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9 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1909–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. McMullengreen1 sentence2021Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, we will address Appellant’s newly-raised, novel double- ____________________________________________ 15 “The double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions are nearly identical in language and co-extensive in scope.” Commonwealth v. McMullen, 745 A.2d 683, 686 (Pa. Super. 2000) (footnotes omitted). - 37 - J-S16008-21 jeopardy claim, as we are unable to uncover any caselaw making such a distinction for waiver purposes. | 1 | 1 |
Ellwood City Area School District v. Secretary of Educationgreen2 sentences1979See Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Eastern Lancaster County School District, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 482 , 315 A.2d 382 (1974) and Ellwood City Area School District v. Secretary of Education, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 477 , 308 A.2d 635 (1973). 1979See Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Eastern Lancaster County School District, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 482 , 315 A.2d 382 (1974) and Ellwood City Area School District v. Secretary of Education, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 477 , 308 A.2d 635 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Eastern Lancaster County School Districtgreen2 sentences1979See Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Eastern Lancaster County School District, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 482 , 315 A.2d 382 (1974) and Ellwood City Area School District v. Secretary of Education, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 477 , 308 A.2d 635 (1973). 1979See Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Eastern Lancaster County School District, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 482 , 315 A.2d 382 (1974) and Ellwood City Area School District v. Secretary of Education, 9 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 477 , 308 A.2d 635 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kugler's Appeal
green
2 sentences1958We have frequently recognized this distinction and applied the rule that where the reference in an adopting statute is to the law generally upon any subject, the adopting statute means the law in force on the subject at the time it is invoked: In re Yernon Park, 163 Pa. 70 ; Kugler’s App., 55 Pa. 123 ____” It seems clear to us, therefore, that Section 3 of the Act of 1854 applies to violations of the intoxicating beverage laws as they existed at the time of the offense, and that Section 602 (5) of the Act of 1933 as amended does not require a showing of “wilfulness” in order to make out a viol 1958We have frequently recognized this distinction and applied the rule that where the reference in an adopting statute is to the law generally upon any subject, the adopting statute means the law in force on the subject at the time it is invoked: In re Vernon Park, 163 Pa. 70 ; Kugler's App., 55 Pa. 123 . . . ." It seems clear to us, therefore, that Section 3 of the Act of 1854 applies to violations of the intoxicating beverage laws as they existed at the time of the offense, *231 and that Section 602(5) of the Act of 1933 as amended does not require a showing of "wilfulness" in order to make out | 3 | 1912–1958 |
Vernon Park
neutral
2 sentences1958We have frequently recognized this distinction and applied the rule that where the reference in an adopting statute is to the law generally upon any subject, the adopting statute means the law in force on the subject at the time it is invoked: In re Yernon Park, 163 Pa. 70 ; Kugler’s App., 55 Pa. 123 ____” It seems clear to us, therefore, that Section 3 of the Act of 1854 applies to violations of the intoxicating beverage laws as they existed at the time of the offense, and that Section 602 (5) of the Act of 1933 as amended does not require a showing of “wilfulness” in order to make out a viol 1958We have frequently recognized this distinction and applied the rule that where the reference in an adopting statute is to the law generally upon any subject, the adopting statute means the law in force on the subject at the time it is invoked: In re Vernon Park, 163 Pa. 70 ; Kugler's App., 55 Pa. 123 . . . ." It seems clear to us, therefore, that Section 3 of the Act of 1854 applies to violations of the intoxicating beverage laws as they existed at the time of the offense, *231 and that Section 602(5) of the Act of 1933 as amended does not require a showing of "wilfulness" in order to make out | 3 | 1912–1958 |
Henderson v. Continental Refining Co.
neutral
2 sentences1919Co., 218 Pa. 444 , was based and that upon which Henderson v. Eefining Co., 219 Pa. 384 , stands, may be a narrow one, but the distinction in principle may be readily traced. 1909Co., 218 Pa. 444 , was based, and that upon which Henderson v. Refining Co., 219 Pa. 384 , stands, may be a narrow one, but the distinction in principle between them may be readily traced. | 2 | 1909–1919 |
Thompson v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
green
2 sentences1919Co., 218 Pa. 444 , was based and that upon which Henderson v. Eefining Co., 219 Pa. 384 , stands, may be a narrow one, but the distinction in principle may be readily traced. 1909Co., 218 Pa. 444 , was based, and that upon which Henderson v. Refining Co., 219 Pa. 384 , stands, may be a narrow one, but the distinction in principle between them may be readily traced. | 2 | 1909–1919 |
Stuart v. Carter
neutral
1 sentence1964Va. 92 , 90 S. E. 537 , (1916), the court said as follows: (90 S. E. p. 539) “The inquiry raised by the exception involves consideration of a distinction and principle not extensively discussed or applied, if at all, in the decisions of this court, but often adverted to and made effective in cases arising in other jurisdictions, namely, the distinction between a bond or other contract binding the obligated parties to do particular things for prevention of injury and damage to the obligee, and a contract of mere indemnity, binding the obligors to make good an injury or damage, or compensate for | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Commonwealth v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co.
green
1 sentence1923It is true that some of the language used by Judge McCarrell in his opinion reported in 242 Pa. 163 , might be regarded as supporting the contention of appellants that there is a distinction in principle between a wholesaler and a retailer, for he says: “The defendant company (a wholesale dealer) simply takes the animal apart and disposes of the parts or pieces in their natural condition. | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.