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18 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1967–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Sibleygreen2 sentences2017See In re Sibley, 990 A.2d 483, 487-88 (D.C. 2010) (explaining that the presumption of identical discipline in D.C. 2017See In re Sibley, 990 A.2d 483, 487-88 (D.C. 2010) (explaining that the presumption of identical discipline in D.C. | 2 | 2 |
In Re RSgreen1 sentence2015In addition, in considering the injury threshold for “significant bodily injury,” we are mindful that during the Council of the District of Columbia hearing on the legislation that established the offense of felony assault, the Attorney General of the District of Columbia endorsed the legislation as responding to “the need for an intermediary felony assault to cover the ‘many assault cases involv[ing] a victim who has been seriously beaten, sometimes leaving the victim with black eyes, lacerations, broken bones, or serious bruising all over the body.’” R.S., 6 A.3d at 858 (emphasis added) (quo | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Canadygreen1 sentence2013See Taylor, 536 A.2d at 96 . 9 Thus, we conclude that there is no conflict between Virginia and District of Columbia law and therefore Urban Pace may raise the defense authorized in the Virginia statute. 10 Given that the Virginia Condominium Act applies, the question then becomes whether this statute, and in particular the provision governing liability for condominium developers and their agents, bars the instant action against Urban Pace. | 1 | 1 |
Bussineau v. President of Georgetown Collegegreen2 sentences1996See id., 413 A.2d at 921 n. 4. 6 Indeed, in Bussineau , in holding that a plaintiff can be on inquiry notice by knowing, or having reason to know, only “some evidence of wrongdoing” — for example, an awareness of “possible negligence,” id., 518 A.2d at 431— we explicitly stated a restriction: the District of Columbia rule does not extend as far as the rule, adopted in some states, that a plaintiff will not have inquiry notice until aware of “all” the essential elements of the claim. 1996See id., 413 A.2d at 921 n. 4. [6] Indeed, in Bussineau , in holding that a plaintiff can be on inquiry notice by knowing, or having reason to know, only "some evidence of wrongdoing" — for example, an awareness of "possible negligence," id., 518 A.2d at 431 — we explicitly stated a restriction: the District of Columbia rule does not extend as far as the rule, adopted in some states, that a plaintiff will not have inquiry notice until aware of "all" the essential elements of the claim. | 1 | 1 |
Kelton v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences1996See id., 413 A.2d at 921 n. 4. 6 Indeed, in Bussineau , in holding that a plaintiff can be on inquiry notice by knowing, or having reason to know, only “some evidence of wrongdoing” — for example, an awareness of “possible negligence,” id., 518 A.2d at 431— we explicitly stated a restriction: the District of Columbia rule does not extend as far as the rule, adopted in some states, that a plaintiff will not have inquiry notice until aware of “all” the essential elements of the claim. 1996See id., 413 A.2d at 921 n. 4. 6 Indeed, in Bussineau , in holding that a plaintiff can be on inquiry notice by knowing, or having reason to know, only “some evidence of wrongdoing” — for example, an awareness of “possible negligence,” id., 518 A.2d at 431— we explicitly stated a restriction: the District of Columbia rule does not extend as far as the rule, adopted in some states, that a plaintiff will not have inquiry notice until aware of “all” the essential elements of the claim. | 1 | 1 |
Michael Sindram v. John H. Suda Paul R. Webber, III Oliver P. Corbin Edward Jenkins Everett O'Quinn Frederick B. Beane, Jr. (Two Cases)green2 sentences1995Sindram v. Suda, 300 U.S.App.D.C. 110, 112 , 986 F.2d 1459, 1461 (1993) (citations omitted). 1995Sindram v. Suda, 300 U.S.App.D.C. 110, 112 , 986 F.2d 1459, 1461 (1993) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Holland v. Hannangreen2 sentences1994Appellants now contend that the Gross Receipt Tax Amendment Act of 1987 is unconstitutional on three grounds: (1) it was enacted by the Council of the District of Columbia in violation of the Origination Clause of the United States Constitution; (2) it violates appellants’ right under the Commerce Clause to be free of discriminatory burdens on out-of-state competitors; and (3) it violated Due Process as a result of its retroactivity provisions in light of the foreclosure to appellants under federal law of recovery of the tax from them customers. 8 We address only the first two contentions. 9 S 1994Appellants now contend that the Gross Receipt Tax Amendment Act of 1987 is unconstitutional on three grounds: (1) it was enacted by the Council of the District of Columbia in violation of the Origination Clause of the United States Constitution; (2) it violates appellants' right under the Commerce Clause to be free of discriminatory burdens on out-of-state competitors; and (3) it violated Due Process as a result of its retroactivity provisions in light of the foreclosure to appellants under federal law of recovery of the tax from their customers. [8] We address only the first two contentions. | 1 | 1 |
Rustin v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence1993Rustin v. District of Columbia, 491 A.2d 496, 500 (D.C.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 , 106 S.Ct. 343 , 88 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985); Wade v. District of Columbia, 310 A.2d 857, 860 (D.C.1973). | 1 | 1 |
Wade v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence1993Rustin v. District of Columbia, 491 A.2d 496, 500 (D.C.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 , 106 S.Ct. 343 , 88 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985); Wade v. District of Columbia, 310 A.2d 857, 860 (D.C.1973). | 1 | 1 |
