reviewed the merits of a trial court's denial of a summary-judgment motion in which a defendant argued that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.' "Ex parte Jackson, 780 So. 2d 681, 684 (Ala. 2000)." 153 So. 3d at 745-46 .

2014Co., 775 So.2d 805, 808 (Ala.2000) (noting that the “question of subject-matter jurisdiction is reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus”); Ex parte Jackson, 780 So.2d 681, 684 (Ala.2000) (observing that “‘[t]he fact that a statute of limitations defense is applicable is not a proper basis for issuing a writ of mandamus, due to the availability of a remedy by appeal.’ [Ex parte Southland Bank,] 514 So.2d [954,] 955 [ (Ala.1987) ]-In a narrow class of cases involving fictitious parties and the relation-back doctrine, this Court has reviewed the merits of a trial court’s denial of a summa

2025P., provides that such an 20 SC-2025-0127 amendment shall "relate[] back to the date of the original pleading when ... relation back is permitted by principles applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to Rule 9(h)." " ' "However, the relation back principle applies only when the plaintiff 'is ignorant of the name of an opposing party.' Rule 9(h); Harmon v. Blackwood, 623 So. 2d 726, 727 (Ala. 1993) ('In order to invoke the relation- back principles of Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c), a plaintiff must ... be ignorant of the identity of that defendant....'); Marsh v. Wenzel, 732 So. 2d 985 (Ala

2025The due-diligence standard, as stated in Davis v. Mims, 510 So. 2d 227, 229 (Ala. 1987), "is whether the plaintiff knew, or should have known or was on notice, that the substituted defendants were in fact the parties described fictitiously." ' "Thus, in order for the relation-back doctrine to apply and justify the substitution of a defendant for a fictitiously named party after the limitations period has run, the plaintiff seeking such substitution must establish: (1) that it stated a cause of action against the defendant in the body of the original complaint, albeit identifying the party only

2025P., provides that such an 20 SC-2025-0127 amendment shall "relate[] back to the date of the original pleading when ... relation back is permitted by principles applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to Rule 9(h)." " ' "However, the relation back principle applies only when the plaintiff 'is ignorant of the name of an opposing party.' Rule 9(h); Harmon v. Blackwood, 623 So. 2d 726, 727 (Ala. 1993) ('In order to invoke the relation- back principles of Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c), a plaintiff must ... be ignorant of the identity of that defendant....'); Marsh v. Wenzel, 732 So. 2d 985 (Ala

2018P., provides that such an amendment shall 'relate[ ] back to the date of the original pleading when ... relation back is permitted by principles applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to Rule 9(h).' " 'However, the relation back principle applies only when the plaintiff "is ignorant of the name of an opposing party." Rule 9(h) ; Harmon v. Blackwood , 623 So.2d 726 , 727 (Ala. 1993) ("In order to invoke the relation-back principles of Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c), a plaintiff must ... be ignorant of the identity of that defendant ...."); Marsh v. Wenzel , 732 So.2d 985 (Ala. 1998).' " Ex

2026Our Court has previously stated that, "to invoke the relation-back principle of Rule 15(c), a plaintiff, after filing suit, must proceed in a reasonably diligent manner to determine the true identity of a fictitiously named defendant and to amend his complaint accordingly." Ex parte FMC Corp., 599 So. 2d 592, 593-94 (Ala. 1992).

2016Likewise, to invoke the relation-back principle of Rule 15(c), a plaintiff, after filing suit, must proceed in a reasonably diligent manner to determine the true identity of a fictitiously named defendant and to amend his complaint accordingly.’ “Ex parte FMC Corp., 599 So.2d 592, 593-94 (Ala.1992) (emphasis added).

2025See Ex parte Snow, 764 So. 2d 531 (Ala. 1999) (issuing the writ and directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of the defendant); Ex parte Stover, 663 So. 2d 948 (Ala. 1995) (reviewing the merits of the trial court's order denying the defendant's motion for a summary judgment, but denying the defendant's petition for a 18 SC-2025-0127 writ of mandamus); Ex parte FMC Corp., 599 So. 2d 592 (Ala. 1992) (same); Ex parte Klemawesch, 549 So. 2d 62, 65 (Ala. 1989) (issuing the writ and directing the trial court "to set aside its order denying [the defendant's] motion to quash serv

2016See Ex parte Snow, 764 So.2d 531 (Ala. 1999) (issuing the writ and directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of the defendant); Ex parte Stover, 663 So.2d 948 (Ala. 1995) (reviewing the merits of the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion for a summary judgment, but denying the defendant’s petition for a writ of mandamus); Ex parte FMC Corp., 599 So.2d 592 (Ala. 1992) (same); Ex parte Klemawesch, 549 So.2d 62, 65 (Ala. 1989) (issuing the writ and directing the trial court ‘to set aside its order denying [the defendant’s] motion to quash service or, in the alter

