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13 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cummings v. X-Ray Associates of New Mexico, P. C.green2 sentences2013A statute of repose runs from a statutorily determined triggering event. 1996-NMSC-035 , ¶¶ 49-50, 121 N.M. 821 , 918 P.2d 1321 (citations omitted). {7} Furthermore, our courts have consistently held that “[t]he triggering event of Section 41-5-13 is determined by the occurrence rule. 2013A statute of repose runs from a statutorily determined triggering event. 1996-NMSC-035 , ¶¶ 49-50, 121 N.M. 821 , 918 P.2d 1321 (citations omitted). {7} Furthermore, our courts have consistently held that “[t]he triggering event of Section 41-5-13 is determined by the occurrence rule. | 4 | 9 |
Roberts v. Southwest Community Health Servicesgreen2 sentences2005The Court noted that “New Mexico appellate courts have consistently construed Section 41-5-13 according to its plain meaning as an occurrence rule.” • Id. ¶ 51 (relying on Roberts, 114 N.M. at 250 , 837 P.2d at 444 , Irvine v. St. 2005The Court noted that “New Mexico appellate courts have consistently construed Section 41-5-13 according to its plain meaning as an occurrence rule.” • Id. ¶ 51 (relying on Roberts, 114 N.M. at 250 , 837 P.2d at 444 , Irvine v. St. | 3 | 4 |
Keithley Ex Rel. Estate of Keithley v. St. Joseph's Hospitalgreen2 sentences2005Joseph Hosp., Inc., 102 N.M. 572 , 698 P.2d 442 (Ct.App.1984), Kern, 102 N.M. at 455, 697 P.2d at 138 , and Keithley v. St Joseph’s Hosp., 102 N.M. 565 , 698 P.2d 435 (Ct.App.1984)). 2005Joseph Hosp., Inc., 102 N.M. 572 , 698 P.2d 442 (Ct.App.1984), Kern, 102 N.M. at 455, 697 P.2d at 138 , and Keithley v. St Joseph’s Hosp., 102 N.M. 565 , 698 P.2d 435 (Ct.App.1984)). | 1 | 2 |
Textron, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.green1 sentence2012See, e.g., Textron, 754 A.2d at 752 (“Our examination of the pollution-exclusion clause’s drafting history . . . suggests that its original purpose-at least as the industry represented it to regulators-was to deny coverage to reckless or intentional polluters.”); Queen City Farms, 882 P.2d at 721-22 (“As reported in published decisions, representations were made to state insurance regulators that the pollution exclusion was intended to exclude coverage for intentional polluters and clarify the occurrence clause.”); Joy Techs., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. | 1 | 1 |
Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omahagreen1 sentence2012See, e.g., Textron, 754 A.2d at 752 (“Our examination of the pollution-exclusion clause’s drafting history . . . suggests that its original purpose-at least as the industry represented it to regulators-was to deny coverage to reckless or intentional polluters.”); Queen City Farms, 882 P.2d at 721-22 (“As reported in published decisions, representations were made to state insurance regulators that the pollution exclusion was intended to exclude coverage for intentional polluters and clarify the occurrence clause.”); Joy Techs., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. | 1 | 1 |
Maestas Ex Rel. Estate of Varela v. Zagergreen2 sentences2010See 5 Maestas, 2007-NMSC-003, ¶ 20 (explaining that (1) under the occurrence rule, 6 accrual hinges strictly on the date of the act of negligence; and (2) Peralta explicitly 7 held that the language “manifest and ascertainable” does not describe a discovery 8 rule). 9 In addition, the discovery rule is applied somewhat uniquely in personal injury 10 cases for medical malpractice (non MMA cases) based on policy considerations not 11 applicable to the case at bar. 2010See 5 Maestas, 2007-NMSC-003, ¶ 20 (explaining that (1) under the occurrence rule, 6 accrual hinges strictly on the date of the act of negligence; and (2) Peralta explicitly 7 held that the language “manifest and ascertainable” does not describe a discovery 8 rule). 9 In addition, the discovery rule is applied somewhat uniquely in personal injury 10 cases for medical malpractice (non MMA cases) based on policy considerations not 11 applicable to the case at bar. | 1 | 1 |
Bolden v. Village of Corralesgreen2 sentences2007This clear singular temporal focus is not present in Section 41-4-15(A). {13} Further, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Section 41^á-15(A) is an occurrence rule constitutes a deviation from our precedent, which has consistently stated that the TCA statute of limitations commences when an “injury manifests itself and is ascertainable, rather than when the wrongful or negligent act occurs.” Long v. Weaver, 105 N.M. 188, 191 , 730 P.2d 491, 494 (Ct.App.1986) (“We have recognized that under the Tort Claims Act the limitation period commences when an injury manifests itself and is ascertainabl 2007This clear singular temporal focus is not present in Section 41-4-15(A). {13} Further, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Section 41^á-15(A) is an occurrence rule constitutes a deviation from our precedent, which has consistently stated that the TCA statute of limitations commences when an “injury manifests itself and is ascertainable, rather than when the wrongful or negligent act occurs.” Long v. Weaver, 105 N.M. 188, 191 , 730 P.2d 491, 494 (Ct.App.1986) (“We have recognized that under the Tort Claims Act the limitation period commences when an injury manifests itself and is ascertainabl | 1 | 1 |
