18 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1940–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cornelisen v. City of Atlantagreen2 sentences2026Those waivers are not relevant here. 6 [of 1895], of nonliability for conduct of officers, agents, and servants of municipal corporations in respect to duties devolving upon them in virtue of the sovereign or governmental functions of the municipality.” Cornelisen v. City of Atlanta, 146 Ga. 416, 417 (1917). 2026Those waivers are not relevant here. 6 [of 1895], of nonliability for conduct of officers, agents, and servants of municipal corporations in respect to duties devolving upon them in virtue of the sovereign or governmental functions of the municipality.” Cornelisen v. City of Atlanta, 146 Ga. 416, 417 (1917). | 2 | 2 |
Georgia Department of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc.green2 sentences2015Except as provided in this subparagraph, officers and employees of the state or its departments and agencies shall not be subject to suit or liability, and no judgment shall be entered against them, for the performance or nonperformance of their official functions. . . . 2 A further waiver of a municipal corporation’s sovereign immunity is found in subsection (a) which provides that a “municipal corporation shall not waive its immunity by the purchase of liability insurance, except as provided in Code Section 33-24-51 or 36-92-2, or unless the policy of insurance issued covers an occurrence fo 2015Except as provided in this subparagraph, officers and employees of the state or its departments and agencies shall not be subject to suit or liability, and no judgment shall be entered against them, for the performance or nonperformance of their official functions. . . . 2 A further waiver of a municipal corporation’s sovereign immunity is found in subsection (a) which provides that a “municipal corporation shall not waive its immunity by the purchase of liability insurance, except as provided in Code Section 33-24-51 or 36-92-2, or unless the policy of insurance issued covers an occurrence fo | 2 | 2 |
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. City of Garden Citygreen2 sentences2019See also CSX Transp., 277 Ga. at 251 (2) (“the legislature has provided that municipal sovereign immunity may be waived . . . by the purchase of liability insurance”). 2015For example, in the context of tort liability, OCGA § 36-33-1 (a) provides a narrow waiver of a municipality’s sovereign immunity by the purchase of liability insurance.2 CSX Transp., 277 Ga. at 249-250 ; Godfrey, 290 Ga. at 214 . 2 A “municipal corporation shall not waive its immunity by the purchase of liability insurance, except as provided in Code Section 33-24-51 or 36-92-2 or unless the policy of insurance issued covers an occurrence for which the defense of 5 Moreover, OCGA § 36-33-1 (b) also provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity as follows: “Municipal corporations shall not b | 1 | 2 |
Owens v. City of Greenvillegreen2 sentences2022See Gatto, 353 Ga. App. at 183. 22 available,’” id. (quoting OCGA § 36-33-1 (a)), and that this Court “has specifically analyzed insurance policies to determine whether they actually provide coverage for a plaintiff’s claims for damages.” Id. (citing Owens v. City of Greenville, 290 Ga. 557, 559 (3) (a) (722 SE2d 755) (2012)). 11 The Court of Appeals panel in this case purported to distinguish Gatto by noting that “unlike the statutory scheme in Gatto, the statutory scheme at issue here is decidedly more complex.” Atlantic Specialty, 357 Ga. App. at 562. 2022See Gatto, 353 Ga. App. at 183. 22 available,’” id. (quoting OCGA § 36-33-1 (a)), and that this Court “has specifically analyzed insurance policies to determine whether they actually provide coverage for a plaintiff’s claims for damages.” Id. (citing Owens v. City of Greenville, 290 Ga. 557, 559 (3) (a) (722 SE2d 755) (2012)). 11 The Court of Appeals panel in this case purported to distinguish Gatto by noting that “unlike the statutory scheme in Gatto, the statutory scheme at issue here is decidedly more complex.” Atlantic Specialty, 357 Ga. App. at 562. | 1 | 1 |
Spivey v. Safeway Insurancegreen2 sentences2020Co., 210 Ga. App. 775, 776 (1) ( 437 SE2d 641 ) (1993) (appellant entitled to a direct appeal from what appeared to be an order granting summary judgment in declaratory action). 7 corporation’s sovereign immunity, expressly providing that “[a] municipal corporation shall not waive its immunity by the purchase of liability insurance, except as provided in Code Section 33-24-51 or 36-92-2, or unless the policy of insurance issued covers an occurrence for which the defense of sovereign immunity is available, and then only to the extent of the limits of such insurance policy.” OCGA § 33-24-51 auth 2020Co., 210 Ga. App. 775, 776 (1) ( 437 SE2d 641 ) (1993) (appellant entitled to a direct appeal from what appeared to be an order granting summary judgment in declaratory action). 7 corporation’s sovereign immunity, expressly providing that “[a] municipal corporation shall not waive its immunity by the purchase of liability insurance, except as provided in Code Section 33-24-51 or 36-92-2, or unless the policy of insurance issued covers an occurrence for which the defense of sovereign immunity is available, and then only to the extent of the limits of such insurance policy.” OCGA § 33-24-51 auth | 1 | 1 |
