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18 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 2008–2021 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Laymon v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See Laymon v. State, 280 Kan. 430, 438, 444 , 122 P.3d 326 (2005) (invocation of McAdam , providing defendant could only be sentenced to lesser penalty when defendant is convicted under statutes containing identical elements but providing different penalties, will be unsuccessful if no direct appeal was taken and the invocation occurs for the first time on a collateral attack of sentence; appellate counsel’s failure to pursue McAdam line of argument was ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. McCoin, 278 Kan. 465, 467-68 , 101 P.3d 1204 (2004) (no jurisdiction over untimely motion for arr 2010See Laymon v. State, 280 Kan. 430, 438, 444 , 122 P.3d 326 (2005) (invocation of McAdam , providing defendant could only be sentenced to lesser penalty when defendant is convicted under statutes containing identical elements but providing different penalties, will be unsuccessful if no direct appeal was taken and the invocation occurs for the first time on a collateral attack of sentence; appellate counsel’s failure to pursue McAdam line of argument was ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. McCoin, 278 Kan. 465, 467-68 , 101 P.3d 1204 (2004) (no jurisdiction over untimely motion for arr | 2 | 2 |
State v. Campbellgreen2 sentences2012In State v. Campbell, 279 Kan. 1, 14-15 , 106 P.3d 1129 (2005), this court applied the identical offense sentencing doctrine analysis from McAdam to conclude that possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to use it to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(3) was identical to possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine with the intent to produce a controlled substance in violation of K.S.A. 65-7006(a). 2012In State v. Campbell, 279 Kan. 1, 14-15 , 106 P.3d 1129 (2005), this court applied the identical offense sentencing doctrine analysis from McAdam to conclude that possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to use it to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(3) was identical to possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine with the intent to produce a controlled substance in violation of K.S.A. 65-7006(a). | 1 | 5 |
State v. Salasgreen2 sentences2020Warledo."); State v. Hernandez, 292 Kan. 598, 607-08 , 257 P.3d 767 (2011) ("In Warledo, this court considered the argument that premeditated first-degree murder and intentional second-degree murder run afoul of the identical offense sentencing doctrine because there is no appreciable difference between 'premeditation' and 'intentional.' This court concluded that the two 'crimes are clearly not identical.'"); State v. Salas, 289 Kan. 245, 251 , 210 P.3d 635 (2009) ("[W]e reject Salas' argument that premeditated first- 12 degree murder and intentional second-degree murder are substantially simi 2020Warledo."); State v. Hernandez, 292 Kan. 598, 607-08 , 257 P.3d 767 (2011) ("In Warledo, this court considered the argument that premeditated first-degree murder and intentional second-degree murder run afoul of the identical offense sentencing doctrine because there is no appreciable difference between 'premeditation' and 'intentional.' This court concluded that the two 'crimes are clearly not identical.'"); State v. Salas, 289 Kan. 245, 251 , 210 P.3d 635 (2009) ("[W]e reject Salas' argument that premeditated first- 12 degree murder and intentional second-degree murder are substantially simi | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fanninggreen2 sentences2012Identical Offense Sentencing Doctrine The principle behind the identical offense sentencing doctrine, which is the focus of Snellings' argument, is: "`Where two criminal offenses have identical elements but are classified differently for purposes of imposing a penalty, a defendant convicted of either crime may be sentenced only under the lesser penalty provision.'" State v. Cooper, 285 Kan. 964, 966-67 , 179 P.3d 439 (2008) (quoting State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 229 , 768 P.2d 268 [1989]); see State v. Fanning, 281 Kan. 1176, 1180 , 135 P.3d 1067 (2006). 2012Identical Offense Sentencing Doctrine The principle behind the identical offense sentencing doctrine, which is the focus of Snellings' argument, is: "`Where two criminal offenses have identical elements but are classified differently for purposes of imposing a penalty, a defendant convicted of either crime may be sentenced only under the lesser penalty provision.'" State v. Cooper, 285 Kan. 964, 966-67 , 179 P.3d 439 (2008) (quoting State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 229 , 768 P.2d 268 [1989]); see State v. Fanning, 281 Kan. 1176, 1180 , 135 P.3d 1067 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Snellings
