16 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Havens v. Ritcheygreen2 sentences1997In Havens v. Ritchey, 582 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ind.1991), our supreme court noted that "Indiana courts have previously acknowledged the inherent harshness of the occurrence rule on certain plaintiffs, but have found the rule to be reasonable in light of other policies intended to be furthered by the rule." If two years is no longer a reasonable time for the bringing of a medical malpractice action, see Bunker, supra, the legislature, not the court of appeals, needs to re-visit the rule. 1997In Havens v. Ritchey, 582 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ind.1991), our supreme court noted that “Indiana courts have previously acknowledged the inherent harshness of the occurrence rule on certain plaintiffs, but have found the rule to be reasonable in light of other policies intended to be furthered by the rule.” If two years is no longer a reasonable time for the bringing of a medical malpractice action, see Bunker, supra, the legislature, not the court of appeals, needs to revisit the rule. | 2 | 3 |
Rohrabaugh Ex Rel. Cross v. Wagonergreen2 sentences1995See, e.g., Havens v. Ritchey (1991), Ind., 582 N.E.2d 792, 795 ("inherent harshness of the occurrence rule on certain plaintiffs"); Rohrabaugh v. Wagoner (1980), Ind., 413 N.E.2d 891, 895 ("no doubt that this measure is a stern one and will have harsh application in individual cases"). 1991See Rohrabaugh, 274 Ind. 661 , 413 N.E.2d 891 ; Jones v. Cloyd (1989), Ind.App., 534 N.E.2d 257 . | 2 | 3 |
Alwood v. Davisgreen2 sentences1997Indeed, over a decade ago, a panel of this court considered the large number of plaintiffs left without a remedy under the occur rence-based statute of limitations and said, “[w]e have not though, ruled out the possibility of deciding in a future case that this occurrence rule must be applied as though it was a discovery rule due to the questionable constitutionality of the occurrence rule.” Atwood v. Davis, 411 N.E.2d 759, 761 (Ind.Ct. 1997But see Alwood v. Davis (1980) Ind.App., 411 N.E.2d 759, 761 (“We have not though, ruled out the possibility of deciding in a future case that this occurrence rule must be applied as though it was a discovery rule due to the questionable constitutionality of the occurrence rule.”) It may well be that our Supreme Court should and will revisit the issues presented both by this ease and by Martin v. Richey, supra. Until such time, however, the latitude afforded such policy determinations by the legislature or by administrative rules or regulations must receive our deference. | 1 | 5 |
Cinergy Corp. v. Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services, Ltd.green2 sentences2012The court discerned “no ambiguity here that would permit the occurrence requirement reasonably to be understood to allow coverage for damages in the form of installation costs for government-mandated equipment intended to reduce future emissions of pollutants and to prevent future environmental harm.” Id. 2012The court discerned “no ambiguity here that would permit the occurrence requirement reasonably to be understood to allow coverage for damages in the form of installation costs for government-mandated equipment intended to reduce future emissions of pollutants and to prevent future environmental harm.” Id. | 1 | 3 |
Woodson v. Stategreen1 sentence2017“The State need not present separate proof of impairment of action, impairment of thought, and loss of control of faculties to establish an individual’s intoxication.” Woodson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 135, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alwood v. Davisgreen2 sentences1997Indeed, over a decade ago, a panel of this court considered the large number of plaintiffs left without a remedy under the occur rence-based statute of limitations and said, “[w]e have not though, ruled out the possibility of deciding in a future case that this occurrence rule must be applied as though it was a discovery rule due to the questionable constitutionality of the occurrence rule.” Atwood v. Davis, 411 N.E.2d 759, 761 (Ind.Ct. 1997But see Alwood v. Davis (1980) Ind.App., 411 N.E.2d 759, 761 (“We have not though, ruled out the possibility of deciding in a future case that this occurrence rule must be applied as though it was a discovery rule due to the questionable constitutionality of the occurrence rule.”) It may well be that our Supreme Court should and will revisit the issues presented both by this ease and by Martin v. Richey, supra. Until such time, however, the latitude afforded such policy determinations by the legislature or by administrative rules or regulations must receive our deference. | 1 | 5 |