Deal v. Colemangreen2 sentences2019See also Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (“[w]hen we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant”) (citation omitted). 2019See also Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (“[w]hen we consider the meaning of a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant”) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. City Councilgreen1 sentence2015See Koehler v. Massell, 229 Ga. 359, 361-362 (3) ( 191 SE2d 830 ) (1972); Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah v. Jones, 149 Ga. 139, 141-142 ( 99 SE 294 ) (1919); Wright v. City Council of Augusta, 78 Ga. 241, 243-244 (1886). | 1 | 1 |
Huff v. Watsongreen1 sentence2015See Koehler v. Massell, 229 Ga. 359, 361-362 (3) ( 191 SE2d 830 ) (1972); Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah v. Jones, 149 Ga. 139, 141-142 ( 99 SE 294 ) (1919); Wright v. City Council of Augusta, 78 Ga. 241, 243-244 (1886). | 1 | 1 |
Koehler v. Massellgreen2 sentences2015See Koehler v. Massell, 229 Ga. 359, 361-362 (3) ( 191 SE2d 830 ) (1972); Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah v. Jones, 149 Ga. 139, 141-142 ( 99 SE 294 ) (1919); Wright v. City Council of Augusta, 78 Ga. 241, 243-244 (1886). 2015See Koehler v. Massell, 229 Ga. 359, 361-362 (3) ( 191 SE2d 830 ) (1972); Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah v. Jones, 149 Ga. 139, 141-142 ( 99 SE 294 ) (1919); Wright v. City Council of Augusta, 78 Ga. 241, 243-244 (1886). | 1 | 1 |
Bowen v. Littlegreen2 sentences2011Compare Brockman v. Burnette, 184 Ga. App. 66, 67 ( 360 SE2d 655 ) (1987) (reversing grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when it was “undisputed that at the time of the accident the city was insured under a general liability insurance policy”), with Cyr v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 188 Ga. App. 261, 261 ( 372 SE2d 659 ) (1988) (upholding grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when “[t]he appellants I did | not contend that the city had in force any policy of 2011Compare Brockman v. Burnette, 184 Ga. App. 66, 67 ( 360 SE2d 655 ) (1987) (reversing grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when it was “undisputed that at the time of the accident the city was insured under a general liability insurance policy”), with Cyr v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 188 Ga. App. 261, 261 ( 372 SE2d 659 ) (1988) (upholding grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when “[t]he appellants I did | not contend that the city had in force any policy of | 1 | 1 |
Barnett v. City of Albanygreen2 sentences2011Compare Brockman v. Burnette, 184 Ga. App. 66, 67 ( 360 SE2d 655 ) (1987) (reversing grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when it was “undisputed that at the time of the accident the city was insured under a general liability insurance policy”), with Cyr v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 188 Ga. App. 261, 261 ( 372 SE2d 659 ) (1988) (upholding grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when “[t]he appellants I did | not contend that the city had in force any policy of 2011Compare Brockman v. Burnette, 184 Ga. App. 66, 67 ( 360 SE2d 655 ) (1987) (reversing grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when it was “undisputed that at the time of the accident the city was insured under a general liability insurance policy”), with Cyr v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 188 Ga. App. 261, 261 ( 372 SE2d 659 ) (1988) (upholding grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when “[t]he appellants I did | not contend that the city had in force any policy of | 1 | 1 |
Christensen v. Floyd Countygreen2 sentences2011Compare Brockman v. Burnette, 184 Ga. App. 66, 67 ( 360 SE2d 655 ) (1987) (reversing grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when it was “undisputed that at the time of the accident the city was insured under a general liability insurance policy”), with Cyr v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 188 Ga. App. 261, 261 ( 372 SE2d 659 ) (1988) (upholding grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when “[t]he appellants I did | not contend that the city had in force any policy of 2011Compare Brockman v. Burnette, 184 Ga. App. 66, 67 ( 360 SE2d 655 ) (1987) (reversing grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when it was “undisputed that at the time of the accident the city was insured under a general liability insurance policy”), with Cyr v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 188 Ga. App. 261, 261 ( 372 SE2d 659 ) (1988) (upholding grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when “[t]he appellants I did | not contend that the city had in force any policy of | 1 | 1 |
