reopened suppression hearing in New York

2014Even accepting defendant’s argument that no plausible strategy could justify counsel’s failure to seek a reopened suppression hearing after the evidentiary landscape was altered by the detective’s trial testimony, we find that the lack of reopening did not prejudice defendant (see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 [1984]) or render the assistance he received less than meaningful (see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 713-714 [1998]).

2014Even accepting defendant’s argument that no plausible strategy could justify counsel’s failure to seek a reopened suppression hearing after the evidentiary landscape was altered by the detective’s trial testimony, we find that the lack of reopening did not prejudice defendant (see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 [1984]) or render the assistance he received less than meaningful (see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 713-714 [1998]).

1994The issue must, therefore, be resolved after a full examination of the facts at a reopened suppression hearing (see, People v Brigante, supra; People v Perez, supra; People v Ricks, supra).

1986By order dated December 9, 1985, this court remitted the matter to Criminal Term to hear and report, after a reopened suppression hearing, and held the appeal in abeyance in the interim (see, People v Brigante, 115 AD2d 547 ).

2023Defendant's contention that the arresting officer's testimony at the reopened suppression hearing was unworthy of belief is unpreserved for appellate review, since he did not raise this argument at the suppression hearing ( see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Britton , 113 AD3d 1101, [*2]1102 [2014], lv denied 22 NY3d 1154 [2014]).

2023Defendant's contention that the arresting officer's testimony at the reopened suppression hearing was unworthy of belief is unpreserved for appellate review, since he did not raise this argument at the suppression hearing ( see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Britton , 113 AD3d 1101, [*2]1102 [2014], lv denied 22 NY3d 1154 [2014]).

2022This matter was remanded for an initial, rather than a reopened suppression hearing, so it was the People's first opportunity to present any evidence regarding the lawfulness of the stop ( compare People v Kevin W. , 22 NY3d 287 [2013]; People v Havelka , 45 NY2d 636 [1978]).

2022This matter was remanded for an initial, rather than a reopened suppression hearing, so it was the People's first opportunity to present any evidence regarding the lawfulness of the stop ( compare People v Kevin W. , 22 NY3d 287 [2013]; People v Havelka , 45 NY2d 636 [1978]).

2017This Court previously held this appeal in abeyance pending a reopened suppression hearing ( 135 AD3d 423 [1st Dept 2016]).

2006Suppression is warranted because of the untimely disclosure alone, regardless of the offer and acceptance of a reopened suppression hearing (see Bagley, supra; United States v Agurs, 427 US 97 [1976]).

2006Suppression is warranted because of the untimely disclosure alone, regardless of the offer and acceptance of a reopened suppression hearing *26 ( see Bagley, supra ; United States v Agurs, 427 US 97 [1976]).

2006Suppression is warranted because of the untimely disclosure alone, regardless of the offer and acceptance of a reopened suppression hearing (see Bagley, supra; United States v Agurs, 427 US 97 [1976]).

2006Suppression is warranted because of the untimely disclosure alone, regardless of the offer and acceptance of a reopened suppression hearing *26 ( see Bagley, supra ; United States v Agurs, 427 US 97 [1976]).

2004The court properly exercised its discretion in denying, defendant’s application to testify at the reopened suppression hearing (see People v Morales, 281 AD2d 182 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 922 [2001]; cf. People v Washington, 71 NY2d 916 [1988]).

2004The court properly exercised its discretion in denying, defendant’s application to testify at the reopened suppression hearing (see People v Morales, 281 AD2d 182 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 922 [2001]; cf. People v Washington, 71 NY2d 916 [1988]).

2000Defendant failed to establish that the evidence adduced at the reopened suppression hearing raised an issue concerning the suggestiveness of the lineup sufficient to warrant permitting him to call additional witnesses at the hearing (see, People v Chipp, 75 NY2d 327 , cert denied 498 US 833 ; People v Phillips, 234 AD2d 57 , lv denied 89 NY2d 1098 ).

2000Defendant failed to establish that the evidence adduced at the reopened suppression hearing raised an issue concerning the suggestiveness of the lineup sufficient to warrant permitting him to call additional witnesses at the hearing (see, People v Chipp, 75 NY2d 327 , cert denied 498 US 833 ; People v Phillips, 234 AD2d 57 , lv denied 89 NY2d 1098 ).

2000Defendant failed to establish that the evidence adduced at the reopened suppression hearing raised an issue concerning the suggestiveness of the lineup sufficient to warrant permitting him to call additional witnesses at the hearing (see, People v Chipp, 75 NY2d 327 , cert denied 498 US 833 ; People v Phillips, 234 AD2d 57 , lv denied 89 NY2d 1098 ).

2000Since defendant failed to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction pursuant to CPL 440.10, his claim is not reviewable on direct appeal because it is based on facts dehors the record and counsel cannot explain his trial tactics (People v Brown, 45 NY2d 852 ).

1998Likewise, defendant has not shown that counsel’s purported omissions with respect to cross-examination of one of the identifying witnesses, and introduction of documentary evidence affected the outcome of the trial (see, People v Hobot, 84 NY2d 1021, 1024 ).

