distinction principle in New York

2003(See, City of Syracuse v State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 101 AD2d 653, 654 [3d Dept 1984], affd 64 NY2d 894 [1985].) Whether Real Property Services is establishing the state rate, a special rate or a segment special rate, the court does not find a distinction as to the standard of review.

2003The establishment of an equalization rate is a quasi-judicial determination which must be supported by substantial evidence. ( See , City of Syracuse v State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment , 101 AD2d 653, 654 [3d Dept 1984], affd 64 NY2d 894 [1985].) Whether Real Property Services is establishing the state rate, a special rate or a segment special rate, the court does not find a distinction as to the standard of review. ( See , Matter of City of Oswego v New York State {** 2 Misc 3d at 671 }Bd. of Real Prop.

2021Co., 183 NY 368, 374 [1906]; see Matter of Heisler v Gingras, 90 NY2d 682, 686-687 [1997], rearg denied 91 NY2d 867 [1997]; Foster v White & Sons, 244 App Div 368, 369-371 [1st Dept 1935], affd 270 NY 572 [1936]).

2003The establishment of an equalization rate is a quasi-judicial determination which must be supported by substantial evidence. ( See , City of Syracuse v State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment , 101 AD2d 653, 654 [3d Dept 1984], affd 64 NY2d 894 [1985].) Whether Real Property Services is establishing the state rate, a special rate or a segment special rate, the court does not find a distinction as to the standard of review. ( See , Matter of City of Oswego v New York State {** 2 Misc 3d at 671 }Bd. of Real Prop.

1979Finally, as a logical consequence of the distinction which our analysis found inherent in the statute between malpractice and simple negligence in the rendition of services by an architect, the recent decisions holding that a cause of action against an architect by his client arising out of faulty design or construction accrues on completion of construction (Sosnow v Paul, 43 AD2d 978 , affd 36 NY2d 780 , supra; Matter of Paver & Wildfoerster [Catholic High School Assn.], 38 NY2d 669 , supra; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assoc., 43 NY2d 389 , supra) cannot have any application here.

1979Finally, as a logical consequence of the distinction which our analysis found inherent in the statute between malpractice and simple negligence in the rendition of services by an architect, the recent decisions holding that a cause of action against an architect by his client arising out of faulty design or construction accrues on completion of construction (Sosnow v Paul, 43 AD2d 978 , affd 36 NY2d 780 , supra; Matter of Paver & Wildfoerster [Catholic High School Assn.], 38 NY2d 669 , supra; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assoc., 43 NY2d 389 , supra) cannot have any application here.

1979Finally, as a logical consequence of the distinction which our analysis found inherent in the statute between malpractice and simple negligence in the rendition of services by an architect, the recent decisions holding that a cause of action against an architect by his client arising out of faulty design or construction accrues on completion of construction (Sosnow v Paul, 43 AD2d 978 , affd 36 NY2d 780 , supra; Matter of Paver & Wildfoerster [Catholic High School Assn.], 38 NY2d 669 , supra; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assoc., 43 NY2d 389 , supra) cannot have any application here.

1979Finally, as a logical consequence of the distinction which our analysis found inherent in the statute between malpractice and simple negligence in the rendition of services by an architect, the recent decisions holding that a cause of action against an architect by his client arising out of faulty design or construction accrues on completion of construction (Sosnow v Paul, 43 AD2d 978 , affd 36 NY2d 780 , supra; Matter of Paver & Wildfoerster [Catholic High School Assn.], 38 NY2d 669 , supra; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assoc., 43 NY2d 389 , supra) cannot have any application here.

1975In Reed v Reed ( 404 US 71 ) a State statute which favored men over women in the appointment of probate administrators was overturned.

1972Co., 257 App. Div. 15 , aifd. 283 N. Y. 581 .) “ Much will depend on the distinction whether the standard is an old one, long recognized in law and life (International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 219 , 223), or one novel and unfamiliar, not yet approaching certainty, at least in a measurable degree, through habitude and example. ’ ’ '(People v. Mancuso, 255 N. Y. 463, 470 ). “ Carnal knowledge ” means sexual intercourse. (75 C.

1972Co., 257 App. Div. 15 , aifd. 283 N. Y. 581 .) “ Much will depend on the distinction whether the standard is an old one, long recognized in law and life (International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 219 , 223), or one novel and unfamiliar, not yet approaching certainty, at least in a measurable degree, through habitude and example. ’ ’ '(People v. Mancuso, 255 N. Y. 463, 470 ). “ Carnal knowledge ” means sexual intercourse. (75 C.

1972Co., 257 App. Div. 15 , aifd. 283 N. Y. 581 .) “ Much will depend on the distinction whether the standard is an old one, long recognized in law and life (International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 219 , 223), or one novel and unfamiliar, not yet approaching certainty, at least in a measurable degree, through habitude and example. ’ ’ '(People v. Mancuso, 255 N. Y. 463, 470 ). “ Carnal knowledge ” means sexual intercourse. (75 C.

