defense of absolute privilege in Illinois

1998App. 495 , 23 N.E.2d 180 (1939)), to out-of-court communications between attorney and client related to pending litigation (Weller v. Stern, 67 Ill.

1997App. 495 , 23 N.E.2d 180 (1939)), to out-of-court communications between attorney and client related to pending litigation ( Weiler v. Stern , 67 Ill.

1998The defense of absolute privilege in a defamation action involving statements made by an attorney is set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 (1977) (Restatement) and provides as follows: “An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding.” The privilege extends to out-of-court communications between opposing coun

1997The defense of absolute privilege in a defamation action involving statements made by an attorney is set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 586 (1977) (Restatement) and provides as follows: "An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding." The privilege extends to out-of-court communications between opposing cou

1993App. 3d 936, 942 , 568 N.E.2d 513 , 516-17: “A communication is absolutely privileged when its propagation is so much in the public interest that the publisher should speak fully and fearlessly. [Citation.] As a matter of public policy certain types of defamatory statements are deemed privileged so that the person making the statement will not be deterred from speaking by the threat of civil liability. [Citation.] *** The defense of absolute privilege has been described as resting upon the idea that conduct which otherwise would be actionable is to escape liability because the defendant is act

1991App. 3d 652 , 490 N.E.2d 1062 .) The defense of absolute privilege has been described as resting upon the idea that conduct which otherwise would be actionable is to escape liability because the defendant is acting in furtherance of some interest of social importance that is entitled to protection even at the expense of uncompensated harm to the plaintiff’s reputation.

2014Id. at 836 .

2014Id.

1993App. 3d 936, 942 , 568 N.E.2d 513 , 516-17: “A communication is absolutely privileged when its propagation is so much in the public interest that the publisher should speak fully and fearlessly. [Citation.] As a matter of public policy certain types of defamatory statements are deemed privileged so that the person making the statement will not be deterred from speaking by the threat of civil liability. [Citation.] *** The defense of absolute privilege has been described as resting upon the idea that conduct which otherwise would be actionable is to escape liability because the defendant is act

1993App. 3d 652, 657 , 490 N.E.2d 1062, 1065 ), the absolute privilege has been recognized in giving statements to county boards, Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commissions, chief judges of the circuit court (see Weber, 209 Ill.

1992Ed. 2d 586 , 111 S. Ct. 2513 , the defense of absolute privilege is, barred because of the separation agreement.

1990App. 3d 417 , 495 N.E.2d 1159 , where the court held that the supervisors of a State employee, including the Attorney General, have a defense of absolute immunity from a claim for retaliatory discharge.

1986In a case analogous to the present one, Du Busk v. Harvin (5th Cir. 1954), 212 F.2d 143 , it was held that the absolute-immunity doctrine barred the plaintiff’s retaliatory-discharge claim where the plaintiff alleged that his governmental supervisors “deliberately set snares for him in their malicious efforts to concoct charges” to terminate his employment. ( 212 F.2d 143, 144 .) In dismissing the suit, the court noted the following rationale for the absolute immunity defense: “to protect public officials from undue harassment by civil litigation for acts committed by law to their control or s

1986In a case analogous to the present one, Du Busk v. Harvin (5th Cir. 1954), 212 F.2d 143 , it was held that the absolute-immunity doctrine barred the plaintiff’s retaliatory-discharge claim where the plaintiff alleged that his governmental supervisors “deliberately set snares for him in their malicious efforts to concoct charges” to terminate his employment. ( 212 F.2d 143, 144 .) In dismissing the suit, the court noted the following rationale for the absolute immunity defense: “to protect public officials from undue harassment by civil litigation for acts committed by law to their control or s

1986We also note that the Seventh Circuit, in effect, applied an absolute-immunity privilege to an action involving the allegedly wrongful dismissal of an assistant State’s Attorney in Livas v. Petka (7th Cir. 1983), 711 F.2d 798 .

1984(Richardson v. Dunbar (1981), 95 Ill.

1984App. 340, 346 , 18 N.E.2d 709, 712 .) The defense of absolute privilege has been described as resting upon the idea “that conduct which otherwise would be actionable is to escape liability because the defendant is acting in furtherance of some interest of social importance, which is entitled to protection even at the expense of uncompensated harm to the plaintiff’s reputation.” (Prosser, Torts sec. 114, at 776 (4th ed. 1971).) Whether a tribunal is quasi-judicial depends upon the facts of each case and whether at the time in question the tribunal is performing a quasi-judicial function.