1994The issue must, therefore, be resolved after a full examination of the facts at a reopened suppression hearing (see, People v Brigante, supra; People v Perez, supra; People v Ricks, supra).

1994The issue must, therefore, be resolved after a full examination of the facts at a reopened suppression hearing (see, People v Brigante, supra; People v Perez, supra; People v Ricks, supra).

1987By order dated January 12, 1981, this court remitted the matter to Criminal Term to hear and report, after a reopened suppression hearing, and held the appeals in abeyance in the interim (see, People v Murray, 79 AD2d 993).

1985In People v Pace (supra, at p 340 ), Justice (now Court of Appeals Judge) Titone, speaking for the majority of this court, wrote as follows: "When a search is not undertaken as a routine regulatory inspection, the administrative search rationale is simply inapplicable (see United States v Russo, 517 F Supp 83 ; United States v Lawson, 502 F Supp 158, 165 ; United States v Anile, 352 F Supp 14, 17 ; Commonwealth v Lipomi, 385 Mass 370, —, 432 NE2d 86, 91 ; State v Sidebotham, 124 NH 682, 474 A2d 1377 , 35 Crim L Rptr 2077; Hall, Search and Seizure, § 11:8, 1983 Cum Supp, pp 204-205).

1985In People v Pace (supra, at p 340 ), Justice (now Court of Appeals Judge) Titone, speaking for the majority of this court, wrote as follows: "When a search is not undertaken as a routine regulatory inspection, the administrative search rationale is simply inapplicable (see United States v Russo, 517 F Supp 83 ; United States v Lawson, 502 F Supp 158, 165 ; United States v Anile, 352 F Supp 14, 17 ; Commonwealth v Lipomi, 385 Mass 370, —, 432 NE2d 86, 91 ; State v Sidebotham, 124 NH 682, 474 A2d 1377 , 35 Crim L Rptr 2077; Hall, Search and Seizure, § 11:8, 1983 Cum Supp, pp 204-205).

1985In People v Pace (supra, at p 340 ), Justice (now Court of Appeals Judge) Titone, speaking for the majority of this court, wrote as follows: "When a search is not undertaken as a routine regulatory inspection, the administrative search rationale is simply inapplicable (see United States v Russo, 517 F Supp 83 ; United States v Lawson, 502 F Supp 158, 165 ; United States v Anile, 352 F Supp 14, 17 ; Commonwealth v Lipomi, 385 Mass 370, —, 432 NE2d 86, 91 ; State v Sidebotham, 124 NH 682, 474 A2d 1377 , 35 Crim L Rptr 2077; Hall, Search and Seizure, § 11:8, 1983 Cum Supp, pp 204-205).

1985In People v Pace (supra, at p 340 ), Justice (now Court of Appeals Judge) Titone, speaking for the majority of this court, wrote as follows: "When a search is not undertaken as a routine regulatory inspection, the administrative search rationale is simply inapplicable (see United States v Russo, 517 F Supp 83 ; United States v Lawson, 502 F Supp 158, 165 ; United States v Anile, 352 F Supp 14, 17 ; Commonwealth v Lipomi, 385 Mass 370, —, 432 NE2d 86, 91 ; State v Sidebotham, 124 NH 682, 474 A2d 1377 , 35 Crim L Rptr 2077; Hall, Search and Seizure, § 11:8, 1983 Cum Supp, pp 204-205).

1985In People v Pace (supra, at p 340 ), Justice (now Court of Appeals Judge) Titone, speaking for the majority of this court, wrote as follows: "When a search is not undertaken as a routine regulatory inspection, the administrative search rationale is simply inapplicable (see United States v Russo, 517 F Supp 83 ; United States v Lawson, 502 F Supp 158, 165 ; United States v Anile, 352 F Supp 14, 17 ; Commonwealth v Lipomi, 385 Mass 370, —, 432 NE2d 86, 91 ; State v Sidebotham, 124 NH 682, 474 A2d 1377 , 35 Crim L Rptr 2077; Hall, Search and Seizure, § 11:8, 1983 Cum Supp, pp 204-205).

1985In People v Pace (supra, at p 340 ), Justice (now Court of Appeals Judge) Titone, speaking for the majority of this court, wrote as follows: "When a search is not undertaken as a routine regulatory inspection, the administrative search rationale is simply inapplicable (see United States v Russo, 517 F Supp 83 ; United States v Lawson, 502 F Supp 158, 165 ; United States v Anile, 352 F Supp 14, 17 ; Commonwealth v Lipomi, 385 Mass 370, —, 432 NE2d 86, 91 ; State v Sidebotham, 124 NH 682, 474 A2d 1377 , 35 Crim L Rptr 2077; Hall, Search and Seizure, § 11:8, 1983 Cum Supp, pp 204-205).

1981In our opinion, the proper procedure on the present record is to remit the matter to the County Court of Clinton County for a reopened suppression hearing on the issue of the admissibility of defendant’s statements (People v Pettiford, 78 AD2d 823).

1981When this case was previously before this court, we remitted the matter for a reopened suppression hearing so that proof could be taken concerning what occurred when defendant was first taken into custody and during the course of his interrogation thereafter (People v McGregor, 84 AD2d 610 ).