18 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1935–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
John R. Yarnevic v. Brink's, Incorporated, a Delaware Corporation Thomas R. Fussnergreen2 sentences2024Under 28 U.S.C. 1446(d), “[p]romptly after the filing of such notice of removal of a civil action the defendant or defendants shall give written notice thereof to all adverse parties and shall file a copy of the notice with the clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal and the -10- State court shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.” There is no claim here that Synchrony failed to meet the provisions for removal in 28 U.S.C. 1446(d). {¶ 20} “A basic removal principle is that once the provisions of Section 1446(d), Title 28, U.S.Code have been met, the st 2024“A basic removal principle is that once the provisions of Section 1446(d), Title 28, U.S.Code have been met, the state court is divested of jurisdiction to proceed further until there has been a remand by the federal court.” Borkowski v. Abood, 117 Ohio St.3d 347, 2008-Ohio-857, 884 N.E.2d 7, ¶ 12, citing Yarnevic v. Brink’s, Inc., 102 F.3d 753, 754 (4th Cir.1996), and Maseda v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 861 F.2d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir.1988). {¶ 14} Conversely, removal is not complete until the removing party has completed all steps required by the statute. | 3 | 4 |
Don D. Maseda v. Honda Motor Company, Ltd.green2 sentences2024“A basic removal principle is that once the provisions of Section 1446(d), Title 28, U.S. Code have been met, the state court is divested of jurisdiction to proceed further until there has been a remand by the federal court.” Borkowski v. Abood, 117 Ohio St.3d 347 , 2008-Ohio-857 , 884 N.E.2d 7, ¶ 12 , citing Yarnevic v. Brink’s, Inc., 102 F.3d 753, 754 (4th Cir.1996), and Maseda v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 861 F.2d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir.1988). {¶ 14} Conversely, removal is not complete until the removing party has completed all steps required by the statute. 2024“A basic removal principle is that once the provisions of Section 1446(d), Title 28, U.S.Code have been met, the state court is divested of jurisdiction to proceed further until there has been a remand by the federal court.” Borkowski v. Abood, 117 Ohio St.3d 347, 2008-Ohio-857, 884 N.E.2d 7, ¶ 12, citing Yarnevic v. Brink’s, Inc., 102 F.3d 753, 754 (4th Cir.1996), and Maseda v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 861 F.2d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir.1988). {¶ 14} Conversely, removal is not complete until the removing party has completed all steps required by the statute. | 2 | 2 |
Borkowski v. Aboodgreen2 sentences2024The State court may thereupon proceed with such case.” No. 23AP-366 9 {¶ 28} “A basic removal principle is that once the provisions of Section 1446(d), Title 28, U.S.Code have been met, the state court is divested of jurisdiction to proceed further until there has been a remand by the federal court.” Borkowski v. Abood, 117 Ohio St.3d 347 , 2008-Ohio-857 , ¶ 12. 2024“A basic removal principle is that once the provisions of Section 1446(d), Title 28, U.S.Code have been met, the state court is divested of jurisdiction to proceed further until there has been a remand by the federal court.” Borkowski v. Abood, 117 Ohio St.3d 347, 2008-Ohio-857, 884 N.E.2d 7, ¶ 12, citing Yarnevic v. Brink’s, Inc., 102 F.3d 753, 754 (4th Cir.1996), and Maseda v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 861 F.2d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir.1988). {¶ 14} Conversely, removal is not complete until the removing party has completed all steps required by the statute. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Hartman (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2024“But the trial court’s weighing of the probative value of admissible evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant pursuant to Evid.R. 403(A) involves an exercise of judgment and will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Id. {¶45} “Evidence of other acts may not be used to prove by inference that the accused acted in conformity with those other acts or that he or she has a propensity to act in that way.” Worley at ¶ 118 ; Evid.R. 404(B). {¶46} “Other-acts evidence may be admissible for nonpropensity purposes—i.e., as ‘proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, pl 2024“But the trial court’s weighing of the probative value of admissible evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant pursuant to Evid.R. 403(A) involves an exercise of judgment and will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Id. {¶45} “Evidence of other acts may