green
2 sentences2021In June 2020, Tomlin filed a pro se request for relief from his sentence under the identical offense sentencing doctrine as discussed by our Supreme Court in State v. Snellings, 294 Kan. 149 , 273 P.3d 739 (2012). 2021"The principle behind the identical offense sentencing doctrine . . . is: '"Where two criminal offenses have identical elements but are classified differently for purposes of imposing a penalty, a defendant convicted of either crime may be sentenced only under the lesser penalty provision."' [Citations omitted.]" Snellings, 294 Kan. at 151 . | 4 | 2012–2021 |
State v. McAdam
green
2 sentences2012McAdam argued that under the identical offense sentencing doctrine, he should have been sentenced under the lesser offense defined in K.S.A. 65-4161(a), which at the time, read in part: "`Except as authorized by the uniform controlled substances act, it shall be unlawful for any person to sell, offer for sale or have in such person's possession with intent to sell, deliver or distribute; prescribe; administer; deliver; distribute; dispense or compound any opiates, opium or narcotic drugs, or any stimulant designated in subsection (d)(1), (d)(3) or (f)(1) of K.S.A. 65-4107 and amendments theret 2012McAdam argued that under the identical offense sentencing doctrine, he should have been sentenced under the lesser offense defined in K.S.A. 65-4161(a), which at the time, read in part: "`Except as authorized by the uniform controlled substances act, it shall be unlawful for any person to sell, offer for sale or have in such person's possession with intent to sell, deliver or distribute; prescribe; administer; deliver; distribute; dispense or compound any opiates, opium or narcotic drugs, or any stimulant designated in subsection (d)(1), (d)(3) or (f)(1) of K.S.A. 65-4107 and amendments theret | 4 | 2008–2012 |
State v. Friday
green
2 sentences2021In its most basic form, the identical offense sentencing doctrine holds that "if two criminal offenses have identical elements but different penalty classifications, a defendant convicted of either crime may be sentenced only under the lesser penalty provision." (Emphasis added.) State v. Friday, 297 Kan. 1023, 1046 , 306 P.3d 265 (2013). 2021In its most basic form, the identical offense sentencing doctrine holds that "if two criminal offenses have identical elements but different penalty classifications, a defendant convicted of either crime may be sentenced only under the lesser penalty provision." (Emphasis added.) State v. Friday, 297 Kan. 1023, 1046 , 306 P.3d 265 (2013). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Warledo
green
2 sentences2020For example, in State v. Warledo, 286 Kan. 927 , Syl. ¶ 9, 190 P.3d 937 (2008), we unequivocally held "[p]remeditated first-degree murder and intentional second-degree murder are not identical and the identical offense sentencing doctrine does not apply." Our analysis was succinct: "Comparing premeditated first-degree murder and intentional second-degree murder leads to the conclusion these crimes are clearly not identical. 2020For example, in State v. Warledo, 286 Kan. 927 , Syl. ¶ 9, 190 P.3d 937 (2008), we unequivocally held "[p]remeditated first-degree murder and intentional second-degree murder are not identical and the identical offense sentencing doctrine does not apply." Our analysis was succinct: "Comparing premeditated first-degree murder and intentional second-degree murder leads to the conclusion these crimes are clearly not identical. | 2 | 2011–2020 |
State v. Nunn
green
2 sentences2014That review requires a determination of whether the offenses are identical because the principle behind the identical offense sentencing doctrine is: “ ‘ “Where two criminal offenses have identical elements but are classified differently for purposes of imposing a penalty, a defendant convicted of either crime may be sentenced only under the lesser penalty provision.” ’ State v. Cooper, 285 Kan. 964, 966-67 , 179 P.3d 439 (2008) (quoting State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 229 , 768 P.2d 268 [1989]).” State v. Sellings, 294 Kan. 149, 151 , 273 P.3d 739 (2012); State v. Robinson, 293 Kan. 1002, 1037 , 2014That review requires a determination of whether the offenses are identical because the principle behind the identical offense sentencing doctrine is: “ ‘ “Where two criminal offenses have identical elements but are classified differently for purposes of imposing a penalty, a defendant convicted of either crime may be sentenced only under the lesser penalty provision.” ’ State v. Cooper, 285 Kan. 964, 966-67 , 179 P.3d 439 (2008) (quoting State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 229 , 768 P.2d 268 [1989]).” State v. Sellings, 294 Kan. 149, 151 , 273 P.3d 739 (2012); State v. Robinson, 293 Kan. 1002, 1037 , | 2 | 2012–2014 |