Martin v. Richeygreen2 sentences1997But see Alwood v. Davis (1980) Ind.App., 411 N.E.2d 759, 761 ("We have not though, ruled out the possibility of deciding in a future case that this occurrence rule must be applied as though it was a discovery rule due to the questionable constitutionality of the occurrence rule.") It may well be that our Supreme Court should and will revisit the issues presented both by this case and by Martin v. Richey, supra . 1997But see Alwood v. Davis (1980) Ind.App., 411 N.E.2d 759, 761 (“We have not though, ruled out the possibility of deciding in a future case that this occurrence rule must be applied as though it was a discovery rule due to the questionable constitutionality of the occurrence rule.”) It may well be that our Supreme Court should and will revisit the issues presented both by this ease and by Martin v. Richey, supra. Until such time, however, the latitude afforded such policy determinations by the legislature or by administrative rules or regulations must receive our deference. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. State
green
1 sentence2017Id. [13] The offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated is governed by Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2 , which provides that “a person who operates a vehicle while intoxicated commits a Class C misdemeanor.” Ind. Code § 9-30-5-3 (a)(1) provides that a person who violates section 1 or 2 of this chapter commits a Level 6 felony if . . . the person has a previous conviction of operating while intoxicated that occurred within the five (5) years immediately preceding the occurrence of the violation of section 1 or 2 of this chapter[.] “Intoxicated” means under the influence of alcohol, a controlled subs | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Fought v. State
green
1 sentence2015Id. [11] The offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated is governed by Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2 , which provides that “a person who operates a vehicle while intoxicated commits a Class C misdemeanor.” At the time of the offense, Ind. Code § 9-30-5-32 provided that a person who violates Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2 commits a class D felony if the person has a prior conviction of operating while intoxicated that occurred within five years immediately preceding the occurrence of the violation of Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Bunker v. National Gypsum Co.
green
2 sentences1997In Havens v. Ritchey, 582 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ind.1991), our supreme court noted that "Indiana courts have previously acknowledged the inherent harshness of the occurrence rule on certain plaintiffs, but have found the rule to be reasonable in light of other policies intended to be furthered by the rule." If two years is no longer a reasonable time for the bringing of a medical malpractice action, see Bunker, supra, the legislature, not the court of appeals, needs to re-visit the rule. 1997In Havens v. Ritchey, 582 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ind.1991), our supreme court noted that “Indiana courts have previously acknowledged the inherent harshness of the occurrence rule on certain plaintiffs, but have found the rule to be reasonable in light of other policies intended to be furthered by the rule.” If two years is no longer a reasonable time for the bringing of a medical malpractice action, see Bunker, supra, the legislature, not the court of appeals, needs to revisit the rule. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Wehling v. Citizens National Bank
green
1 sentence1992Bank (1992), Ind., 586 N.E.2d 840 , in which our supreme court held that a merged discovery and ascertainment rule applies in all tort claims, the occurrence rule continues to apply in medical malpractice claims. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Jones v. Cloyd
green
1 sentence1991See Rohrabaugh, 274 Ind. 661 , 413 N.E.2d 891 ; Jones v. Cloyd (1989), Ind.App., 534 N.E.2d 257 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Martin v. Rinck
green
1 sentence1989Martin v. Rinck (1986), Ind. App., 501 N.E.2d 1086 ; Colbert v. Waitt, supra ; Frady v. Hedgcock (1986), Ind. App., 497 N.E.2d 620, 622 , trans. denied. *260 Moreover, our courts have acknowledged the inherent harshness of such an occurrence rule on certain plaintiffs but have found the rule to be reasonable in light of other policies intended to be furthered by it. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Corbert v. Waitt
green
1 sentence1989Martin v. Rinck (1986), Ind. App., 501 N.E.2d 1086 ; Colbert v. Waitt, supra ; Frady v. Hedgcock (1986), Ind. App., 497 N.E.2d 620, 622 , trans. denied. *260 Moreover, our courts have acknowledged the inherent harshness of such an occurrence rule on certain plaintiffs but have found the rule to be reasonable in light of other policies intended to be furthered by it. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Frady v. Hedgcock
green
