Dyas test in District of Columbia

2014This court has rejected the argument that when the Dyas issue is presented in a bench trial, the proper standard for admissibility should be the “ken of the presiding trial judge” rather than that of the average layperson.11 The average layperson standard applies “even though it could be said that the trial [judge is] competent to resolve the issue without the aid of an expert.”12 10 See Benn II, 978 A.2d at 1277 (“Despite the fact that jurors may be familiar from their own experience with factors relevant to the reliability of eyewitness observation and identification, it cannot be said that

2014This court has rejected the argument that when the Dyas issue is presented in a bench trial, the proper standard for admissibility should be the “ken of the presiding trial judge” rather than that of the average layperson.11 The average layperson standard applies “even though it could be said that the trial [judge is] competent to resolve the issue without the aid of an expert.”12 10 See Benn II, 978 A.2d at 1277 (“Despite the fact that jurors may be familiar from their own experience with factors relevant to the reliability of eyewitness observation and identification, it cannot be said that

2013We also acknowledged that "[o]ur holding does not, of course, preclude a trial court from determining in an appropriate case that particular expert testimony, even if it satisfies all three Dyas factors, should be excluded as more prejudicial than probative on the facts of the particular case.” Id. at 419 n. 6.

2012See Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.1977). 2 He also asserts that the second trial court’s acceptance of the ruling of the first trial court was erroneous because some of the “corroborative evidence [relied upon by the first trial judge] was different than that which the [second trial judge] based his decision to exclude [the expert testimony].” We need not decide whether the trial court erred by basing its decision to exclude the expert testimony on the existence of evidence corroborating the identification of appellant, without conducting a Dyas inquiry, for we are satisfied th

2021In assessing the need for an expert, the operative question is whether expert testimony would “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.” Motorola v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751, 756-57 (D.C. 2016) (retiring the Dyas test and adopting the federal test for the admission of expert testimony under Daubert/Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702); see also Jackson v. United States, 210 A.3d 800, 805-06 (D.C. 2019) (assessing “whether the jurors are ‘just as competent as the expert to consider and weigh the evidence and draw the necessary conclusions.’”) (emphasis and quota

2021In assessing the need for an expert, the operative question is whether expert testimony would “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.” Motorola v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751, 756-57 (D.C. 2016) (retiring the Dyas test and adopting the federal test for the admission of expert testimony under Daubert/Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702); see also Jackson v. United States, 210 A.3d 800, 805-06 (D.C. 2019) (assessing “whether the jurors are ‘just as competent as the expert to consider and weigh the evidence and draw the necessary conclusions.’”) (emphasis and quota

2021See Motorola Inc. v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751, 752 (D.C. 2016) (en banc) (adopting the federal standards on admissibility of expert testimony laid out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).

2021See Motorola Inc. v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751, 752 (D.C. 2016) (en banc) (adopting the federal standards on admissibility of expert testimony laid out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).

2021See, e.g., Hager v. United States, 856 A.2d 1143, 1148-49 (D.C. 2004), amended in part on other grounds, 861 A.2d 601 (D.C. 2004), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1035 (2006) (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identifications because “the studies on which [the expert witness] would have relied concern the 4 This conclusion is aided by the government’s expert, who testified that the findings from stranger identification research should not be applied to situations where the witness has a prior acquaintance with the subject of the identificat

2021See, e.g., Hager v. United States, 856 A.2d 1143, 1148-49 (D.C. 2004), amended in part on other grounds, 861 A.2d 601 (D.C. 2004), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1035 (2006) (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identifications because “the studies on which [the expert witness] would have relied concern the 4 This conclusion is aided by the government’s expert, who testified that the findings from stranger identification research should not be applied to situations where the witness has a prior acquaintance with the subject of the identificat

2021The question of whether Rule 702 applied retroactively to cases that had already been tried but were not yet final on direct appeal was left open in Motorola, see, 147 A.3d at 759 , but we have since held that “the standards adopted for the admission of expert testimony in Motorola apply to all cases . . . that are still ‘pending on direct review or not yet final.’” Williams v. United States, 210 A.3d 734, 743 (D.C. 2019) (citing Davis v. Moore, 772 A.2d 204, 226 (D.C. 2001) (en banc)).

2021The question of whether Rule 702 applied retroactively to cases that had already been tried but were not yet final on direct appeal was left open in Motorola, see, 147 A.3d at 759 , but we have since held that “the standards adopted for the admission of expert testimony in Motorola apply to all cases . . . that are still ‘pending on direct review or not yet final.’” Williams v. United States, 210 A.3d 734, 743 (D.C. 2019) (citing Davis v. Moore, 772 A.2d 204, 226 (D.C. 2001) (en banc)).

