Requiring defendant (Illinois) · Go Syfert
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Requiring defendant in Illinois

18 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2023 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. O'MALLEYgreen
illappct · 1982 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011The State's argument is premised on People v. Cosenza, 215 Ill.2d 308, 315-16 , 294 Ill.Dec. 110 , 830 N.E.2d 522 (2005), where our supreme court compared the 30-day limit in section 2-118.1(b) to the speedy-trial provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, and People v. O'Malley, 108 Ill.App.3d 823, 827 , 64 Ill.Dec. 333 , 439 N.E.2d 998 (1982), where the court observed that "[t]he speedy-trial term only runs when charges are pending against the defendant." The problem with accepting the State's position is that this court has found, in the speedy-trial context, that "[t]he speedy trial sta

2011The State's argument is premised on People v. Cosenza, 215 Ill.2d 308, 315-16 , 294 Ill.Dec. 110 , 830 N.E.2d 522 (2005), where our supreme court compared the 30-day limit in section 2-118.1(b) to the speedy-trial provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, and People v. O'Malley, 108 Ill.App.3d 823, 827 , 64 Ill.Dec. 333 , 439 N.E.2d 998 (1982), where the court observed that "[t]he speedy-trial term only runs when charges are pending against the defendant." The problem with accepting the State's position is that this court has found, in the speedy-trial context, that "[t]he speedy trial sta

12
People v. Cosenzagreen
ill · 2005 · cited in 2 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011The State's argument is premised on People v. Cosenza, 215 Ill.2d 308, 315-16 , 294 Ill.Dec. 110 , 830 N.E.2d 522 (2005), where our supreme court compared the 30-day limit in section 2-118.1(b) to the speedy-trial provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, and People v. O'Malley, 108 Ill.App.3d 823, 827 , 64 Ill.Dec. 333 , 439 N.E.2d 998 (1982), where the court observed that "[t]he speedy-trial term only runs when charges are pending against the defendant." The problem with accepting the State's position is that this court has found, in the speedy-trial context, that "[t]he speedy trial sta

2011The State's argument is premised on People v. Cosenza, 215 Ill.2d 308, 315-16 , 294 Ill.Dec. 110 , 830 N.E.2d 522 (2005), where our supreme court compared the 30-day limit in section 2-118.1(b) to the speedy-trial provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, and People v. O'Malley, 108 Ill.App.3d 823, 827 , 64 Ill.Dec. 333 , 439 N.E.2d 998 (1982), where the court observed that "[t]he speedy-trial term only runs when charges are pending against the defendant." The problem with accepting the State's position is that this court has found, in the speedy-trial context, that "[t]he speedy trial sta

12
People v. Zumotgreen
illappct · 2021 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023Requiring defendant to plead with that sort of specificity is at odds with the “gist” standard because, by definition, a “gist” of a claim is “something less than a completely pled or fully stated claim.” Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 245 ; Zumot, 2021 IL App (1st) 191743, ¶ 29 (quoting Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 245 ).

11
People v. Glovergreen
illappct · 2017 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022
1 sentence

2022People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 59 ; see also People v. Glover, 2017 IL App (4th) 160586, ¶ 36 (defendant’s alleged misapprehension of the possible maximum sentence for two dismissed charges did not render his guilty plea invalid).

11
People v. Janesgreen
ill · 1994 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015See People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27, 35 , 630 N.E.2d 790, 793 (1994). ¶ 36 Requiring defense counsel to certify he or she has consulted with a defendant to ascertain defendant's contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty "would make it more likely, rather than less likely, that all of the contentions of error were included in the post-plea motion, enabling the trial court to address and correct any improper conduct or errors of the trial court." Tousignant, 2014 IL 115329, ¶ 19 , 5 N.E.3d 176 .

2015See People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27, 35 , 630 N.E.2d 790, 793 (1994). ¶ 36 Requiring defense counsel to certify he or she has consulted with a defendant to ascertain defendant's contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty "would make it more likely, rather than less likely, that all of the contentions of error were included in the post-plea motion, enabling the trial court to address and correct any improper conduct or errors of the trial court." Tousignant, 2014 IL 115329, ¶ 19 , 5 N.E.3d 176 .