State v. Cooper
green
2 sentences2014That review requires a determination of whether the offenses are identical because the principle behind the identical offense sentencing doctrine is: “ ‘ “Where two criminal offenses have identical elements but are classified differently for purposes of imposing a penalty, a defendant convicted of either crime may be sentenced only under the lesser penalty provision.” ’ State v. Cooper, 285 Kan. 964, 966-67 , 179 P.3d 439 (2008) (quoting State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 229 , 768 P.2d 268 [1989]).” State v. Sellings, 294 Kan. 149, 151 , 273 P.3d 739 (2012); State v. Robinson, 293 Kan. 1002, 1037 , 2014That review requires a determination of whether the offenses are identical because the principle behind the identical offense sentencing doctrine is: “ ‘ “Where two criminal offenses have identical elements but are classified differently for purposes of imposing a penalty, a defendant convicted of either crime may be sentenced only under the lesser penalty provision.” ’ State v. Cooper, 285 Kan. 964, 966-67 , 179 P.3d 439 (2008) (quoting State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 229 , 768 P.2d 268 [1989]).” State v. Sellings, 294 Kan. 149, 151 , 273 P.3d 739 (2012); State v. Robinson, 293 Kan. 1002, 1037 , | 2 | 2012–2014 |
State v. Sandberg
green
2 sentences2013After reviewing Kansas caselaw, we identified three situations where the doctrine may apply: “ ‘ “(1) where one statute defines a lesser included offense of the other and they carry different penalties . . . ; (2) where the statutes overlap and carry different penalties . . . ; (3) where the statutes are identical . . . ." ' " Sandberg, 290 Kan. at 986 (quoting State v. Campbell, 279 Kan. 1, 14 , 106 P.3d 1129 [2005]). 2011State v. Sandberg, 290 Kan. 980, 984 , 235 P.3d 476 (2010). | 2 | 2011–2013 |
State v. Barnes
green
2 sentences2010See Laymon v. State, 280 Kan. 430, 438, 444 , 122 P.3d 326 (2005) (invocation of McAdam , providing defendant could only be sentenced to lesser penalty when defendant is convicted under statutes containing identical elements but providing different penalties, will be unsuccessful if no direct appeal was taken and the invocation occurs for the first time on a collateral attack of sentence; appellate counsel’s failure to pursue McAdam line of argument was ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. McCoin, 278 Kan. 465, 467-68 , 101 P.3d 1204 (2004) (no jurisdiction over untimely motion for arr 2010See Laymon v. State, 280 Kan. 430, 438, 444 , 122 P.3d 326 (2005) (invocation of McAdam , providing defendant could only be sentenced to lesser penalty when defendant is convicted under statutes containing identical elements but providing different penalties, will be unsuccessful if no direct appeal was taken and the invocation occurs for the first time on a collateral attack of sentence; appellate counsel’s failure to pursue McAdam line of argument was ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. McCoin, 278 Kan. 465, 467-68 , 101 P.3d 1204 (2004) (no jurisdiction over untimely motion for arr | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2010Recently, in State v. Thompson, 287 Kan. 238, 258 , 200 P.3d 22 (2009), we reiterated that "[i]f the elements in overlapping provisions are identical, the due process considerations involved in Kansas' identical offense sentencing doctrine apply and a defendant may only be sentenced to the lesser punishment provided for in the identical, overlapping provisions." Here, Reyna was actually charged with and convicted of a lesser included offense of the crime for which he was sentenced. 2010Recently, in State v. Thompson, 287 Kan. 238, 258 , 200 P.3d 22 (2009), we reiterated that "[i]f the elements in overlapping provisions are identical, the due process considerations involved in Kansas' identical offense sentencing doctrine apply and a defendant may only be sentenced to the lesser punishment provided for in the identical, overlapping provisions." Here, Reyna was actually charged with and convicted of a lesser included offense of the crime for which he was sentenced. | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State v. McCoin
green