2021See, e.g., Hager v. United States, 856 A.2d 1143, 1148-49 (D.C. 2004), amended in part on other grounds, 861 A.2d 601 (D.C. 2004), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1035 (2006) (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identifications because “the studies on which [the expert witness] would have relied concern the 4 This conclusion is aided by the government’s expert, who testified that the findings from stranger identification research should not be applied to situations where the witness has a prior acquaintance with the subject of the identificat

2021See, e.g., Hager v. United States, 856 A.2d 1143, 1148-49 (D.C. 2004), amended in part on other grounds, 861 A.2d 601 (D.C. 2004), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1035 (2006) (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identifications because “the studies on which [the expert witness] would have relied concern the 4 This conclusion is aided by the government’s expert, who testified that the findings from stranger identification research should not be applied to situations where the witness has a prior acquaintance with the subject of the identificat

2021See, e.g., Hager v. United States, 856 A.2d 1143, 1148-49 (D.C. 2004), amended in part on other grounds, 861 A.2d 601 (D.C. 2004), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1035 (2006) (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identifications because “the studies on which [the expert witness] would have relied concern the 4 This conclusion is aided by the government’s expert, who testified that the findings from stranger identification research should not be applied to situations where the witness has a prior acquaintance with the subject of the identificat

2021See, e.g., Hager v. United States, 856 A.2d 1143, 1148-49 (D.C. 2004), amended in part on other grounds, 861 A.2d 601 (D.C. 2004), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1035 (2006) (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identifications because “the studies on which [the expert witness] would have relied concern the 4 This conclusion is aided by the government’s expert, who testified that the findings from stranger identification research should not be applied to situations where the witness has a prior acquaintance with the subject of the identificat

2021See, e.g., Hager v. United States, 856 A.2d 1143, 1148-49 (D.C. 2004), amended in part on other grounds, 861 A.2d 601 (D.C. 2004), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1035 (2006) (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identifications because “the studies on which [the expert witness] would have relied concern the 4 This conclusion is aided by the government’s expert, who testified that the findings from stranger identification research should not be applied to situations where the witness has a prior acquaintance with the subject of the identificat

2021See, e.g., Hager v. United States, 856 A.2d 1143, 1148-49 (D.C. 2004), amended in part on other grounds, 861 A.2d 601 (D.C. 2004), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1035 (2006) (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identifications because “the studies on which [the expert witness] would have relied concern the 4 This conclusion is aided by the government’s expert, who testified that the findings from stranger identification research should not be applied to situations where the witness has a prior acquaintance with the subject of the identificat

2021The question of whether Rule 702 applied retroactively to cases that had already been tried but were not yet final on direct appeal was left open in Motorola, see, 147 A.3d at 759 , but we have since held that “the standards adopted for the admission of expert testimony in Motorola apply to all cases . . . that are still ‘pending on direct review or not yet final.’” Williams v. United States, 210 A.3d 734, 743 (D.C. 2019) (citing Davis v. Moore, 772 A.2d 204, 226 (D.C. 2001) (en banc)).

2021The question of whether Rule 702 applied retroactively to cases that had already been tried but were not yet final on direct appeal was left open in Motorola, see, 147 A.3d at 759 , but we have since held that “the standards adopted for the admission of expert testimony in Motorola apply to all cases . . . that are still ‘pending on direct review or not yet final.’” Williams v. United States, 210 A.3d 734, 743 (D.C. 2019) (citing Davis v. Moore, 772 A.2d 204, 226 (D.C. 2001) (en banc)).

2021See, e.g., Hager v. United States, 856 A.2d 1143, 1148-49 (D.C. 2004), amended in part on other grounds, 861 A.2d 601 (D.C. 2004), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1035 (2006) (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identifications because “the studies on which [the expert witness] would have relied concern the 4 This conclusion is aided by the government’s expert, who testified that the findings from stranger identification research should not be applied to situations where the witness has a prior acquaintance with the subject of the identificat

2021See, e.g., Hager v. United States, 856 A.2d 1143, 1148-49 (D.C. 2004), amended in part on other grounds, 861 A.2d 601 (D.C. 2004), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1035 (2006) (finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identifications because “the studies on which [the expert witness] would have relied concern the 4 This conclusion is aided by the government’s expert, who testified that the findings from stranger identification research should not be applied to situations where the witness has a prior acquaintance with the subject of the identificat

2014This court has rejected the argument that when the Dyas issue is presented in a bench trial, the proper standard for admissibility should be the “ken of the presiding trial judge” rather than that of the average layperson.11 The average layperson standard applies “even though it could be said that the trial [judge is] competent to resolve the issue without the aid of an expert.”12 10 See Benn II, 978 A.2d at 1277 (“Despite the fact that jurors may be familiar from their own experience with factors relevant to the reliability of eyewitness observation and identification, it cannot be said that