11
People v. Tousignantgreen
ill · 2014 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015See People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27, 35 , 630 N.E.2d 790, 793 (1994). ¶ 36 Requiring defense counsel to certify he or she has consulted with a defendant to ascertain defendant's contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty "would make it more likely, rather than less likely, that all of the contentions of error were included in the post-plea motion, enabling the trial court to address and correct any improper conduct or errors of the trial court." Tousignant, 2014 IL 115329, ¶ 19 , 5 N.E.3d 176 .

2015See People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27, 35 , 630 N.E.2d 790, 793 (1994). ¶ 36 Requiring defense counsel to certify he or she has consulted with a defendant to ascertain defendant's contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty "would make it more likely, rather than less likely, that all of the contentions of error were included in the post-plea motion, enabling the trial court to address and correct any improper conduct or errors of the trial court." Tousignant, 2014 IL 115329, ¶ 19 , 5 N.E.3d 176 .

11
Wilmette Park District v. Village of Wilmettegreen
ill · 1986 · cited in 1 Illinois opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
2 sentences

1990See Wilmette Park District, 112 Ill. 2d at 15 , 490 N.E.2d at 1286 .

1990See Wilmette Park District, 112 Ill. 2d at 15 , 490 N.E.2d at 1286 .

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

CaseCitedYears
The People v. Irwin green
ill · 1965
2 sentences

1985Additionally, it focuses the attention of the trial judge upon those aspects of the proceedings of which the defendant complains, and gives to the reviewing court the benefit of the judgment and observations of the trial court with reference thereto.” People v. Irwin (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 441, 443-44 .

1973In People v. Irwin, 32 Ill.2d 441, at 443-444 , this court stated: “Requiring defendant’s written motion for a new trial to specify the errors allegedly entitling him to a new trial may save the delay and expense inherent in an appeal in those instances where the motion is meritorious.

51973–1985
People v. Hughes green
ill · 2013
2 sentences

2022People v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 59 ; see also People v. Glover, 2017 IL App (4th) 160586, ¶ 36 (defendant’s alleged misapprehension of the possible maximum sentence for two dismissed charges did not render his guilty plea invalid).

2015Rather, where the consequence is severe, certain, and sufficiently enmeshed in the criminal process the sixth amendment right to counsel may give rise to a basis for withdrawing a plea.” Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 59 . - 20 - 1-14-2260 court found that when a defendant risks deportation, the defendant may suffer prejudice from counsel’s failure to properly advise him or her “regardless of the strength of his case at trial.” Id.

22015–2022
People v. Britt-El green
ill · 2002
2 sentences

2003People v. Britt-El , 206 Ill. 2d 331 (2002).

2003People v. Britt-El, 206 Ill. 2d 331 (2002).

22003–2003
People v. Edwards green
ill · 2001
2 sentences

2023Requiring defendant to plead with that sort of specificity is at odds with the “gist” standard because, by definition, a “gist” of a claim is “something less than a completely pled or fully stated claim.” Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 245 ; Zumot, 2021 IL App (1st) 191743, ¶ 29 (quoting Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 245 ).

2023Requiring defendant to plead with that sort of specificity is at odds with the “gist” standard because, by definition, a “gist” of a claim is “something less than a completely pled or fully stated claim.” Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 245 ; Zumot, 2021 IL App (1st) 191743, ¶ 29 (quoting Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 245 ).

12023–2023
People v. Rodgers green
illappct · 1982
1 sentence

2011The State's argument is premised on People v. Cosenza, 215 Ill.2d 308, 315-16 , 294 Ill.Dec. 110 , 830 N.E.2d 522 (2005), where our supreme court compared the 30-day limit in section 2-118.1(b) to the speedy-trial provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, and People v. O'Malley, 108 Ill.App.3d 823, 827 , 64 Ill.Dec. 333 , 439 N.E.2d 998 (1982), where the court observed that "[t]he speedy-trial term only runs when charges are pending against the defendant." The problem with accepting the State's position is that this court has found, in the speedy-trial context, that "[t]he speedy trial sta

12011–2011
People v. Vaughn green
illappct · 1983
1 sentence

1992(People v. Vaughn, 116 Ill.