1961We are mindful of Hopkins v. State of New York ( 276 App. Div. 945 [1950]), wherein the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed a judgment of this court entered upon an appropriation claim but said: “we are of the opinion that the agreements of adjustment do not constitute evidence of the price upon any sale, under the provisions of section 16 of the Court of Claims Act, and were improperly received upon the issue of the value of claimant’s property However, claimant’s attorney sees in the more recent decision, Hewitt v. State of New York ( 27 Misc 2d 930 , affd. 11 A D 2d 1079), a dis

1957He could know the distinction only by inquiry from the physician himself, or from other expert advice.” (Pride v. Inter-State Business Men’s Acc. Assn., 207 Iowa 167, 174 .) For the error described, there should be a new trial.

1954(Verplanck v. Van Buren, 76 N. Y. 247 ; Ross v. Preston, 292 N. Y. 433 ; Young v. Leach, 27 App. Div. 293 ; Anchor Wire Corp. v. Borst, 277 App. Div. 728 ; accord: Byrnes v. Owen, 243 N. Y. 211, 217 ,139 A. L.

1954(Verplanck v. Van Buren, 76 N. Y. 247 ; Ross v. Preston, 292 N. Y. 433 ; Young v. Leach, 27 App. Div. 293 ; Anchor Wire Corp. v. Borst, 277 App. Div. 728 ; accord: Byrnes v. Owen, 243 N. Y. 211, 217 ,139 A. L.

1954(Verplanck v. Van Buren, 76 N. Y. 247 ; Ross v. Preston, 292 N. Y. 433 ; Young v. Leach, 27 App. Div. 293 ; Anchor Wire Corp. v. Borst, 277 App. Div. 728 ; accord: Byrnes v. Owen, 243 N. Y. 211, 217 ,139 A. L.

1954(Verplanck v. Van Buren, 76 N. Y. 247 ; Ross v. Preston, 292 N. Y. 433 ; Young v. Leach, 27 App. Div. 293 ; Anchor Wire Corp. v. Borst, 277 App. Div. 728 ; accord: Byrnes v. Owen, 243 N. Y. 211, 217 ,139 A. L.

1934The comparatively recent case of Stewart v. Turney ( 237 N. Y. 117 ) related to the title of certain lands on the east shore of Cayuga lake, a body of water some thirty-six miles long by one to three wide.

1922The distinction between an administrator and a testamentary trustee is clear for “ with administrators the source of title is the grant of letters of administration ” and with trustees the will but the distinction in principle between trustees and executors is not so clear for like a trustee “ the executor’s interest in the testator’s estate is what the testator gives him.” Helme v. Buckelew, supra; 14 Halsbury Laws of Eng., Executors and Administrators, §§ 263-270.

1922The distinction between an administrator and a testamentary trustee is clear for “ with administrators the source of title is the grant of letters of administration ” and with trustees the will but the distinction in principle between trustees and executors is not so clear for like a trustee “ the executor’s interest in the testator’s estate is what the testator gives him.” Helme v. Buckelew, supra; 14 Halsbury Laws of Eng., Executors and Administrators, §§ 263-270.

1922Rep. 811; Colgate v. White & Co., 180 id. 882; Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N. Y. 414 , and other similar cases relied upon by plaintiff in support of his claim for injunctive relief, in all of which proprietary interests of authorship or ownership remained in the owner or actor and where but restricted licenses of use were granted.

1922It will thus be seen (Chaplin v. Vitagraph-Lubin-Selig, Essanay, Inc., 174 App. Div. 864, 866 ) a distinction in principle and reason exists between the case at bar and DeBekker v. Stokes, 168 App. Div. 542 ; Manners v. Famous Players-Lasky Corporation, 262 Fed.

1922It will thus be seen (Chaplin v. Vitagraph-Lubin-Selig, Essanay, Inc., 174 App. Div. 864, 866 ) a distinction in principle and reason exists between the case at bar and DeBekker v. Stokes, 168 App. Div. 542 ; Manners v. Famous Players-Lasky Corporation, 262 Fed.

1906This was overstepping the province of the judge. * * * It is true the question was not taken absolutely from the jury by the court; this was beyond its power (People v. Howell, 5 Hun, 620 ; affirmed, 69 N. Y. 607 ); but the opinion of the judge, considered as an opinion on the weight of evidence, was stated much stronger that it ought to have been, and was calculated to make an erroneous impression upon the minds of the jurors, and with that impression, carrying into the jury room the weight of the opinion, it cannot be said that the prisoner had, at the outset of their deliberations, an even

1906It might very well be that the jury, left to its own deliberations, might conclude that the evidence in corroboration was entirely insufficient to tend to connect the defendant with the crime; and while, as suggested by the Court of Appeals in People v. Flack, 125 N. Y. 324, 334 , “ Jurors may be perverse; the ends of justice may be defeated by unrighteous verdicts, but so long as the functions of the judge and jury are distinct, the one responding to the law, the other to the facts, neither can invade the province of the other without destroying the significance of trial by court and jury.” T