2025See Ex parte Snow, 764 So. 2d 531 (Ala. 1999) (issuing the writ and directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of the defendant); Ex parte Stover, 663 So. 2d 948 (Ala. 1995) (reviewing the merits of the trial court's order denying the defendant's motion for a summary judgment, but denying the defendant's petition for a 18 SC-2025-0127 writ of mandamus); Ex parte FMC Corp., 599 So. 2d 592 (Ala. 1992) (same); Ex parte Klemawesch, 549 So. 2d 62, 65 (Ala. 1989) (issuing the writ and directing the trial court "to set aside its order denying [the defendant's] motion to quash serv

2013In a narrow class of cases involving fictitious parties and the relation-back doctrine, this Court has reviewed the merits of a trial court’s denial of a summary-judgment motion in which a defendant argued that the plaintiffs claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.” 780 So.2d at 684 (quoting Ex parte South-land Bank, 514 So.2d 954, 955 (Ala.1987) (citation omitted)). “ ‘[A] writ of mandamus is proper ... if the undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff failed to act with due diligence in identifying the fictitiously named defendant as the party the plaintiff intended to s

2025P., provides that such an 20 SC-2025-0127 amendment shall "relate[] back to the date of the original pleading when ... relation back is permitted by principles applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to Rule 9(h)." " ' "However, the relation back principle applies only when the plaintiff 'is ignorant of the name of an opposing party.' Rule 9(h); Harmon v. Blackwood, 623 So. 2d 726, 727 (Ala. 1993) ('In order to invoke the relation- back principles of Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c), a plaintiff must ... be ignorant of the identity of that defendant....'); Marsh v. Wenzel, 732 So. 2d 985 (Ala

2018P., provides that such an amendment shall 'relate[ ] back to the date of the original pleading when ... relation back is permitted by principles applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to Rule 9(h).' " 'However, the relation back principle applies only when the plaintiff "is ignorant of the name of an opposing party." Rule 9(h) ; Harmon v. Blackwood , 623 So.2d 726 , 727 (Ala. 1993) ("In order to invoke the relation-back principles of Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c), a plaintiff must ... be ignorant of the identity of that defendant ...."); Marsh v. Wenzel , 732 So.2d 985 (Ala. 1998).' " Ex

2009See generally Ex parte Tidmore, 418 So.2d 866 (Ala.1982) (two-year delay in substituting proper defendant too long where party sought to be added would be prejudiced thereby).’ (emphasis added)).

2007See generally Ex parte Tidmore, 418 So.2d 866 (Ala.1982)(two-year delay in substituting proper defendant too long where party sought to be added would be prejudiced thereby).” (emphasis added)).

2009See Denney v. Serio, 446 So.2d 7, 11 (Ala.1984) (‘Although this Court has refused to apply the relation-back principle to inordinate delays from the time of knowledge of the fictitious party’s true identity until actual substitution of the fictitious party’s true name—see Walden v. Mineral Equipment Co., 406 So.2d 385 (Ala.1981) (three-year delay too long); Shirley v. Getty Oil Co., 367 So.2d 1388 (Ala.1979) (17-month delay too long) — Dr. Serio proffered no evidence establishing that Denney’s dilatory substitution in fact prejudiced him.

2007See Denney v. Serio, 446 So.2d 7, 11 (Ala.1984) (“Although this Court has refused to apply the relation-back principle to inordinate delays from the time of knowledge of the fictitious party’s true identity until actual substitution of the fictitious party’s true name — see Walden v. Mineral Equipment Co., 406 So.2d 385 (Ala.1981)(three-year delay too long); Shirley v. Getty Oil Co., 367 So.2d 1388 (Ala.1979)(17-month delay too long) — Dr. Seño proffered no evidence establishing that Denney’s dilatory substitution in fact prejudiced him.

2018P., provides that such an amendment shall 'relate[ ] back to the date of the original pleading when ... relation back is permitted by principles applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to Rule 9(h).' " 'However, the relation back principle applies only when the plaintiff "is ignorant of the name of an opposing party." Rule 9(h) ; Harmon v. Blackwood , 623 So.2d 726 , 727 (Ala. 1993) ("In order to invoke the relation-back principles of Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c), a plaintiff must ... be ignorant of the identity of that defendant ...."); Marsh v. Wenzel , 732 So.2d 985 (Ala. 1998).' " Ex

