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18 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Herrongreen2 sentences2010“This so-called disjunctive test does not offer two divergent interpretations of plain error, but instead two different ways to ensure the same thing — namely, a fair trial.” Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 179 . 2010"This so-called disjunctive test does not offer two divergent interpretations of plain error, but instead two different ways to ensure the same thing--namely, a fair trial." Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 179 . | 3 | 11 |
People v. Carlsongreen2 sentences2008Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177-79 , 830 N.E.2d at 475 ; People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576-77 , 404 N.E.2d 233, 238 (1980). 2008Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177-79 , 830 N.E.2d at 475 ; People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576-77 , 404 N.E.2d 233, 238 (1980). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Browngreen2 sentences2006First, where the evidence in a case is so closely balanced that the jury’s guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and not the evidence, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error in order to preclude an argument that an innocent person was wrongly convicted. [Citation.] Second, where the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, and thus a fair trial, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error in order to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. [Citations.] This so-called disjunctive test does not offer two divergent interpretations of 2006First, where the evidence in a case is so closely balanced that the jury's guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and not the evidence, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error in order to preclude an argument that an innocent person was wrongly convicted. [Citation.] Second, where the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, and thus a fair trial, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error in order to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. [Citations.] This so-called disjunctive test does not offer two divergent interpretations of | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hudsongreen2 sentences2008People v. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d 181, 191 , 886 N.E.2d 964, 971 (2008). 2008People v. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d 181, 191 , 886 N.E.2d 964, 971 (2008). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Doss
green
2 sentences2007The defendant argues that we should follow People v. Doss, 347 Ill. 2007The defendant argues that we should follow People v. Doss, 347 Ill. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
United States v. Olano
green
2 sentences2005The State asks us to abandon the disjunctive test in favor of the four-part federal test outlined in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 , 123 L. 2005The State asks us to abandon the disjunctive test in favor of the four-part federal test outlined in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 , 123 L. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Cotton
green
2 sentences2005Ed. 2d at 868 , 122 S. Ct. at 1785 . 1 The State asserts that in People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352 (2003), and People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335 (2001), this court adopted the federal test, but inexplicably-retreated to the disjunctive test in later cases. 2005Ed. 2d at 868 , 122 S. Ct. at 1785 . (footnote: 1) The State asserts that in People v. Thurow , 203 Ill. 2d 352 (2003), and People v. Crespo , 203 Ill. 2d 335 (2001), this court adopted the federal test, but inexplicably retreated to the disjunctive test in later cases. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Thurow
green
2 sentences2005Ed. 2d at 868 , 122 S. Ct. at 1785 . 1 The State asserts that in People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352 (2003), and People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335 (2001), this court adopted the federal test, but inexplicably-retreated to the disjunctive test in later cases. 2005Ed. 2d at 868 , 122 S. Ct. at 1785 . (footnote: 1) The State asserts that in People v. Thurow , 203 Ill. 2d 352 (2003), and People v. Crespo , 203 Ill. 2d 335 (2001), this court adopted the federal test, but inexplicably retreated to the disjunctive test in later cases. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Crespo
green
2 sentences2005Ed. 2d at 868 , 122 S. Ct. at 1785 . 1 The State asserts that in People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352 (2003), and People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335 (2001), this court adopted the federal test, but inexplicably-retreated to the disjunctive test in later cases. 2005Ed. 2d at 868 , 122 S. Ct. at 1785 . (footnote: 1) The State asserts that in People v. Thurow , 203 Ill. 2d 352 (2003), and People v. Crespo , 203 Ill. 2d 335 (2001), this court adopted the federal test, but inexplicably retreated to the disjunctive test in later cases. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Allen
green
1 sentence2026Allen, 222 Ill. 2d at 352 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Aronson v. Lewis
green
1 sentence2009The Aronson court announced a disjunctive test to be used in determining demand futility: “whether, under the particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the directors are disinterested and independent [or] (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.” Aron-son, 473 A.2d at 814 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Goldblatt v. City of Chicago
green
2 sentences1973(Goldblatt v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill.App.2d 211, 217 , 174 N.E.2d 222 .) Moreover, the Act initially defines what acts, generally, constitute the practice of optometry (“The practice of optometry is * * *”); thereafter, the Act proscribes certain conduct, if engaged in, as within the broad definitional structure of the practice of optometry. 1973(Goldblatt v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill.App.2d 211, 217 , 174 N.E.2d 222 .) Moreover, the Act initially defines what acts, generally, constitute the practice of optometry (“The practice of optometry is * * *”); thereafter, the Act proscribes certain conduct, if engaged in, as within the broad definitional structure of the practice of optometry. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.