not be used to prove by inference that the accused acted in conformity with those other acts or that he or she has a propensity to act in that way.” Worley at ¶ 118 ; Evid.R. 404(B). {¶46} “Other-acts evidence may be admissible for nonpropensity purposes—i.e., as ‘proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, pl | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Drouhard v. Morrow Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2024Bd. of Commrs., 161 Ohio St.3d 357 , 2020-Ohio-4160 , 163 N.E.3d 518, ¶ 29 (because the statute governing removal of appointed members of hospital board did not specify how members of the appointing authority were to schedule removal hearings or decide on removal, board of county commissioners, which made up the majority of the appointing authority, did not patently and unambiguously lack authority to schedule a removal hearing); State ex rel. 2024Bd. of Commrs., 161 Ohio St.3d 357 , 2020-Ohio-4160 , 163 N.E.3d 518, ¶ 29 (because the statute governing removal of appointed members of hospital board did not specify how members of the appointing authority were to schedule removal hearings or decide on removal, board of county commissioners, which made up the majority of the appointing authority, did not patently and unambiguously lack authority to schedule a removal hearing); State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. M.L. v. O'Malley (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2024M.L. v. O’Malley, 144 Ohio St.3d 553 , 2015-Ohio-4855, 20 . 45 N.E.3d 971, ¶ 15, 17 (When a trial court “arguably has jurisdiction” pursuant to statute, “[a]ny lack of jurisdiction is not patent and unambiguous.”).4 {¶ 37} Because the superintendent of public instruction does not patently and unambiguously lack the authority to settle the residency dispute, the board must demonstrate that it lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 2024M.L. v. O’Malley, 144 Ohio St.3d 553 , 2015-Ohio-4855, 20 . 45 N.E.3d 971, ¶ 15, 17 (When a trial court “arguably has jurisdiction” pursuant to statute, “[a]ny lack of jurisdiction is not patent and unambiguous.”).4 {¶ 37} Because the superintendent of public instruction does not patently and unambiguously lack the authority to settle the residency dispute, the board must demonstrate that it lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. | 1 | 1 |
The State of South Carolina v. James Edward Mooregreen1 sentence2024“As a result, any subsequent state court proceedings are without effect even if the federal court later determines that removal was not proper.” Id., citing South Carolina v. Moore, 447 F.2d 1067, 1073 (4th Cir.1971). | 1 | 1 |
Huddleston v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024“But the trial court’s weighing of the probative value of admissible evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant pursuant to Evid.R. 403(A) involves an exercise of judgment and will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Id. {¶45} “Evidence of other acts may not be used to prove by inference that the accused acted in conformity with those other acts or that he or she has a propensity to act in that way.” Worley at ¶ 118 ; Evid.R. 404(B). {¶46} “Other-acts evidence may be admissible for nonpropensity purposes—i.e., as ‘proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, pl 2024“But the trial court’s weighing of the probative value of admissible evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant pursuant to Evid.R. 403(A) involves an exercise of judgment and will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Id. {¶45} “Evidence of other acts may not be used to prove by inference that the accused acted in conformity with those other acts or that he or she has a propensity to act in that way.” Worley at ¶ 118 ; Evid.R. 404(B). {¶46} “Other-acts evidence may be admissible for nonpropensity purposes—i.e., as ‘proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, pl | 1 | 1 |
Sampson v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authoritygreen1 sentence2013See id. 2 Contrary to the contention in Major Davis’s reply brief, Ms. Hauser did 6 App.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-3415 , 935 N.E.2d 98, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.) (a majority of judges reiterated this point on rehearing en banc). {¶ 13} Notably, division (A) of R.C. 2744.09 includes employees in the removal of immunity. | 1 | 1 |