Emery Ex Rel. Emery v. University of New Mexico Medical Centergreen2 sentences2007This clear singular temporal focus is not present in Section 41-4-15(A). {13} Further, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Section 41^á-15(A) is an occurrence rule constitutes a deviation from our precedent, which has consistently stated that the TCA statute of limitations commences when an “injury manifests itself and is ascertainable, rather than when the wrongful or negligent act occurs.” Long v. Weaver, 105 N.M. 188, 191 , 730 P.2d 491, 494 (Ct.App.1986) (“We have recognized that under the Tort Claims Act the limitation period commences when an injury manifests itself and is ascertainabl 2007This clear singular temporal focus is not present in Section 41-4-15(A). {13} Further, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Section 41^á-15(A) is an occurrence rule constitutes a deviation from our precedent, which has consistently stated that the TCA statute of limitations commences when an “injury manifests itself and is ascertainable, rather than when the wrongful or negligent act occurs.” Long v. Weaver, 105 N.M. 188, 191 , 730 P.2d 491, 494 (Ct.App.1986) (“We have recognized that under the Tort Claims Act the limitation period commences when an injury manifests itself and is ascertainabl | 1 | 1 |
Peralta v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2007Therefore, our courts have consistently held that the limitations period runs not from the act of medical malpractice, but from the time when the resulting injury manifests itself in a physically objective manner and is ascertainable. {14} Our analysis next focuses on how to interpret the phrase “manifests itself in a physically objective manner and is ascertainable.” This language was first used by a New Mexico Court in Peralta v. Martinez, 90 N.M. 391, 394 , 564 P.2d 194, 197 (Ct.App.1977). 2007Therefore, our courts have consistently held that the limitations period runs not from the act of medical malpractice, but from the time when the resulting injury manifests itself in a physically objective manner and is ascertainable. {14} Our analysis next focuses on how to interpret the phrase “manifests itself in a physically objective manner and is ascertainable.” This language was first used by a New Mexico Court in Peralta v. Martinez, 90 N.M. 391, 394 , 564 P.2d 194, 197 (Ct.App.1977). | 1 | 1 |
Long v. Weavergreen2 sentences2007This clear singular temporal focus is not present in Section 41-4-15(A). {13} Further, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Section 41^á-15(A) is an occurrence rule constitutes a deviation from our precedent, which has consistently stated that the TCA statute of limitations commences when an “injury manifests itself and is ascertainable, rather than when the wrongful or negligent act occurs.” Long v. Weaver, 105 N.M. 188, 191 , 730 P.2d 491, 494 (Ct.App.1986) (“We have recognized that under the Tort Claims Act the limitation period commences when an injury manifests itself and is ascertainabl 2007This clear singular temporal focus is not present in Section 41-4-15(A). {13} Further, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Section 41^á-15(A) is an occurrence rule constitutes a deviation from our precedent, which has consistently stated that the TCA statute of limitations commences when an “injury manifests itself and is ascertainable, rather than when the wrongful or negligent act occurs.” Long v. Weaver, 105 N.M. 188, 191 , 730 P.2d 491, 494 (Ct.App.1986) (“We have recognized that under the Tort Claims Act the limitation period commences when an injury manifests itself and is ascertainabl | 1 | 1 |
Jaramillo v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Cummings held that Section 41-5-13 is an occurrence rule, not permitting a discovery rule exception, even though the result was "so harsh that the limitations period can run on a potential malpractice claim before the claim even comes into existence," and stating that "[c]ourts often point out that it is not their responsibility to inquire into the harshness of a legislative enactment, the strategy behind a legislative policy, or even the wisdom of a legislative solution to a particular problem." Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035 , ¶ 59, 121 N.M. 821 , 918 P.2d 1321 ; see also Jaramillo, 111 N.M. at 727 2005Cummings held that Section 41-5-13 is an occurrence rule, not permitting a discovery rule exception, even though the result was "so harsh that the limitations period can run on a potential malpractice claim before the claim even comes into existence," and stating that "[c]ourts often point out that it is not their responsibility to inquire into the harshness of a legislative enactment, the strategy behind a legislative policy, or even the wisdom of a legislative solution to a particular problem." Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035 , ¶ 59, 121 N.M. 821 , 918 P.2d 1321 ; see also Jaramillo, 111 N.M. at 727 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2005See Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035 , ¶¶ 50-51, 121 N.M. 821 , 918 P.2d 1321 ; see also State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 12 , 134 N.M. 172 , 74 P.3d 1064 ("The rule that statutes in pari materia should be construed together has the greatest probative force in the case of statutes relating to the same subject matter passed at the same session of the Legislature."). 2. 2005See Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035 , ¶¶ 50-51, 121 N.M. 821 , 918 P.2d 1321 ; see also State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 12 , 134 N.M. 172 , 74 P.3d 1064 ("The rule that statutes in pari materia should be construed together has the greatest probative force in the case of statutes relating to the same subject matter passed at the same session of the Legislature."). 2. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kern Ex Rel. Kern v. St. Joseph Hospital, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Joseph Hosp., Inc., 102 N.M. 572 , 698 P.2d 442 (Ct.App.1984), Kern, 102 N.M. at 455, 697 P.2d at 138 , and Keithley v. St Joseph’s Hosp., 102 N.M. 565 , 698 P.2d 435 (Ct.App.1984)). 2003Joseph Hosp., Inc., 102 N.M. 452 , 697 P.2d 135 (1985), a fraudulent concealment case, which permitted the plaintiffs claim filed after the three-year Section 41-5-13 deadline where the act of malpractice was fraudulently concealed for the full three-year period, and Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 1996-NMSC-035 , ¶ 40, 121 N.M. 821 , 918 P.2d 1321 , not a fraudulent concealment case, which barred the plaintiffs claim where the act of malpractice was discovered early in the Section 41-5-13 three-year period. | 2 | 2003–2005 |
Cobb v. State Canvassing Board
green
2 sentences2007Cobb, 2006-NMSC-034, ¶ 34 , 140 N.M. 77 , 140 P.3d 498 . 2007Cobb, 2006-NMSC-034, ¶ 34 , 140 N.M. 77 , 140 P.3d 498 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Maestas v. Zager
green
2 sentences2007Another way of framing this ambiguity is whether the statute of limitations under the TCA constitutes an occurrence rule running from the act of malpractice or a discovery rule that accrues when a plaintiff has discovered the relevant facts to establish a legal cause of action. {11} In its opinion, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the plain language of Section 41-4-15(A) should be interpreted as an occurrence rule, accruing from the date of the act of malpractice, because “the temporal focus of Section 41-4-15(A) seems to be on the date of the occurrence rather than the loss, injury, or deat 2007Another way of framing this ambiguity is whether the statute of limitations under the TCA constitutes an occurrence rule running from the act of malpractice or a discovery rule that accrues when a plaintiff has discovered the relevant facts to establish a legal cause of action. {11} In its opinion, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the plain language of Section 41-4-15(A) should be interpreted as an occurrence rule, accruing from the date of the act of malpractice, because “the temporal focus of Section 41-4-15(A) seems to be on the date of the occurrence rather than the loss, injury, or deat | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Roybal v. White
green
2 sentences2005Roybal determined in 1963 that under the general statute of limitations for personal injuries, then Section 23-1-8, "a cause of action... accrues at the time of the wrongful act causing the injury." Roybal, 72 N.M. at 287 , 383 P.2d at 252 . 2005Roybal determined in 1963 that under the general statute of limitations for personal injuries, then Section 23-1-8, "a cause of action... accrues at the time of the wrongful act causing the injury." Roybal, 72 N.M. at 287 , 383 P.2d at 252 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Irvine v. St. Joseph Hospital, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Joseph Hosp., Inc., 102 N.M. 572 , 698 P.2d 442 (Ct.App.1984), Kern, 102 N.M. at 455, 697 P.2d at 138 , and Keithley v. St Joseph’s Hosp., 102 N.M. 565 , 698 P.2d 435 (Ct.App.1984)). 2005Joseph Hosp., Inc., 102 N.M. 572 , 698 P.2d 442 (Ct.App.1984), Kern, 102 N.M. at 455, 697 P.2d at 138 , and Keithley v. St Joseph’s Hosp., 102 N.M. 565 , 698 P.2d 435 (Ct.App.1984)). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Garcia on Behalf of Garcia v. La Farge
green
1 sentence2003Cummings, 1996—NMSC-035, ¶ 50, 121 N.M. 821 , 918 P.2d 1321 . {16} La Farge states: “Because equity tolls [Section 41-5-13], it does so only as long as the patient is not guilty of failing to exercise ordinary diligence in pursuit of a cause of action.” Id. at 536, 893 P.2d at 432 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Seevers v. Potter
green
1 sentence1997Plaintiff claims that adopting the Gebhardt rule would be wrong for New Mexico because it was based, both in Michigan and elsewhere, see Seevers, 537 N.W.2d at 511 , on an occurrence rule for limitation of actions, which New Mexico does not follow. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.