11992–1992
The PEOPLE v. King green
ill · 1963
2 sentences

1983(See People v. Precup (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 , 382 N.E .2d 227; People v. King (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 150, 155 , 193 N.E.2d 790 .) In People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280 , 296 N.E.2d 856 , the court explained the purpose of the requirement that errors be set forth in the post-trial motion in order to bring them to the attention of the trial court: “ ‘Requiring defendant’s written motion for a new trial to specify errors allegedly entitling him to a new trial may save the delay and expense inherent in an appeal in those instances where the motion is meritorious.

1983(See People v. Precup (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 , 382 N.E .2d 227; People v. King (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 150, 155 , 193 N.E.2d 790 .) In People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280 , 296 N.E.2d 856 , the court explained the purpose of the requirement that errors be set forth in the post-trial motion in order to bring them to the attention of the trial court: “ ‘Requiring defendant’s written motion for a new trial to specify errors allegedly entitling him to a new trial may save the delay and expense inherent in an appeal in those instances where the motion is meritorious.

11983–1983
People v. Pickett green
ill · 1973
2 sentences

1983(See People v. Precup (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 , 382 N.E .2d 227; People v. King (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 150, 155 , 193 N.E.2d 790 .) In People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280 , 296 N.E.2d 856 , the court explained the purpose of the requirement that errors be set forth in the post-trial motion in order to bring them to the attention of the trial court: “ ‘Requiring defendant’s written motion for a new trial to specify errors allegedly entitling him to a new trial may save the delay and expense inherent in an appeal in those instances where the motion is meritorious.

1983(See People v. Precup (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 , 382 N.E .2d 227; People v. King (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 150, 155 , 193 N.E.2d 790 .) In People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280 , 296 N.E.2d 856 , the court explained the purpose of the requirement that errors be set forth in the post-trial motion in order to bring them to the attention of the trial court: “ ‘Requiring defendant’s written motion for a new trial to specify errors allegedly entitling him to a new trial may save the delay and expense inherent in an appeal in those instances where the motion is meritorious.

11983–1983
People v. Precup green
ill · 1978
1 sentence

1983(See People v. Precup (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 , 382 N.E .2d 227; People v. King (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 150, 155 , 193 N.E.2d 790 .) In People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 280 , 296 N.E.2d 856 , the court explained the purpose of the requirement that errors be set forth in the post-trial motion in order to bring them to the attention of the trial court: “ ‘Requiring defendant’s written motion for a new trial to specify errors allegedly entitling him to a new trial may save the delay and expense inherent in an appeal in those instances where the motion is meritorious.

11983–1983
People v. Pittman green
illappct · 1979
1 sentence

1983People v. Pittman (1979), 75 Ill.

11983–1983
Hanson v. Denckla green
scotus · 1958
2 sentences

1981Requiring defendants to defend in Illinois is reasonable and consonant with the orderly administration of justice (Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U.S. 235 , 2 L.

1981Requiring defendants to defend in Illinois is reasonable and consonant with the orderly administration of justice (Hanson v. Denckla (1958), 357 U.S. 235 , 2 L.

11981–1981
People v. Price green
illappct · 1975
1 sentence

1977App. 3d 610 , 336 N.E.2d 56 .) As stated in People v. Irwin: “Requiring defendant’s written motion for a new trial to specify the errors allegedly entitling him to a new trial may save the delay and expense inherent in an appeal in those instances where the motion is meritorious.

11977–1977
The PEOPLE v. Heaven green
ill · 1970
1 sentence

1972People v. Heaven, 44 Ill. 2d 249 .

11972–1972

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IL § 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (4) IL § 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 18 (1972–2023) WA 9 (2006–2025) CA 8 (1997–2019) NY 7 (1994–2024) NJ 6 (1984–2025) NC 5 (1919–2022) VT 4 (1996–2022) TX 4 (1878–2024) CO 4 (1993–2015) UT 3 (1992–2024) PA 3 (2013–2025) ID 3 (2011–2011) IN 3 (1983–2010) TN 3 (1872–1872) HI 2 (1996–2017) DC 2 (2009–2023) LA 2 (1985–1988) MD 2 (1999–2016) MI 2 (1992–1997) AK 2 (1982–2025) AZ 2 (1995–2013) OH 2 (1984–2021)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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