Fortner v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2001See Fortner v. Thomas (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14 , 51 O.O.2d 35 , 257 N.E.2d 371 ; Burger Brewing Co. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm. (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 93, 97-98 , 63 O.O.2d 149 , 296 N.E.2d 261 . 2001See Fortner v. Thomas (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14 , 51 O.O.2d 35 , 257 N.E.2d 371 ; Burger Brewing Co. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm. (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 93, 97-98 , 63 O.O.2d 149 , 296 N.E.2d 261 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Worley (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2024While defense counsel did not “necessarily agree” the state did not use other-acts evidence during its case-in-chief, he did not object to the removal of the instruction. {¶38} The jury found Mr. Wolfe guilty of one count of grand theft, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2913.02. {¶39} In March 2023, after a presentence investigation, the trial court held a sentencing hearing at which Mr. Wolfe was sentenced to a term of 36 months in prison and ordered to pay $150,000 in restitution. {¶40} Mr. Wolfe raises two assignments of error for our review: {¶41} “[1.] The trial court erred as 2024While defense counsel did not “necessarily agree” the state did not use other-acts evidence during its case-in-chief, he did not object to the removal of the instruction. {¶38} The jury found Mr. Wolfe guilty of one count of grand theft, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2913.02. {¶39} In March 2023, after a presentence investigation, the trial court held a sentencing hearing at which Mr. Wolfe was sentenced to a term of 36 months in prison and ordered to pay $150,000 in restitution. {¶40} Mr. Wolfe raises two assignments of error for our review: {¶41} “[1.] The trial court erred as | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Young v. Kaufman
green
2 sentences2020On January 5, 2017, the trial court granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment on the removal claim, rejecting appellants’ assertion that they had standing to pursue their removal claim on the basis of their “newly created oral trust theory[.]” Young v. Kaufman I, 2017-Ohio-9015 , 101 N.E.3d 655, at ¶ 42 . 2020On January 5, 2017, the trial court granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment on the removal claim, rejecting appellants’ assertion that they had standing to pursue their removal claim on the basis of their “newly created oral trust theory[.]” Young v. Kaufman I, 2017-Ohio-9015 , 101 N.E.3d 655, at ¶ 42 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Adamson v. Varnau
green
1 sentence2018Brown No. CA2014-07-016, 2014-Ohio-5739, ¶10 , citing Petitioners for the Removal of Stringer v. Stringer, 11th Dist. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Huang
green
1 sentence2016Cuyahoga No. 99945, 2014-Ohio-1511 , the defendant was convicted of a domestic violence charge in 2001 following a no contest plea and then was contacted by immigration authorities in 2004 regarding a removal hearing. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008Indeed, the court did not exclude the possibility under the Hobbs Act “that liability might be based on obtaining something as intangible as another’s right to exercise exclusive control over the use of a party’s business assets.” Id. at 402 , 123 S.Ct. 1057 , 154 L.Ed.2d 991 . {¶ 16} The central issue in Scheidler is what the act means by the requirement that the extorter “obtain” the property of another. 3 One of the court’s concerns *565 was not, as Cunningham suggests, expanding the definition of “property” to intangible property, but rather, the removal of this requirement altogether. 2008Indeed, the court did not exclude the possibility under the Hobbs Act “that liability might be based on obtaining something as intangible as another’s right to exercise exclusive control over the use of a party’s business assets.” Id. at 402 , 123 S.Ct. 1057 , 154 L.Ed.2d 991 . {¶ 16} The central issue in Scheidler is what the act means by the requirement that the extorter “obtain” the property of another. 3 One of the court’s concerns *565 was not, as Cunningham suggests, expanding the definition of “property” to intangible property, but rather, the removal of this requirement altogether. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Gordon v. Dziak, 88882 (2-14-2008)
green
1 sentence2008Gordon v. Dziak , Cuyahoga App. No. 88882, 2008-Ohio-570 , 1J1J36, 38. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Pembaur v. Leis
green
1 sentence2007"An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or of judgment; it implies an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude on the part of the court." *Page 7 Quonset Hut, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 46 , 47 , citing Pembaur v. Leis (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 89 , 91 . {¶ 29} Failure to Hold Full Hearing {¶ 30} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Burrows contends that his due process rights were violated by the trial court's decision not to allow his brother Willard to testify and to end the removal hearing abruptly. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Schaffter v. Ward
