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9 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1966–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Praggastis v. Clackamas Countygreen2 sentences2024See id. (explaining that when “judicial functions are per- formed by a public officer other than a judge, the immunity is often referred to as quasi-judicial immunity, but this is a distinction of name and not a distinction of immunity”); see also Harmon v. State of Oregon, 320 Or App 406, 432 , 514 P3d 1131 (2022) (holding that judicial immunity applied to quasi-judicial decisions made by the Psychiatric Security Review Board); Jones-Clark v. Severe, 118 Or App 270, 274 , 846 P2d 1197 (1993) (explaining that parole board decisions are subject to judicial immunity). 2022“When such judicial functions are performed by a public officer other than a judge, the immunity is often referred to as quasi-judicial immunity, but this is a distinction of name and not a distinction of immunity.” Praggastis, 305 Or at 426 ; see also Ramstead v. Morgan, 219 Or 383, 388 , 347 P2d 594 (1959) (“The absolute immunity attaches to statements made in the course of, or incident to a judicial proceeding. * * * The rule of absolute privilege is applicable not only to judicial proceedings but to quasi-judicial proceedings as 422 Harmon v. State of Oregon well.”). | 2 | 5 |
Imbler v. Pachtmangreen2 sentences1991Watts v. Gerking, supra ; see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 US 409, 423 , 96 SCt 984 [991], 47 LEd2d 128 (1976). 1991Watts v. Gerking, supra ; see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 US 409, 423 , 96 SCt 984 [991], 47 LEd2d 128 (1976). | 2 | 2 |
Fay v. City of Portlandgreen2 sentences2024Cite as 333 Or App 367 (2024) 371 In addition to providing immunity for “judicial func- tions,” judicial immunity also immunizes acts “performed under a court order or directive,” so long as the court order or directive is “a permissible exercise of judicial authority” and the acts “comply with the court order or directive.” Fay v. City of Portland, 311 Or 68, 73-74 , 804 P2d 1155 (1991); Fossen v. Clackamas County, 271 Or App 842, 849 , 352 P3d 1288 (2015). 2024Cite as 333 Or App 367 (2024) 371 In addition to providing immunity for “judicial func- tions,” judicial immunity also immunizes acts “performed under a court order or directive,” so long as the court order or directive is “a permissible exercise of judicial authority” and the acts “comply with the court order or directive.” Fay v. City of Portland, 311 Or 68, 73-74 , 804 P2d 1155 (1991); Fossen v. Clackamas County, 271 Or App 842, 849 , 352 P3d 1288 (2015). | 1 | 2 |
Harmon v. State of Oregongreen2 sentences2024See id. (explaining that when “judicial functions are per- formed by a public officer other than a judge, the immunity is often referred to as quasi-judicial immunity, but this is a distinction of name and not a distinction of immunity”); see also Harmon v. State of Oregon, 320 Or App 406, 432 , 514 P3d 1131 (2022) (holding that judicial immunity applied to quasi-judicial decisions made by the Psychiatric Security Review Board); Jones-Clark v. Severe, 118 Or App 270, 274 , 846 P2d 1197 (1993) (explaining that parole board decisions are subject to judicial immunity). 2024See id. (explaining that when “judicial functions are per- formed by a public officer other than a judge, the immunity is often referred to as quasi-judicial immunity, but this is a distinction of name and not a distinction of immunity”); see also Harmon v. State of Oregon, 320 Or App 406, 432 , 514 P3d 1131 (2022) (holding that judicial immunity applied to quasi-judicial decisions made by the Psychiatric Security Review Board); Jones-Clark v. Severe, 118 Or App 270, 274 , 846 P2d 1197 (1993) (explaining that parole board decisions are subject to judicial immunity). | 1 | 1 |
Ramstead v. Morgangreen2 sentences2022“When such judicial functions are performed by a public officer other than a judge, the immunity is often referred to as quasi-judicial immunity, but this is a distinction of name and not a distinction of immunity.” Praggastis, 305 Or at 426 ; see also Ramstead v. Morgan, 219 Or 383, 388 , 347 P2d 594 (1959) (“The absolute immunity attaches to statements made in the course of, or incident to a judicial proceeding. * * * The rule of absolute privilege is applicable not only to judicial proceedings but to quasi-judicial proceedings as 422 Harmon v. State of Oregon well.”). 2022“When such judicial functions are performed by a public officer other than a judge, the immunity is often referred to as quasi-judicial immunity, but this is a distinction of name and not a distinction of immunity.” Praggastis, 305 Or at 426 ; see also Ramstead v. Morgan, 219 Or 383, 388 , 347 P2d 594 (1959) (“The absolute immunity attaches to statements made in the course of, or incident to a judicial proceeding. * * * The rule of absolute privilege is applicable not only to judicial proceedings but to quasi-judicial proceedings as 422 Harmon v. State of Oregon well.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harrison v. Joseph B. Mazza, LLC