Cyr v. Mayor of Savannahgreen2 sentences2011Compare Brockman v. Burnette, 184 Ga. App. 66, 67 ( 360 SE2d 655 ) (1987) (reversing grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when it was “undisputed that at the time of the accident the city was insured under a general liability insurance policy”), with Cyr v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 188 Ga. App. 261, 261 ( 372 SE2d 659 ) (1988) (upholding grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when “[t]he appellants I did | not contend that the city had in force any policy of 2011Compare Brockman v. Burnette, 184 Ga. App. 66, 67 ( 360 SE2d 655 ) (1987) (reversing grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when it was “undisputed that at the time of the accident the city was insured under a general liability insurance policy”), with Cyr v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 188 Ga. App. 261, 261 ( 372 SE2d 659 ) (1988) (upholding grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when “[t]he appellants I did | not contend that the city had in force any policy of | 1 | 1 |
Brockman v. Burnettegreen2 sentences2011Compare Brockman v. Burnette, 184 Ga. App. 66, 67 ( 360 SE2d 655 ) (1987) (reversing grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when it was “undisputed that at the time of the accident the city was insured under a general liability insurance policy”), with Cyr v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 188 Ga. App. 261, 261 ( 372 SE2d 659 ) (1988) (upholding grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when “[t]he appellants I did | not contend that the city had in force any policy of 2011Compare Brockman v. Burnette, 184 Ga. App. 66, 67 ( 360 SE2d 655 ) (1987) (reversing grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when it was “undisputed that at the time of the accident the city was insured under a general liability insurance policy”), with Cyr v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 188 Ga. App. 261, 261 ( 372 SE2d 659 ) (1988) (upholding grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when “[t]he appellants I did | not contend that the city had in force any policy of | 1 | 1 |
Arthur v. City of Albanygreen2 sentences2011Compare Brockman v. Burnette, 184 Ga. App. 66, 67 ( 360 SE2d 655 ) (1987) (reversing grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when it was “undisputed that at the time of the accident the city was insured under a general liability insurance policy”), with Cyr v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 188 Ga. App. 261, 261 ( 372 SE2d 659 ) (1988) (upholding grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when “[t]he appellants I did | not contend that the city had in force any policy of 2011Compare Brockman v. Burnette, 184 Ga. App. 66, 67 ( 360 SE2d 655 ) (1987) (reversing grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when it was “undisputed that at the time of the accident the city was insured under a general liability insurance policy”), with Cyr v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 188 Ga. App. 261, 261 ( 372 SE2d 659 ) (1988) (upholding grant of summary judgment on claim of sovereign immunity under similar underlying factual circumstances when “[t]he appellants I did | not contend that the city had in force any policy of | 1 | 1 |
City of Lawrenceville v. MacKogreen2 sentences2006See OCGA § 36-33-1, which establishes that the sovereign immunity of municipal corporations is not waived “by the purchase of liability insurance unless the policy of insurance issued covers an occurrence for which the defense of sovereign immunity is available, and then only to the extent of the limits of such insurance policy.” (Punctuation omitted.) City of Lawrenceville v. Macko, 211 Ga. App. 312, 313-314 (1) ( 439 SE2d 95 ) (1993). 2006See OCGA § 36-33-1, which establishes that the sovereign immunity of municipal corporations is not waived “by the purchase of liability insurance unless the policy of insurance issued covers an occurrence for which the defense of sovereign immunity is available, and then only to the extent of the limits of such insurance policy.” (Punctuation omitted.) City of Lawrenceville v. Macko, 211 Ga. App. 312, 313-314 (1) ( 439 SE2d 95 ) (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Woodard v. Laurens Countygreen2 sentences2003A municipal corporation shall not waive its immunity by the purchase of liability insurance, except as provided in Code Section 33-24-51, 3 or unless the policy of insurance issued covers an occurrence for which the defense of sovereign immunity is available, and then only to the extent of the limits of such insurance policy. 