2011But a passing statement that the judge considered the "particular case" is insufficient to show that the judge properly performed a case-specific consideration of the three Dyas factors. [17] See id. at 1280; see also Russell v. United States, 17 A.3d 581 (D.C.2011). [18] The government invokes the standard of harmlessness applicable to non-constitutional error set forth in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-765 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946): If, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the v

2012See Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.1977). 2 He also asserts that the second trial court’s acceptance of the ruling of the first trial court was erroneous because some of the “corroborative evidence [relied upon by the first trial judge] was different than that which the [second trial judge] based his decision to exclude [the expert testimony].” We need not decide whether the trial court erred by basing its decision to exclude the expert testimony on the existence of evidence corroborating the identification of appellant, without conducting a Dyas inquiry, for we are satisfied th

2012See Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.1977). 2 He also asserts that the second trial court’s acceptance of the ruling of the first trial court was erroneous because some of the “corroborative evidence [relied upon by the first trial judge] was different than that which the [second trial judge] based his decision to exclude [the expert testimony].” We need not decide whether the trial court erred by basing its decision to exclude the expert testimony on the existence of evidence corroborating the identification of appellant, without conducting a Dyas inquiry, for we are satisfied th

1995In doing so, we should further recognize the relationship between the third prong of the Dyas test and Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46 , 293 F. 1013 (1923), our controlling test on the admissibility of new scientific evidence.

1995In doing so, we should further recognize the relationship between the third prong of the Dyas test and Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46 , 293 F. 1013 (1923), our controlling test on the admissibility of new scientific evidence.

2018Jones v. United States, 990 A.2d 970, 980 (D.C. 2010).

2018Jones v. United States , 990 A.2d 970 , 980 (D.C. 2010).

2021In assessing the need for an expert, the operative question is whether expert testimony would “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.” Motorola v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751, 756-57 (D.C. 2016) (retiring the Dyas test and adopting the federal test for the admission of expert testimony under Daubert/Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702); see also Jackson v. United States, 210 A.3d 800, 805-06 (D.C. 2019) (assessing “whether the jurors are ‘just as competent as the expert to consider and weigh the evidence and draw the necessary conclusions.’”) (emphasis and quota

2021In assessing the need for an expert, the operative question is whether expert testimony would “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.” Motorola v. Murray, 147 A.3d 751, 756-57 (D.C. 2016) (retiring the Dyas test and adopting the federal test for the admission of expert testimony under Daubert/Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702); see also Jackson v. United States, 210 A.3d 800, 805-06 (D.C. 2019) (assessing “whether the jurors are ‘just as competent as the expert to consider and weigh the evidence and draw the necessary conclusions.’”) (emphasis and quota

2014This court has rejected the argument that when the Dyas issue is presented in a bench trial, the proper standard for admissibility should be the “ken of the presiding trial judge” rather than that of the average layperson.11 The average layperson standard applies “even though it could be said that the trial [judge is] competent to resolve the issue without the aid of an expert.”12 10 See Benn II, 978 A.2d at 1277 (“Despite the fact that jurors may be familiar from their own experience with factors relevant to the reliability of eyewitness observation and identification, it cannot be said that

2014This court has rejected the argument that when the Dyas issue is presented in a bench trial, the proper standard for admissibility should be the “ken of the presiding trial judge” rather than that of the average layperson.11 The average layperson standard applies “even though it could be said that the trial [judge is] competent to resolve the issue without the aid of an expert.”12 10 See Benn II, 978 A.2d at 1277 (“Despite the fact that jurors may be familiar from their own experience with factors relevant to the reliability of eyewitness observation and identification, it cannot be said that

2014One such legitimate concern, embodied in the Dyas test, is that expert testimony serve its proper function and not usurp the role of the jury. “[B]e-cause expert or scientific testimony possesses an ‘aura of special reliability and trustworthiness,’ the proffer of such testimony must be carefully scrutinized.” Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 632 (citation omitted); see 1 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 13, at 90 (7th ed. 2013) (“In the past three decades, the use of expert witnesses has skyrocketed....

2014One such legitimate concern, embodied in the Dyas test, is that expert testimony serve its proper function and not usurp the role of the jury. “[B]e-cause expert or scientific testimony possesses an ‘aura of special reliability and trustworthiness,’ the proffer of such testimony must be carefully scrutinized.” Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 632 (citation omitted); see 1 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 13, at 90 (7th ed. 2013) (“In the past three decades, the use of expert witnesses has skyrocketed....

2013See also Patterson, 37 A.3d at 248 (Glickman, J., concurring) ("[W]e have chosen to follow the federal rule that relevant and otherwise admissible evidence may be excluded only 'if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.’ ") (concurring opinion withdrawn on other grounds, 56 A.3d at 1155 ).

