castle doctrine in Florida

2018Florida has long recognized the common law “castle doctrine,” “which stands for the proposition that a person’s dwelling house is a castle of defense for himself and his family, and an assault on it with intent to injure him or any lawful inmate of it may justify the use of force as protection, and even deadly force if there exist reasonable and factual grounds to believe that unless so used, a felony would be committed.” Falco v. State, 407 So. 2d 203, 208 (Fla. 1981).

2018SIGNED: OPINION CLERK The corrected hard copy will follow. 1 Florida has long recognized the common law "castle doctrine," "which stands for the proposition that a person's dwelling house is a castle of defense for himself and his family, and an assault on it with intent to injure him or any lawful inmate of it may justify the use of force as protection, and even deadly force if there exist reasonable and factual grounds to believe that unless so used, a felony would be committed." Falco v. State , 407 So.2d 203 , 208 (Fla. 1981).

2014As the Second District explained in Little v. State, 111 So.3d 214, 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), sections 776.012, 776.013, and 776.032 provide alternative forms of immunity.

2013As the Second District explained in Little v. State, 111 So.3d 214, 219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), sections 776.012, 776.013, and 776.032 provide alternative forms of immunity.

2012See, e.g., Baker v. State, 506 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), supersession recognized in Smiley v. State, 966 So.2d 330 (Fla.2007).

2007Compare Redondo v. State, 380 So.2d 1107, 1110 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (holding that the castle doctrine extends to a place of business), quashed in part on other grounds, 403 So.2d 954 (Fla.1981) with Baker v. State, 506 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (holding that the castle doctrine does not extend to automobiles).

2007Compare Redondo v. State, 380 So.2d 1107, 1110 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (holding that the castle doctrine extends to a place of business), quashed in part on other grounds, 403 So.2d 954 (Fla.1981) with Baker v. State, 506 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (holding that the castle doctrine does not extend to automobiles).

1980In the Grantham case, the husband's conviction of murder in the death of his wife was reversed because the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the "privilege of non-retreat" in a case where the accused pleaded self-defense to an attack by the wife in the marital home. [3] We agree and hold, as do the majority of jurisdictions, that the castle doctrine or privilege of non-retreat in the home applies regardless of whether co-occupants or intruders are involved. [4] As stated in Redondo v. State, 380 So.2d 1107, 1111 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), cert. granted, Case No. 59,032 (Fla. September 8, 19

2018Although the common law "castle doctrine" was originally limited to the privilege of nonretreat from the home, Weiand v. State , 732 So.2d 1044 , 1049 (Fla. 1999), it has also been extended to business premises.

2003The castle doctrine privilege of non-retreat is "equally available to all those lawfully residing in the premises, provided, of course, that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm." Weiand, 732 So.2d at 1057 .

2003We think that a further extension of the "castle doctrine" privilege to include a temporary social guest or visitor must be weighed against the underlying policy consideration of the "duty to retreat" rule as enunciated by Justice Overton's dissenting opinion in State v. Bobbitt, 415 So.2d 724, 728 (Fla. 1982) (Overton, J., dissenting), and later adopted by the Supreme Court in Weiand, 732 So.2d at 1051 : "[h]uman life is precious, and deadly combat should be avoided if at all possible when imminent danger to oneself can be avoided." Bobbitt, 415 So.2d at 728 .

1996In State v. Bobbitt, 415 So.2d 724 (Fla. 1982), the supreme court addressed the question of whether the castle doctrine applies where the victim and assailant are occupants of the same home and held that it did not apply.

1982See Hedges v. State, 172 So.2d 824 (Fla.1965). .

1982In Rippie v. State, 404 So.2d 160, 161-62 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), Judge Boardman set forth a historical background and legal basis for the doctrine, stating: Many jurisdictions, including Florida, have expanded the "castle doctrine" to permit its use even when the attacker is not an intruder, Hedges v. State, 172 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1965), and even when he is a co-occupant, Watkins v. State, 197 So.2d 312 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967).

2012See, e.g., Baker v. State, 506 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), supersession recognized in Smiley v. State, 966 So.2d 330 (Fla.2007).

2007Compare Redondo v. State, 380 So.2d 1107, 1110 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (holding that the castle doctrine extends to a place of business), quashed in part on other grounds, 403 So.2d 954 (Fla.1981) with Baker v. State, 506 So.2d 1056, 1059 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (holding that the castle doctrine does not extend to automobiles).

1982In Rippie v. State, 404 So.2d 160, 161-62 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), Judge Boardman set forth a historical background and legal basis for the doctrine, stating: Many jurisdictions, including Florida, have expanded the "castle doctrine" to permit its use even when the attacker is not an intruder, Hedges v. State, 172 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1965), and even when he is a co-occupant, Watkins v. State, 197 So.2d 312 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967).

1978The castle doctrine is of ancient origin and "... in its original applications it doubtless had in view only attacks from external aggressors *776 ...." Watts v. State, 177 Ala. 24 , 59 So. 270, 273 (1912).

1978The castle doctrine is of ancient origin and "... in its original applications it doubtless had in view only attacks from external aggressors *776 ...." Watts v. State, 177 Ala. 24 , 59 So. 270, 273 (1912).