9 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1932–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lecroy v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Frison v. State, 76 So. 3d 1103, 1104-05 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (rejecting State’s argument that defendant’s resentencing was merely ministerial because, although parties agreed that life sentence was illegal, imposition of a forty-year sentence was not mandatory, thus trial court had discretion on resentencing); Acosta, 46 So. 3d at 1180-81 (explaining that while a fifteen-year mandatory minimum requirement limited the trial court’s discretion at the original sentencing hearing, the removal of that requirement restored sentencing discretion to the trial judge, and thus “the resentencing was no l 2014Frison v. State, 76 So.3d 1103, 1104-05 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (rejecting State’s argument that defendant's resentencing was merely ministerial because, although parties agreed that life sentence was illegal, imposition of a forty-year sentence was not mandatory, thus trial court had discretion on re-sentencing); Acosta, 46 So.3d at 1180-81 (explaining that while a fifteen-year mandatory minimum requirement limited the trial court's discretion at the original sentencing hearing, the removal of that requirement restored sentencing discretion to the trial judge, and thus "the resentencing was no lo | 2 | 2 |
Acosta v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Frison v. State, 76 So. 3d 1103, 1104-05 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (rejecting State’s argument that defendant’s resentencing was merely ministerial because, although parties agreed that life sentence was illegal, imposition of a forty-year sentence was not mandatory, thus trial court had discretion on resentencing); Acosta, 46 So. 3d at 1180-81 (explaining that while a fifteen-year mandatory minimum requirement limited the trial court’s discretion at the original sentencing hearing, the removal of that requirement restored sentencing discretion to the trial judge, and thus “the resentencing was no l 2014Frison v. State, 76 So.3d 1103, 1104-05 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (rejecting State’s argument that defendant's resentencing was merely ministerial because, although parties agreed that life sentence was illegal, imposition of a forty-year sentence was not mandatory, thus trial court had discretion on re-sentencing); Acosta, 46 So.3d at 1180-81 (explaining that while a fifteen-year mandatory minimum requirement limited the trial court's discretion at the original sentencing hearing, the removal of that requirement restored sentencing discretion to the trial judge, and thus "the resentencing was no lo | 2 | 2 |
Cross v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Frison v. State, 76 So. 3d 1103, 1104-05 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (rejecting State’s argument that defendant’s resentencing was merely ministerial because, although parties agreed that life sentence was illegal, imposition of a forty-year sentence was not mandatory, thus trial court had discretion on resentencing); Acosta, 46 So. 3d at 1180-81 (explaining that while a fifteen-year mandatory minimum requirement limited the trial court’s discretion at the original sentencing hearing, the removal of that requirement restored sentencing discretion to the trial judge, and thus “the resentencing was no l 2014Frison v. State, 76 So.3d 1103, 1104-05 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (rejecting State’s argument that defendant's resentencing was merely ministerial because, although parties agreed that life sentence was illegal, imposition of a forty-year sentence was not mandatory, thus trial court had discretion on re-sentencing); Acosta, 46 So.3d at 1180-81 (explaining that while a fifteen-year mandatory minimum requirement limited the trial court's discretion at the original sentencing hearing, the removal of that requirement restored sentencing discretion to the trial judge, and thus "the resentencing was no lo | 2 | 2 |
Frison v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Frison v. State, 76 So. 3d 1103, 1104-05 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (rejecting State’s argument that defendant’s resentencing was merely ministerial because, although parties agreed that life sentence was illegal, imposition of a forty-year sentence was not mandatory, thus trial court had discretion on resentencing); Acosta, 46 So. 3d at 1180-81 (explaining that while a fifteen-year mandatory minimum requirement limited the trial court’s discretion at the original sentencing hearing, the removal of that requirement restored sentencing discretion to the trial judge, and thus “the resentencing was no l 2014Frison v. State, 76 So.3d 1103, 1104-05 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (rejecting State’s argument that defendant's resentencing was merely ministerial because, although parties agreed that life sentence was illegal, imposition of a forty-year sentence was not mandatory, thus trial court had discretion on re-sentencing); Acosta, 46 So.3d at 1180-81 (explaining that while a fifteen-year mandatory minimum requirement limited the trial court's discretion at the original sentencing hearing, the removal of that requirement restored sentencing discretion to the trial judge, and thus "the resentencing was no lo | 2 | 2 |
The Florida Bar v. Thomsongreen1 sentence2004Florida Bar v. Thomson, 271 So.2d 758, 761 (Fla.1972) (quoting State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Richardson v. Lewisgreen1 sentence1995In Hernandez , the contempt based on simple battery "was incorporated into and could not be abstracted from the injunction for protection which was violated." Richardson v. Lewis, 639 So.2d 1098, 1100 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mullins v. State
green
2 sentences2014Frison v. State, 76 So. 3d 1103, 1104-05 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (rejecting State’s argument that defendant’s resentencing was merely ministerial because, although parties agreed that life sentence was illegal, imposition of a forty-year sentence was not mandatory, thus trial court had discretion on resentencing); Acosta, 46 So. 3d at 1180-81 (explaining that while a fifteen-year mandatory minimum requirement limited the trial court’s discretion at the original sentencing hearing, the removal of that requirement restored sentencing discretion to the trial judge, and thus “the resentencing was no l 2014Frison v. State, 76 So.3d 1103, 1104-05 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (rejecting State’s argument that defendant's resentencing was merely ministerial because, although parties agreed that life sentence was illegal, imposition of a forty-year sentence was not mandatory, thus trial court had discretion on re-sentencing); Acosta, 46 So.3d at 1180-81 (explaining that while a fifteen-year mandatory minimum requirement limited the trial court's discretion at the original sentencing hearing, the removal of that requirement restored sentencing discretion to the trial judge, and thus "the resentencing was no lo | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp.