2013See also Patterson, 37 A.3d at 248 (Glickman, J., concurring) (“[W]e have chosen to follow the federal rule that relevant and otherwise admissible evidence may be excluded only „if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.‟”) (concurring opinion withdrawn on other grounds, 56 A.3d at 1155 ). (continued…) 13 First, as described above, during the hearing on appellant‟s motion for a new trial, appellant‟s trial cou

2012See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 27 A.3d 1189, 1195 (D.C.2011) ("Generally, expert testimony should be admitted if it is relevant and likely to aid the trier of fact in the search for the truth.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); note 11 supra, (setting forth the Dyas test on the admissibility of expert testimony). .

2012See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 27 A.3d 1189, 1195 (D.C.2011) ("Generally, expert testimony should be admitted if it is relevant and likely to aid the trier of fact in the search for the truth.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); note 11 supra, (setting forth the Dyas test on the admissibility of expert testimony). .

2011Jackson, supra, 768 A.2d at 590 (exclusion of testimony was error "because Jackson's defense was that his wrongful arrest stemmed from the officers' neglect ... of their duty to gather available fingerprint evidence"). "[T]he relevance of [fingerprint expert] testimony to that defense [i]s heightened" once the government has presented evidence on the futility of gathering fingerprint evidence.

2011Jackson, supra, 768 A.2d at 590 (exclusion of testimony was error "because Jackson's defense was that his wrongful arrest stemmed from the officers' neglect ... of their duty to gather available fingerprint evidence"). "[T]he relevance of [fingerprint expert] testimony to that defense [i]s heightened" once the government has presented evidence on the futility of gathering fingerprint evidence.

2011The proffer stated only that the alleged phenomenon "is an area of expert testimony and thus, the use of an expert that has the requisite skill and knowledge to discuss and explain the phenomen[on] to a trier of fact is necessary." These bare assertions indicate that unconscious transference is an esoteric subject of research, but not that the existence of the phenomenon or the methodology used to identify it had gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community, or (if so) that the state of scientific knowledge regarding unconscious transference permitted a reasonable opinion to

2011The proffer stated only that the alleged phenomenon "is an area of expert testimony and thus, the use of an expert that has the requisite skill and knowledge to discuss and explain the phenomen[on] to a trier of fact is necessary." These bare assertions indicate that unconscious transference is an esoteric subject of research, but not that the existence of the phenomenon or the methodology used to identify it had gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community, or (if so) that the state of scientific knowledge regarding unconscious transference permitted a reasonable opinion to

2010Relying on two cases, Mindombe v. United States, 795 A.2d 39, 42 (D.C.2002), and Oliver v. United States, 711 A.2d 70, 72 (D.C.1998), he maintains, “The evidence which [he] sought to present here was simply the defense corollary of expert testimony presented by the prosecution in child sex abuse cases that this [c]ourt has already concluded is beyond the ken of the average lay person.” He argues that the alleged trial court error was not harmless because “Dr. Robbins’s testimony was crucial to the defense of fabrication.” He asserts, in essence, that the exclusion of the expert’s testimony imp

2010Relying on two cases, Mindombe v. United States, 795 A.2d 39, 42 (D.C.2002), and Oliver v. United States, 711 A.2d 70, 72 (D.C.1998), he maintains, “The evidence which [he] sought to present here was simply the defense corollary of expert testimony presented by the prosecution in child sex abuse cases that this [c]ourt has already concluded is beyond the ken of the average lay person.” He argues that the alleged trial court error was not harmless because “Dr. Robbins’s testimony was crucial to the defense of fabrication.” He asserts, in essence, that the exclusion of the expert’s testimony imp

2010Relying on two cases, Mindombe v. United States, 795 A.2d 39, 42 (D.C.2002), and Oliver v. United States, 711 A.2d 70, 72 (D.C.1998), he maintains, “The evidence which [he] sought to present here was simply the defense corollary of expert testimony presented by the prosecution in child sex abuse cases that this [c]ourt has already concluded is beyond the ken of the average lay person.” He argues that the alleged trial court error was not harmless because “Dr. Robbins’s testimony was crucial to the defense of fabrication.” He asserts, in essence, that the exclusion of the expert’s testimony imp

2010Relying on two cases, Mindombe v. United States, 795 A.2d 39, 42 (D.C.2002), and Oliver v. United States, 711 A.2d 70, 72 (D.C.1998), he maintains, “The evidence which [he] sought to present here was simply the defense corollary of expert testimony presented by the prosecution in child sex abuse cases that this [c]ourt has already concluded is beyond the ken of the average lay person.” He argues that the alleged trial court error was not harmless because “Dr. Robbins’s testimony was crucial to the defense of fabrication.” He asserts, in essence, that the exclusion of the expert’s testimony imp

1995See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C.1983).

1995See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C.1983).