green
1 sentence2007We disagree. {¶ 31} At the outset, we note that "[a] trial court's determination as to the admissibility of evidence is generally a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court." Davis v. Killing , 171 Ohio App.3d 400 , 2007-Ohio-2303 , at ¶ 11 , citing Schaffter v. Ward (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 79 , 80 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Davis v. Killing
green
2 sentences2007We disagree. {¶ 31} At the outset, we note that "[a] trial court's determination as to the admissibility of evidence is generally a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court." Davis v. Killing , 171 Ohio App.3d 400 , 2007-Ohio-2303 , at ¶ 11 , citing Schaffter v. Ward (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 79 , 80 . 2007We disagree. {¶ 31} At the outset, we note that "[a] trial court's determination as to the admissibility of evidence is generally a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court." Davis v. Killing , 171 Ohio App.3d 400 , 2007-Ohio-2303 , at ¶ 11 , citing Schaffter v. Ward (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 79 , 80 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Quonset Hut, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.
green
1 sentence2007"An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or of judgment; it implies an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude on the part of the court." *Page 7 Quonset Hut, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 46 , 47 , citing Pembaur v. Leis (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 89 , 91 . {¶ 29} Failure to Hold Full Hearing {¶ 30} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Burrows contends that his due process rights were violated by the trial court's decision not to allow his brother Willard to testify and to end the removal hearing abruptly. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Schucker v. Metcalf
green
2 sentences2002In his memorandum in support, relator asserted that Schucker v. Metcalf (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 33 [22 OBR 27, 488 N.E.2d 210 ], is controlling in this matter. {¶ 35} 8. 2002In his memorandum in support, relator asserted that Schucker v. Metcalf (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 33 [22 OBR 27, 488 N.E.2d 210 ], is controlling in this matter. {¶ 35} 8. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Burger Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Commission
green
2 sentences2001See Fortner v. Thomas (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14 , 51 O.O.2d 35 , 257 N.E.2d 371 ; Burger Brewing Co. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm. (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 93, 97-98 , 63 O.O.2d 149 , 296 N.E.2d 261 . 2001See Fortner v. Thomas (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14 , 51 O.O.2d 35 , 257 N.E.2d 371 ; Burger Brewing Co. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm. (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 93, 97-98 , 63 O.O.2d 149 , 296 N.E.2d 261 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm.
neutral
1 sentence2001White v. Pengov (Sept. 13, 2000), Lorain App. No. 99CA007515, unreported, 2000 WL 1288302 , appeal not allowed (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 1495 , 739 N.E.2d 1157 (“Pengov I ”). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Scott
neutral
1 sentence2001White v. Pengov (Sept. 13, 2000), Lorain App. No. 99CA007515, unreported, 2000 WL 1288302 , appeal not allowed (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 1495 , 739 N.E.2d 1157 (“Pengov I ”). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Richard D. Meehan v. John W. MacY Jr., Chairman, Civil Service Commission
green
1 sentence1976C. 217, 230, 392 F. 2d 822, 835 , wherein it was stated: *398 “* # * [I]t is not feasible or necessary for the Government to spell out in detail all that conduct which will result in retaliation. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Cole v. . Sweet
green
1 sentence1935Having reached the conclusion that the introduction by plaintiff of the excerpts from the deposition of defendant, taken in another case, was tantamount to plaintiff’s calling defendant for cross-examination /Cole v Sweet, supra), we address ourselves now to a consideration of the extent of the removal of the bar of the statute, in so far as it pertains to the testimony of defendant. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.