M. A. P. v. Ryangreen2 sentences1987See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971). . 1987His status changed to Associate Judge, Retired, on September 1, 1987. [1] The only interest of Maryland that is implicated in this litigation, an interest in protecting public safety which we infer from its statutory prohibition on serving persons under the influence, is consistent with rather than in conflict with applying a District of Columbia rule of civil liability. [2] See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971). [3] The Definitions section of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act provides: The words "alcoholic beverage" or " beverage " include the 4 varieties of liquor above defined | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals & Reviewgreen2 sentences1981See id., Aug. 10, 1978, at C1, col. 6; id., May 11, 1978, at B1, col. 2; id., May 5, 1978, at C1, col. 2. [2] Petitioner does not contend, nor do we conclude, that her appearance pro se at the District of Columbia hearing was anything less than completely voluntary. [3] We note that initial license applicants and renewal applicants are accorded a hearing before denial. 5 DD DCRR § 20.1(a)-(c), (h). [4] This provision is drawn from the statutory grant of authority to the Mayor to suspend or revoke licenses "when, in his judgment, such is deemed desirable in the interest of public decency or the 1981See id., Aug. 10, 1978, at C1, col. 6; id., May 11, 1978, at B1, col. 2; id., May 5, 1978, at C1, col. 2. [2] Petitioner does not contend, nor do we conclude, that her appearance pro se at the District of Columbia hearing was anything less than completely voluntary. [3] We note that initial license applicants and renewal applicants are accorded a hearing before denial. 5 DD DCRR § 20.1(a)-(c), (h). [4] This provision is drawn from the statutory grant of authority to the Mayor to suspend or revoke licenses "when, in his judgment, such is deemed desirable in the interest of public decency or the | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kennedy v. Educational Testing Service, Inc.
green
1 sentence2005The court went on to explain that “[although the District of Columbia has no statutorily established procedure for petitioning the Court of Appeals for review of a final determination of the Committee on Admissions denying certification that an applicant has passed the bar examination, the Court of Appeals nevertheless does accept and consider petitions for review.” Id. at 1046 (citing [Alvin S .] Kennedy, 393 A.2d at 525 , and Harper, 375 A.2d at 27 ). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
In Re Demos
green
1 sentence2005I Respondent passed the District of Columbia bar examination in 1983, but was not admitted to our bar at that time, for reasons explained in In re Demos, 579 A.2d 668 (D.C.1990) (en banc). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Harper v. District of Columbia Committee on Admissions
green
1 sentence2005The court went on to explain that “[although the District of Columbia has no statutorily established procedure for petitioning the Court of Appeals for review of a final determination of the Committee on Admissions denying certification that an applicant has passed the bar examination, the Court of Appeals nevertheless does accept and consider petitions for review.” Id. at 1046 (citing [Alvin S .] Kennedy, 393 A.2d at 525 , and Harper, 375 A.2d at 27 ). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Powell v. Nigro
green
2 sentences2005The District Court recognized that “[t]he [District of Columbia] Court of Appeals alone may make the final decision, whether express or implied, concerning whether to admit a particular applicant to the District of Columbia bar.” Id. at 1046 . 2005The court went on to explain that “[although the District of Columbia has no statutorily established procedure for petitioning the Court of Appeals for review of a final determination of the Committee on Admissions denying certification that an applicant has passed the bar examination, the Court of Appeals nevertheless does accept and consider petitions for review.” Id. at 1046 (citing [Alvin S .] Kennedy, 393 A.2d at 525 , and Harper, 375 A.2d at 27 ). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Matter of Souls
green
1 sentence2003Mr. Souls was held to have violated Rule 8.4(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Professional Conduct (which is identical to the District of Columbia rule in all relevant respects) because he “knew he had been involved in a collision wherein he was required [by state law] to stop ... and render reasonable aid” to any possible victim, but instead “left the scene without [conducting] a diligent search” for a possible victim. 669 A.2d at 583-584 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Tupling v. Britton
green
1 sentence2002We reiterate our admonition in Tupling , that “[a]s professionals and officers of this court, members of the District of Columbia bar have the obligation to exercise their independent professional judgment to determine whether a civil appeal is frivolous before filing one.” Id. at 352 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Matter of Haupt
green
1 sentence1997July 28, 1986)(attorney charged with two counts each of dishonesty, practicing law in the District of Columbia in violation of its rules, neglecting a legal matter, and one count of engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, ordered disbarred when he failed to answer petition, and did not participate in subsequent proceedings); Matter of Haupt, 444 A.2d 317 (D.C.1982)(attorney’s pattern of neglect and willful disregard of ethical and legal duties to numerous clients, and repeated failures to respond to requests of Bar Counsel warranted disbarment); Matter of Bush, D.C.Ap | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Peterson v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n
green