green
1 sentence2006Likewise, the first district found the intentional torts exception applicable in Cunningham v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 558 So.2d 93 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), which involved toxic substances and the removal of warning labels by the employer to prevent knowledge by the employees. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
La Pointe Outdoor Advertising v. Florida Dept. of Transp.
green
1 sentence1981This is a petition to review a decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal reported at 382 So.2d 1347 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), in which the court held that the Department of Transportation need not compensate the owner of a billboard sign under section 479.24, Florida Statutes (1977), for requiring the sign's removal for violation of section 479.02(1), Florida Statutes (1977). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Brazil v. DIV. OF ADMIN., STATE DOT
green
1 sentence1981The First District Court of Appeal, in Brazil v. Division of Administration, State Department of Transportation, 347 So.2d 755 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), has held to the contrary. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Gould v. State
green
2 sentences1972Zachary v. State, 53 Fla. 94 , 43 So. 925 (1907), and Gould v. State, 99 Fla. 662 , 127 So. 309 (1930). 1972Zachary v. State, 53 Fla. 94 , 43 So. 925 (1907), and Gould v. State, 99 Fla. 662 , 127 So. 309 (1930). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Zachary v. State
green
1 sentence1972Zachary v. State, 53 Fla. 94 , 43 So. 925 (1907), and Gould v. State, 99 Fla. 662 , 127 So. 309 (1930). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Pargoud v. United States
green
1 sentence1954Speaking to this point, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 , 80 U.S. 335 , 20 L.Ed. 646 , the Court said: "To deprive one of an office of this character would often be to decree poverty to himself and destitution to his family." A removal from the bar should therefore never be decreed where any punishment less severe, such as reprimand, temporary suspension or fine, would accomplish the end desired. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Bradley v. Fisher
green
2 sentences1954Speaking to this point, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 , 80 U.S. 335 , 20 L.Ed. 646 , the Court said: "To deprive one of an office of this character would often be to decree poverty to himself and destitution to his family." A removal from the bar should therefore never be decreed where any punishment less severe, such as reprimand, temporary suspension or fine, would accomplish the end desired. 1954Speaking to this point, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 , 80 U.S. 335 , 20 L.Ed. 646 , the Court said: "To deprive one of an office of this character would often be to decree poverty to himself and destitution to his family." A removal from the bar should therefore never be decreed where any punishment less severe, such as reprimand, temporary suspension or fine, would accomplish the end desired. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Brecht v. Bur-Ne Co.
green
2 sentences1932Stuart v. Stephanus et al., 94 Fla. 1087 , 114 So. 767 ; Brecht v. Bur-Ne Co., 91 Fla. 345 , 108 So. 173 . 1932Stuart v. Stephanus et al., 94 Fla. 1087 , 114 So. 767 ; Brecht v. Bur-Ne Co., 91 Fla. 345 , 108 So. 173 . | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Stuart v. Stephanus
green
2 sentences1932Stuart v. Stephanus et al., 94 Fla. 1087 , 114 So. 767 ; Brecht v. Bur-Ne Co., 91 Fla. 345 , 108 So. 173 . 1932Stuart v. Stephanus et al., 94 Fla. 1087 , 114 So. 767 ; Brecht v. Bur-Ne Co., 91 Fla. 345 , 108 So. 173 . | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.