1 sentence1989Martin v. Rinck (1986), Ind. App., 501 N.E.2d 1086 ; Colbert v. Waitt, supra ; Frady v. Hedgcock (1986), Ind. App., 497 N.E.2d 620, 622 , trans. denied. *260 Moreover, our courts have acknowledged the inherent harshness of such an occurrence rule on certain plaintiffs but have found the rule to be reasonable in light of other policies intended to be furthered by it. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Guy v. SCHULDT
green
2 sentences1985Guy v. Schuldt (1956), 236 Ind. 101 , 188 N.E.2d 891 ; Conard v. Waugh (1985), Ind.App., 474 N.E.2d 180 ; Spoljaric v. Pangan (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 37 . 1985Guy v. Schuldt (1956), 236 Ind. 101 , 138 N.E.2d 891 ; Conard v. Waugh (1985), Ind. App., 474 N.E.2d 130 ; Spoljaric v. Pangan (1984), Ind. App., 466 N.E.2d 37 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Spoljaric v. Pangan
green
2 sentences1985Guy v. Schuldt (1956), 236 Ind. 101 , 188 N.E.2d 891 ; Conard v. Waugh (1985), Ind.App., 474 N.E.2d 180 ; Spoljaric v. Pangan (1984), Ind.App., 466 N.E.2d 37 . 1985Guy v. Schuldt (1956), 236 Ind. 101 , 138 N.E.2d 891 ; Conard v. Waugh (1985), Ind. App., 474 N.E.2d 130 ; Spoljaric v. Pangan (1984), Ind. App., 466 N.E.2d 37 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Conard v. Waugh
green
1 sentence1985Guy v. Schuldt (1956), 236 Ind. 101 , 138 N.E.2d 891 ; Conard v. Waugh (1985), Ind. App., 474 N.E.2d 130 ; Spoljaric v. Pangan (1984), Ind. App., 466 N.E.2d 37 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Ayers v. Morgan
green
2 sentences1983Our supreme court in Chaffin v. Nicosia, (1974) 261 Ind. 698, 702 , 310 N.E.2d 867, 870 , in holding that the statute granting minors until two years after attaining majority to institute actions controlled over the two years from the act, neglect, or omission provision of IC 34-4-19-1 (the 1941 act) 4 observed, quoting from Ayers v. Morgan, (1959) 397 Pa. 282 , 154 A.2d 788 , “it would be illogical and unintelligent to say that a person who does not know, and cannot know ... would be denied damages because his claim was filed, due to delay in learning . .. more than two years after the operat 1983Our supreme court in Chaffin v. Nicosia, (1974) 261 Ind. 698, 702 , 310 N.E.2d 867, 870 , in holding that the statute granting minors until two years after attaining majority to institute actions controlled over the two years from the act, neglect, or omission provision of IC 34-4-19-1 (the 1941 act) 4 observed, quoting from Ayers v. Morgan, (1959) 397 Pa. 282 , 154 A.2d 788 , “it would be illogical and unintelligent to say that a person who does not know, and cannot know ... would be denied damages because his claim was filed, due to delay in learning . .. more than two years after the operat | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Adams v. Luros
green
1 sentence1983In Adams v. Luros, (1980) Ind.App., 406 N.E.2d 1199 , the plaintiff saw the physician in January 1973 for back pain and partial paralysis of the leg. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Chaffin v. Nicosia
green
2 sentences1983Our supreme court in Chaffin v. Nicosia, (1974) 261 Ind. 698, 702 , 310 N.E.2d 867, 870 , in holding that the statute granting minors until two years after attaining majority to institute actions controlled over the two years from the act, neglect, or omission provision of IC 34-4-19-1 (the 1941 act) 4 observed, quoting from Ayers v. Morgan, (1959) 397 Pa. 282 , 154 A.2d 788 , “it would be illogical and unintelligent to say that a person who does not know, and cannot know ... would be denied damages because his claim was filed, due to delay in learning . .. more than two years after the operat 1983Our supreme court in Chaffin v. Nicosia, (1974) 261 Ind. 698, 702 , 310 N.E.2d 867, 870 , in holding that the statute granting minors until two years after attaining majority to institute actions controlled over the two years from the act, neglect, or omission provision of IC 34-4-19-1 (the 1941 act) 4 observed, quoting from Ayers v. Morgan, (1959) 397 Pa. 282 , 154 A.2d 788 , “it would be illogical and unintelligent to say that a person who does not know, and cannot know ... would be denied damages because his claim was filed, due to delay in learning . .. more than two years after the operat | 1 | 1983–1983 |
City of Fort Wayne v. Cameron
green
2 sentences1980Later, in City of Fort Wayne v. Cameron, (1977) 267 Ind. 329 , 370 N.E.2d 338 , the Supreme Court refused to strictly apply an occurrence rule in a situation analogous to this case. 1980Later, in City of Fort Wayne v. Cameron, (1977) 267 Ind. 329 , 370 N.E.2d 338 , the Supreme Court refused to strictly apply an occurrence rule in a situation analogous to this case. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Thompson
green
1 sentence1979We think that our recent decision in State v. Thompson, (1979) Ind.App., 385 N.E.2d 198 , is likewise distinguishable where this court held that the provisions of Ind.Code 34-4-16.5-4, which would have limited recovery to $300,000 in Thompson , were inapplicable to a judgment on a jury verdict rendered after the effective date of the Act. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.