1 sentence1993Rustin v. District of Columbia, 491 A.2d 496, 500 (D.C.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 , 106 S.Ct. 343 , 88 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985); Wade v. District of Columbia, 310 A.2d 857, 860 (D.C.1973). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Hepler v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
green
1 sentence1993Rustin v. District of Columbia, 491 A.2d 496, 500 (D.C.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 , 106 S.Ct. 343 , 88 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985); Wade v. District of Columbia, 310 A.2d 857, 860 (D.C.1973). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Reed v. Terrell
green
1 sentence1993Rustin v. District of Columbia, 491 A.2d 496, 500 (D.C.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 , 106 S.Ct. 343 , 88 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985); Wade v. District of Columbia, 310 A.2d 857, 860 (D.C.1973). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp.
green
2 sentences1991In noting that the test for summary judgment "mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion to the verdict," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 , 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the Court explained that "summary judgment should be granted where the evidence is such that it 'would require a directed verdict for the moving party.”' Id. at 251 , 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (quoting Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp., 3 1991In noting that the test for summary judgment "mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion to the verdict," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 , 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the Court explained that "summary judgment should be granted where the evidence is such that it 'would require a directed verdict for the moving party.”' Id. at 251 , 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (quoting Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp., 3 | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
green
2 sentences1991In noting that the test for summary judgment "mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion to the verdict," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 , 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the Court explained that "summary judgment should be granted where the evidence is such that it 'would require a directed verdict for the moving party.”' Id. at 251 , 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (quoting Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp., 3 1991In noting that the test for summary judgment "mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion to the verdict," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 , 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the Court explained that "summary judgment should be granted where the evidence is such that it 'would require a directed verdict for the moving party.”' Id. at 251 , 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (quoting Sartor v. Arkansas Gas Corp., 3 | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Metropolitan Railroad v. District of Columbia
green
2 sentences1985In Metropolitan Railroad Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1 , 10 S.Ct. 19 , 33 L.Ed. 231 (1889), the Supreme Court considered whether a statute of limitations would operate against the District of Columbia to bar a contract action against a railroad company. 1985In Metropolitan Railroad Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1 , 10 S.Ct. 19 , 33 L.Ed. 231 (1889), the Supreme Court considered whether a statute of limitations would operate against the District of Columbia to bar a contract action against a railroad company. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Roth v. United States
green
2 sentences1967In 1957, the United States Supreme Court in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 , 77 S.Ct. 1304 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 , first announced that the constitutional test of “obscenity” is whether, to the average person applying “contemporary community standards,” the dominant theme of the material as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex. 1967In 1957, the United States Supreme Court in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 , 77 S.Ct. 1304 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 , first announced that the constitutional test of “obscenity” is whether, to the average person applying “contemporary community standards,” the dominant theme of the material as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Jacobellis v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1967MYERS, Associate Judge: Appellants 1 were convicted of staging obscene shows in the District of Columbia in violation of § 22-2001 D.C.Code (1961 ed.). 2 Although in obscenity cases, as in all other cases relating to First Amendment guarantees of free expression, it is usually the duty of an appellate court to review the evidence, from the trial court for the purpose of making “an independent constitutional judgment on the' facts of the case as to whether the material involved is constitutionally protected,” Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 , 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1678 , 12 L.Ed.2d 793 1967MYERS, Associate Judge: Appellants 1 were convicted of staging obscene shows in the District of Columbia in violation of § 22-2001 D.C.Code (1961 ed.). 2 Although in obscenity cases, as in all other cases relating to First Amendment guarantees of free expression, it is usually the duty of an appellate court to review the evidence, from the trial court for the purpose of making “an independent constitutional judgment on the' facts of the case as to whether the material involved is constitutionally protected,” Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 , 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1678 , 12 L.Ed.2d 793 | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.