2018P., provides that such an amendment shall 'relate[ ] back to the date of the original pleading when ... relation back is permitted by principles applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to Rule 9(h).' " 'However, the relation back principle applies only when the plaintiff "is ignorant of the name of an opposing party." Rule 9(h) ; Harmon v. Blackwood , 623 So.2d 726 , 727 (Ala. 1993) ("In order to invoke the relation-back principles of Rule 9(h) and Rule 15(c), a plaintiff must ... be ignorant of the identity of that defendant ...."); Marsh v. Wenzel , 732 So.2d 985 (Ala. 1998).' " Ex

2016Section 43-2-831, Ala.Code 1975, provides, in part, that u[t]he powers of a personal representative relate back in time to give acts by the person appointed which are beneficial to the estate occurring prior to appointment the same effect as those occurring thereafter.” (Emphasis added.) The Court in Ogle overruled the holding in StHckland v. Mobile Towing & Wrecking Co., 293 Ala. 348 , 303 So.2d 98 (1974), “regarding the application of the doctrine of relation back, insofar as it [was] inconsistent with” what the Court held in Ogle, 706 So.2d at 710 .

2016We, therefore, overrule Strickland’s holding regard ing the application of the doctrine of relation back, insofar as it is inconsistent with what we hold today, but we note that Strickland correctly points out that under the doctrine of relation back one must have something to relate back to, and we note that in the present case the filing of the original petition is the event to which the appointment would relate back.’ “Ogle, 706 So.2d at 710 (emphasis added)/ Ogle is not specific as to what it overruled in Strickland, saying only that ‘we overrule Strickland’s holding regarding the applicat

2009See Denney v. Serio, 446 So.2d 7, 11 (Ala.1984) (‘Although this Court has refused to apply the relation-back principle to inordinate delays from the time of knowledge of the fictitious party’s true identity until actual substitution of the fictitious party’s true name—see Walden v. Mineral Equipment Co., 406 So.2d 385 (Ala.1981) (three-year delay too long); Shirley v. Getty Oil Co., 367 So.2d 1388 (Ala.1979) (17-month delay too long) — Dr. Serio proffered no evidence establishing that Denney’s dilatory substitution in fact prejudiced him.

2007See Denney v. Serio, 446 So.2d 7, 11 (Ala.1984) (“Although this Court has refused to apply the relation-back principle to inordinate delays from the time of knowledge of the fictitious party’s true identity until actual substitution of the fictitious party’s true name — see Walden v. Mineral Equipment Co., 406 So.2d 385 (Ala.1981)(three-year delay too long); Shirley v. Getty Oil Co., 367 So.2d 1388 (Ala.1979)(17-month delay too long) — Dr. Seño proffered no evidence establishing that Denney’s dilatory substitution in fact prejudiced him.

2025Ex parte Mobile Infirmary, 74 So. 3d at 429 ; Crowl v. Kayo Oil Co., 848 So. 2d 930, 940 (Ala. 2002).

2008In addition, a party “ ‘ “must have been ignorant of the true identity of the defendant and must have used due diligence in attempting to discover it.” ’ ” Pearson v. Brooks, 883 So.2d 185, 191 (Ala.2003) (quoting Crowl v. Kayo Oil Co., 848 So.2d 930, 937 (Ala.2002), quoting in turn Fulmer, 654 So.2d at 46 (emphasis omitted)).

1995The purpose of the relation-back principle and the fictitious party rule, of course, is “to toll the statute of limitations in emergency cases where plaintiff knows he has been injured and has a cause of action against some person or entity, but has been unable to ascertain through due diligence the name of that responsible person or entity.” Columbia Engineering Int’l, Ltd. v. Espey, 429 So.2d 955, 959 (Ala.1983).

1995The purpose of the relation-back principle and the fictitious party rule, of course, is "to toll the statute of limitations in emergency cases where plaintiff knows he has been injured and has a cause of action against some person or entity, but has been unable to ascertain through due diligence the name of that responsible person or entity." Columbia Engineering Int'l, Ltd. v. Espey , 429 So.2d 955 , 959 (Ala. 1983).

2008In Ex parte Jenkins , this Court overruled DeBruce to the extent that it "applied the relation-back doctrine to proceedings governed by Rule 32." 972 So.2d at 165 .

2008In Ex parte Jenkins, this Court overruled DeBruce to the extent that it "applied the relation-back doctrine to proceedings governed by Rule 32.” 972 So.2d at 165 .

2017Ltd. , 182 So.3d 510 , 513 (Ala. 2015) (explaining, with regard to fictitious-party practice, that " 'the relation back principle applies only when the plaintiff "is ignorant of the name of an opposing party" ' " (quoting Ex parte General Motors of Canada, Ltd. , 144 So.3d 236 , 239 (Ala. 2013) )).

2016See Ex parte Nicholson, supra (stating that this Court will provide mandamus review of a circuit court’s denial of a summary-judgment motion in which a defendant argues that the plaintiffs claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations when that case involves fictitiously named parties and the relation-back doctrine).