2 sentences2010See Laymon v. State, 280 Kan. 430, 438, 444 , 122 P.3d 326 (2005) (invocation of McAdam , providing defendant could only be sentenced to lesser penalty when defendant is convicted under statutes containing identical elements but providing different penalties, will be unsuccessful if no direct appeal was taken and the invocation occurs for the first time on a collateral attack of sentence; appellate counsel’s failure to pursue McAdam line of argument was ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. McCoin, 278 Kan. 465, 467-68 , 101 P.3d 1204 (2004) (no jurisdiction over untimely motion for arr 2010See Laymon v. State, 280 Kan. 430, 438, 444 , 122 P.3d 326 (2005) (invocation of McAdam , providing defendant could only be sentenced to lesser penalty when defendant is convicted under statutes containing identical elements but providing different penalties, will be unsuccessful if no direct appeal was taken and the invocation occurs for the first time on a collateral attack of sentence; appellate counsel’s failure to pursue McAdam line of argument was ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. McCoin, 278 Kan. 465, 467-68 , 101 P.3d 1204 (2004) (no jurisdiction over untimely motion for arr | 2 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Hernandez
green
2 sentences2020Warledo."); State v. Hernandez, 292 Kan. 598, 607-08 , 257 P.3d 767 (2011) ("In Warledo, this court considered the argument that premeditated first-degree murder and intentional second-degree murder run afoul of the identical offense sentencing doctrine because there is no appreciable difference between 'premeditation' and 'intentional.' This court concluded that the two 'crimes are clearly not identical.'"); State v. Salas, 289 Kan. 245, 251 , 210 P.3d 635 (2009) ("[W]e reject Salas' argument that premeditated first- 12 degree murder and intentional second-degree murder are substantially simi 2020Warledo."); State v. Hernandez, 292 Kan. 598, 607-08 , 257 P.3d 767 (2011) ("In Warledo, this court considered the argument that premeditated first-degree murder and intentional second-degree murder run afoul of the identical offense sentencing doctrine because there is no appreciable difference between 'premeditation' and 'intentional.' This court concluded that the two 'crimes are clearly not identical.'"); State v. Salas, 289 Kan. 245, 251 , 210 P.3d 635 (2009) ("[W]e reject Salas' argument that premeditated first- 12 degree murder and intentional second-degree murder are substantially simi | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Moore
green
1 sentence2020Moore I, 2012 WL 2045359, at *5 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2014That review requires a determination of whether the offenses are identical because the principle behind the identical offense sentencing doctrine is: “ ‘ “Where two criminal offenses have identical elements but are classified differently for purposes of imposing a penalty, a defendant convicted of either crime may be sentenced only under the lesser penalty provision.” ’ State v. Cooper, 285 Kan. 964, 966-67 , 179 P.3d 439 (2008) (quoting State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 229 , 768 P.2d 268 [1989]).” State v. Sellings, 294 Kan. 149, 151 , 273 P.3d 739 (2012); State v. Robinson, 293 Kan. 1002, 1037 , 2014That review requires a determination of whether the offenses are identical because the principle behind the identical offense sentencing doctrine is: “ ‘ “Where two criminal offenses have identical elements but are classified differently for purposes of imposing a penalty, a defendant convicted of either crime may be sentenced only under the lesser penalty provision.” ’ State v. Cooper, 285 Kan. 964, 966-67 , 179 P.3d 439 (2008) (quoting State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 229 , 768 P.2d 268 [1989]).” State v. Sellings, 294 Kan. 149, 151 , 273 P.3d 739 (2012); State v. Robinson, 293 Kan. 1002, 1037 , | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Clements
green
2 sentences2010Application of Kansas’ Identical Offense Sentencing Doctrine Several years after the Batchelder decision, this court applied the identical offense sentencing doctrine in State v. Clements, 241 Kan. 77, 83 , 734 P.2d 1096 (1987). 2010Application of Kansas’ Identical Offense Sentencing Doctrine Several years after the Batchelder decision, this court applied the identical offense sentencing doctrine in State v. Clements, 241 Kan. 77, 83 , 734 P.2d 1096 (1987). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Harp
green
1 sentence2008Harp “denied being informed of his appellate remedies, the steps necessary to implement an appeal, or the possibility of an appeal on the identical offense doctrine.” 283 Kan. at 747 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Thompson
neutral
1 sentence2008The Court of Appeals agreed and held: “[T]he facts of the case *260 demonstrate that the defendant used drug paraphernalia with an intent to manufacture methamphetamine” and that the “use of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture is identical to manufacturing methamphetamine.” Thompson II, 2008 WL 142103, at *6 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.