Requiring defendant in California

2013Requiring defendants to defend plaintiff’s complaint before the referee but litigate their cross-complaints in court could force the parties “ ‘to conduct the same discovery, litigate[,] and ultimately try the same issues in separate but parallel forums’ ” (Tarrant Bell, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 541 ) because the defenses asserted by defendants in response to the complaint are based on identical facts as their cross-claims against Cassidy and Centrix.

2013Requiring defendants to defend plaintiff‟s complaint before the referee but litigate their cross- complaints in court could force the parties “to conduct the same discovery, litigate[,] and ultimately try the same issues in separate but parallel forums” (Tarrant Bell, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 541 ) because the defenses asserted by defendants in response to the complaint are based on identical facts as their cross-claims against Cassidy and Centrix.

1997If shaving caused defendant to resemble the gunman, as some of the witnesses testified, that similarity was legitimate, probative evidence that he was the gunman. “[Requiring defendant to appear clean shaven and reveal his facial features . . . would seem to reduce the chance of misidentification instead of increase it.” (United States v. Valenzuela, supra, 722 F.2d at p. 1434 .) “ ‘[T]he First Amendment should not provide a criminal defendant with the right to possibly disguise himself at trial.’ ” (Ibid.) 3.

1997If shaving caused defendant to resemble the gunman, as some of the witnesses testified, that similarity was legitimate, probative evidence that he was the gunman. “[Requiring defendant to appear clean shaven and reveal his facial features . . . would seem to reduce the chance of misidentification instead of increase it.” (United States v. Valenzuela, supra, 722 F.2d at p. 1434 .) “ ‘[T]he First Amendment should not provide a criminal defendant with the right to possibly disguise himself at trial.’ ” (Ibid.) 3.

2019Rather, the Legislature’s changes constituted an act of lenity that does not implicate defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights.” (People v. Anthony, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1156-1157; see People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1063-1064 [trial court may determine facts based on new evidence regarding the petitioner’s eligibility for resentencing under Proposition 36 because retroactive application of the benefits from the proposition are a legislative act of lenity that does not implicate Sixth Amendment rights; “a factual finding that results in resentencing ineligibility 14 The Supreme Court

2019Requiring defendants to seek relief pursuant to section 1170.95 does not deprive them of their right to a jury trial Requiring Lopez and Navarrete to pursue relief in the trial court pursuant to section 1170.95, where the trial court can determine they remain liable for murder if the People establish beyond a reasonable doubt they personally acted with malice, does not, as they contend, deprive them of their constitutional right to a jury trial under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 ] and Alleyne v United 14 States (2013) 570 U.S. 99 [ 133 S.Ct. 215

2019Requiring defendants to seek relief pursuant to section 1170.95 does not deprive them of their right to a jury trial Requiring Lopez and Navarrete to pursue relief in the trial court pursuant to section 1170.95, where the trial court can determine they remain liable for murder if the People establish beyond a reasonable doubt they personally acted with malice, does not, as they contend, deprive them of their constitutional right to a jury trial under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 ] and Alleyne v United 14 States (2013) 570 U.S. 99 [ 133 S.Ct. 215

2019Requiring defendants to seek relief pursuant to section 1170.95 does not deprive them of their right to a jury trial Requiring Lopez and Navarrete to pursue relief in the trial court pursuant to section 1170.95, where the trial court can determine they remain liable for murder if the People establish beyond a reasonable doubt they personally acted with malice, does not, as they contend, deprive them of their constitutional right to a jury trial under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 ] and Alleyne v United 14 States (2013) 570 U.S. 99 [ 133 S.Ct. 215

2019Requiring defendants to seek relief pursuant to section 1170.95 does not deprive them of their right to a jury trial Requiring Lopez and Navarrete to pursue relief in the trial court pursuant to section 1170.95, where the trial court can determine they remain liable for murder if the People establish beyond a reasonable doubt they personally acted with malice, does not, as they contend, deprive them of their constitutional right to a jury trial under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [ 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 ] and Alleyne v United 14 States (2013) 570 U.S. 99 [ 133 S.Ct. 215

2015The court found that requiring instruction on lesser related offenses undermines the prosecutor’s exclusive executive discretion to choose which charges to bring from “among those potentially available,” which “arises from ‘ “the complex considerations necessary for the effective and efficient administration of law enforcement.” ’ ” (Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 134 .) It necessarily follows that if the prosecution agrees to submit lesser related offenses to the jury, as it did here, the prosecutor’s discretion is unaffected, and there is no separation of powers issue.

2014(People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 553 (Moye); People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 .) Although the duty to instruct on a lesser included offense implicates the defendant’s constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue in the case (People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 596 ), the standard for requiring such instruction is not “ ‘ “any evidence, no matter how weak,” ’ ” but evidence “ ‘ “substantial enough to merit consideration” by the jury.’ ” (Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 553 .) Attempted murder requires a direct but ineffectual act toward killing a pers

2014(People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 553 (Moye); People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 .) Although the duty to instruct on a lesser included offense implicates the defendant’s constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue in the case (People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 596 ), the standard for requiring such instruction is not “ ‘ “any evidence, no matter how weak,” ’ ” but evidence “ ‘ “substantial enough to merit consideration” by the jury.’ ” (Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 553 .) Attempted murder requires a direct but ineffectual act toward killing a pers

2014(People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1217 .) Attempted voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a person without malice, and is a lesser included offense of attempted murder.