neutral
1 sentence2024Cite as 333 Or App 367 (2024) 371 In addition to providing immunity for “judicial func- tions,” judicial immunity also immunizes acts “performed under a court order or directive,” so long as the court order or directive is “a permissible exercise of judicial authority” and the acts “comply with the court order or directive.” Fay v. City of Portland, 311 Or 68, 73-74 , 804 P2d 1155 (1991); Fossen v. Clackamas County, 271 Or App 842, 849 , 352 P3d 1288 (2015). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Jones-Clark v. Severe
green
2 sentences2024See id. (explaining that when “judicial functions are per- formed by a public officer other than a judge, the immunity is often referred to as quasi-judicial immunity, but this is a distinction of name and not a distinction of immunity”); see also Harmon v. State of Oregon, 320 Or App 406, 432 , 514 P3d 1131 (2022) (holding that judicial immunity applied to quasi-judicial decisions made by the Psychiatric Security Review Board); Jones-Clark v. Severe, 118 Or App 270, 274 , 846 P2d 1197 (1993) (explaining that parole board decisions are subject to judicial immunity). 2024See id. (explaining that when “judicial functions are per- formed by a public officer other than a judge, the immunity is often referred to as quasi-judicial immunity, but this is a distinction of name and not a distinction of immunity”); see also Harmon v. State of Oregon, 320 Or App 406, 432 , 514 P3d 1131 (2022) (holding that judicial immunity applied to quasi-judicial decisions made by the Psychiatric Security Review Board); Jones-Clark v. Severe, 118 Or App 270, 274 , 846 P2d 1197 (1993) (explaining that parole board decisions are subject to judicial immunity). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Fossen v. Clackamas County
green
2 sentences2024Cite as 333 Or App 367 (2024) 371 In addition to providing immunity for “judicial func- tions,” judicial immunity also immunizes acts “performed under a court order or directive,” so long as the court order or directive is “a permissible exercise of judicial authority” and the acts “comply with the court order or directive.” Fay v. City of Portland, 311 Or 68, 73-74 , 804 P2d 1155 (1991); Fossen v. Clackamas County, 271 Or App 842, 849 , 352 P3d 1288 (2015). 2024Cite as 333 Or App 367 (2024) 371 In addition to providing immunity for “judicial func- tions,” judicial immunity also immunizes acts “performed under a court order or directive,” so long as the court order or directive is “a permissible exercise of judicial authority” and the acts “comply with the court order or directive.” Fay v. City of Portland, 311 Or 68, 73-74 , 804 P2d 1155 (1991); Fossen v. Clackamas County, 271 Or App 842, 849 , 352 P3d 1288 (2015). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Shuraleff v. Donnelly
green
2 sentences2008At the same time,"[c]ouples who choose to live together without marriage also choose not to avail themselves of [those] benefits * * *." Shuraleff v. Donnelly , 108 Or App 707 , 715 , 817 P2d 764 (1991). 2008At the same time,"[c]ouples who choose to live together without marriage also choose not to avail themselves of [those] benefits * * *." Shuraleff v. Donnelly , 108 Or App 707 , 715 , 817 P2d 764 (1991). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Melvin v. Reid
green
1 sentence1986But neither the courts nor the commentators have *465 made a distinction in principle between one woman’s objections to a book based on her experiences, Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla 198, 20 So2d 243 (1944), and another’s to a motion picture, Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal App 285, 297 P 91 (1931), and we perceive none. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
United States v. Eggers
green
2 sentences1966While the distinction has been obscured in many of the decided cases, ① and deprecated by some commentators, ② I believe there is a distinction in principle between the taking of existing evidence which requires no cooperation by the accused ③ and forcing the accused to create evidence which, without the intelligent cooperation of the accused, would not exist. ④ The distinction is ably set forth, with a review of the authorities, in United States v. Eggers, 3 USCMA 191 , 11 CMR 191 (1953). 1966While the distinction has been obscured in many of the decided cases, ① and deprecated by some commentators, ② I believe there is a distinction in principle between the taking of existing evidence which requires no cooperation by the accused ③ and forcing the accused to create evidence which, without the intelligent cooperation of the accused, would not exist. ④ The distinction is ably set forth, with a review of the authorities, in United States v. Eggers, 3 USCMA 191 , 11 CMR 191 (1953). | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.