continued detention hearing in Illinois

2026Burries, 2025 IL App (5th) 241033 , ¶ 20; Walton, 2024 IL App (4th) 240541, ¶¶ 24-29 (establishing that, to obtain release at a continued detention hearing, the defendant must present some new information or change in circumstance).

2025Thomas, 2024 IL App (1st) 240479, ¶ 14 ; see People v. Walton, 2024 IL App (4th) 240541, ¶ 29 (“If a court has found that a defendant qualifies for detention and no new information or change in circumstances is presented, it makes little sense to think that court would reverse its prior ruling for no particular reason.”).

2026Hongo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232482, ¶¶ 9, 14, 25-26 ; Casey, 2024 IL App (3d) 230568 , ¶¶ 6, 13.

2025Thomas, 2025 IL App (1st) 250251-U, ¶ 25 . “ ‘Although this determination necessarily entails consideration of the threat or flight risk posed by a defendant and the potential mitigation of such threat or flight risk by conditions of release, the [statute] does not require the court to again make specific findings that the State proved the three propositions by clear and convincing evidence as required at the initial hearing.’ ” Hongo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232482, ¶ 22 (quoting People v. Casey, 2024 IL App (3d) 230568 , ¶ 13). ¶ 47 While the State is not required to repeatedly prove by clear and

2026Its decision to do so, while unnecessary, is not problematic, as the finding required during a continued detention hearing “is effectively subsumed by the elements the State must prove at [an initial] detention hearing.” People v. Thomas, 2024 IL App (1st) 240479, ¶ 13 ; see People v. Mansoori, 2024 IL App (1st) 232351, ¶ 51 (Reyes, P.J., dissenting).

2025Instead, as required by section 110-6.1(i-5), the finding at a continued detention hearing is “a less demanding standard than what is required at the detention hearing, though both are concerned with fundamentally the same question.” People v. Thomas, 2024 IL App (1st) 240479, ¶ 14 .

2025The finding, as required by section 110-6.1(i- 5), is “a less demanding standard than what is required at the detention hearing, though both are concerned with fundamentally the same question.” Id. ¶ 22 Under the recent Supreme Court decision in People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626 , “when the parties to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer, the reviewing court is not bound by the circuit court’s factual findings and may therefore conduct its own independent de novo review of the proffered evidence and evidence otherwise documentary in nature.” People v. -5- No. 1-24-2240B Morgan

2025See id. ¶ 23 We must note that the trial court did not follow proper procedures in addressing defendant’s “motion for pretrial release.” Instead of applying section 110-6.1(i-5) to determine whether continued detention was necessary to avoid a safety threat or prevent willful flight, the court made findings regarding the three elements required for an initial detention hearing.

2026See Post, 2025 IL App (4th) 250598, ¶ 25 .

2026Its decision to do so, while unnecessary, is not problematic, as the finding required during a continued detention hearing “is effectively subsumed by the elements the State must prove at [an initial] detention hearing.” People v. Thomas, 2024 IL App (1st) 240479, ¶ 13 ; see People v. Mansoori, 2024 IL App (1st) 232351, ¶ 51 (Reyes, P.J., dissenting).

2026Its decision to do so, while unnecessary, is not problematic, as the finding required during a continued detention hearing “is effectively subsumed by the elements the State must prove at [an initial] detention hearing.” People v. Thomas, 2024 IL App (1st) 240479, ¶ 13 ; see People v. Mansoori, 2024 IL App (1st) 232351, ¶ 51 (Reyes, P.J., dissenting).

2025See People v. Milner, 2024 IL App (1st) 241284, ¶ 37 (in construing a different section of the Pretrial Fairness Act, observing that the words “ ‘if any’ ” when referencing conditions of release make clear that one possible result is that no such conditions of release exist); People v. Watkins-Romaine, 2025 IL 130618, ¶ 40 (citing Milner with approval).

2025See People v. Milner, 2024 IL App (1st) 241284, ¶ 37 (in construing a different section of the Pretrial Fairness Act, observing that the words “ ‘if any’ ” when referencing conditions of release make clear that one possible result is that no such conditions of release exist); People v. Watkins-Romaine, 2025 IL 130618, ¶ 40 (citing Milner with approval).

2024People v. Shockley, 2024 IL App (5th) 240041, ¶ 11 ; People v. Barber, 381 Ill.

2024See Castillo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232315, ¶ 18 (“An abuse of discretion occurs where the circuit court’s decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or fanciful or where no reasonable person would have taken the position adopted by the circuit court.”). ¶ 52 Davis’s procedural claim against the less restrictive conditions finding at the continued detention hearing is that the circuit court again did not create a sufficient record per Stock, as it only repeated the underlying allegations against him.