4 Thus, as we have previously stated, any “waiver of sovereign immunity is a mere privilege, not a right, and the extension of that privilege is solely a matter of legislative grace. [Cit.]” Woodard v. Laurens County, 265 Ga. 404, 406 (1) ( 456 SE2d 581 ) (1995). 2003A municipal corporation shall not waive its immunity by the purchase of liability insurance, except as provided in Code Section 33-24-51, 3 or unless the policy of insurance issued covers an occurrence for which the defense of sovereign immunity is available, and then only to the extent of the limits of such insurance policy. 4 Thus, as we have previously stated, any “waiver of sovereign immunity is a mere privilege, not a right, and the extension of that privilege is solely a matter of legislative grace. [Cit.]” Woodard v. Laurens County, 265 Ga. 404, 406 (1) ( 456 SE2d 581 ) (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Mahlay v. Stategreen1 sentence1940In Welborn v. State, 116 Ga. 522, 524 ( 42 S. E. 773 ), it was said: “No evidence was had as to any criminal assault save that which was included in the commission of the rape.” In Rich v. State, 33 Ga. App. 153 ( 126 S. E. 154 ), it was said: “Though the person outraged swears that the crime of rape was actually committed by the prisoner, yet where an attempt is made to impeach her testimony, and her age and the circumstances surrounding the criminal act render her testimony on this subject doubtful, the jury may disregard it and find the accused guilty of an assault with intent to rape, ther | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ricks v. State
green
2 sentences2021See also UAP Rule I (A) (2) (stating that one of the purposes of the UAP is “[m]inimizing the occurrence of error and correcting as promptly as possible any error that nonetheless may occur”); Ricks, 301 Ga. at 194 n.22 (stating that the purpose of interim review is “to avoid even arguably reversible errors in death penalty trials”). 6 Sinkfield’s enumeration of error fails because even if Fulton County’s 2015 master jury list violated the JCR (an issue we need not decide here), he has not shown that he is entitled to a reversal of his convictions. 2021See also UAP Rule I (A) (2) (stating that one of the purposes of the UAP is “[m]inimizing the occurrence of error and correcting as promptly as possible any error that nonetheless may occur”); Ricks, 301 Ga. at 193 n.22 (stating that the purpose of interim review is “to avoid even arguably reversible errors in death penalty trials”). 6 Sinkfield’s enumeration of error fails because even if Fulton County’s 2015 master jury list violated the JCR (an issue we need not decide here), he has not shown that he is entitled to a reversal of his convictions. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Mayor of Savannah v. Jones
green
1 sentence2015See Koehler v. Massell, 229 Ga. 359, 361-362 (3) ( 191 SE2d 830 ) (1972); Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah v. Jones, 149 Ga. 139, 141-142 ( 99 SE 294 ) (1919); Wright v. City Council of Augusta, 78 Ga. 241, 243-244 (1886). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Godfrey v. Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency
green
1 sentence2015For example, in the context of tort liability, OCGA § 36-33-1 (a) provides a narrow waiver of a municipality’s sovereign immunity by the purchase of liability insurance.2 CSX Transp., 277 Ga. at 249-250 ; Godfrey, 290 Ga. at 214 . 2 A “municipal corporation shall not waive its immunity by the purchase of liability insurance, except as provided in Code Section 33-24-51 or 36-92-2 or unless the policy of insurance issued covers an occurrence for which the defense of 5 Moreover, OCGA § 36-33-1 (b) also provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity as follows: “Municipal corporations shall not b | 1 | 2015–2015 |
City of Atlanta v. Mitcham
green
1 sentence2015For neglect to perform or improper or unskillful performance of their ministerial duties, they shall be liable.” As currently set forth in OCGA § 36-33-1 (b), “[t]his provision has for more than a century been interpreted to mean that municipal corporations are immune from liability for acts taken in performance of a governmental function but may be liable for the negligent performance of their ministerial duties.” Mitcham, 296 Ga. at 577 - 578. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
SOUTHEASTERN EXP. SYS. v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co. of Georgia
green
1 sentence2007Id. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Janice Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund, L.P
green
1 sentence1996Rodgers argues an exception to the two-year limit was permitted in Silverman v. Eastrich Multiple Investor Fund, L.P., 51 F3d 28 (3rd Cir. 1995) (holding exception to two-year statute of limitation possible where guarantor spouse raises violation of the ECOA at her first opportunity as defense to recoupment). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Gaynok v. Travelers Insurance
green
2 sentences1979Co., 12 Ga. App. 601 (4) ( 77 SE 1072 ) (1912). (b) In such a clause the term "uninsured automobile” means one as to which there is no insurance applicable under the facts surrounding the occurrence on which the claim is made. 1979Co., 12 Ga. App. 601 (4) ( 77 SE 1072 ) (1912). (b) In such a clause the term "uninsured automobile" means one as to which there is no insurance applicable under the facts surrounding the occurrence on which the claim is made. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
West v. Winston
green
1 sentence1950Suit to recover such amount may be brought in any Federal, State, or Territorial court of competent jurisdiction within one year after the date of such violation.” In West v. Winston, and Elliott v. Winston, 8 F.R.D. 311 , it was held that, “Before a defendant can be held liable for treble damages, he must be given an opportunity to prove ‘that “the violation . . was neither wilful nor the result of failure to take practicable precautions against the occurrence of the violation.” ’ ” We think that this is the only interpretation of this section reasonably permissible, and that, as applied to t | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Lightbody v. Russell
green
2 sentences1946In Lightbody v. Russell, 293 N. Y. 492 ( 58 N. E. 2d, 508 ), it is stated, and we think correctly: “The statute gives plaintiffs a cause of action in the circumstances set forth in the complaint only where the commodity is sold at a price in excess of the prescribed ceiling or maximum price and purchased by them ‘for use or consumption other than in the course of trade or business/ They can not bring the suit or successfully maintain a cause of action unless they allege and prove that they purchased the tractor for use or consumption other than in the *534 course of their trade or business. 1946In Lightbody v. Russell, 293 N. Y. 492 ( 58 N. E. 2d, 508 ), it is stated, and we think correctly: “The statute gives plaintiffs a cause of action in the circumstances set forth in the complaint only where the commodity is sold at a price in excess of the prescribed ceiling or maximum price and purchased by them ‘for use or consumption other than in the course of trade or business/ They can not bring the suit or successfully maintain a cause of action unless they allege and prove that they purchased the tractor for use or consumption other than in the *534 course of their trade or business. | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Welborn v. State
green
1 sentence1940In Welborn v. State, 116 Ga. 522, 524 ( 42 S. E. 773 ), it was said: “No evidence was had as to any criminal assault save that which was included in the commission of the rape.” In Rich v. State, 33 Ga. App. 153 ( 126 S. E. 154 ), it was said: “Though the person outraged swears that the crime of rape was actually committed by the prisoner, yet where an attempt is made to impeach her testimony, and her age and the circumstances surrounding the criminal act render her testimony on this subject doubtful, the jury may disregard it and find the accused guilty of an assault with intent to rape, ther | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Rich v. State
neutral
2 sentences1940In Welborn v. State, 116 Ga. 522, 524 ( 42 S. E. 773 ), it was said: “No evidence was had as to any criminal assault save that which was included in the commission of the rape.” In Rich v. State, 33 Ga. App. 153 ( 126 S. E. 154 ), it was said: “Though the person outraged swears that the crime of rape was actually committed by the prisoner, yet where an attempt is made to impeach her testimony, and her age and the circumstances surrounding the criminal act render her testimony on this subject doubtful, the jury may disregard it and find the accused guilty of an assault with intent to rape, ther 1940In Welborn v. State, 116 Ga. 522, 524 ( 42 S. E. 773 ), it was said: “No evidence was had as to any criminal assault save that which was included in the commission of the rape.” In Rich v. State, 33 Ga. App. 153 ( 126 S. E. 154 ), it was said: “Though the person outraged swears that the crime of rape was actually committed by the prisoner, yet where an attempt is made to impeach her testimony, and her age and the circumstances surrounding the criminal act render her testimony on this subject doubtful, the jury may disregard it and find the accused guilty of an assault with intent to rape, ther | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.